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Preface
This is the third intermediate working partial draft of a book intended for Oxford University Press.
Earlier drafts seem to have attracted great interest among the international community. The
6th Draft was published as a report by CIS, University of Munich in February 1991. LDS is
used as a framework in three major European Esprit basic research actions and its development is
supported by several national projects. I am therefore responding by publishing what I currently
have written, as is, labelling it the third intermediate version in the form of a technical report. I
am happy to include a discussion of algebraiclabelled deductive systems and a prototype semantics
for LDS in the current version. Many colleagues have been asking what the Fibred semantics for
LDS looks like.
This version is currently being expanded and adjusted and it is expected that the nal draft
will be double in size. I am therefore labelling it as Volume 1. Among the shortcomings of the
present version are the following:
 Some topics have been further developed than others. This is a bit of a distortion which may
create a feeling of lack of thematic ow.
 Some concepts need further renement and adjustments. For example, label dependent
skolemising is done in several contexts; modal logic, metabox environment, substructural
logics etc. The principles are the same but the local denitions need to be made more
compatible. This takes time, and comments from readers are welcome.
 Chapters 4{6 are less complete than others.
 The references to works by colleagues are not complete, and proper credit to other authors
is yet to come.
 The nal denition of what a logical system is and of what an LDS system is may change
slightly, as well as the ne tuning of the bred semantics.
I hope this third intermediate version will be of value and I would greatly appreciate reader's




It is not easy writing this book. It is not only a matter of doing the research and trying to
solve problems and seek the correct formulation of new concepts, it is also the problem of how to
communicate and present the material to the reader. The framework of Labelled Deductive Systems
is of interest to a large variety of readers. On the one extreme there is the pure mathematical
logician who likes exact formal denitions and dry theorems, who probably specialises in one logic
and methodology. On the other extreme there are also the practical consumers of logic, who like
to absorb the intuitions and use labelling as needed to advance the cause of their aplications.
Between the two extremes there are the rest of the `logic and computation' community. My
problem is how to communicate with all these readers in one book.
My compromise was to divide the book into parts and thus allow for dierent emphasis in the
presentation. The purpose of this overview to the reader is to explain what I had done.
The rst step in reading this book is to understand its intuitive message. This message is very
simple:
Traditional logics manipulate formulas. My message is to manipulate pairs; formulas and
labels. The labels annotate the formulas. This sounds very simple but it turned out to be a
big step, which makes a serious dierence, like the dierence between using one hand only or
allowing for the coordinated use of two hands. Of course the idea has to be made precise, and its
advantages and limitations clearly demonstrated. `Precise' means a good mathematical denition
and `advantages demonstrated' means case studies and applications in pure logic and in AI.
To achieve that we need to address the following:
1. Dene the notion of LDS, its proof theory and semantics and relate it to traditional logics.
2. Explain what form the traditional concepts of cut elimination, deduction theorem, negation,
inconsistency, update, etc. take in LDS.
3. Formulate major known logics in LDS. For example, modal and temporal logics, substructural
logics, default, nonmonotonic logics, etc.
4. Show new results and solve long-standing problems using LDS.
5. Demonstrate practical applications.
This is what I am trying to do in this book. Part I of the book is an intuitive presentation of
LDS in the context of traditional current views of monotonic and nonmonotonic logics. It is less
oriented towards the pure logician and more towards the practical consumer of logic. It has two
tasks, addressed in two chapters. These are:
Chapter1: Formally motivate LDS by starting from the traditional notion of `What is a logical
system' and slowly adding features to it until it becomes essentially an LDS.
Chapter 2: Intuitively motivate LDS by showing many examples where labels are used, as well as
some case studies of familiar logics (e.g. modal logic) formulated as an LDS.
The second part of the book presents the formal theory of LDS for the formal logician. I
have tried to avoid the style of denition-lemma-theorem and put in some explanations. What
is basically needed here is the formulation of the mathematical machinery capable of doing the
following.
 Dene LDS algebra, proof theory and semantics.
 Show how an arbitrary (or fairly general) logic, presented traditionally, say as a Hilbert
system or as a Gentzen system, can be turned into an LDS formulation.
 Show how to obtain a traditional formulations (e.g. Hilbert) for an arbitrary LDS presented
logic.
CONTENTS vii
 Dene and study major logical concepts intrinsic to LDS formalisms.
 Give detailed study of the LDS formulation of some major known logics (e.g. modal logics,
resource logics) and demonstrate its advantages.
 Translate LDS into classical logic (reduce the `new' to the `old'), and explain LDS in the
context of classical logic (two sorted logic, metalevel aspects, etc).
Chapter 3: Give fairly general denitions of some basic concepts of LDS theory, mainly to cater for
the needs of the practical consumer of logic who may wish to apply it, with a detailed
study of the metabox system.
The presentation of Chapter 3 is a bit tricky. It may be too formal for the intuitive
reader, but not suciently clear and elegant for the mathematical logician. I would be
very grateful for comments from the readers for the next draft.
Chapter 4: Presents the basic notions of algebraic LDS. The reader may wonder how come we
introduce algebraic LDS in chapter 3 and then again in chapter 4. Our aim in chapter
3 is to give a general denition and formal machinery for the applied consumer of
logic. Chapter 4 on the other hand studies LDS as formal logics. It turns out that
to formulate an arbitrary logic as an LDS one needs some specic labelling algebras
and these need to be studied in detail (chapter 4). For general applications it is more
convenient to have general labelling algebras and possibly mathematically redundant
formulations (chapter 3). In a sense chapter 4 continues the topic of the second section
of chapter 3.
Chapter 5: Present the full theory of LDS where labels can be databases from possibly another
LDS. It also presents Fibred Semantics for LDS.
Chapter 6: Presents a theory of quantifers for LDS. The material for this chapter is still under
research.
Chapter 7: Studies structured consequence relations. These are logical system swhere the structure
is not described through labels but through some geometry like lists, multisets, trees,
etc. Thus the label of a w A is implicit, given by the place of A in the structure.
Chapter 8: Deals with metalevel features of LDS and its translation into two sorted classical logic.
Parts 3 and 4 of the book deals in detail with some specic families of logics. Chapters 9{11
essentailly deal with substructural logics and their variants.
Chapter 9: Studies resource and substructural logics in general.
Chapter 10: Develops detailed proof theory for some systems as well as studying particular features
such as negation.
Chapter 11: Deals with many valued logics.
Chapter 12: Studies the Curry Howard formula as type view and how it compres with labelling.
Chapter 13: Deals with modal and temporal logics.
Part 5 of the book deals with LDS metatheory.
Chapter 14: Deals with labelled tableaux.
Chapter 15: Deals with combining logics.
Chapter 16: Deals with abduction.
This concludes the current version of Volume 1.
0 CONTENTS
Tentative chapters for Volume 2
 Default in LDS
 Decision problems
 Inconsistency and integrity
 Goal directed algorithmic proof
 Priority labelling
 Action and processes in LDS
 Practical reasoning and arugmentation
 Cut and other meta notions
 Labels and types
 Labels and situations
 Applications.
Part I




What is a Logical System?
1.1 Introduction
There is an increasing demand from computer science, linguistics and philosophy for a variety of
logical systems. This is prompted by the extensive applications of logic in theoretical computer
science, articial intelligence and logic programming. In these elds there is a growing need for
a diversity of semantically meaningful and algoirthmically presented logical systems which can
serve various applications. Therefore renewed research activity is being devoted to analysing and
tinkering with old and new logics.
This activity has produced a shift in the notion of a logical system. Traditionally a logic was
perceived as a `consequence relation' between sets of formulas. Problems arising in application
areas have emphasized the need for consequnce relations between structures of formulas (such as
multisets, sequences or even richer structures). This ner-tuned approach to the notion of a logical
system introduces new problems which call for an improved general framework in which many of
the new logics arising from computer science applications can be presented and investigated.
This chapter is a systematic study of the notion of what is a logical system. It will incrementally
motivate a notion of logical system through the needs of various applications and applied logical
activity, with a view of naturally leading to the notion of Labelled Deductive Systems, the topic
of this book. We begin with the traditional concept of a logical system as a consequence relation
between sets of formulas and slowly end up with the notion of a logical system as a Labelled
Deductive System. Let us consider the initial position of a logical system as a consequence relation
on sets of formulas. In this traditional view, any set theoretical binary relation of the form  j  
satisfying certain conditions (reexivity, monotonicity and cut) is a logical system. Such a relation
has to be mathematically presented. This can be done either semantically, or set theoretically or
it can be algorithmically generated. There are several options for the latter. Generate rst the
fA j ? j Ag as a Hilbert system and then generate f(; ) j  j  g or generate the pairs (; )
directly (via Gentzen rules) or use any other means (other proof theories)?
The concepts of a logical system, semantics and proof theory are not sharp enough even in the
traditional literature. There are no clear denitions of what is a proof theoretic formulation of a
logic (as opposed to, e.g. a decision procedure algorithm) and what is e.g. a Gentzen formulation.
Let us try here to propose a working denition, only for the purpose of making the reader a bit
more comfortable and not necessarily for the purpose of giving a denitive formulation of these
concepts.
 We start with the notion of a well formed formula of the language L of the logic.
 A consequence relation is a binary relation on nite sets of formulas, ;  written as  j  ,
satisfying certain conditions, namely reexivity, monotonicity and cut.
 Such a relation can be dened in many ways. For example, one can list all pairs (; ) such
that  j   should hold. Another way is to give ;  to some computer program and wait
for an answer (which should always come).
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 A semantics is an interpretation of the language L into some family of set theoretical struc-
tures, together with an interpretation of the consequence relation j in terms of the inter-
pretation. What I have just said is not clear in itself because I have not explained what
`structures' are and what an interpretation is. Indeed, there is no clear denition of what
is a semantics. In my book [Gabbay, 1981], following Scott I dened a model as a function
s giving each w of the language a value in f0,1g. A semantics S is a set of models, and
 jS   is dened as the condition:
(8s 2 S)[8X 2 (s(X) = 1)! 9Y 2  (s(Y ) = 1)]
 There can be algorithmic systems for generating j. Such systems are not to be considered
`proof theoretical systems' for j. They could be decision procedures or just optimal theorem
proving machines.
 the notion of a proof system is not well dened in the literature. There are some recognised
methodologies such as `Gentzen formulations', `tableaux', `Hilbert style' but these are not
sharply dened. For our purpose, let us agree that a proof system is any algorithmic system
for generating j using rules of the form:
1 j  1; : : : ;n j  n
 j  
and `axioms' of the form:
?
 j  
The axioms are initial list of (; ) 2j and the other rules generate more. So a proof system
is a particular way of generating j. Note that there need not be structural requirement on
the rule (that each involves a main connective and some subformulas, etc.).
A Hilbert formulation is a proof system where all the 's involved are ?. A Gentzen for-
mulation would be a proof system where the rules are very nicely structured (try to dene
something reasonable yourself, again, there is no clear denition!) A Gentzen system can be
viewed as a higher level Hilbert system for the `connective' `j'.
A tableaux formulation is a syntactical countermodel construction relative to some seman-
tics. We have j  if the countermodel construction is `closed', i.e. must always fail. It
is also possible to present tableaux formulations for logics which have no semantics if the
consequence j and the connectives satisfy some conditions.
The central role which proof theoretical methodologies play in generating logics compells us to put
forward the view that a logical system is a pair (j;Sj), where Sj is a proof theory for j. In
other words, we are saying that it is not enough to know j to `understand' the logic, but we must
also know how it is presented (i.e. Sj).
The next shift in our concept of a logic is when we observed from application areas whose
knowledge representation involves data and assumptions the need to add structure to the assump-
tions and the fact that the reasoning involved relies on and uses the structure. This view also
includes non-monotonic systems. This led us to develop the topic of this book, namely the notion
of Labelled Deductive Systems and adopt the view that this is the framework for presenting logics.
Whether we accept these new systems as logics or not, we must have a general framework able to
represent them.
The real departure from traditional logics (as opposed to just giving them more structure)
comes with the notion of aggregating arguments. Real human reasoning does aggregate arguments
(circumstantial evidence in favour of A as opposed to evidence for :A) and what is known as quan-
titative (fuzzy) reasoning systems make heavy use of that. Fortunately LDS can handle that easily.
The section concludes with the view that a proper practical reasoning system has `mechanisms'
for updates, inputs, abduction, actions, etc. as well as databases (theories, assumptions) and that
a proper logic is an integrated LDS system together with a specic choice of such mechanisms.1
1My personal view is that this is a logic, i.e. Logic = LDS system + several mechanisms. In AI circles this might
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1.2 Logical systems as consequence relations
Traditionally, to present a logic L, we need to present rst the set of well formed formulas of
that logic. This is the language of the logic. We dene the sets of atomic formulas, connectives,
quantiers and the set of arbitrary formulas. Secondly we mathematically dene the notion of
consequence, namely for a given set of formulas  and a given formula Q, we dene the consequence
relation  jL Q, reading `Q follows from  in the logic L'.
The consequence relation is required to satisfy the following intuitive properties: (;0 abbre-
viates  [0).
Reexivity
 j Q if Q 2 
Monotonicity
 j Q implies ;0 j Q
Transitivity (Cut)2:
 j A; ; A j Q imply  j Q
The consequence relation may be dened in various ways. Either through an algorithmic system
Sj,or implicitly by postulates on the properties of j.
Thus a logic is obtained by specifying L and j. Two algorithmic systems S1 and S2 which
give rise to the same j are considered the same logic.
If you think of  as a database and Q as a query, then reexivity means that the answer is
yes to any Q which is ocially listed in the database. Monotonicity reects the accumulation of
data, and transitivity is nothing but lemma generation, namely if  j A, then A can be used as
a lemma to obtain B from .
The above properties seemed minimal and most natural for a logical system to have, given that
the main applications of logic were in mathematics and philosophy.
be called an agent. Unfortunately, the traditional logic community are still very conservative in the sense that they
have not even accepted non-monotonic reasoning systems as logics yet. They believe that all this excitement is
transient, temporarily generated by computer science and that it will zzle out sooner or later. They believe that
we will soon be back to the old research problems, such as how many non-isomorphic models does a theory have
in some inaccessible cardinal or what is the ordinal of yet another subsystem of analysis. I think this is ne for
mathematical logic but not for the logic of human reasoning. There is no conict here between the new and the old,
just further evolution of the subject.
2There are several versions of the Cut Rule in the literature, they are all equivalent for the cases of classical
and intuitionistic logic but are not equivalent in the context of this section. The version in the main text we call
Transitivity (Lemma Generation). Another version is:
  j A; ; A j B
:
;  j B
This version implies monotonicity, when added to Reexivity.
Another version we call Internal Cut:
; A j  ;  j A; 
:
 j  
A more restricted version of cut is Unitary Cut:
 j A;A j Q
 j Q
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The above notion was essentially put forward by [Tarski, 1956] and is referenced to as Tarski
consequence. [Scott, 1974], following [Gabbay, 1969], generalised the notion to allow Q to be a set
of formulas  . The basic relation is then of the form  j  , satisfying:
Reexivity





; A j  ;0 j A; 0
0; j  ; 0
Scott has shown that for any Tarski consequence relation there exists two Scott consequence
relations (a maximal one and a minimal one) that agree with it (see my book [Gabbay, 1981]).
The above notions are monotonic. However, the increasing use of logic in articial intelligence
has given rise to logical systems which are not monotonic. The axiom of monotonicity is not sat-
ised in these systems. There are many such systems, satisfying a variety of conditions, presented
in a variety of ways. Furthermore, some are proof theoretical and some are model theoretical. All
these dierent presentations give rise to some notion of consequence  j Q, but they only seem
to all agree on some form of restricted reexivity (A j A). The essential dierence between these
logics (commonly called non-monotonic logics) and the more traditional logics (now referred to as
monotonic logics) is the fact that  j A holds in the monotonic case because of some A  ,
while in the non monotonic case the entire set  is used to derive A. Thus if  is increased to 0,
there is no change in the monotonic case, while there may be a change in the non monotonic case.
The above describes the situation current in the early 1980's. We have had a multitude of
systems generally accepted as `logics' without a unifying underlying theory and many had semantics
without proof theory. Many had proof theory without semantics, though almost all of them were
based on some sound intuitions of one form or another. Clearly there was the need for a general
unifying framework. An early attempt at classifying non-monotonic systems was [Gabbay, 1985].
It was put forward that basic axioms for a consequence relation should be reexivity, transitivity
(cut) and restricted monotonicity, namely:
Restricted Monotonicity
 j A; j B
; A j B
A variety of systems seem to satisfy this axiom. Further results were obtained [Makinson, 1989,
Makinson, 1993, Wojcicki, to appear, Wojcicki, 1989, Kraus et al., 1990, Lehmann and Magidor, 1992]
and the area was called `axiomatic theory of the consequence relation' by Wojcicki.3
Although some classication was obtained and semantical results were proved, the approach
does not seem to be strong enough. Many systems do not satisfy restricted monotonicity. Other
systems such as relevance logic, do not satisfy even reexivity. Others have richness of their own
which is lost in a simple presentation as an axiomatic consequence relation. Obviously a dierent
approach is needed, one which would be more sensitive to the variety of features of the systems in
the eld. Fortunately, developments in a neighbouring area, that of automated deduction, seem to
give us a clue.
3In general, the exact formulations of transitivity and reexivity can force some form of monotonicity.
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1.3 Logical systems as algorithmic proof systems
The relative importance of automated deduction is on the increase, in view of its wide applicability.
New automated deduction methods have been developed for non-classical logics, and resolution
has been generalised and modied to be applicable to these logics. In general, because of the value
of these logics in theoretical computer science and articial intelligence, a greater awareness of the
computational aspects of logical systems is developing and more attention being devoted to proof
theoretical presentations. It became apparent to us that a key feature in the proof theoretic study
of these logics is that a slight natural variation in an automated or proof theoretic system of one
logic (say L1), can yield another logic (say L2).
Although L1 and L2 may be conceptually far apart (in their philosophical motivation, and
mathematical denitions) when it comes to automated techniques and proof theoretical presenta-
tion, they turn out to be brother and sister. This kind of relationship is not isolated and seems to
be widespread. Furthermore, non monotonic systems seem to be obtainable from monotonic ones
through variations on some of their monotonic proof theoretical formulation.
This seems to give us some handle on classifying non-monotonic systems.
This phenomena has prompted us to put forward the view that a logical system L is not just
the traditional consequence relation ` (monotonic or non monotonic) but a pair (j;Sj), where
j is a mathematically dened consequence relation (i.e. the set of pairs (; ) such that  j  )
satisfying whatever minimal conditions on a consequence one happens to agree to, and Sj is an
algorithmic system for generating all those pairs [Gabbay, 1992a]. Thus according to this denition
classical propositional logic j perceived as a set of tautologies together with a Gentzen system Sj
is not the same as classical logic together with the two valued truth table decision procedure Tj
for it. In our conceptual framework,( j;Sj) is not the same logic as (j;Tj).
To illustrate and motivate our way of thinking, observe that it is very easy to move from Tj for
classical logic to a truth table system Tnj for  Lukasiewicz n-valued logic. It is not so easy to move
to an algorithmic system for intuitionistic logic. In comparison, for a Gentzen system presentation,
exactly the opposite is true. Intuitionistic and classical logics are neighbours, while  Lukasiewicz
logics seem completely dierent. In fact for a Hilbert style or Gentzen style formulation, one can
show proof theoretic similarities between  Lukasiewicz's innite valued logic and Girard's Linear
Logic, which in turn is proof theoretically similar to intuitionistic logic.
This issue has a bearing on the notion of `what is classical logic'. Given an algorithmic proof
system Sjc for classical logic jc, then (jc;Sjc) is certainly classical logic. Now suppose we
change Sjc a bit by adding heuristics to obtain S
0. The heuristics and modications are needed
to support an application area. Can we still say that we are essentially in `classical logic? I
suppose we can because S0 is just a slight modication of Sjc . However, slight modications of
an algorithmic system may yield another well-known logic. In fact S0 may be linear logic. So is
linear logic essentially classical logic, slightly modied, or vice versae!
We give an example from goal directed implicational logic. Consider a language with implication
only. It is easy to see that all ws A have the form A1 ! (A2 ! : : : ! (An ! q) : : :), q atomic,
where Ai has the same form as A. We now describe a computation with database a multiset  of
ws of the above form and the goal a w of the above form. We use the metapredicate  ` A to
mean the computation succeeds; i.e. A follows from . Here are the rules:
1. ; q ` q, q atomic and  empty. (Note that we are not writing A ` A for arbitrary A. We
are not writing a Gentzen system).
2.  ` A1 ! (A2 ! : : : ! (An ! q) : : :) if  [ fA1; : : : ; Ang ` q. Remember we are dealing
with multisets.
3. 0 =  [ fA1 ! (A2 ! : : : (An ! q) : : :)g ` q if  = 1 [2 [ : : : [n, i; i = 1; : : : ; n
are pairwise disjoint and i ` Ai.
The above computation characterises linear implication. If we relinquish the side condition in (3)
and let i = 
0 and the side condition (1) that  is empty, we get intuitionistic implication.
The dierence in logics is serious. In terms of proof methodologies, the dierence is minor.
More examples in [Gabbay, 1992a, Olivetti and Gabbay, 1993].
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1.4 Logical systems as algorithmic structured consequence
relations
Further observation of eld examples shows that in many cases the database is not just a set of
formulas but a structured set of formulas. The most common is a list or multiset.4 Such structures
appear already in linear and concatenation logics and in many non-monotonic systems such as
priority and inheritance systems. In many algorithmically presented systems much use is made
(either explicitly or implicitly) of this additional structure.
A very common example is a Horn clause program. The list of clauses
(a1) q
(a2) q ! q
does not behave in the same way as the list
(b1) q ! q
(b2) q
The query ?q succeeds from one and loops from the other.
It is necessary to formulate axioms and notions of consequence relations for structures. This is
studied in detail in a later chapter. Here are the main features:
 Databases (Assumptions) are structured. They are not just sets of formulas but have a more
general structure such as multisets, lists, partially ordered sets, etc. To present a database
formally, we need to describe the structures. Let M be a class of structures (e.g. all nite
trees). Then a database  has the form  = (M; f), where M 2 M and f : M 7! ws,
such that for each t 2M; f(t) is a formula. We assume the one point structure ftg is always
in M. We also assume we know how to take any single point t 2 M out of M and obtain
(M 0; f 0); f 0 = f  M . This we need for some versions of the cut rule and the deduction
theorem.
 A structured-consequence relation j is a relation  j A between structured databases
 and formulas A. (We will not deal with structured consequence relations between two
structured databases j  here. More details are in the chapter on structured consequence
relation.




 j A;  [A] j B
 [] j B
where  [A] means that A resides somewhere in the structure   and  [] means that 
replaces A in the structure. These concepts have to be dened precisely. If  = (M1; f1)
and   = (M2; f2) then  [A] displays the fact that for some t 2 M2, f2(t) = A. We allow for
the case that M2 = f2 = ? (i.e. taking A out) We need a notion of substitution, which is a
4Classical logic cannot make these distinctions using conjunction only. It needs further annotation or use of
predicates.
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three place function Sub( ;; t), meaning that for t 2 M2 we substitute M1 in place of t.
This gives us a structure (M3; f3) according to the denition of Sub. (M3; f3) is displayed as
 [], and  [?] displays the case of taking A out.
Many non monotonic systems satisfy a more restricted version of surgical cut:
 [?=A] j A;  [A] j B
 [ [?=A]] j B
Another variant would be
Deletional Cut
 [?=A] j A;  [A] j B
 [?=A] j B
.
 A logical system is a pair (j;Sj), where j is a structured-consequence and Sj is an
algorithmic system for it.
Of course we continue to maintain our view that dierent algorithmic systems for the same struc-
tured consequence relation dene dierent logics. Still although we now have a fairly general
concept of a logic, we do not have a general framework. Monotonic and non-monotonic systems
still seem conceptually dierent. There are many diverse examples among temporal logics, modal
logics, defeasible logics and more. Obviously, there is a need for a more unifying framework. The
question is, can we adopt a concept of a logic where the passage from one logic to another is natu-
ral, and along predened acceptable modes of variation? Can we put forward a framework where
the computational aspects of a logic also play a role? Is it possible to nd a common home for
a variety of seemingly dierent techniques introduced for dierent purposes in seemingly dierent
intellectual logical traditions?
1.5 Logical systems as labelled deductive systems
To nd an answer, let us ask ourselves what makes one logic dierent from another? How is
a new logic presented and described and compared to another? The answer is obvious. These
considerations are performed in the metalevel. Most logics are based on modus ponens anyway.
The quantier rules are formally the same anyway and the dierences between them are metalevel
considerations on the proof theory or semantics. If we can nd a mode of presentation of logical
systems where metalevel features can reside side by side with object level features then we can
hope for a general framework. We must be careful here. In the logical community the notions of
object-level vs metalevel are not so clear. Most people think of naming and proof predicates in this
connection. This is not what we mean by metalevel here. We need a more rened understanding
of the concept. There is a similar need in computer science.
We found that the best framework to put forward is that of a Labelled Deductive System, LDS,
the topic of this book. Our notion of what is a logic is that of a pair (j;Sj) where j is a
structured (possibly non-monotonic) consequence relation on a language L and Sj is an LDS, and
where j is essentially required to satisfy no more than Identity (i.e. fAg j A) and a version of
Cut. This is a renement of our concept of a logical system presented of the previous sections. We
now not only say that a logical system is a pair (j;Sj), but we are adding that Sj itself has a
special presentation, that of an LDS.
As a rst approximation, we can say that an LDS proof system is a triple (A;L;M), where L
is a logical language (connectives and ws) and A is an algebra (with some operations) of labels
and M is a discipline of labelling formulas of the logic (from the algebra of labels A), together
with deduction rules and with agreed ways of propagating the labels via the application of the
deduction rules. The way the rules are used is more or less uniform to all systems.
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To present an LDS system we need rst to dene its set of formulas and its set of labels.
For example, we can take the language of classical logic as the formulas (with variables, con-
stants and quantiers) and take some set of function symbols on the same variables and constants
as generating the labels. More precisely, we allow ordinary formulas of predicate logic with quanti-
ers to be our LDS formulas. Thus 9xA(x; y) is a formula with free variable y and bound variable
x. To generate the labels, we start with a new set of function symbols t1(y); t2(x; y); : : : of various
arities which can be applied to the same variables which appear in the formulas. Thus the labels
and formulas can share variables, or even some constants and function symbols. In other words
in some applications it might be useful to allow some labels to appear inside formulas A. We can
form declarative units of the form t1(y) : 9xA(x; y). When y is assigned a value y = a, so does
the label and we get t1(a) : 9xA(x; a). The labels should be viewed as more information about
the formulas, which is not coded inside the formula, (hence dependence of the labels on variables
x makes sense as the extra information may be dierent for dierent x). A formal denition of an
algebraic LDS system will be given later, meanwhile, let us give an informal denition of an LDS
system and some examples which help us understand what and why we would want labels.5
Denition 1.5.1 (Prototype AlgebraicLDS System) Let A be a rst order language of the
form A = (A;R1; : : : ; Rk; f1; : : : ; fm) where A is the set of terms of the algebra (individual variables
and constants) and Ri are predicate symbols (on A, possibly binary but not necessarily so) and
f1; : : : ; fm are function symbols (on A) of various arities. We think of the elements of A as atomic
labels and of the functions as generating more labels and of the predicates as giving additional
structure to the labels. A typical example would be (A;R; f1; f2) where R is binary and f1; f2 are
unary.
A diagram of labels is a set D containing elements generated from A by the function symbols
together with formulas of the form R(t1; : : : ; tk), where ti 2 D and R is a predicate symbol of the
algebra.
Let L be a predicate language with connectives ]1; : : : ; ]n, of various arities, with quantiers
and with the same set of atomic terms A as the algebra.
We dene the notions of a declarative unit, a database and a label as follows:
1. An atomic label is any t 2 A. A label is any term generated from the atomic labels by the
symbols f1; : : : ; fm.
2. A formula is any formula of L.
3. A declarative unit is a pair t : A, where t is a label and A is a formula.
4. A database is either a declarative unit or has the form (D; f ; d; U), where D is a nite diagram
of labels, d 2 D is the distinguished label, and f is a function associating with each label t
in D either a database or a nite set of formulas and U is the set of all terms. (Note that
5The idea of annotating formulas for various purposes is not new. A R Anderson and N. Belnap in their book
on Entailment, label formulas and propagate lables during proofs to keep track of relevance of assumptions. Term
annotations (Curry{Howard formula as type approach) are also known where the propagation rules are functional
application. The Lambek Calculus and the categorial approach is also related to labelling. The extra arguments
sometimes present in the Demo predicate of metalogic programming are also a form of labelling. What is new is
that we are proposing that we use an arbitrary algebra for the labels and consider the labelling as part of the logic.
We are creating a discipline of LDS and claiming that we have a unifying framework for logics and that almost any
logic can be given an LDS formulation. We can give j an LDS formulation provided j is reexive and transitive
and each connective is either j monotonic or antimonotonic in each of its arguments. See the chapter on structured
consequence relation. We are claiming that the notion of a logic is an LDS. This is not the same as the occasional
use of labelling with some specic purpose in mind. We are translating and investigating systematically all the
traditional logical concepts into the context of LDS and generalising them.
I am reminded of the story of the Yuppy who hired an interior decorator to redesign his sitting room. After much
study, the decorator recommended that the Yuppy needed a feeling of space and so the best thing to do is to arrange
the furniture against the wall, so that there will be a lot of space in the middle. The cleaning lady, when she rst
saw the new design was very pleased. She thought it was an excellent idea. `Yes', said the Yuppy, `and I paid $1000
for it'. `That was stupid', exclaimed the cleaning lady, `I could have told you for free! I arrange the furniture this
way every time I clean the oor!'.
Of course she is right, but she used the idea of the new arrangement only as a side eect!
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this is a recursive clause. We get simple databases if we allow f to associate with each label
t only single or nite sets of formulas. Simple databases are adequate for a large number of
applications.)
Denition 1.5.1 is simplied. To understand it intuitively, think of the atomic labels as atomic
places and times (top of the hill, Jan 1st 1992, etc.) and the function symbols as generating more
labels, namely more times and more places (behind(x), day after(t) etc.). We form declarative units
by taking labels and attaching formulas to them. Complex structures (D; f ; d; U) of these units
are databases. This denition can be made more complex. Here the labels are terms generated by
function symbols from atomic labels. We can complicate matters by using databases themselves as
labels. This will give us recursively more complex, richer labels. We will not go into that now. The
rst simplication is therefore that we are not using databases as labels. The second simplication
is that we assume constant domains. All times and places have the same elements (population)
in them. If this were not the case we would need a function Ut giving for each t 2 D a set of
terms, being the elements residing in t, and a database would have the form (D; f ; d; Ut). Chapter
3 continues with the formal denition of LDS.
Example 1.5.2 Consider a language with the predicate VS900(x; t). This is a two sorted predi-
cate, denoting Virgin airline ight London-Tokyo, where t is the ight date and x is a name of an
individual. For example VS900 (Dov, 15.11.91) may be put in the database, denoting that Dov is
booked on this ight scheduled to embark on 15.11.91.
If the airline practices overbooking and cancellation procedures (whatever that means), it might
wish to annotate the entries by further useful information such as
 Time of booking;
 Individual/group travel booking;
 Type of ticket
  VIP.
This information may be of a dierent nature to that coded in the main predicate and it is therefore
more convenient to keep it as annotation, or label. It may also be the case that the manipulation
of the extra information is of a dierent nature to that of the predicate.
In general, there may be many uses for the label t in the declarative unit t : A. Here is a partial
list
 Fuzzy reliability value:
(a number x; 0  x  1.) Used mainly in expert systems.
 Origin of A:
t indicates where the input A came from. Very useful in complex databases.
 Priority of A:
t can be a date of entry of updates and a later date (label) means a higher priority.
 Time when A holds:
(temporal logic)
 Possible world where A holds:
(modal logic)
 t indicates the proof of A:
(which assumptions were used in deriving A and the history of the proof). This is a useful
labelling for Truth Maintenance Systems.
 t can be the situation and A the infon (of situation semantics).
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Example 1.5.3 Let us look at one particular example, connected with modal logic. Assume the
algebra A has the form (A;<), with a set of atomic labels A, no function symbols and a binary
relation <. According to the previous denition, a diagram of labels, would contain a (nite) set
D  A, together with a set of pairs of the form ft < sg, t, s;2 D. A database has the form
(D; f ; a), where D is a nite diagram and f is a function, say giving a formula At = f(t), for each
t 2 D.
The perceptive reader may feel resistence to the idea of the label at this stage. First be assured
that you are not asked to give up your favourite logic or proof theory nor is there any hint of a
claim that your activity is now obsolete. In mathematics a good concept can rarely be seen or
studied from one point of view only and it is a sign of strength to have several views connecting
dierent concepts. So the traditional logical views are as valid as ever and add strength to the new
point of view. In fact, manifestations of our LDS approach already exist in the literature in various
forms, they were locally regarded as convenient tools and there was not the realisation that there
is a general framework to be studied and developed. None of us is working in a vacuum and we
build on each others work. Further, the existence of a general framework in which any particular
case can be represented does not necessarily mean that the best way to treat that particular case
is within the general framework. Thus if some modal logics can be formulated in LDS, this does
not mean that in practice we should replace existing ways of treating the logics by their LDS
formulation. The latter may not be the most ecient for those particular logics. It is sucient
to show how the LDS principles specialise and manifest themselves in the given known practical
formulation of the logic.
The reader may further have doubts about the use of labels from the computational point of
view. What do we mean by a unifying framework? Surely a Turing machine can simulate any
logic. Is that a unifying framework? The use of labels is powerful, as we know from computer
science. Are we using labels to play the role of a Turing machine? The answer to the question
is twofold. First that we are not operating at the metalevel, but at the object level, (see point 4
below). Second, there are severe restrictions on the way we use LDS. Here is a preview:
1. The only rules of inference allowed are the traditional ones, modus ponens and some form of
introduction rule (deduction theorem) for implication, for example.
2. Allowable modes of label propagation are xed for all logics. They can be adjusted in agreed
ways to obtain variations but in general the format is the same. For example, it has the
following form for implications:
Let LDS be a particular LDS system with labels A, and with  a special implication
characteristic to this particular LDS system. Then there exists a xed set of labels  , which
can characterise  as follows. For any theory  (of labelled ws) we have:
 proves (A  B) with label t i 8x 2   [B can be proved from  and x : A with label
t
 x],
where   is a set of labels characterising the implication in that particular logic. For example
  may be restricted to atomic labels only, or to labels related to t, or some other restrictions.
The freedom that dierent logics have is in the choice of   and the (possibly not only
equational) properties of `
'. For example we can restrict the use of modus ponens by a wise
propagation of labels.
3. The quantier rules are the same for all logics.
4. Metalevel features are implemented via the labelling mechanism, which is object language.
The reader who prefers to remain within the traditional point of view of:
assumptions (data) proving a conclusion
can view the labelled formulas as another form of data.
There are many occasions when it is most intuitive to present an item of data in the form t : A,
where t is a label and A is a formula. The common underlying reason for the use of the label t is
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that t represents information which is needed to modify A or to supplement (the information in) A
which is not of the same type or nature as (the information represented by) A itself. A is a logical
formula representing information declaratively, and the additional information of t can certainly
be added declaratively to A to form A0, however, we may nd it convenient to put forward the
additional information through the label t as part of a pair t : A.
Take for example a source of information which is not reliable. A natural way of representing
an item of information from that source is t : A, where A is a declarative presentation of the
information itself and t is a number representing its reliability. Such expert systems exist (eg
Mycin) with rules which manipulate both t and A as one unit, propagating the reliability values t
through applications of modus ponens. We may also use a label naming the source of information
and this would give us a qualitative idea of its reliability.
Another area where it is natural to use labels is in reasoning from data and rules. If we want
to keep track, for reasons of maintaining consistency and/or integrity constraints, where and how
a formula was deduced, we use a label t. In this case, the label in t : A can be the part of the data
which was used to get A. Formally in this case t is a formula, the conjunction of the data used.
We thus get pairs of the form i : Ai, where Ai are formulas and i are the parts of the database
from which Ai was derived.
A third example where it is natural to use labels is time stamping of data. Where data is
constantly revised and updated, it is important to time stamp the data items. Thus the data items
would look like ti : Ai, where ti are time stamps. Ai itself may be a temporal formula. Thus there
are two times involved, the logical time si in Ai(si) and the time stamping ti of Ai. For reasons
of clarity, we may wish to regard ti as a label rather than incorporate it into the logic (by writing
for example A(ti; si)).
To summarise then, we replace the traditional notion of consequence between formulas of the
form A1; : : : ; An ` B by the notion of consequence between labelled formulas
t1 : A1; t2 : A2; : : : ; tn : An ` s : B
Depending on the logical system involved, the intuitive meaning of the labels varies. In querying
databases, we may be interested in labelling the assumptions so that when we get an answer to a
query, we can record, via the label of the answer, from which part of the database the answer was
obtained. Another area where labelling is used is temporal logic. We can time stamp assumptions
as to when they are true and query, given those assumptions, whether a certain conclusion will be
true at a certain time. Thus the consequence notion for labelled deduction is essentially the same
as that of any logic: given assumptions does a conclusion follow.
Whereas in the traditional logical system the consequence is dened using proof rules on the
formulas, in the LDS methodology the consequence is dened by using rules on both formulas
and their labels. Formally we have formal rules for manipulating labels and this allows for more
scope in decomposing the various features of the consequence relation. The meta features can be
reected in the algebra or logic of the labels and the object features can be reected in the rules
of the formulas. Recall, however, that there are severe restrictions on how we use LDS rules, as
we discussed earlier.
The notion of a database or of a `set of assumptions' also has to be changed. A database
is a hierarchical conguration of labelled formulas. The conguration depends on the labelling
discipline. For example, it can be a linearly ordered set fa1 : A1; : : : ; an : Ang; a1 < a2 < : : : < an.
The proof discipline for the logic will specify how the assumptions are to be used. See for example
the logic programming case study.
We summarise our current position on what is a logical system. A logical system is a pair
(j;LDSj), where j is a consequence relation between labelled databases  and declarative units
t : A and LDSj is an algorithmic system for j.
We need one more component to the notion of a logical system. In previous subsections, a
logical system was presented as (j;Sj), where j is a structured consequence relation satisfying
Identity and Surgical Cut and Sj is an algorithmic proof system for computing j. We are now
saying that we need to rene this notion and deal with Labelled Deductive Systems, where j is
a consequence relation between labelled databases  and declarative units t : A and that Sj is
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replaced by some specic LDS discipline (algorithm) for computing the above. We need to be able
to retrieve the old notion i.e. (j1;Sj1) from the new notion (j2;LDS j2). In other words, we
must add into LDS the capability of proving and reasoning without labels. To achieve this we
can rst reason with labels and then strip the labels and give a conclusion without labels. The
additional algorithm which we can use to strip the labels is called attening. Thus a labelled
theory  may prove ti : A and si : :A, with many dierent labels ti and si, depending on various
labelling considerations and proof paths. The attening algorithm will allow us to decide whether
we atten the pair of sets (ftig; fsig) to + or   i.e. whether we say jA or j:A. In fact, the
attening rules simply allow us to simplify the labels. They have the general form:
t1 : A; t2 : A; : : : ; tm : A ` s : A
or if we have negation
ti : A; t
0
j : :Ajs : A
See also Denition 3.2.8. See Example 2.3.1 for a clear cut case where only attening is required.
Flattening can also be used during the deduction in an interlaced mode. For example, if the
labels represent moments of time or priorities, we may say the value is + if max ftig  maxfsjg, or
we may interlace the attening with the deduction itself, by attening during the dedution before
each proof step is taken. A careful inductive denition is neded. We need the notion  `n t : A
maning t : A can be proved from  in at most n steps. We cannow atten the sets ft j  `n t : Ag
and fs j  `n s : :Ag before we continue the proof. See Example 1.5.4 below.
Thus, given a structured theory  (without labels) and a candidate A, we can have the following
procedure, using LDS, of deciding whether j?A.
 Label the elements of  with completely dierent atomic labels, representing existing struc-
ture in .
 Use the LDS machinery to deduce all possibilities jti : A and jsi : :A.
 Flatten and get A (or interlace with attening and get A).
Example 1.5.4 (Interlacing) The database has
t1 : A
t2 : :A
t3 : :A! B
t4 : A! :B:
Assume priority is t1 < t2 < t3 < t4, and assume a attening process which gives higher priority
rules superiority over low priority rules and similarly for facts but gives lexicographic superiority
for rules over facts. Thus t4t1 is stronger than t3t2. If we deduce and then atten, we get
t4t1 : :B
t3t2 : B
The attening process would take :B.
If we pursue an interlace argument, we rst atten the premisses and take :A and then perform
the modus ponens and get B.
1.6 Aggregated systems
So far all our logical systems either proved or not proved a conclusion A. There was no possibility
of aggregating arguments in favour of A as against arguments in favour of negation of A. The lack
of aggregation is a basic characteristic which currently separates the symbolic qualitative school
of reasoning from the numerical, quantitative one. We can view thenotion of attening of the
previous section as a special form of aggregation; a noncompromising, all or nothing, aggregation.
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There are many systems around (many are recognised as probabilistic systems, expert systems,
fuzzy systems) which attach numerical values to assumptions and rules, use various functions and
numerical procedures to manipulate these values and formulas and reach conclusions.
In many cases we get systems which give answers which seem to make sense, which can be very
successfully and protably applied but which cannot be recognised or understood by traditional
logic. The main feature common to all of these numerical systems (which is independent of how
they calculate and propagate their values) is that their `proofs' aggregate. They can add the
numbers involved and thus aggregate arguments. The spirit is: Five good rumours are better than
one proof.
To further illustrate, consider the following example
Example 1.6.1 (Aggregation and interlacing) The assumptions are:
t1 : A! C
t2 : B ! C
t3 : A
t4 : B
t5 : D ! :C
t6 : D
Here we can conclude C in two dierent ways and conclude :C in one way.
Non monotonic systems like defeasible logic will not allow us to draw any conclusion unless one
rule defeats all others. If we had a numerical evaluation of the data, say ti are numbers in [0 1],
then we could aggregate our condence in the conclusion. Thus we get:
(t1  t3 ] t2  t4) : C
t5  t6 : :C
the two numbers can be compared and a conclusion reached.
If we operate in the context of LDS, we can use the labels to aggregate arguments. Any
conclusion is proved with a label indicating its proof path. These can be formally (algebraically)
added (aggregated) and an additional process (called attening) can compare them. See Examples
4.1.1 and 2.3.12.
In consequence relation terms, the property of aggregation destroys the cut rule. The reason
is as follows:
Assume ; A j B. This now means that the aggregated proofs in favour of B are stronger
than the aggregated proofs in favour of :B. Similarly  jA would mean the balance from   is in
favour of A.
If we perform the cut we get
;  j?B
 and   may interact, forming new additional proofs of :B, which outweigh the proofs for B.
Cut is a very basic rule in traditional logical systems and can be found in one form or another
in each one of them. Thus it is clear that aggregation of arguments is a serious departure from
traditional formal logic. Yet, it cannot be denied. In practical reasoning we do aggregate arguments
and so logic, if it is to be successfully applied and be able to mirror human reasoning, must be
able to cope with aggregation. Classical logic, if it is to be a universal language, must also be able
to deal naturally with aggregation.
One form of cut is still valid. The unitary cut.
 j A;A j B
 j B
This holds because there is nothing for  to interact with.
We thus require from our reasoning system that it satisfy only Identity (AjA) and Unitary
Cut.
To show how real and possibly destructive aggregation can be, consider the example of Prince
Karlos and Princess Laura.
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Example 1.6.2 The prince and princess are separated. Both made it clear to the press that no
third parties were involved and the separation was purely due to a personality clash. However,
the editor Mr Angel of the Daily Tabloid, thought otherwise. First he observed that after her
separation the princess moved to a house very near the Imperial Institute of Logic, Language and
Computation. This in itself did not mean much, because both the Institute and the residence were
in the centre of town. However, Mr Angel further found out that in the past two years, whenever
the princess went on a European holiday, there was an Esprit project meeting in the same hotel,
and surprisingly all projects involve a certain professor from the Institute. Again, this could be a
coincidence, because it is a well known fact that Esprit project consortia nd it most inspiring to be
in the most expensive holiday resorts in Europe and it is equally well known that certain dynamic
professors participate in many such projects.
However the plot thickens when the princess, as part of her general social activity seems to
actively support the new logics for computation. This could also be a coincidence because after
all, this subject is going to transform the nature of our society. The various little arguments do
seem to be aggregating, though not conclusively enough to risk an article in such a responsible
paper as the Daily Tabloid. The situation changed when it became known that the princess actively
supports Labelled Deductive Systems and the Universality of classical logic. Under this aggregation
of arguments an obvious conclusion could be drawn!
1.7 Practical reasoning systems
Our discussion so far generalised the notion of a deductive system; namely, given a database  and
a formula Q, we ask the basic question, does  prove Q? The various concepts we studied had to
do with what form do  and Q take and what kinds of consequence relations j and algorithmic
systems Sj are involved.
In practical reasoning systems, the deductive question is but one of many which interest us.
Other operations such as updating, abduction, action, explanation are also involved. If we rethink
of Q as an input, we can partially list the kind of of operations which may be involved. These
operations are performed using algorithms which accompany the deductive component. We refer
to them as mechanisms.
 The input Q is a query from . We are interested in whether  j Q and possibly ask what
proofs are available.
 The input Q is an update. We want to insert Q into  to obtain 0. We may possibly have
to deal with inconsistency and restructuring of .6
 The input Q is an abductive stimulus (goal). We are interested in 0 such that +0 j Q.
Where + is a symbol (to be precisely dened) which `adds' or `joins'  and 0 to `combine'
their declarative information.
The + operation may or may not be the same as update. The abductive question is to nd
(possibly the minimal) 0 which helps prove the input.7
 The input Q may be a stimulus for action on the database outputting a new database or
outputting an explanation or any other output of interest.
The new possibilities of a formula Q interacting with a database , (via action or abduction
or other mechanisms) allow for a new way of answering queries from . To see this, consider the
query ?Q. In the declarative aspect, we want an answer, namely we are asking whether jQ.
This can be checked via Sj,or semantically. Q does not act or change  in any way. In the
interactive case, we trigger an action. Q acts on  to produce a new 0. Q is read imperatively.
6Such a view has been presented in Chapter 13 of Bob Kowalski's book [1979]. The systematic study of updates
and theory change was initiated in [Alchourron et al., 1985, Gardenfors, 1988].
7For a given system (j;Sj), the abductive mechanism is usually dependent on Sj, the particular algorithmic
proof system involved. Dierent applications might require dierent abductive procedures.
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We can write !Q to stress this fact. The result of the interaction is 0. Thus !Q = 0. Thus
given a  and a Q, we have two options. We can ask whether  j Q holds, (written ?Q, with
j implicit) or we can let Q act on , written !Q, where ! denotes the action. When an action !
is given, it is possible to derive a new consequence relation j dependent on the action ! (really we
should write j!). The new j is dened by  j Q i !Q = . This view was particularly put
forward by F. Veldman and pursued by J. van Benthem.
Let us clearly state our current view on the question of what is a logical system:
Denition 1.7.1 (Current tentative view of a logical system) A logical system has the form
(j;Sj;Sabduce;Supdate; : : :) where j is a labelled consequence relation, Sj is a Labelled Deductive
System with Flattening procedures and Sabduce;Supdate etc are mechanisms which are dependent
on (make use of ) Sj.
The above denition of a logical system is really a denition of an agent (in the AI sense). Thus
we are rening the notion of a logic to be a system more and more like a practical reasoner,or an
agent. In fact, research in the applications of logic in AI has concentrated mainly on the study
of essentially logical systems modelling various pure logical aspects of an agent in an application
area. There is less emphasis on integrated combined systems, modelling how the agent uses these
pure aspects in an interleaved and combined way. Yet, this integrated use is the dominant feature
in any application area, the feature which gives the agent what we perceive as intelligence. Our
view is to consider such systems as logics, and bring into the realm of logic the methodology of
integrating various human reasoning mechanisms.
To focus our ideas, we start with an example, involving integrated practical reasoning.
Imagine a situation where a Head of Department goes to a member of sta trying to persuade
him to teach a course which is not exactly in his area. Say the fellow is a logician and the course is
operating systems. The Head of Department will explain the situation in the department, pointing
out the shortage of sta, nancial cutbacks, and argue that everyone must teach more etc. He may
use emotional and other arguments, saying things like: think of the challenge! I cannot rely on
someone else for this important course! You don't want to antagonise the dept! etc. The member
of sta may put forward his general dissatisfaction with his promotion etc. At the end a deal
may be struck. This is a typical reasoning interactive process involving many types of databases,
beliefs, processes, views and logics. To understand human practical reasoning we must understand
and model such interactions.
Our strategy is to build a complex formal model for describing human practical reasoning inter-
actions, show the model is plausible and highlight the role of multilogic integration and combination
in such a model. The emphasis is not on the actual practical modelling of human reasoning, (which
is a major serious task) but on showing how systematic combinations of logical mechanisms can
produce an intelligent agent. Thus, for example, we an try and construct an overall system capable
of formalizing the above interaction. We shall describe below the basic components we expect such
a system to have. Thus our new notion of a logical system must be capable of dening the following
central concepts:
1. Declarative Unit
This concept corresponds to the notion of a formula in classical logic. It is supposed to be the
basic information units of our system. It is a labelled formula in Gabbay's Labelled Deductive
System ; a situation and an infon in Barwise and Perry Situation Theory; a node and a formula
in an inheritance network; a world and a modal formula in a semantically presented modal logic;
a formula and a fuzzy value in fuzzy logic and so forth.
Formally a declarative unit is a pair  = (t : A), where A is a formula in some logic L and t a
term in some algebra A. The intended meaning is that t gives more information about A. There
are various possibilities for what this information can be. It can be priority, it can indicate the
source of A, or it can code the proof of A.
2. Databases
This concept corresponds to a theory (set of formulas) in classical logic. In general it is some
structure (constellation, network) of declarative units. It is supposed to be, in each logic, the ar-
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chitecture of how several declarative units are put together to form a more complex data structure.
In linear logic it is a multiset of formulas. In the Lambek calculus it is a list of formulas.
It is reasonable to require that a single declarative unit counts as a singleton database. We also
allow ?, the empty database.
3. Input
This notion is a function associating with each database  and a declarative unit , a new database,
0 = Input (; ), the result of `adding  to .
In classical logic there is only one input function,  = [fg. Same in linear logic, where the
union is a multiset union. In other logics, where databases are more complex structures, there can
be a variety of input functions. For example in the Lambak calculus, where a database is a list of
formulas, there are two obvious input functions, appending  either to the end or to the beginning
of the list. It is reasonable to assume that the Input Function, is also dened for databases, i.e.
Input (1;2) is meaningful and it is not necessarily commutative.
4. Integrity (Consistency)
Given a database  we assume we have a notion of Integrity. Certain databases are not wanted
(they do not satisfy integrity). This notion is not exactly the same as consistency. It generalises
consistency. In classical logic inconsistent databases can prove ? and so we can say that we do
not want them. But we can equally say databases are not wanted if they for example list people's
addresses without their telephone numbers. These are consistent but do not satisfy integrity
(constraints).
5. Update
Updating a database is a function Update (; ) = 0, inputting  into  and obtaining a 0 whose
integrity is maintained. Input (; ) may not satisfy integrity. Update (; ), will yield a dierent
theory which does satisfy integrity. Algorithmic versions of this function could conceivably contain
a truth maintenance component which restores integrity.
There can be several possible update functions for a logic. We may or may not stipulate some
minimal conditions on the update function.
6. Consequence
This is a binary relation between databases of the form 1 ` 2 . Its meaning can vary from logic
to logic and it must satisfy some minimal conditions. It may be only partially presented
 Hilbert consequence has the form ? ` 
 Singleton Tarski consequence has the form 1 ` 2
 Structured (Tarski) consequence has the form  ` 
 Structured (Scott) consequence has the general form 1 ` 2
In practice one version of the consequence may be presented in some (axiomatic or proof theoretic
or semantical) manner, (e.g. Hilbert,) and other forms, (e.g. Tarski,) may or may not be denable
from it.
For our purpose, we insist that the consequence relation be presented through an algorithmic
proof procedure for determining, for arbitrary  and , whether  `  holds or not. The procedure
may succeed, fail or loop on each input. We refer to such a consequence relation as an algorithmic
consequence.
7. Abudction
Abduction is an algorithm which is dened on top of a consequence relation `. The denition
of the abduction algorithm may possibly make use of the particular algorithmic proof procedure
which presents `. The abductive algorithm denes a function, Abduce (; ) = 0, such that when
0 is input into , the goal  succeeds. In symbols
 Abduce(; ) = ? when  ` .
 Abduce(; ) = 0, where 00 = input(;0) and 00 ` .
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We can assume that the abduction algorithm we are dealing with is particularly convenient,
for example, assume that it produced only labelled conjunctions of atoms.
Abduction is used in nding what is needed to have goals succeed. Since goals represnt what
the agent `wants', abduction procedures may be involved in causing actions.
8. Actions
We need notation for actions. This is comprised of atomic actions (a set 0 of atomic actions) and
some algebraic operations giving new actions from old, generating the family  of all actions. The
theory of action is complex, involving post-conditions and pre-conditions. We assume the action
`a' is semantics, in the sense that it operates on models of the world. [Note, however, that we
did not igve a notion of a model or semanitcs forthe structured databases proposed above.] a is
controlled by a precondition a, and when applied to a model satisfying a, a post condition a is
guaranteed to hold.
a can be understood as operating on theories as well as follows.
Let  be a theory. Let fm1;m2; : : :g be its models. For each mi, let mai be mi if a does not
hold and let mai be the result of applying a to mi if a does hold. Let a be the theory of the
models fma1 ;ma2 ; : : :g. Then a can be taken to be the result of applying a to . When dealing
with labelled formulas and databases, it is possible to have (in many cases) a a = (ta : Ea) such
that a = Update (; a). i.e. there is a syntactical representation of the action a.
Thus the labels may allow us to present general actions as syntactical operations on databases.
The action a can be represented by a labelled w ta : Ea and the result of the action given a
database  can be described by a = Update(; ta : Ea), where Update is the input function
associated with the action family .
We can assume for simplicity that Ea is a conjunction of atoms or their negations.
This approach allows us to represent the fact that in an interaction between two people, the
same action `a' may be understood dierently by dierent persons and may have a dierent update




a) may be what person i `understands' of it and
Updatei(i; 
i
a) is the resulting updated theory.
9. Goals, desires and wants
Each person or `logic' has goals he wants to achieve or `wants'. We represnt them as a sequence
(g1; : : : ; gn), each gi is a declarative unit. The interpretation is that the person will take actions
to create a situation (database) from which all goals succeed (i.e. follow as consequence).
Having now presented the basic components of a `logic' or `agent', we can describe how we view
the `interaction' between the two agents; the Head of Department and the member of sta. In
the context of our model of the interaction, we will identify the role of the various non monotonic
mechanisms described in this volume.
The following are some components involved in the interaction:
 We need two notions of time, external time (day, hour, minute, etc.) and cycle time, the
counting of the moves by the agents. So, for example, agent 1 may ask a query at time t1
which causes a reply at time t2 > t1. The external time is the t1; t2 axis while the cycle time
is f1; 2; 3; : : :g.
 Assume that at step n, time tn, agent 1 makes a move. What he might do is to ask goal g
from his database 1n at step n. Assume g does not succeed from 
1
n. He can then ask the
abduction mechanism to nd what input  is needed to make g succeed. Thus
 = Abduce (1n; g):
 cannot just be put into the database since the database is expected to be related to the
real world. Agent 1 looks at his stock of actions and possibly nds an action `a' whose
precondition succeeds from his database 1n, and whose post condition is . Note that for
simplicity we assumed that abductions and conditions are conjunctions of literals. Agent 1
executes this action. Agent 2 also updates his database according to what he sees of action
a.
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 Since the databases represent parts of the world, there are other things that may happen
during the interaction. An external input may be asked or information exchanged.
The following lists the possible occurrrences at step n.
1. Agent 1 asks a query from agent 2.
2. Agent 1 takes an action to satisfy a goal.
3. An external input i arrives for agent i.
4. Agent 1 gives information 1 to agent 2 who inputs it.
Obviously the input of data is a major activity for our agents. We view this process as syntac-
tical model building. The following is a more detailed analysis:
 Agent 1 observes the real world and inputs data of the form t : E.
 Another agent proforms an action a and agent 1 interprets the action his own way and inputs
some resulting data of the form t1a : E
1
a.
 Agent 1 receives a direct input t2 : E2 from agent 2.
The above are external inputs. They can be compared with internal updates such that arise from
abduction.
How does non-monotonicity arise in such a set up? Suppose agent 1 gets input t : E. This
input arises in an active environment. The agent understands the environment and can non-
monotonically assume and add a further input s : B, which accompanies t : E. For example, a
used car salesman seeing a man looking around his parking lot examining prices can assume that
he has a potential customer. Of course it may be the local printing shop emloyee examining how
the price stickers were printed. However, we do have the phenomena in general that more input is
generated by such non-monotonic principles. I will call this phenomena conduction (from peoples
conduct).
t : E yields s : B by conduction.
This is not just default, although it may technically embrace it. It includes any principles which
allow for more data to be put in in addition to any input.
Thus a conduction rule looks like this:
 If  `  : A and t : E is received as input and s : B is consistent (with  and t : E) then
add s : B to the input.
It would be instructive to construct a logical system in the sense of the above discussion. We
now incrementally present one.
Example 1.7.2 (Minimal implication) Our starting point is minimal propositional implica-
tional logic with a constant for falsity. The langauge contains atomic propositions fp; q; r; : : :g
and the implication connective f!g together with the falsity constant f?g. As a Hilbert system,
minimal logic satises the following schemas (see [Gabbay, 1981]):
 A! (B ! A)
 (A! (B ! C)! ((A! B)! (A! C))




The following theorems can be proved
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 ` A! A
 ` (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)).
A consequence relation jm can be dened by:
 A1; : : : ; AnjmB i (def ) ` A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :)
Note that in minimal logic ? does not imply anything in particular, just itself. If we add the axiom
schema ? ! A, we get intuitionistic logic based on the connectives f!;?g.
The following additional Hilbert axioms yield full minimal logic with ^ and _.
 A! (B ! A ^B)
 A ^B ! A
 A ^B ! B
 (A! C)! ((B ! C)! (A _B ! C))
 A! A _B
 B ! A _B
We now have dened jm, the consequence relation of our logic. We proceed to dene Sm
(actually Sjm), an algorithmic proof system for jm. There are many options to choose from,
such as Gentzen systems, Tableaux, Term Translation into Classical logic, etc. We choose a goal
directed formulation.
Denition 1.7.3 (Goal directed algorithm for minimal consequence) 1. First note that
any formula B of the language (without _ and ^) has the form B = (B1 ! (B2 ! : : : !
(Bn ! q) : : :), where q is atomic and Bi has the same form as B. q is called the head of
B and fBig is the body. If we allow ^ in the language, then every formula is equivalent to
a set of ws of the above form. This holds because of the following equivalences in minimal
logic:
A ^B ! C and A! (B ! C)
A! (B ^ C) and (A! B) ^ (A! C)
2. A theory  is a list of ws of the logic.
3. We dene the following metapredicates:
 ?A = 1, reading `the goal A succeeds from the theory '.
 ?A = 0 reading `the goal A nitely fails from '.
The denition is as follows:
(a) ?q = 1, for q atomic if q is listed in .
(b) ?q = 0, for q atomic if q is not the head of any element in .
(c) ?A1 ! (: : : (An ! q) : : :) = 1 (resp. 0) if   (A1; : : : ; An)?q = 1 (resp. 0) where  is
concatenation.
(d) ?q = 1 if for some B = (B1 ! : : :! (Bn ! q) : : :) in  we have that ?Bi = 1, for
i = 1; : : : ; n.
(e) ?q = 0 if for each B in  of the form B1 ! (B2 : : : (Bn ! q) : : :) there exists an
1  i  n such that ?Bi = 0.
Theorem 1.7.4 (Completeness of algorithm) A1; : : : ; AnjmB i (A1; : : : ; An)?B = 1
Proof. See [Gabbay, 1992a]. 
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To obtain a proper algorithm for Sjm , we need to specify exactly how we compute ?Q. It
is convenient for the purpose of ease of control to let the goal be a list of formulas  , as in some
Prolog interpreters. Thus clause 3d of Denition 1.7.3 will now read:
?q    = 1 if for some B = (B1 ! (: : :! (Bn ! q) : : :) in  we have ?(B1; : : : ; Bn)    = 1.
We can agree to search the list  top down and agree where to continue the search when starting a
new goal in the list of goals. The policy of some Prolog interpreters is always to start the search
at the top of the database list . This would yield a precise algorithm but may cause loops. For
example (q ! q)?q will loop. With a loop checker, however, we get decidability in P -space.
We now proceed with the incremental denition of our logic. We need next the notion of a
database. This will contain integrity constraints and some clauses as data. The data is divided into
two parts, permanent data and added hypothetical data. (e.g. to show A! B, we hypothetically
assume A and try to show B.) The next denition does the job.
Denition 1.7.5 (The basic logic) 1. A formula of the form B1 ! (: : : ! (Bn ! ?) : : :)
where ? does not appear in Bi; i = 1; : : : ; n, is called an integrity constraint.
2. A formula in the pure ! fragment (i.e. without ?) is called a clause.
3. A simple database is a concatenation of three (possibly empty) lists of formulas of the form
 = I  P  A, where I is a list of integrity constraints, P is a list of clauses,
called protected clauses (the signicace of P will emerge later when we update), and A is
another list of clauses called the additional clauses.
4. A database  is inconsistent if ?? = 1. Note that  is also a theory, so ?? can be
computed.
Denition 1.7.6 (Updates) 1. Let  = I P A be a consistent database with A =
(C1; : : : ; Cm) and let Q be a clause. We dene the update of  by Q, denoted by !Q, to be
the following database 0.
 0 =  if I P  (Q) is not consistent.
 Otherwise, let 0 be I  P  (Ci; Ci+1; : : : ; Cm; Q) where i is the least number  1
such that the above theory is consistent.
An update !Q insists, if possible, on putting Q into  and maintains consistency by taking
out from  those assumptions that are unprotected (i.e. in A) and old (i.e. earlier in the list
A). If Q is inconsistent with I P , then and only then do we reject the input.
In Denition 1.7.3, the algorithm Sjm for computing ?A ! B is based on the deduction
theorem and the query ?A ! B is reduced to   (A)?B. In minimal logic, where  is a
theory,   (A) is always consistent, because we do not mind deriving ?, and there is no notion
of inconsistency. When we move to the notion of databases, integrity constraints and clauses,
databases can be inconsistent and the old reduction of ?A! B to   (A)?B may need to face
the fact that   (A) is inconsistent. However, we do have in this case the notion of the update
!A, and we could reduce the query ?A ! B to that of !A?B. This new reduction actually
denes a new a conditional implication A) B, meaning B would be true if A were true i.e. update
 by A and then (query) check B. The next denition gives the details. We are going to keep
using the `!' symbol for both kinds of implication and the context will decide what meaning we
give to `!'. See [Gabbay et al., 1994].
Denition 1.7.7 (Computation for conditional !) We dene a new computation ?!Q = 1
and ?!Q = 0 for clauses Q as follows:
a. ?!q = 1 if q is in , for atomic q.
b. ?!q = 0 for q atomic, if q is not the head of any clause in .
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c. ?!B1 ! (B2 ! : : :! (Bn ! q) : : :) = 1 (resp. 0) i (((!B1)!B2) : : :!Bn)?!q = 1 (resp. 0).
d. ?!q = 1 if for some B1 ! (: : :! (Bn ! q) : : :) in  we have ?!Bi = 1, for i = 1; : : : ; n.
e. ?!q = 0 if for each B1 ! (: : :! (Bn ! q) : : :) in  there exists an i such that ?!Bi = 0.
f. ?!? is not dened. We only compute ??.
We now have an update mechanism and a new consequence relation. Let us dene some more
mechanisms. First we deal with normal defaults of the form A:BB , reading: if A is in  and it
is consistent to add B then we do add B. Note that the default notion we are proposing here is
straightforward and tailored for our case and is not a general theory of default. We are building a
`new logic' and we want to put some default aspects to it.
Denition 1.7.8 (Default mechanism) 1. A normal default  is a pair  = (A;B) where A
and B are clauses.
2. A default database is a concatenation of several lists of clauses and constraints containing at
least the following
 = I P A D
where D is a list added because of default.
3. We now dene the default update ! as follows
! = I P A D  (B)
provided this theory is consistent and ?A = 1.
So far we have built a logical system with a consequence relation, an algorithmic procedure for it
and some mechanisms such as updates and default. We will add one more mechanism and then
rest our case. This time we add abduction.
From the purely logical point of view, abduction is a syntactical action on a theory  and a
goal Q, consistent with , in a logic (j;Sj), yielding some additional data B , consistent with
, (denoted by B = Abduce (; Q)) such that ;B jQ. i.e. we `answer' the question of `what
do we need to consistently add to  to make it prove Q'?
Let us dene Abduce(; Q) for the logic (jm;Sjm). The denition will be by induction on the
computation steps of Q from , as in Denition 1.7.3.
Denition 1.7.9 Let  be a theory and Q be a goal in the minimal logic jm of Example 1.7.2
(for the language with !;? and possibly ^), using the algorithm Sjm of Denition 1.7.3(3) which
is complete by Theorem 1.7.4.
We dene a formula Abduce(; Q) in the full language of minimal logic, with ^ and _ such
that:
  Abduce (; Q)jmQ
1. Abduce(; Q) = > if ?Q = 1.
2. Abduce(; q) = q, for q atomic such that q is not the head of any clause in .
3. Abduce(; A1 ! (A2 ! : : : (An ! q) : : :)) = A1 ! : : : (An ! Abduce ((A1; : : : ; An); q) : : :)
4. Let q be atomic and let Bj = Bj1 ! : : : ! (Bjnj ! q) : : :), j = 1; : : : ;m be all clauses in 




i=1 Abduce (; B
j
i ).
5. In case we have conjunctions;
Abduce(; A ^B) = Abduce (; A) ^ Abduce (; B).
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Note that clause 4 of the above denition of Abduce may be simplied to be that any one of the
disjuncts (say of the rst Bj in the list ) is always chosen. However, when we take the disjunction
we get a logically weaker abduced formula. Also note that clause 5 may give rise to inconsistency;
Abduce(; A) and Abduce(; B) may be consistent but not necessarily their conjunction.
If we adopt the policy of taking disjunctions in clause 4, we increase the chances of nding a
consistent abduced formula. In the ! fragment, of course, we do not want disjunctions.
Examples 1.7.10 1. Let  be fag and let the goal be q. The abduced fomula is Abduce((a); q) =
q. Note that if we were to take  = (a! q) then certainly
; jmq
so the abudced formula is not the logically weakest which can be added to  to prove the goal
(since  6 jmq but qjm). However, in the presence of  it is the weakest.
2. Let  be
(a) a! (b! q)
(b) a
(c) (c! d)! q
and let the goal be q.
The abduced theory is b _ (c! d)
Lemma 1.7.11 ; Abduce (; Q)jmQ:
Proof. The proof is by induction on the denition of the abduced formula.
1. If the abduced formula is > then this means jmQ.
2. Assume that Q = q is atomic and that it is not the head of any clause. Then the abduced
formula is q and clearly ; qjmq.
3. Assume Q has the form
Q = (A1 ! : : :! (An ! q) : : :):
Then the abduced formula is
A1 ! : : :! (An ! Abduce (  (A1; : : : ; An); q); : : :):
We need to show
; A1 ! (: : :! (An ! Abduce ( A1; : : : ; An); q) : : :)jmQ:
By the induction hypothesis
; A1; : : : ; An; Abduce (  (A1; : : : ; An); q)jmq;
hence
; A1; : : : ; An; A1 ! : : : (An ! Abduce (  (A1; : : : ; An); q) : : :)jmq;
hence
; A1 ! (: : : An ! Abduce (  (A1; : : : ; An); q) : : :)jmQ:
4. Assume Q = q is atomic and let Bj = (Bj1 ! : : : ! (Bjnj ! q) : : :); j = 1; : : : ;m, be all the
clauses in  with head q.
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Then we need to show
; Abduce (; q)jmq
where





Abduce (; Bji ):
By the induction hypothesis for j xed, we have
; Abduce (; Bji )jmBji
for i = 1; : : : ; nj .












This completes the induction step and the lemma is proved. 
Remark 1.7.12 (Abdtop) The above dened abduction mechanism gives rise to abduced formu-
las which may be disjunctions, but not necessarily. If we are dealing with the ! fragment only,
we will not be able to add the abduced formula into . We notice however, that conjunctions are
no problem because in the ! fragment, every formula with conjunctions is equivalent to a con-
junction of pure ! formulas. This conjunction can be added to  as an additional list. We have
already observed that disjunctions arise from the fact that an atom q may have several clauses in
the database with head q (item 4 of the inductive denition). Since all clauses are ordered, we can
shoose as part of our abduction policy to use only an agreed one of them (say the top of the list).
This will give us no disjunctions. Call such a modied abduction algorithm by Abdtop(; Q).
Example 1.7.13 Consider the database  with one integrity constraint in it and one data item
in it.
1. a ^ s ^ e! ?
2. a
We are using conjunction but it can be eliminated. We can write item 1 as
a! (s! (e! ?)):
Consider the following two goals.
 Q1 = a ^ e
 Q2 = a ^ e! ?
Note that for conjunctions the obvious rule to use (at a risk that integrity constraints are violated)
is:
 Abduce(; A ^B) = Abduce (; A)^ Abduce(; B)
Therefore for our example:
Abduce(; Q1) = Abduce(; a)^ Abduce(; e) = Abduce(; e)
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Clearly Abduce(; e) = e, as the only way to prove e from  is to abduce e itself (note we do
not have ?jme).
We now try to abduce the second goal, Q2.
Abduce(; Q2) = (a ^ e! Abduce(  (a)  (e);?) = a ^ e! s
Since
Abduce(  (a)  (e);?) = Abduce(  (a)  (e); a ^ s ^ e) = s
Remark 1.7.14 There is a sense in which Abduce(; q) is the logically minimal addition to 
which can prove Q, namely
If ; XjmQ, then 0; Xjm Abduce(; Q), where 0 is some completion of . It is not clear
to me at this stage exactly what 0 should be. Consider the following:
 = fa! bg; Q = b: Abduce(; Q) = a:
Clearly, ; b ` Q but ; b 6` a. However, Clark's completion, 0 = fa$ bg does the job; 0; b ` a.
There is work for Horn clauses in this direction in [Console et al., 1991], but our language here
contains embedded implications.
Example 1.7.15 (An example of a logical system) We can now dene an example of a `log-
ical' system in our sense as follows:
 The language has ! only.
 The notion of a theory and of a consequence relation is that of minimal logic jm.
 The algorithmic system is Sjm of Denition 1.7.3. Theorem 1.7.4 shows the algorithm is
complete and sound.
 The abduction mechanism is Abdtop of Remark 1.7.12. The result is appended at the end of
the B list.
 A database is comprised of several lists of clauses and integrity constraints of the form
 = I P B A D
where I is the integrity constraint, P is the permanent data, B is the abduced data, A
is the additional data and D is
the default data.
 The update mechanism is as in Denitions 1.7.6 and 1.7.7, where for the purpose of per-
forming an update the list B is considered `protected' data while A  D is considered
`additional data'. This gives defaults higher priority than hypotheticals.
 Input of hypotheticals is appended to the end of the A list.
 The default mechanism is as in Denition 1.7.8 and the result of default is appended at the
end of the D list
Note that some of our decisions in dening the logic of Example 1.7.15 are not the most
reasonable. They need to be rened. We can be more careful how we update and more careful
where to input the results of abduction by looking at what part of the database was used in the
abduction. For example if we abduce q because of default rules, it makes more sense to put the
result in the default database then in the abduced database.
However, for the purpose of illustrating what we mean by a logical system with mechanisms,
the above is sucient.
In the most general case, databases are LDS databases and not just lists. In this case the
mechanisms and algorithms will be more complex.
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1.8 Semantics
We cannot address the problem of what is a logical system without saying something about our
view of semantics. The traditional view, for classical, intuitionisitc, or modal logic is to have some
notion of a class of models and of an evaluation procedure of a formula in a model. Thus we may
have a set K of models and a notion of validity in m 2 K of a formula A of the logic. We use the
notation m  A. Given no details on the internal structure of m and on how m  A is evaluated,
all we can say about the model is that m is a f0,1g function on ws. Completeness of K for j
means that the following holds:
 AjB i for all m 2 K (if m  A then m  B).
We would like to present a dierent view of semantics.
We would like to remain totally within the world of logical systems (in our sense, i.e. LDS with
mechanisms) and to the extent that semantics is needed, we bring it into the syntax. This can
obviously and transparently be done in modal logic where the labels denote possible worlds and
the proof rules closely reect semantical evaluation rules. This in fact can also be done in general.
So what then is the basic notion involved in a purely syntactical set up? What replaces the notions
of a `model', `evaluation', and completeness? We give the following denition. It must be taken
with care, as it is easy to give trivial interpretations.
Denition 1.8.1 (Syntactical semantics) Let j be a consequence relation and let K be a class
of consequence relations, not necessarily of the same language. for each j 2 K, let kj be an
interpretation of j into j. This involves mapping of the language of j into the language of j
and the following homomorphic commitment:
 AjB implies AjB (where A is kj(A) and resp. B).
We say j is complete for (K;k), i we have
 AjB i for all j 2 K; AjB.
Example 1.8.2 The following can be considered as semantical interpretations in our sense:
1. The Solovay{Boolos interpretation of modal logic G (with Lobs axiom) in Arithmetic, with
 meaning `provable'.
2. The interpretation of intuitionistic propositional logic into various sequences of intermediate
logics whose intersection is intuitionistic logic (e.g. the Jaskowski sequence).
3. The interpretation of modal logic into classical logic.
Remark 1.8.3 We gave a denition of interpretation for conseqeunce relations j. In the general
case, we have a general LDS proof system with algorithmic proof systems Sj and various mecha-
nisms. These should also be interpreted. Each algorithmic move in Sj should be interpreted as a
move package in Sj , and similarly for mechanisms.
It is possible to justify and motivate our syntactical notion of semantics from the more tradi-
tional one. Let us take as our starting point the notion of Scott-semantics described in [Gabbay,
1976].
Denition 1.8.4 Let L be a propositional language, for example the modal language with  or
intuitionistic language with !.
1. A model for the language is a function s assigning a value in f0; 1g to each w of the language.
2. A semantics S is a class of models.
3. Let  be a set of ws and A a w. We say  S A i for all s 2 S if s(B) = 1 for all
B 2  then s(A) = 1.
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The above denition relies on the intuition that no matter what our basic concepts of a `model'
or interpretation is, sooner or later we have to say whether a formula A `holds' in it or does not
`hold' in it. Thus the technical `essence' of a model is a f0; 1g function s (we ignore the possibility
of no value).
It can be shown that this notion of semantics can characterise any monotonic (syntactical)
consequence relation i.e. any relation j between sets  (including  = ?) of ws and ws A
satisfying reexivity, monotonicity and cut. Thus for any j there exists an S such that j equals
S .
Given the above point of view, the notion of syntactical semantics subsumes that of Scott
semantics. If, as in Denition 1.8.1, j is faithfully interpretable in a family of consequence relations
ji, and these in turn have Scott semantics Si, then we can derive Scott sematics S for j through
the interpretations. Conversely, given j and its Scott semantics S, let Si; i 2 I be a large enough
family of subsets of S and let ji be Si . Clearly the family fjig would be syntactical semantics
for j.
The semantics S can be given further structure, depending on the connectives of L. The simplest
is through the binary relation , dened as follows:
 t  s i (denition) for all ws A; t(A)  s(A).
Other relations can be dened on S. For example, if the original language is modal logic we can
dene:
 tRs i for all A of L if t(A) = 1 then s(A) = 1.
One can then postulate connections between values such as:
 t(A) = 1 i 8s[tRs) s(A) = 1]
or for a language with !:
 t(A! B) = 1 i 8s(t  s and s(A) = 1 imply s(B) = 1).
In some logics and their semantics the above may hold. For example, the respective conditions
above hold for the modal logic K and for intuitionistic logic. For other logics, further renements
are needed.
The nature of what is happening here can be best explained through a translation into classical
logic. The language L can be considered as a Herbrand universe of terms (i.e. the free algebra
based on the atomic propositions and the connectives acting as function symbols), and the models
considered as another sort of terms, (i.e. the names of the models can be terms). The `predicate'
t(A) = 1 can be considered as a two sorted predicate Hold(t; A). Thus the reductions above
become
 Hold(t;A) i 8s(tRs) Hold(s; A)), where tRs is 8B(Hold(t;B)) Hold(s; B)).
This condition reduces to
 8s[8X(Hold(t;X)) Hold(s; X))) Hold(s; A)]) Hold(t;A)
This is an internal reduction on Hold.
In general, we want to dene Hold(t; ](A1; : : : ; An)) in terms of some relations Ri(x1; : : : ; xni)
on sort t (rst coordinate ofHold), and the predicatesHold(x;Aj) for subformulas of ](A1; : : : ; An).
Ri(t1; : : : ; tni) in turn, are expected to be dened using Hold(ti; Xj) for some formulas Xj .
Thus in predicate logic we have formulas 'i and 	] such that:
 Hold(t; ](Ai; : : : ; An) i 	](t; Ri; Hold(xi; Aj))
 Ri(t1; : : : ; tni) i (denition) 'i(t1; : : : ; tni ; Hold(tj ; Xk)).
Together they imply a possible closure condition on the semantics
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 Hold(t; ](A1; : : : ; An) i 	](t; 'i(: : : ; Hold(tj ; Xk)); Hold(xi; Ak))
which may or may not hold.
Remark 1.8.5 (Represntation of Algebras) The above considerations can be viewed as a spe-
cial case of a general set-representation problem for algebras. Let A be an algebra with some func-
tion symbols fi satisfying some axioms. Take for example the language of lattices A = (A;u;t).
we ask the following question: Can A be represented as an algebra of sets? In other words, is there
a set S and a mapping h(a)  S, for a 2 A and a monadic rst-order langauge L1 on S involving
possibly some relation symbols R1; : : : ; Rk on S such that for all s 2 S and function symbol f of
the algebra we have the following inductive reduction, for all x1; : : : ; xn 2 A
s 2 h(f(x1; : : : ; xn) i  	f (s; h(x1); : : : ; h(xn))
where 	f is a modadic w of L1 involving R1; : : : ; Rk and the subsets h(xj).
If the relations R(t1; : : : ; tm) on S can be dened using h by some formula 'R of the algebra
(involving the classical connectives and equality and the monadic predicates on the algebra Ti(x)
meaning ti 2 h(x), then
 R(t1; : : : ; tm) i A  'R(T1; : : : ; Tm; R):
Compare with section 8.5.
Remark 1.8.6 (Dependent semantics) The above considerations are not the most general and
do not reect all that might happen. The considerations explain nicely semantics like that of modal
K, but we need renements.
Consider the logic K1 obtained by collecting all theorems of modal logic K together with the
schema A! A and the rule of modus ponens. Necessitation is dropped, so although K1 ` A!
A, we can still have K1 6` (A! A). See Example 3.4.8. This logic is complete for the class of
all Kripke structures of the form m = (Sm; Rm; am; hm), where amRam holds. Completeness
means
1. K1 ` A i for every m as above am  A
Let am be the function satisfying
2. am(A) = 1 i am  A
and let
3. S0 = fam jm as aboveg.
Then we have here a semantics S0  S (of the langauge L of modal logic) where am(A)
cannot be recuced to values of s(A) for s 2 S0, but can be reduced to values s(A), for s 2 S. This
is so because when we evaluate am  A, we evaluate at points b 2 Sm such that amRmb and the
Kripke structure but notnecessarily a K1 structure (S
m; Rm; b; hm) is a K structure as bRb need
not hold. Let bm be the function dened by
4. bm(A) = 1 i b  A in m.
we get
5. am(A) = 1 i for all s 2 fbm j amRbg, we have s(A) = 1.
Let '(a;b) mean as follows:
6. '(a;b) i (denition) for some m;a = am and b = b
m and amRb.
Then we have that K1 is characterised by a designated subset S0 of S and the truth denition:
7. s(A) = 1 i for all s0'(s; s0) and sRs0 imply s0(A) = 1.
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8. A  B i for all s 2 S0; s(A) = 1 implies s(B) = 1.
Compare with Example 4.1.3 for an essentially related meaning of '.
We are now ready to say what it means to give technical semantics t a consequence relation j.
Denition 1.8.7 (What is semantics for j) Let j be a consequence relation (Reexive and
trasitive) in a language with connectives. Then a semantics for j is any set theoretic representation
(in the sense of Remark 1.8.1) of the free term algebra based on j.
The previous denition does not take account of remark 1.8.6. If we want a better concept of
what is semantics, we need to talk about bred sematnics and label dependent connectives. These
topics will be addressed in chapter 15.
1.9 Conclusion
We have incrementally gone through several notions of `what is a logical system' and have ended
up with Denition 1.7.1 and Example 1.7.15 to illustrate it. This new concept of a logic is very far
from the traditional concept. In articial intelligence circles, what we call a `logic' is perceived as
an `agent' or `intelligent agent'. This is no accident. Whereas traditional logical systems (classical
logic, intuitionistic logic, linear logic) model mathematical reasoning and mathematical proof, our
new concept of logic attempts to model, and stay tuned to, human practical reasoning. What we
tried to do is to observe what features and mechanisms are at play in human practical reasoning,
and proceed to formalise them. The systems emerging from this formalisation we accept as the
new `logics'. It is therefore no surprise that in AI circles such systems are perceived as intelligent
agents. However, compared with AI, our motives are dierent. We are looking for general logical
principles of human reasoning and not necessarily seeking to build practical applied systems.
There is one more point to make before we can close this paper. The above `logics' manipulate
formulas, algebraic terms and in general syntactical symbols. We have maintained already in
1988 [Gabbay and Reyle, to appear] that deduction is a form of stylised movement, which can be
carried out directly on natural objects from an application area. Thus `logic' can be done not only
on syntactical formulas, but on any set of structured objects, naturally residing in some application
area.
To reason about gardening, for example, we can either represent the area in some language
and manipulate the syntax in some logic, or we can directly manipulate and move the plants
themselves and `show' the conclusion. The style of movement is the `logic'. This concept of logic
as movement is clearly apparent in automated reasoning. Dierent kinds of `shuing' licenced
by a theorem prover can lead to dierent `logics', because then dierent sets of theorems become
provable. Our insight was that similar movements can be applied directly on the objects of the
application areas, and therefore reasoning can be achieved directly in the application area without
formalisation. This philosophy has been carried out on Discourse Representation Structures in
[Gabbay and Reyle, to appear].
We now address the question of how we propose to tackle the classication of non-monotonic
systems. To explain our ideas, consider for the moment the theory of Boolean algebra. The class
of boolean algebras can be characterised axiomatically by writing the axioms of boolean algebra.
Any specic interesting Boolean algebra may or may not be characterisable using further axioms.
This is the declarative way of classifying algebras. If a logical system is taken as our object of study
(corresponding to a Boolean algebra) then the method of axiomatic presentation of consequence
relation corresponds to identifying Boolean algebras by further axioms. In the Boolean algebra
area, there is another way of identifying a certain algebra. We have a method of constructing
and generating more algebras from given algebras by taking products and subalgebras. So we can
start with the f0; 1g Boolean algebra and generate any algebra in this manner. Thus by the Stone
representation theorem, any boolean algebra can be represented as a subalgebra of a product of
f0; 1g algebras.
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Suppose now we want to identify a certain class of algebras in a natural way. It may be that
this class cannot naturally be identied by axioms nor can it be naturally constructed via a clearly
identiable sequence of products and subalgebras. It may be possible however to combine the two
methods. Give some axioms A and give some ways of constructing algebras, say C, and the desired
class is the intersection, we can denote that by (A;C). The analog in our case is clear. Axioms on
the consequence relation gives us the ` part and the LDS discipline gives us the S part. Together
they can identify a logic (`;S). See the Section `A case study: concatneation logic below.
Going back to our logics, what would be a mechanism for generating more logics? The answer
is simple. Given two logics L1 and L2, L1 is dened as a labelled deductive system. Replace the
labels of L1 by formulas of L2 and retain the L1 labelling discipline. Assuming the discipline can be
meaningfully applied to formulas of L2 as labels, the result will be a new logic L3. In simple words,
we use one logic on the labels, another logic on the rules to form a third logic. I agree that a lot of
these \generated" logics will not be interesting. That is not what is of importance here. What is
important is that we have a unifying mechanism LDS that when rened can generate known logics
and possibly other interesting logics. In the theory and construction of boolean algebras we can
also generate uninteresting systems, it is the good ones that we look at.





The previous chapter successively rened the notion of a logical system with a view of introducing
LDS as the most general concept of a logic. This chapter motivates LDS through many examples
from monotonic and nonmonotonic logics. Section 2.2 is mainly concerned with formulating known
and familiar monotonic logics as LDS. This will persuade the reader that LDS is general enough.
Section 2.3 presents many nonmonotonic systems and features as LDS. This should show that LDS
is indeed natural and comprehensive framework. Within LDS, the distinction between monotonic
and nonmonotonic systems is not important. Both kinds look essentially the same with some
variations. The rest of the sections in the chapter present case studies in depth, showing how
LDS presentations of known logics make us understand them much better and present them with
technical simplicity and elegance. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of
LDS.
2.2 Examples from implicational and monotonic logics
To motivate our approach we study several known examples in this section.
Example 2.2.1 below shows a standard deduction from Relevance Logic. The purpose of the
example is to illustrate our point of view. There are many such examples in Anderson and Belnap's
book. Example 2.2.3 below considers a derivation in modal logic. There we use labels to denote
essentially possible worlds. The objective of the example is to show the formal similarities to the
relevance logic case, Example 2.2.1. Example 2.2.4 can reap the benets of the formal similarities
of the rst two examples and introduce, in the most natural way, a system of relevant modal
logic. The objective of Example 2.2.4 is to show that the labels in Example 2.2.1 and Example
2.2.3 can be read as determining the metalanguage features of the logic and can therefore be
combined \declaratively" to form the new system of Example 2.2.4. Example 2.2.5 considers strict
implication. This example shows that for strict S4 implication one can read the labels either as
relevance labels or as possible world labels. Examples 2.2.6 and 2.2.7 show how labels can interact
with quantiers in modal logic.
Example 2.2.1 (Relevance and Linear Logic) Consider a propositional language with impli-
cation \!" only. The forward rule is modus ponens. From the theorem proving view, modus
ponens is an object language consideration. Thus a proof of ` (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B))
can proceed as follows:
Assume a1 : B ! A and show (A ! B) ! (A ! B). Further assume a2 : A ! B and show
A! B. Further assume a3 : A and show B. We thus end up with the following problem:
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Assumptions
1. a1 : B ! A
2. a2 : A! B
3. a3 : A
Derivation
4. a2a3 : B by modus ponens from lines (2) and (3).
5. a1a2a3 : A from (4) and (1).
6. a2a1a2a3 : B from (5) and (2).
7. a2a1a2 : A! B from (3) and (6).
8. a2a1 : (A! B)! (A! B) from (2) and (7).
9. a2 : (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B)) from (1) and (8).
The meta-aspect of this proof is the annotation of the assumptions and the keeping track of
what was used in the deduction. A metalevel condition would determine the logic involved.
A formal denition of the labelling discipline for this class of logics will be given in a later
chapter. For this example it is sucient to note the following three conventions:
1. A deduction task has labelled assumptions and a labelled goal (later we will allow several
goals). Each new assumption is labelled by a new atomic label.
An ordering on the labels can be imposed, namely a1 < a2 < a3. This is to reect the fact
that the assumptions arose from our attempt to prove (B ! A) ! ((A ! B) ! (A ! B))
and not for example from (A ! B) ! ((B ! A) ! (A ! B)) in which case the ordering
would be a2 < a1 < a3. The ordering can aect the proofs in certain logics.
2. If in the proof A is labelled by the multiset  and A ! B is labelled by  then B can be
derived with a label  [  where \[" denotes multiset union.
3. If B was derived using A as evidenced by the fact that the label  of A is a atomic and is
in the label  of B( 2 ) then we can derive A ! B with the label     (\-" is multiset
subtraction).
The derivation can be represented in a more graphical way.
To show (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B)), we use the metabox of Fig 2.1.
This is a way of representing the deduction. Note that in line 11, multiset subtraction was used
and only one copy of the label a2 was taken out. The other copy of a2 remains and cannot be
cancelled. Thus this formula is not a theorem of linear logic because the outer box does not exit
with label ?. In relevance logic, the discipline uses sets and not multisets. Thus the label of line
11 in this case would be a1 and that of line 12 would be ?. Strictly speaking we get R-mingle, a
variation of relevance logic.
The above deduction can be made even more explicit as follows:
(B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B)) follows with a label from Box a1.
Box a1
a1 : B ! A assumption
a2a1 : (A! B)! (A! B) from Box a2
Box a2
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Box a1 1 show (A! B)! (A! B)
2 a1 : B ! A
Box a2 3 show A! B
4 a2 : A! B
Box a3 5 show B
6 a3 : A
7 a2a3 : B
8 a1a2a3 : A
9 a2a1a2a3 : B
exit 10 a2a1a2 : A! B
exit 11 a2a1 : (A! B)! (A! B)
exit 12 a2 : (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B))
Figure 2.1:
a2 : A! B assumption
a2a1a2 : A! B from Box a3
Box a3
a3 : A assumption
a2 : A! B reiteration from box a2
a2a3 : B by modus ponens
a1 : B ! A reiteration from box a1
a1a2a3 : A modus ponens from the two preceding lines
a2 : A! B repetition of an earlier line
a2a1a2a3 : B modus ponens from the two preceding lines
The following metarule was used:
We have a system of partially ordered metaboxes a1 < a2 < a3. Any assumption in a box a
can be reiterated in any box b provided a < b. In this example the box structure is not necessary
but in general it might be useful.
Remark 2.2.2 a. The above presentation of the boxes makes them look more like possible
worlds. The labels are the worlds and formulas can be exported from one world to another
according to some rules. The next example describes modal logic in just this way.
b. Note that dierent metaconditions on labels and metaboxes correspond to dierent logics.
The following table gives intuitively some correspondence between metaconditions and logics.
A precise denition can be found in Chapter 9.
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Metacondition: Logic
ignore the labels intuitionistic logic
accept only the derivations relevance logic
which use all the assumptions
accept derivations which linear logic
use all assumptions exactly once
The metaconditions can be translated into object conditions in terms of axioms and rules. If
we consider a Hilbert system with modus ponens and substitution then the additional (not
necessarily independent) axioms involved are given below:
Linear Logic
A! A
(A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C))
(C ! A)! ((B ! C)! (B ! A))
(C ! A)! ((A! B)! (C ! B))
Relevance Logic
Add the schema below to linear logic:
(A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C))
R-Mingle
Add the schema below to relevance logic:
A! (A! A)
Intuitionistic Logic
Add the schema below to relevance logic:
A! (B ! A)
The reader can note that the following axiom (Peirce Rule) yields classical logic. The cor-
responding metacondition is the Restart Rule, to be given in Chapter 3. We shall see that
for example, we can dene \Linear Classical Logic" by adding Peirce Rule to linear logic. A
new logic is obtained.
Classical Logic
Add the schema below to intuitionistic logic:
((A! B)! A)! A:
Example 2.2.3 (Modal logic) This example shows the metalevel-object level division in the
case of modal logic. Modal logic has to do with possible worlds. We thus think of our basic
database (or assumptions) as a nite set of information about possible worlds. This consists of two
parts. The conguration part, the nite conguration of possible worlds for the database, and the
assumptions part which tells us what formulas hold in each world. The following is an example of
a database:
Assumptions Conguration
(1) t : B t < s
(2) s : (B ! C)
The conclusion to show (or query) is:
t : C:
The derivation is as follows:
3. From (2) create a new point r with s < r and get r : B ! C.
We thus have
Assumptions Conguration
(1), (2), (3) t < s < r
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4. From (1), since t < s get s : B.
5. From (4) since s < r get r : B.
6. From (5) and (3) we get r : C.
7. From (6) since s < r get s : C.
8. From (7) using t < s we get t : C.
Discussion:
The object rules involved are:
E Rule:
t < s; t : A
s : A
I Rule:




create a new point s with t < s and deduce s : A
Note that the above rules are not complete. We do not have rules for deriving, for example,
A. Also, the rules are all for intuitionistic modal logic. Modal and temporal logics will be studied
in a special chapter.
The metalevel consideration may be properties of <, such as transitivity
t < s and s < r implies t < r
or linearity:
t < s or t = s or s < t etc.
Example 2.2.4 (Modal relevance logic) The reader can already see the benet of separating
the metalevel and the object level features. We can combine both the metalevel features of Examples
2.2.1 and 2.2.3 to create for example a modal relevance logic in a natural way. Each assumption
has a relevance label as well as world label. Thus the proof of the previous example becomes the
following:
Assumptions Conguration
(1) (a1; t) : B t < s
(2) (a2; s) : (B ! C)
We proceed to create a new label r using E rule. The relevance label is carried over. We have
t < s < r.
3. (a2; r) : B ! C
Using E rule with relevance label carried over, we have:
4. (a1; s) : B
5. (a1; r) : B
Using modus ponens with relevance label updated
6. (a1; a2; r) : C
Using I rule:
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7. (a1; a2; s) : C
8. (a1; a2; t) : C
(8) means that we got t : C using both assumptions a1 and a2.
There are two serious problems in modal and temporal theorem proving. One is that of Skolem
functions for 9xA(x) and 9xA(x) are not logically the same. If we skolemise we get A(c).
Unfortunately it is not clear where c exists, in the current world (9x = cA(x)) or the possible
world (9x = cA(x)).
If we use labelled assumptions then, t : 9xA(x) becomes t : A(c) and it is clear that c is
introduced at t.
On the other hand, the assumption t : 9xA(x) will be used by the E rule to introduce a
new point s; t < s and conclude s : 9xA(x). We can further skolemise at s and get s : A(c), with
c introduced at s. We thus need the mechanism of remembering or labelling constants as well, to
indicate where they were rst introduced.
Labelling systems for modal and temporal logics will be studied in a later Chapter.
Example 2.2.5 (S4 Strict implication) The following example describes the logic of modal S4
strict implication. In this logic the labels can be read either as relevance labels or as possible worlds.
S4 strict implication A! B can be understood as a temporal connective, as follows:
\A ! B is true at world t i for all future worlds s to t and for t itself we have that if A is
true at s then B is true at s". Thus A! B reads \From now on, if A then B".
Suppose we want to prove that A ! B and A ! (B ! C) imply A ! C. To show this we
reason semantically and assume that at time t, the two assumptions are true. We want to show
that A! C is also true at t. To prove that we take any future time s, assume that A is true at s
and show that C is also true at s. We thus have the following situation:
1. t : A! B
2. t : A! (B ! C)
3. t : A! C, from box
3.1 Assume s : A Show s : C
Since s is in the future of t, we get that at s,
(1) and (2) are also true.
3.2 s : A! B from (1)
3.3 s : A! (B ! C) from (2)
We now use modus ponens, because X ! Y means
\from now on, if X then Y "
3.4 s : B
3.5 s : B ! C from (3.1) and (3.3)
3.6 s : C modus ponens from (3.4) and (3.5)
exit t : A! C
Notice that any t : D can be brought into (reiterated) the box as s : D, provided it has
an implicational form, D = D1 ! D2. We can thus regard the labels above as simply naming
assumptions (not as possible worlds) and the logic has the reiteration rule which says that only
implications can be reiterated.
Let us add a further note to sharpen our understanding. Suppose! is read as aK4 implication
(ie transitivity without reexivity). Then the above proof should fail. Indeed the corresponding
restriction on modus ponens is that we do perform X;X ! Y ` Y in a box, provided X ! Y is a
reiteration into the box and was not itself derived in that same box. This will block line (3.6).
Example 2.2.6 (The Barcan formula) Another example has to do with the Barcan formula
Assumption Conguration
(1) t : 8xA(x) t < s




1. t : A(x) (stripping 8x, remembering x is arbitrary).
2. Since the conguration contains s; t < s we get
s : A(x)
3. Since x is arbitrary we get
s : 8xA(x)
The above intuitive proof can be restricted.
The rule
t : A(x); t < s
s : A(x)
is allowed only if x is instantiated.
To allow the above rule for arbitrary x is equivalent to adopting the Barcan formula axiom:
8xA(x)! 8xA(x)
Example 2.2.7 (More on the Barcan formula) To show 8xA(x)! 8xA(x) in the modal
logic where it is indeed true.
1. Assume t : 8xA(x)
We show 8xA(x) by the use of the metabox:
create ; t < 
(2) t : A(x) from (1)
(3)  : A(x) from (2) using a rule
which allows this with x a variable.
(4)  : 8xA(x) universal generalisation.
(5) Exit: t : 8xA(x).
This rule has the form:
Create ; t < 
Argue to get  : B
Exit with t : B
The above are just a few examples for the scope we get using labels. The exact details and
correspondences will be worked out in the main body of the book.
A later chapter develops the formal mechanism we use in LDS, the mechanism of theMetabox.
To explain intuitively what is involved, we look at a few more examples in this section and redo
some of our earlier examples in the framework of the Metabox.
If we use modus ponens to go forward, we cannot prove theorems like
A! (B ! C) ` B ! (A! C):
To achieve that, we need to be able to use some metarule like the deduction theorem. We need to
assume B and show that B;A ! (B ! C) ` A ! C and then further assume A and show that
A;B;A! (B ! C) ` C.
Formally in the framework of labelled deduction we have to allow for a mechanism similar to
the \assume" mechanism and we have to indicate what is the label of the assumption.
The general framework is the metabox rule.
Metabox:
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( ) Assume the assumptions i : Ai (this is the input).
( ) Prove within the metabox and get j : Bj .
( ) Exit the metabox with k : Ck.
Example 2.2.8 Relevance Reasoning
The indices are ; ; and  = (   ). The reasoning structure is:
Assume  : A; atomic
Show  : B
If  2  then exit with (   ) : A! B.
To show A! (B ! C) ` B ! (A! C)
Assume
a1 : A! (B ! C)
we use the metabox to show B ! (A! C): See g 2.2.
1 Show A! C
2 a2 : B assumption
3 Show C
4 a3 : A assumption
5 a1a3 : B ! C
6 a1a3a2 : C
exit 7 a1a2 : A! C
exit 8 a1 : B ! (A! C)
Figure 2.2:
Example 2.2.9 ( Lukasiewicz many valued logics) Consider Lukasiewicz innite valued logic,
where the values are all real numbers or rationals in [0,1]. We designate 0 as truth and the truth
table for implication is
x! y = max(0; y   x)
Here the language contains atoms and implication only, assignments h give values to atoms in [0,1],
h(q) 2 [0; 1] and h is extended to arbitrary formulas via the table for ! above. Dene the relation
A1; : : : ; An ` B
to mean that for all h; h(A1) + : : :+ h(An) = h(B), where + is a numerical addition.
This logic can be regarded as a labelled deductive system, where the labels are values t 2 [0; 1].
t : A means that h(A) = t, for a given background h. The interesting part is that to show t : A! B
(ie that A! B has value t) we assume x : A (ie that A has value x) and then have to show that
B has value t+ x, ie show t+ x : B.
This is according to the table of !.
Thus in box form, Fig 2.3:
This has the same structure as the case of relevance logic, where + was understood as concate-
nation.
A full study of many valued logics is given in a subsequent chapter.
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x : A assumption
...
...
t+ x : B
Figure 2.3:
Example 2.2.10 (Formulas as Types) Another instance of the natural use of labels is the
Curry-Howard interpretation of formulas as types. This interpretation conforms exactly to our
framework. In fact, our framework gives the incentive to extend the formulas as types interpre-
tation in a natural way to other logics, such as linear and relevance logics and surprisingly, also
many valued logics, modal logics, and intermediate logics. A formula is considered as a type and
its label is a denable -term of the same type. Given a system for dening -terms, the theorems
of the logic are all those types which can be shown non empty.
The basic propagation mechanism corresponding to modus ponens is:
tA : A
tA!B : A! B
tA!B(tA) : B
It is satised by application.
Thus if we read the + in tA!B + tA as application, we get the exact parallel to the general
schema of propagation. Compare with relevance logic where + was concatenation, and with many
valued logics where + was numerical addition!
To show t : A ! B we assume x : A, with x arbitrary, ie start with a term x of type A, use
the proof rules to get B. As we saw, applications of modus ponens generate more terms which
contain x in them via application. If we accept that proofs generate functionals, then we get B
with a label y = t(x). Thus t = xt(x). This again conforms with our general schema for !.
In a later chapter on the Curry-Howard interpretation we shall exploit this idea systematically.
There are two mechanisms which allow us to restrict or expand our ability to dene terms of any
type. We can restrict -abstraction, (eg allow xt(x) only if x actually occurs in t), this will give us
logics weaker than intuitionistic logic, or we can increase our world of terms by requiring diagrams
to be closed eg, for any ' of classical logic such that
` (A! B)! ['(A)! '(B)]
in classical logic, we want the following diagram to be complete, ie for any term t there must exist










Take for example the formula A ! (B ! A) as type. We want to show a denable term of
this type, we can try and use the standard proof (see Fig 2.5), however, with the restriction on









-abstraction which requires the abstracted variable to actually occur in the formula, we cannot
exit the inner box.
Example 2.2.11 (Realisability Interpretation) The well known realisability interpretation
for intuitionistic implication is another example of a functional interpretation for ! which has
the same universal LDS form. A notation for a recursive function feg realises an implication
A! B, i for any n which realises A; feg(n) realises B. Thus
e : A! B i 8n[n : A) feg(n) : B]
It is an open problem to nd an axiomatic description of the set of all ws which are realisable.
2.3 Examples from non-monotonic logics
The examples in the previous section are from the area of monotonic reasoning. This section will
give examples from non-monotonic reasoning. As we have already mentioned, we hope that the
idea of LDS will unify these two areas.
The next example shows how labels can be used for information sources and priorities.
Example 2.3.1 (Mother-in-law) Let B(a) be a literal meaning `It is a sound investment for Dov




































The accountant and lawyer recommend that I buy the house. So do I and so does my wife. I
like it, the accountant thinks I have the money and it is a good move. The lawyer checked with
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his assistant the legal aspects as well as with his informer in City Hall. The area development plan
looks good. So practically everybody agrees that B(a) is true except the mother-in-law. For her
own (non-logical) reasons she says no. Figure 2.6 represents a labelled database. The tree structure
gives the priorities. It is not a situation theory \situation" in spirit because it is not semantic. It
is just an LDS representing the hierarchy of information where the labels are prioritised sources.












We need a further mechanism (logical or not) to draw a conclusion from this database. We
need to know the answer to the following question: is the nal conclusion B(a) or is it  B(a). In
a general setting, we need one mechanism (proof theory) for the relation  ` t : A, for arbitrary
; t; A and another mechanism which we call attening to `abstract' from the sets ft j  ` t :
Ag; fs j  ` s : Ag a nal conclusion  ` A or  ` A or neither, see Section 1.5.
Example 2.3.2 (Ordered Logic) An ordered logic database is a partially ordered set of local
databases, each local database being a set of clauses. The following diagram (gure 2.8) describes


































ordered as in the gure.
To motivate such databases, consider an ordinary logic program C1 = fp  :qg. The com-
putation of logic program assumes that, since q is not a head of any clause, :q is part of the
data, (this is the closed world assumption). Suppose we relinquish this principle and adopt the
principle of asking an advisor what to do with :q. The advisor might say that :q succeeds or
might say that :q fails. The advisor might have his own program to consult. If his program is
C2, he might run the goal q (or :q), look at what he gets and then advise. To make the situation
symmetrical and general we must allow for Horn programs to have rules with both q and :q (ie
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literals) in heads and bodies and have any number of negotiating advisors. Thus we can have
C2 = f:qg; C1 = fq  :qg and C1 depends on C2. Ordered logic develops and studies various
aspects of such an advisor system which is modelled as a partially ordered set of theories. Such
a logic is useful, eg for multi-expert systems where we want to represent the knowledge of several
experts in a single system. Experts may then be oredered according to an \advisory" or a relative
preference relation.
A problem to consider is what happens when we have several advisors that are in conict. For
example, C1 depends on C2 and C1 depends on C3. The two advisers, C2 and C3, may be in
conict. One may advise :q, the other q. How to decide? There are several options:
1. We can accept q if all advisors say yes to q.
2. We can accept q if at least one advisor says yes to q.
3. We can apply some nonmonotonic or probabilistic mechanism to decide.
If we choose options (1) or (2) we are essentially in modal logic. To have a node t and to
have ?q refer to advisors t1; : : : ; tn with t < ti; i = 1; : : : ; n is like considering ?q at t in modal
logic with t1; : : : ; tn possible worlds in option 1 and like considering q at t in option (2). Option
(3) is more general, and an LDS approach is most useful. We see from this advisors examples an
application area where the labels arise naturally and usefully. The area of ordered logic is surveyed
in [Vermeir and Laenens, 1990].
Example 2.3.3 (Defeasible Logic) This major approach to non-monotonic reasoning was in-
troduced by [Nute, 1986]. The idea is that rules can prove either an atom q or its negation :q. If
two rules are in conict, one proving q and one proving :q, the deduction that is stronger is from
a rule whose antecedent is logically more specic. Thus the database:
Bird (x)! Fly (x)
Big (x) ^ Bird (x)! : Fly (x)
Big (a)
Bird (a)
will entail : Fly (a) because the second rule is more specic.
As an LDS system the labelling of rules in a database  is very simple. We label a rule by its
antecedent. The ordering of the labels is done by logical strength relative to some background theory
 (which can be a subtheory of  of some form). Deduction pays attention to strength of labels.
The previous examples motivated the need for the database to be labelled. The following examples
motivate how a database in itself can be labelled and how it can in itself serve as a label. This will
enhance the analogy between the label and the situation.
Example 2.3.4 (Jethrow's Career) Figure 2.9 is a database labelled S about Jethrow's per-
formance.
S:
Student: good teacher (J),
survey
Letters: good research (J),
Students: fatherly gure (J)
Figure 2.9:
The label involved indicates the source supporting the truth of the predicate. The following
database, gure 2.10, lists candidates for directorship of a new Max-Planck Institute in Germany.
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mp:
(fairly strong, S): candidate (J),
(preferred, t): candidate (H),
Figure 2.10:
The database is labelled mp. It contains data about candidates labelled by their source, and some
non-numeric evaluation.
Here we see that a whole database can be a label in another. There are two ways of looking
at this phenomenon. One is to view the database as being a label. Another is to allow for links
between databases via their labels.
Example 2.3.5 (Linked Databases) Consider two lists of data of the form  and   below.
 = (t1 : A1; t2 : A2; t3 : A3; : : :)
  = (s1 : B1; s2 : B2; s3 : B3; : : :)
The two databases come with a link between t2 and s3. This can be formally described via a
special operator
Link ((t2); (s3); t2; s3):
The link can be understood in one of several ways:
1. ti; si are situations and Ai, Bj are infons, and the link is a constraint. In this case more
information about the link needs to be given.
2. ;  are two databases. ti; sj are the transaction times (in increasing temporal order) in
which the items of data were put in the database.
The links are the synchronisation between some items (ie t2 = s3).
3. The ti; sj are labels naming actions. The declarative formulas Ai; Bj are the respective post
conditions of the actions. The link signies some connection (to be additionally specied)
between the actions. For example, the link can mean that one action should precede another.
Example 2.3.6 (Propositional Circumscription) Circumscription is dened semantically, via
satisfaction in minimal models. Surprisingly, results of N Olivetti allow one to present an LDS
discipline for (at least) propositional circumscription.
To explain the idea let `m denote consequence in minimal models. For this consequence we
have, for example, p _ q `m :p _ :q, which does not follow in classical logic. Suppose we try
and nd a semantic tableaux counter model for the above. In classical logic we try the tableaux
construction and if all the top nodes are closed then there is no countermodel. For `m we just
change the notion of \closed". This can depend on labelling. A more precise study of this theme
will be done later. See [Olivetti, ].
Example 2.3.7 (Application to Planning) The notion of a structured database allows one to
give a logical modelling to actions. To give an idea of how it is done, consider a blocks world
example. Assume three blocks a, b and c and the initial state (model) 1 to be fon (a, c), on
(table, b), on (table, a)g. We move c from the top of a by our rst action  and put it on the
table and then move it again and put it on b by action . The question is can we model the pair
(1;   )? Clearly after executing  we get 2 = f on (table, a), on (table, b), on (table, c)g and
after executing  we get 3 = fon (table, a) , on (table, b), on (b, c)g. If we want one database to
model (1;   ), we can use the following structured database, where 0; ;  are labels.
0. on (a, c)
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0. on (table, b)
0. on (table, a)
: on (table, c)
: on (b, c)
0 <  < .
If we ask the query ?(on (x, c) we get three answers with three labels: 0: on (a, c); : on
(table, , c); : on ( b, c).
The situtation is no dierent from a previous Example 2.3.3 where we get Fly(a) and : Fly
(a) from dierent parts of the database. The relative strength of the data will determine which
answer is accepted.
To sum up, we are saying we can model actions by adding their results to the data to form a
structured database.
Example 2.3.8 (Probabilistic Nets) A typical example is a network of dependencies of the
































There are various probabilistic dependencies in the network and one can put in numerical values
at the nodes. If some of the values are known, the network can predict values at the remaining
nodes. Thus
network ` value x: node t
means that the value x is predicted at the node t.
Suppose we put in a value y at the node Smoker. On the basis of that and the other values
we get a value x at node t. Suppose the value y: Smoker was obtained from another network, for
example Figure 2.12
on the grounds that hippies smoke because they are hippies and yuppies smoke because they are
stressed.
The Surgical Cut rule means that if we replace in the rst network the node \Smoker" by the
second diagram to obtain a new more complex network, then the complex network will give the
same answer at t.
A notion of proper replacement (or Substitution) needs to be dened, which will include adjust-
ments of the probability dependencies between nodes. Such adjustment is possible. There are work-
ing systems of this kind. One such a commercial system is HUGIN, based on [Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 8].
Example 2.3.9 (Databases as labels) Let M be the theory of sequences of numbers and A
algebra of labels and L classical language. Here is a database (gure 2.13).














1. t1 : A1
2. t2 : 1: r1 : B1 2: r2 : B2 .
3. 1: n1 : C1 2: n2 : C2; 3: n3 : C3 : D
Figure 2.13:
The database is labelled s. It has three items in it, t1 : A1; t2 : A2; t3 : A3. The rst, t1 : A1 is
a pure declarative unit. The second is a labelled database (ie A2 is a database) and the third is a
declarative unit with formula D and a database as a label, t3.
Example 2.3.10 (Situation semantics (Barwise and Perry)) Situation semantics, introduced
in the early 1980's, is based on dierent basic notions. The primitives of the theory are situations
(standing for events, properties and relations), and not models and possible worlds. These are
partial states of the real worlds. Formally the situation when compared with the traditional notion
of a model, should be considered as some limited parts of a model. But these situations can also
be elements of situations, standing in relations to one another and to other things.
Types of situations, called infons, take the form of a collection of basic facts. The infons, ,
are to be considered as properties holding of situations s. This relation is denoted by s  . These
properties divide the situations into situation types. Declarative assertions are called propositions,
they are comprised of a situation and a type of situation (infon) representing the assertion that the
situation is of the indicated type. The notion of constraints is understood as a relation between
types of situations. This relation is of the form si  i ) sj  j , namely: If in some situation
si; i holds then in some other situtation sj ; j holds, (eg if there is smoke, there was re). The
traditional notion of a consequence relation is replaced by the notion of an information containment
system (ICS). These are structures (S;;) which contain situations s 2 S and infons  2  as
above, together with a relation of the form s  :
The formal connection of LDS with situation semantics is as follows:
 the label corresponds to the situation
 the formula corresponds to the infon.
This connection is not supercial or just mathematically formal. It is basic and conceptual. By
connection, however, we do not necessarily mean agreement. By connection we mean that both
disciplines focus on more or less the same phenomena and try to address them their own way.
Consider the basic intuition of situation semantics, that the traditional models are not adequate
and that the basic notion should be that of a limited situation, s, a portion of reality with various
facts holding at that context. An infon  is a bit of information holding in s. If we represent
the information of the infon  by a formula A, then we can annotate the formula by a label t,
to indicate the kind of situation s in which the formula holds. Thus s :  becomes t : A. We
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can also represent this intuition by annotating formulas A by s yielding a pair s : A, indicating
which \contexts" A is to be \applied". Conversely, assume we are given a labelled declarative unit
t : A, if we want to give it appropriate semantical interpretation in a model, we need to interpret
the label t in the model as well as the formula A. If we dene a satisfaction relation of the form
M  t : A then, by varying t we get various contexts t, within the model M , which can be viewed
as the situations Mt with A as the infon, and we can let Mt  A mean M  t : A.
The formal connection between the two theories can be given as follows:
1. An ICS is a system (S;;) where S are the situations  2  are the infons and s   is
the support relation. This can be turned into a formal LDS theory by letting the labels be
S, the atomic formulas be  and take the proof system to be identity (namely we let A ` B
i A = B and  ` A i A 2 ).
2. Conversely, given an LDS theory , an ICS can be derived by letting s 2 S be the labels,
 2  be the set of formulas and  be dened by s   i  ` s : .
Let us work out a detailed example of an LDS which is at the same time an Information
Containment System.
1. A time-location situation theory
(a) Let fl1; l2; : : :g be a set of indices for locations and ft1; t2; : : : ; g be a set of indices for
times. Let fRn11 ; Rn22 ; : : :g be a set of preidcates of the indicated arity and fa1; a2; : : :g
be a set of individuals.
(b) A situation is a set of tuples of the form
 = (t; l; Rnii ; a1; : : : ; ani ; )
where  2 f0; 1g. The meaning of  is that at time t and location l the relation Ri
holds (for  = 1) or does not hold (for  = 0) between the individuals a1; : : : ; ani .
(c) We write s  s0 i for all ;  2 s implies  2 s0.
(d) A set S of situations is called realist if S is directed under . This notion is equivalent
to there being a temporal-location model for S.
(e) A situation is coherent if it does not contain both (t; l; R; a1; : : : ; an; 0) and (t; l; R; a1; : : : ; an; 1)
for the same relation.
(f) Let the language for infons be many sorted predicate logic with atoms of the form
R2+nii (t; l; a1; : : : ; ani) where the rst sort is for time variables, the second sort for
location and the rest is for individuals.
(g) An infon is a disjunction of conjunctions of literals of the language. A literal is either
an atom or its negation. We write literals R(t; l; a1; : : : ; an)
 , to mean R(t; l; a1; : : : ; an)
for  = 1 and :R(t; l; a1; : : : ; an) for  = 0.
(h) Given a situation s and an infon  = _i ^i ij , where ij are literals we say s   i for
some i we have that for all j, s  ij .
We say s  R(t; l; a1; : : : ; an) i (t; l; R; a1; : : : ; an; ) 2 s.
We now have an ICS, Information Containment System (S; ;).
2. Translating in general an ICS into LDS
Let us see how this would be represented as an LDS. We rst do a general construction and
later do an LDS system for this particular example.
To turn any ICS system (S; ;) into an LDS, we take (S;) as our algebra of labels
A and M, and take  as our language L. We choose a particular labelled theory  to be
fs :  j s  g and dene an LDS-consequence from any  by  `  : A i  : A 2 . This
consequence ` will give us back, in the case of , our relation , namely s   i  ` s : .
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The relation  satises  ` s :  and s  s0 implies  ` s0 : .
Conversely, given any LDS system and any theory , we can dene an information contain-
ment system (dependent on ) by taking:
S = set of labels
 = set of formulas
and dene
s   if  ` s : :
The relation  has to be dened externally as s  s0 i for all ; s   implies s0  .
3. An LDS formulation of the time location example
We now look at the example in (1) and see how we would naturaly turn it into an LDS theory.
Since in LDS the emphasis is on syntax, we would take as our labels triples (s; t; l) of the
situation, time and location. We take as our formulas literals of the form R(a1; : : : ; an).
The basic declarative unit is (s; t; l) : R(a1; : : : ; an). The relation  can be arbitrarily
dened on the labels and can be written as (s1; t1; l1)  (s2; t2; l2) meaning the situation s1
at (t1; l1) is part of the situation s2 at (t1; l2). (We may wish to require that t1 = t2 and
l1 = l2 depending whether you accept that the same situation can arise at dierent times
and places. It is up to us to formulate what we want).
A theory is a constellation of declarative units. The following is an example of a theory
f : R1(a; b); : :R2(c; d; a);  :g
;  are triples (labels).
The proof theory is very simple:
 : A;  
 : A
:
This reects the fact that  contains .
Let  be any theory, e.g. the above theory. We get an ICS from it by letting
S = fa; g
 = set of  literals
s   i  ` s : 
If we externally dene  0  i for all ;    implies   , we get that 0 is the same as
, since the proof rules ensure that.
For example, let us show that for the above , we have
  R1(a; b):
Here is the proof:
(a)  : R1(a; b) given in 
(b)    given
(c)  : R1(a; b) by rule
Note that so far, our language L does not allow for labels in the formulas. Thus formally
situations cannot appear inside infons. This is only a formality because the label algebra A can
be a sublanguage of L. In fact the LDS discipline allows for label dependent connectives.
Example 2.3.11 (Fallacies) The reader should note that our point of view and the use of labels
is genuinely more general and is capable of yielding more. We describe an unexpected application of
our view. There is a serious, well-motivated and well-organised community; the informal logic and
argumentation community, studying the nature of human reasoning and argumentation in general
and attempting to foundationally explain the role of the fallacies in human arguments. Fallacies
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are argument structures which appear to be correct and convincing, but are actually wrong. Many
of them can be eectively used in some situations, but not in others. Any account of real life
human practical reasoning must give account of the fallacies. Well known among them is the
fallacy Ad Hominem, the fallacy of attacking not the argument but the person presenting it. This
kind of reasoning is sometimes acceptable and sometimes not. It is generally considered non-
logical, although admittedly extensively used by the human practical reasoner. In our framework,
this fallacy has a natural place.
Consider the notion of a database . This is a structure of declarative units of the form t : A,
where t is the label and A the formula. The label t annotates A. Suppose the annotation indicates
the priority of the formula A and that in an external ordering < gives the relative strength of the
priorities. Thus a priority database can be for example
ft : A! C; s : B; t < sg
t and s can be numbers of algebraic terms and t < s indicates that B has a higher priority than A.
This priority can be used in derivation. For example, in the presence of A! :C;B ! C of equal
priority, C will be derived.
The data items A and B are formulas of the logic L1, which is applied to some application
area. In many areas it is quite reasonable to have the labels themselves be formulas ;  of another
language and logic L2, describing the origin and nature of the data items, A;B. Some reasoning
in L2 may be available to determine the priority (if any) of  and . A formula 	(; ) and a
base theory  (possibly dependent on ) of L2 may be used for this purpose, i.e. we have:
   i  `2 	(; ):
The simplest condition (in case L2 has some form of implication) is
   i  `2  ! :
Note that our labels are ws  of L2 labelling ws A of L1 and the base theory  determines
the priorities of labels. We now explain the logical force of the fallacy by an example. Suppose we
are faced with the following deduction.
 : A! :C
 : B ! C
 : A
 : B
 `2  ! 
We must conclude C, because  has higher priority than . To counter this argument, we may
either prove :C from additional data or we may attack the source of information, i.e. add 0 to
 or try and show that [0 6`2  ! ?, (Note that L2 reasoning is also non-monotonic!). This
move appears to us as attacking, not the argument, but its source. However, in the correct context
(priority logic) it is a correct move. Other fallacies which are explainable in this framework are
Ad Verecundiam, appeal to unsuitable authority, where the labelling is incorrect and fallacies of
irrelevance. A systematic study of the fallacies in our context will (hopefully) be done elsewhere.
[Gabbay, 1994]
Example 2.3.12 (Dempster{Shafer Rule) Section 1.6 discussed the feature of aggregating ar-
guments and evidence towards a conclusion. Examples 4.1.1 and 1.6.1 are sample cases. The
present example presents a very well known rule of aggregation, the Dempster{Shafer rule. Our
exposition relies on [Ng and Subrahmanian, 1994].
The algebra A we are dealing with is the set of all subintervals of the unit interval [0,1]. The
Dempster{Shafer addition on these intervals is dened by
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where k = a  (1   d) + c  (1   b), where `', `+', ` ' are the usual arithmetical operations. The
compatibility condition required on a; b; c; d is
'([a; b]; [c; d])  k 6= 1:
The operation  is commutative and associative. Let e = [0; 1].
The following also holds:
 [a; b] e = [a; b]
 For [a; b] 6= [1; 1] we have [a; b] [0; 0] = [0; 0]
 For [a; b] 6= [0; 0] we have [a; b] [1; 1] = [1; 1]
 [a; b] [c; d] = ? i either [a; b] = [0; 0] and [c; d] = [1; 1] or [a; b] = [1; 1] and [c; d] = [0; 0].
In this algebra, we understand the declarative unit [a; b] : A as saying that the probability of the
event represented by A lies in the interval [a; b]. We have, of course
[a; b] : A! B; [c; d] : A
;
[a; b] [c; d] : B
provided '([a; b]; [c; d]) holds.
It is also possible to move to a higher language and write clauses of the form
t : (t1 : A1)! ((t2 : A2)! (t3 : A3))
which is more like the way clauses are used in traditional Dempster{Shafer applications. Such
languages are studied in Section 8.6.
2.4 Case study: Concatenation logic and linear logic
This section will illustrate the ideas of previous sections by applying them to one case study,
that of concatenation logic CL. We give a Hilbert system formulation, an LDS formulation, and
an consequence relation formulation for concatenation logic. We describe its data structures,
deduction theorem and semantics. The full details will be developed later, in the chapters on
resource logics.
A database in this logic is a sequence of formulas (A1; : : : ; An). To derive B from the database
we must \use" the assumptions in the order shown. Further when we use modus ponens A;A !
B ` B, the ticket A! B must be supported by assumptions earlier in the data sequence than all
those which support the minor premise A. Thus, for example
1. A! (B ! C)
2. B
3. A
does not prove C because we have to start by using (1) and (3) \jumping over" (2). However,
1. A! (B ! C)
2. A
3. B
does prove C because (1) and (2) give (B ! C) then (3) is used and we get C.
Another example is:
1. A! (A! B)
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2. A
This database does not prove B because (2) needs to be used twice. However, the database:









This database does not prove B because (4) is not used. Even if (4) were B (ie C = B) we still
could not derive B because if we use (4) we are not using all the assumptions and we are not
starting our proof at the rst one.
Note that in principle there is a lot of scope here to dene how we want to use the resource.
For example we can say that we want to use the assumption in order but it does not matter where











will not prove B.
The reader may ask why one should require such restrictions on resource? This particular
restriction may or may not have any logical intuitive meaning (maybe it is useful for verication
of stack handling in Forth?). We are just technically illustrating the options of resource use.
We have more options for restrictions like those in the following database:
1. A! (B ! C)
2a. : A
2b. B
Our restriction is to use only one of any a; b pair. Thus we can deduce only B ! C but not C.
This particular resource restriction arises naturally in applications. Assume we have the data
1. A! (B ! C)
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2. X
but we do not know whether X is A or X is B. For example, our research project will be funded
and a letter has been sent but we do not know the starting date. It is either October 1 or April 1.
H Williams studies such databases in [Kong and Williams, 1991].
The language contains implication ! only.
Denition 2.4.1 (CL Hilbert System) 1. Consider the Hilbert system dened by the fol-
lowing axiom schemas and rules:
Axioms
1 A! A







(B ! C)! (A! C):
Dene ` A as usual in Hilbert system theory.
2. We now dene a consequence relation for concatenation logic.
Our data structures are lists of ws of the form (A1; : : : ; An). We dene
(A1; : : : ; An) ` B i ` A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :):
The above presented CL in Hilbert style. Notice that our idea of structured database is
exemplied in the fact that our database is a list. We can now formulate the Cut rule.
Theorem 2.4.2 (Cut Rule for CL Hilbert Style) (1) and (2) imply (3):
1.  ` A
2.  [A] ` B
3.  [] ` B
Where
 = (A1; : : : ; An)
 [A] = (C1; : : : ; Cm; A;D1; : : : ; Dk)
 [] = (C1; : : : ; Cm; A1; : : : ; An; D1; : : : ; Dk)
Proof. In later chapters, Theorem 10.1.16. 
Notice that Theorem 2.4.2 illustrates our notion of surgical cut. A appears in the data structure  
and this is symbolised by writing  [A].  can prove A and the cut rule says  can be substituted
for A in the same position in  .
To give another example, if the data structure of a logic are diamonds and   is something like:
and  ` A and  itself is a diamond conguration then the cut rule will substitute  for A in Fig
2.14. The substitution notion will be dened as part of the cut rule.
We now give a consequence relation presentation of CL. We denote the consequence relation
by , to compare it with  of denition 2.4.1.
Denition 2.4.3 (Consequence presentation of CL) Consider data structures in the form of
lists  = (A1; : : : ; An). A structured-consequence relation on pairs (; A), written as   A is
any relation satisfying the following two conditions.






































1. Identity (Restricted Reexivity)
(A)  A
2. Surgical Cut (for the data structure)
(A1; : : : ; An)  A
(C1; : : : ; Cm; A;D1; : : : ; Dk)  B
(C1; : : : ; Cm; A1; : : : ; An; D1; : : : ; Dk)  B
Let CL be the smallest consequence relation satisfying the right hand side for the data structure
namely:
deduction theorem
(A1; : : : ; An)  A! B i (A1; : : : ; An; A)  B
Such a smallest  exists.
Remark 2.4.4 The previous denition illustrates two points.
1. How to dene a logic by conditions on its consequence relation and its data structures.
2. The notion of the Cut rule and a deduction theorem depend on the data structures.
To further illustrate our ideas, note that the well known intuitionistic logic can be dened in a
similar manner, as shown next.
Denition 2.4.5 1. Intuitionistic Consequence
Data structures are sets of ws   A is the smallest consequence relation on the data
structure satisfying Reexivity, Monotonicity, Cut and the Deduction Theorem.
2. R-mingle Consequence
Data structures are sets of ws.   A is the smallest Consequence Relation satisfying
Restricted Reexivity, Cut and the Deduction Theorem.
3. Linear Consequence
Data structures are multisets of formulas.   A is the smallest Consequence Relation
satisfying Restricted Reexivity, Cut and the Deduction Theorem.
Notice that the dierence between R-mingle and linear consequence is only in the data struc-
tures.
Remark 2.4.6 One needs to prove that indeed what is known as implicational linear logic, or
implicational relevance logic or implicational intuitionistic logic are indeed what is dened in the
previous denition. This is a non-trivial claim. See [Gabbay, 1992a, Gabbay et al., 1994] for proofs.
In particular, we will show that `CL of Denition 2.4.1 is the same as CL of 1.4.3.
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We now present an LDS discipline for CL
Denition 2.4.7 (LDS Discipline for CL) 1. The labelling algebra is the free semigroup with
associative binary operation  and left identity e. We thus have
 e  x = x
 (x  y)  z = x  (y  z).
2. The LDS logic rules are ! Introduction and ! Elimination for labelled formulas
! E rule
 : A
 : A! B
   : B
! I Rule:
To introduce  : A ! B, open a box. Assume x : A with a new atomic (generator) label x
and prove using the rules   x : B. Schematically as in gure 2.15:
Show  : A! B
x : A Assumption
...
...
  x : B
Figure 2.15:
Theorem 2.4.8 ` A in the Hilbert system if and only if e : A (A with label e ) is provable in
LDS.
Proof. Later 
Denition 2.4.9 (Concatenation (free semigroup frame) Semantics for CL) 1. ACL
structure is a pair (X;h) where X is a set and h is a function assigning to each atomic propo-
sition q and each nite sequence  2 X a truth value, ie h(; q) 2 f0; 1g, where X is the
set of all nite (or empty) sequences of elements of X.
The function h is called an assignment.
The function h can be extended to a function h on arbitrary formulas via the following
recursive equation:
() h(;A! B) = 1 i
8 2 X[h(;A) = 1 and ( = ? _  6= ?)) h(  ;B) = 1]
where   is result of concatenating the sequence  to  from the right. * is assumed to be
associative, ie
(a  b)  c = a  (b  c) = (a  b  c)
2. We say that a formula A is valid in the semantics if for all structures (X;h), we have
h(?; A) = 1.
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3. Note the requirement  = ?_ 6= ? in (*) above. If we relinquish this requirement we need
the additional rule ` A
` (A! B)! B
Theorem 2.4.10 For the Hilbert system CL we have `CL A i A is valid in the CL semantics.
Proof. The reader can verify soundness directly. To show completeness construct the canonical
structure by letting X be the set of all ws of the language and dene h((A1; : : : ; An); q), for atomic
q to be 1 i (A1; : : : ; An)  q. Show by induction that
h((A1; : : : ; An); B) = 1 i (A1; : : : ; An)  B
for arbitrary A1; : : : ; An and B. 
Remark 2.4.11 Note that the semantics for linear implication is obtained by taking X to be all
nite multisets of elements of X, the semantics for relevant implication is obtained by taking X
to be the set of all nite subsets of X and the semantics for intuitionistic implication is obtained
by further requiring that h(; q) be  monotonic in .
We now give a goal directed computation procedure for the consequence relation CL.
Denition 2.4.12 Let data be lists of ws and goals be ws. Consider the following computation
rules.
1. Identity
(q)?(q) success, for atomic q.
2. Deduction
(A1; : : : ; An)?A! B
succeeds if
(A1; : : : ; An; A)?B
succeeds.
3. Atomic Rule
(B1 ! : : :! (Bk ! q) : : :); A1; : : : ; An)?q
succeeds if the list (A1; : : : ; An) can be divided as a concatenation of k lists (A1; : : : ; Am1+1;
: : : ; Amk) where m0 = 0 < m1 < : : : < mk 1 < mk = n, such that all the following queries
succeed for i = 0; : : : ; k   1
(Ami+1; : : : ; Ami+1)?Bi+1
Notice that the ticket (B1 ! : : :! (Bk ! q) : : :) must appear rst in the data structure.
Theorem 2.4.13 (A1; : : : ; An)  B i (A1; : : : ; An)?B succeeds.
Example 2.4.14 1.
??(A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
succeeds if
(A! B)?(C ! A)! (C ! B)
succeeds if
(A! B;C ! A)?C ! B
succeeds if
(A! B;C ! A;C)?B
succeeds if
(C ! A;C)?A
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This fails because the rule of identity does not apply. The reader should compare this example
with Denition 2.6.2.
2.5 Case study: Modal logic
Modal and temporal logic is a good motivating example for labels. In essence modal logic deals
with information (i.e. formulas) related to dierent worlds or times and with patterns among these
worlds. It is therefore very natural to name and explicitly refer to these worlds and the way they
are related. We also have a distinguished world and time which is where we are. Thus an LDS
approach, where we use labels to name worlds and a labelling language A to describe patterns of
worlds comes very naturally indeed.
Example 2.5.1 (Some modal rules) We begin with a simple conguration of Figure 2.16
The modal axioms and the meaning of  dictate to us that in the constellation displayed in Fig.
2.16, A must hold at s. Further, the meaning of  tells us that there should exist a point r with
s < r such that r : B.
We can thus state two rules for manipulating modal databases.
(1) t : A; t < s
s : A
and
(2) s : B :
create r; s < r and r : B
Using the rst rule we manipulate the constellation displayed in Fig. 2.16 into the one of Fig.
2.17 and using the second rule we further manipulate it into that displayed in Fig. 2.18. In the
predicate case r depends on the free variables of B. The second rule is good for modal logics like
K S4, etc.
The axiom of Lob:
(A! A)! A
corresponds to the modication rule
(3) s : B
create r; s < r and r : B ^  B
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s : A






s : Bt : A
q-q
Figure 2.18:
thus in the logic with the Lob axiom we get from the conguration of Fig. 2.16 to the conguration
in Fig. 2.19.
It is clear now how the rules work. They allow us to move from one conguration to another
and the consequence relation is between congurations. For example, we have Fig. 2.16  Fig.
2.18, in modal K and with Lob's axiom we have Fig. 2.16  Fig. 2.19.
The above rules are elimination rules. We still need introduction rules
(4) s : A; t < s :
t : A
(5)
create an arbitrary s; t < s
and show s : A
:
t : A
Example for  introduction:
Given t : (A! B) ^A
Create s; t > s
Show s : B
Deduce t : B:
The picture however is not as simple as it seems. In the usual formulations of modal logics,
axioms correspond to conditions on the possible world relation.
In our presentation, axioms correspond to any one of a variety of features. Table 2.1 below
oers a selection.
We see here how a second order axiom, i.e. the axiom of Lob, which corresponds to a second
order semantical condition, can become a simple movement in LDS. When LDS is translated into
two sorted classical logic, the function symbols generating the labels may allow us to reduce the
second order condition into rst order, as is the case with McKinsey axiom q ! q, when
added to K without transitivity.
Remark 2.5.2 (Linear Modal Logic) Suppose we deal with the modal logic for linear frames.
Then the conguration in Fig. 2.20. can be expanded in three ways.
By rule (*2) we can create a point u : A, with t < u. In a non linear modal logic such as K,
S4, etc. this would lead us to the conguration of Fig. 2.21.
one more step would allow us to have u : A^B and hence by  introduction we get t : (A^B).
However in the case of linear modal logic, Fig. 2.21. is not allowed. We need to consider ve
possibilities.
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K axioms The notion of basic constellation
(A! B)! (A! B) or a diagram, as in Denition 1.5.1
` A)` A Note that in the modal case the relation R
A = def::A in the diagram is binary. The LDS
formulation contains also some simple
rules for  and  some of which were
shown in the gure above, rules (*1), (*2)
A! A Transitivity of R in the constellation
(A! A)! A In modal semantics the axiom has no
rst order condition. It corresponds
to the niteness of the frame. In LDS
it corresponds to the modication rule (*3).
A ^ B ! Corresponds to the linearity
(A ^B) _ (A ^ B) of the relation R. This aects the
_(B ^ A) basic rule (*2) as explained in Remark 2.5.2
1. t < u < r < s
2. t < u = r < s
3. t < r < u < s
4. t < r < u = s
5. t < r < s < u
If, as a result of each of these possibilities, we end up with t : (A ^ B) then we can conclude
t : (A ^B).
We have to do that because our databases are linear and the above ve congurations are all
the minimal possible extensions in which u can be accommodated.
We thus have to modify all the rules with `create' in them to mean:
t : B
r : Bs : Bt : A
q - q-
Figure 2.20:














Split proof into n branches according to all




t : A in a conguration
create u, consider all allowed minimal
extensions of D with u in them. Put
u : A in and branch the proof. The ultimate
goal of the overall proof must succeed in
all branches.
The above is computationally very expensive. In the example previously given, we need to go
to ve congurations in order to make the simple move
(6)
t : A ^ B
t : (A ^B)
However our LDS proof discipline does not stop us from adopting (*6) as a rule. Recall that the
LDS discipline tries to enjoy both worlds|the classical world through the labels and the special
non-classical world through the language of the formulas in the labels. For each application, desired
balance can be sought.
We now come to quantier rules. We have already assumed that dierent labels will have
dierent sets of elements in them. To appreciate what this means, we take our clue from modal
logic. Consider Fig. 2.22.
At the label t, an x exists such that t : A(x; y) holds. This x depends on t and on y. We
therefore need a Skolem function ct(y). The index t is read to mean that ct was created at t.
We thus get t : A(ct(y); y). Hence we can create a node s : A(ct(y); y). We also must indicate
whether ct(y) `exists' at the node s. If it does exist at s (probably because of some rules) then we
write s : ct(y). The dierence comes out in existential introduction. Suppose we have s : E(ct(y)),
can we infer s : 9xE(x)? The answer depends whether ct(y) exists at s or not. Here are some
rules:
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(7) s : c; s : E(c) :
s : 9xE(x)
(8) t : 9xA(x; y1; : : : ; yn) :
t : A(ct(y1; : : : ; yn); y1; : : : ; yn); t : c
t(y1; : : : ; yn)
(9) t : 8xA(x) ut is a universal constant.
t : A(ut); t : ut;
(10) s : u
t; s : A(ut); s : cr
:
s : A(cr)
ut is a new universal constant, r is arbitrary.
(11) t : c
r; s : A(ut)
ut a universal constant.
s : A(cr)
(12) s : u
t; s : A(ut)
ut a universal constant.
s : 8xA(x)
Rule (*9) is analogous to the classical logic rule which allows us to replace 8xA(x) by A(u),
where u is a universal constant, i.e. u is arbitrary. At any stage later in a classical logic proof,
we can pass from B(u) to 8uB(u) provided we discharged all additional assumptions. We can
certainly pass from B(u) to B(c), c any constant. The same considerations apply to the labelled
case except that we have to watch for the added complication that elements created in one label
(world) (e.g. cr; ut) may not exist in another label (world). Imagine we have t : 8xA(x), this means
A holds for all elements existing at t. We use rule (*9) and represent t : 8xA(x) by a universal
constant ut, i.e. we have now t : ut and t : A(ut). Suppose for some proof theoretical reason,
s : A(ut) is obained. Thus we really have that A holds at s for an arbitrary element existing at t.
Suppose now that we know that the element cr created at r, exists at t. This is written as t : cr.
Then we can deduce s : A(cr). This is rule (*11).
We now explain rule (*10). Start with t : 8xA(x), this by rules (*9) and (*12) is equivalent
to having t : ut and t : A(ut). Suppose that by some proof manipulation we end up with s : ut
and s : A(ut). This means that the universal constant ut is in label s and so is s : A(ut). We
understand that as a proof of s : 8xA(x) from t : 8xA(x) and so we allow ourselves to deduce
s : 8xA(x). Therefore for any cr, which exists at s displayed as s : cr, we get A(cr) at s, i.e.
s : A(cr). This entire chain is summarized as rule (*10).
So far these rules assume that somehow an element ct created at t ends up available at label
s, i.e. s : ct holds. How do elements move around? We need special rules for that and they dier
from system to system. In other words the logic must tell us how elements skolemized in one
label can be transported to another label. These are called visa rules. Here are two sample rules
corresponding to the Barcan and converse Barcan formulas:
(b1)
t : xr; t < s
x either a constant c or a universal constant u.
s : xr
(b2)
t : xr; s < t
x either constant c or a universal constant u.
s : xr
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Example 2.5.3 (Barcan formula revisited ) Use (b1) to show that
t : 8xA(x) ` t : 8xA(x)
1. Start t : 8xA(x).
2. 8-Elimination at t yields t : A(ut); t : ut.
3. Create an arbitrary s; t < s.
4. s : A(ut); s : ut by  elimination rule and visa rule (b1).
5. s : 8xA(x), by (*12).
6. t : 8xA(x), since s was arbitrary.
To present modal logic as an LDS, we take the usual language of modal logic with  and  as
our L and take sets D with a binary relation  as our labels. It is convenient to think of (D;<)
as a conguration.
Denition 2.5.4 1. A declarative unit is a pair t : A where t is a label and A is a formula
of the modal language. A labelled term has the form t : cs, where t; s are labels and c is a
constant or variable of the modal language. The double indices for terms are needed because
c can be created at label s and be used or be present at label t. We write t : cs to denote that.
2. A conguration has the form (D; f ;; d), where (D;; d) is a nite partially ordered set, with
d 2 D and f a function, f : D 7! w and terms such that f(t) = a set of formulas and a set
of labelled terms.
f(t) can be represented as
fA1; A2; : : : ; cs1 ; cs2 ; : : : ; g:
Note that the terms are labelled arbitrarily.
3. Queries have the form s : A.
Denition 2.5.5 A modal LDS system is determined by the following components (compare with
Denition 3.2.8)
1. A class K of partially ordered sets (D;; d) to be used in the congurations of the system.
2. Inference rules. The inference rules manipulate congurations. These include creation and
elimination of points t 2 D and the introduction and elimination of ws. The rules are
divided into the following categories.
2.1. Introduction and elimination rules for connectives specialised for modal logic.
2.2. Quantier rules, including Skolemization, as intuitively dened in the discussion above.
2.3. Individual elements visa permits (mobility of elements from one node to another). These
have the general form
(D; f ;; d)
(D; f 0;; d)
where f 0 is like f except that for some cs and t 2 D, f 0(t) = f(t) [ fcsg.
We write
t : A; t : cs; t < r
to represent the information that in the conguration (D; f ;; d) which we are dealing with (ie
re-writing), we have t; s; r 2 D; t < r, and f(t) contains A and cs.
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The notation `(t; s); t < s; s : B; s : cr; s a new point' means that we are given a conguration
 = (D; f ;; d), with t 2 D. We add a new point s to D to form D0 = D [ fsg and extend  by
stipulating t < s and let f 0 be like f on D and let f 0(s) = fB; crg. Then `(t; s); t < s; s : B; s : cr'
denotes 0 = (D0; f 0;; d).
A rule of the form
t : A
create s; t < s; s : B; s : cr
should be understood as

`(t; s); t < s; s : B; s : cr'
as explained above.
Example 2.5.6 Show (A! A) ` A.
1. Assume t : (A! A) and show t : A.
2. Use an introduction rule. Create an s; t < s and show s : A.
2.1. Use  elimination rule.
s : A! A;(A! A)
t
q
2.2. Use classical logic to rewrite the entry at s.
s :   A _A
2.3. Split into two cases











Case 1 is a success because we needed to show s : A.
We proceed with case 2 and show it leads to a contradiction:
Create a new point r:
r : A ^As
.
bring A! A from s.
r : A! A
use classical logic and get:
r : A
a contradiction, because we also have r : A.
3. Since we showed (2) successfully, we conclude t : A.
Example 2.5.7 Test whether 9xA(x) ` 9xAx
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1. t : 9xA(x)
2. Create s, with t < s; s : 9xA(x)
3. Skolemise and get s : A(cs).
4. t : A(cs)
5. t : 9xA(x), to be derived only if there is a visa for cs to be at t.
Example 2.5.8 Test whether 9xAx ` 9Ax
1. t : 9xA(x)
2. t : A(ct)
3. Create s, with t < s; s : A(ct)
4. s : 9xA(x), to be derived only if there is a visa for ct to be at s.
5. t : 9xA(x)
Example 2.5.9 Our modal rules can be label dependent rules, for example  can change meaning
from world to world:
t : tA
create t < s1 < : : : < sn(t); sn(t) : A
The semantic condition for this modality is:
kAkt = 1 i kAkt+n(t) = 1:
Dierent truth tables in dierent worlds.
Let us give a quick proof that
t : A; t : B ` t : (A ^B)
1. Initial conguration
t : A;B
2. Create an s; t < s with s : B we get the conguration
t : A;B; s : B; t < s:
3. Move A to s : A, using the rule:
t : A t < s
s : A
we get the conguration
t : A;B; s : B;A; t < s:
4. Add t : (A ^B), using the rule
s : A; t < s
t : A
we get the conguration
t : A;B;(A ^B); s : B;A; t < s:
We have thus proved that A;B ` (A ^ B) because we started with the conguration in (1)
with t : A;B and we step by step manipulated it into the conguration in (4) which contained
t : (A ^B).
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Example 2.5.10 To show that the logic depends on the class K of orders, assume we want (D;
; d) to be linearly ordered. We now try and prove
t : A ^ B ` t : (A ^B) _ (A ^ B) _ (B ^ A)
To show that assume
1. t : A;B
2. Create s; t < s with
s : A
3. Create r; t < r with
r : B
However, since only linear orders are allowed our options are
t < r < s; t < r = s; t < s < r:
In each of these options, the conclusion can be proved. The lesson to be learnt is that the class of
allowed congurations can inuence the proof theory.
Example 2.5.11 We show that
t : A; t : B ` t : (A ^B)
1. Initial conguration
t : A;B
2. Create an s; t < s with s : B we get the conguration
t : A;B; s : B; t < s:
3. Move A to s : A, using the rule:
t : A t < s
s : A
we get the conguration
t : A;B; s : B;A; t < s:
4. Add t : (A ^B), using the rule
s : A; t < s
t : A
we get the conguration
t : A;B;(A ^B); s : B;A; t < s:
We have thus proved that A;B ` (A ^ B) because we started with the conguration in (1)
with t : A;B and we step by step manipulated it into the conguration in (4) which contained
t : (A ^B).
Discussion
Advantages of the LDS proof discipline for modal logics:
 No conceptual problem in Skolemising and theorem proving, which is a major problem for
modal logic.
 The principles involved are more general, good for any LDS.
 We can handle systems which have semantics which is higher order (Lob's system is higher
order because it has to be characterised by a higher order condition on the Kripke frame,
namely it being a nite irreexive partial ordering).
 The modal logic can change from world to world, all we have to do is to make our rules label
dependent (ie containing labels as parameters).
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2.6 Case study: priority logic and prolog
Our next case study involving structure is propositional Horn clause computation without negation
by failure. This case study is not semantically based. It is based on prioritized proof theory and is a
typical challenge to translate to classical logic. Here LDS can help. If  is a set of Horn clauses and
q an atom then the non-deterministic procedural interpretation of ?q should mean  `c q, where
`c is provability in classical logic. Thus since the database fq; q ! qg proves q, the computation
of ?q from this database should succeed. In practice, i.e. in any prolog implementation, for this
simple example, the database is represented as a list, i.e. either 1
1. q
2. q ! q
or 2
1. q ! q
2. q
and the computation is deterministic, searching the list either top down or bottom up, unifying
with the head of a clause asking for the body. Thus if the implementation scans the clauses top
down, we have that 1?q succeeds while 2?q loops.
Can we characterize the notion of ?q = success for the top down interpretation?
We can enumerate the database 2 but obviously a translation into classical logic like the one
of the modal logic case is not easily available.
It is no use translating 2 into fq(1) ! q(1); q(2)g and trying to gure out a truth table for
! much in the same way we did for  in the previous case study. I don't think we can nd some
natural translation. Of course one can always translate into classical logic using meta predicates
like database (`'), succeed (`', `A') etc. but this is not a direct translation. To make our case
study more tractable let us change slightly the way the computation works. This will no longer
yield computation but another familiar logic. The reason for doing so is simply that at this stage
I do not know how to handle the prolog case. There is, however, a Gentzen system for it by J.
van Benthem [1992]. The change we make is that we ask the pointer to continue moving in one
direction only. Thus ?q from
1. q ! q
2. q
succeeds, because after clause 1 the pointer continues to clause 2.
On the other hand ?q from
1. p! q
2. r
3. r ! p
fails, because the pointer, having passed clause 2, cannot go back to it.
I am using the word `pointer' without due explanation. Use your own intuitions. In more
complex prolog programs execution is much more complex using stacks and several pointers.
This database and query has only one goal done in sequence. So it is easy to explain the `pointer'.
Let  be a database in the form of a list of clauses  = (A1; : : : ; An). The pointer is just a
number 1  k  n. We query the pair (; k) i.e. (; k)?q. To search for a solution we try and
resolve with heads of the clauses (Ak; Ak+1; : : :). Once we resolve with clause j, we ask for the
body of the clause. The computation must tell us for each k and j what is the new pointer. This
we call the strategy of the pointer. For example if the pointer always goes back to r = j   k, we
get that ((q ! q; q); 1)?q loops, while ((q ! q; q); 2)?q succeeds.
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The above discussion presented an example where the database was a list. The list was needed
for technical reasons, having to do with the implementation strategies of prolog interpreters.
There is a rich family of systems which require priorities among the data. Among them are
defeasible logics, cumulative defaults, Lambek Calculus, truth maintainance and belief revision.
They all share the feature that they have no semantics but the data is organized according to
priority or some network hierarchy and computation depends on this structure. The structure
may come from the application area (defeasible logics, default) or be purely technical (maintaining
consistency). This subsection deals with list structure. We would like our case study to be based
on an application where the list structure in the database comes intuitively and naturally and has
an obvious meaning. We nd such a case in legal reasoning.
Consider the area of Esprit projects with which we are all familiar. There are rules for claiming
expenses following an Esprit project meeting. These rules may vary slightly from country to
country and from university to university. A typical rule could be of the form
C(x; d)! S(x; d; 50)
which reads:
x spent the day d at a conference !
x gets subsistence of DM 50 for d.
This is a time dependent rule in the sense that it is valid at any time s after it was introduced.
Thus if the rule was introduced at time t, we can put it at the database as
t : C(x; d)! S(x; d; 50):
If Dov has been to a conference at time s then the database will contain
s : C(Dov; d):
To ask the query ?S(Dov; d; 50) we resolve with the rst clause and get ?C(Dov; d). However, we
can use the clause s : C(Dov; d) only if t < s.
The above control mechanism is not temporal control (as was the case in the previous case study)
but rather prioritized control,1 and although the priorities come from temporal considerations, the
time does not enter into the computation, only the control strategy of the `prolog pointer'. In
fact there are cases where exceptions are made by the commission allowing to claim for conferences
before the start time of the rule. In terms of labelled deduction, the rule is that to perform modus
ponens on t : A ! B with s : A, we must have t < s, i.e. the `fact' must come after the `rule',
where `after' is not necessarily real `after' but virtual `after' including special permission.
Turning back to the application at hand, obviously we are supposed to claim expenses only
once for each conference we attend. Thus if there is another rule, say university rule, introduced
at time t0 which says:
t0 : C(x; y)! UP (x; y; 150)
where UP (x; y; 150) means university participation of DM 150, we are not expected to use both
rules and get a total of DM 200. Either we claim from Esprit or we claim from the university.
The system may be exible enough to allow us to claim DM 50 from Esprit and get the rest
(DM 50) from the university, but not all systems are like that. The important point is that the
assumption s : C(x; d) can be used only once in the computation.
Let us summarize the properties we have so far:
 The database is structured with labels which are ordered.
1Again, we are not being precise. What is a `prioritized' system? As a rst approximation, say that a labelling
system is a priority system if the atomic labels form a partially ordered set (T;; d) and the label generating function
is concatenation. i.e. the labels are nite sequences of elements of T . The ordering  on T is used to dene some
priority ordering on the sequences. This priority ordering is then used in all proof theoretical rules.
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 Modus ponens is allowed only when the ticket (i.e. the implication) is earlier than the minor
premiss (i.e. the fact).
 Minor premisses (facts) can be used at most once.
Let us now consider another complication arising in the application area. The above rules are
only valid for conferences held in European Community countries. For a conference in America,
one needs permission from the project coordinator in Brussels. So we can write a more accurate
rule:
t00 : AC(x; d) ^ Per(x; d)! S(x; d; 100):
x participates at an American conference at day d and x has permission then x can get DM 100.
The problem with the above is that Brussels insists that permission be asked before confer-
ence participation, and not after the event. Thus to represent the rule we cannot use ordinary
conjunction, but we need the `rst A then B' connective, which we denote by A 
 B. Our rule
becomes
t00 : Per(x; d)
 C(x; d)! S(x; d; 100):
Consider the query ?S(a; d; 100). We resolve with the above rule and get the query ? Per(a; d)

C(a; d). To succeed with that query we need to look at facts after t, succeed with Per(a; d) rst
and then succeed with C(a; d) with label bigger than that of Per(a; d).
We thus get the following additional property for our system:
 To show A
B we must succeed with A and with B, but must show A from an earlier part
of the database than B.
So far, we made a distinction between `facts' and `rules'. In a full scale logic (not Horn clause)
a rule can serve as a `fact' for another rule. Take for example, the following:
t2: If subsistence per day is only DM 50, we must appeal to the commission.
This has the form
t2: 8x[C(x; d)! S(x; d; 50)]! q.
If t < t2 then the rule can be used to derive q. At time r, how do we know whether the antecedent
of t2 holds? In our case it is explicitly stated as a rule, but in general it may be derivable from
a group of rules. How do we check the implicational goal r : 8x[C(x; d) ! S(x; d; 50)]? We have
to use hypothetical reasoning. We add C(x0; d0) to the database and try and derive S(x0; d0; 50),
with x0 and d0 a new Skolem constants. We thus get an additional principle.
There are two questions to be settled. First is when we add C(x0; d0), i.e. with what priority
(time) label? Intuitively the answer is at r, i.e. we add r : C(x0; d0). This is not so simple. In
general we may be checking r : A ! B and so we want to add r : A, but A may have the form
A1 
A2. Do we add r : A1 
A2 or do we add r1 : A1; r2 : A2, with r1; r2 new priority points with
the restriction r < r1 < r2? It makes sense to choose the latter, in which case, if r < s do we also
require r2 < s. (i.e. do we put r2 immediately after r but before anything which comes after r?).
The second question is how do we compute with the additional r : A? Do we use the part of
the database after r : A? or do we say that since our purpose was to determine r : A ! B then
`future data' is not relevant. The validity of r1 : A! B now means that data up to now together
with r must yield B? These issues we leave for later.
Meanwhile note that rules can be used at any time after they are introduced, and as many times
as necessary, while facts (in this particular Esprit example, though not necessarily in general) can
be used only once. Thus the rule A(x)! B(x) can be used as often as needed, but the fact A(d)
can be used only once. This is a bit misleading because we can regard the rule as a family of rules
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If A(d) as a fact can be used only once and A(d)! B(d) can be red only with A(d) then the
rule can be used only once anyway. We get
 Without a real loss of generality we can assume that propositional instances of rules can be
used at most once.
We are now ready for an example.
Example 2.6.1 (Esprit travel expenses) Database
t1 : 8x; d[ Per(x; d)
 C(x; d)! S(x; d; 200)]
s1 : Per(Dov, date)
s2 : C(Dov, date)
t0 : 8x; d[C(x; d)! UP(x; d; 150)]
t2 : 8x; d[C(x; d)! S(x; d; 50)]! q:
Priority
t1 < s1 < s2 < t
0 < t2:
Computation pointer
At any time the pointer resides at some priority label r, i.e. the basic computation structure is
(; r)?t : G. The label r is the pointer. The compuation rules tell us which rules we can use
to resolve with G. In our particular example we can resolve with any rule with label s. The
computation then continues with the new pointer label max(r; s). Formally (we leave the pointer
implicit):
 ?t : q succeeds if s : q 2 ; t = s.
 ?t : q succeeds if for some s : A! q 2 ; s < t and ?t : A succeeds.
 ?t : A! q succeeds if  [ ft : Agj?t : q succeeds.
 ?t : A
B if for some s2 > s1 > t;?s1 : A and ?s2 : B succeeds.
Let us ask the query ?s : q, with t2 < s. We can thus unify with rule t2 and ask ?C(x0; d0) !
S(x0; d0; 50). We add to the database s : C(x0; d0) and ask ?s : S(x0; d0; 50). This unies with t1
and we ask ?s : Per(x0; d0)
 C(x0; d0). The last query fails.
If at some future time a general permission is given, then of course the computation will succeed.
It is possible to develop the model further. One can add integrity constraints, to make the
database more realistic. Once we have integrity constraints we can deal with conditions ?t : A! B
as a goal is computed by letting t : A into the database, which may violate integrity constraints,
so some truth maintenance has to be done. We will not go into the details of all our options. A.
Martelli, L. Giordano, N. Olivetti and I have a paper on this [Gabbay et al., 1994]. Our purpose
here is just to illustrate a realistic use of labels which is purely syntactical. For this purpose our
discussion so far is quite sucient.
Let us give a simplied version of the computation so far in the form of propositional directional
N-prolog. The version is a stylized, simplication of the above legal database problem, but it also
happens to be a fragment of the Lambek calculus, exactly suited for linguistic application and
implemented by Esther Koning [1994].
Denition 2.6.2 (directional N-prolog) Let our language contain 
 and !.
1. Clauses and goals
(a) A is a clause if A is an atom.
(b) A is a body if A is an atom.
(c) If Ai are clauses and q an atom then (A1
: : :





 need not be commutative.
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(d) A database is a list of clauses. We present a database  as
t1 : A1; : : : ; tn : An, t1 < t2 < : : : < tn. Ai are clauses. ti are priorities and hence < is
strict. In case t1 = t2, we can simply write t1 : A1 ^A2.
2. Let  be a database and B a goal. We recursively dene the notion of  `  : B where  is
a sequence of elements from ft1; : : : ; tng.
(a)  `  : B if B is atomic and  : B 2 .
(b)  `  : B1 
 : : :
Bk ! q i the database
;x1 : B1; : : : xk : Bk `    : q
where  is concatenation and where t1 < : : : tn < x1 < : : : < xk and  is a subsequence
of (x1; : : : ; xk).
(c)  `  : B i B is an atomic q and for some
ti : Ai 2 ; we have Ai = C1 
 : : :
 Ck ! q
and  = (ti)  0 and
fti+1 : Ai+1; : : : ; tn : Ang ` 0 : C1 
 : : :
 Ck:
(d)  `  : C1 
 : : : 
 Ck i  can be partitioned into k segments  = 1  : : : k and
j ` j : Cj and  = 1  : : :  k.
Example 2.6.3
t1 : A! B
t2 : C
t3 : A
t1 < t2 < t3
proves t1t3 : B.
Note that we require the pointer to continue to go in the same direction. Thus
s1 : A
s2 : A! B
s1 < s2
does not prove B.
We need not use all clauses.
Example 2.6.4 (Translation into classical logic) It is possible to represent the above databases
and reasoning structures in classical logic by introducing a new sort for the priority labels and de-
scribe the computation in classical logic. It might be rather unnatural. The translation is the
following. We need predicate logic with two sorts of variables. The rst sort, the t1; t2; s2; s2, : : : ,
type of variables, range over an algebra (A; ; <), where  is concatenation, and < is a irreexive
and transitive ordering. The other sort are x; y; x1; x2, : : : , type of variables, which are the ordi-
nary predicate calculus variables. Atomic predicates have the form Q(t; x1; : : : ; xn) where n  1; t
is the algebra sort variable and xi are ordinary predicate sort variables. We now translate into this
two sorted predicate logic, the Directional N-prolog clauses as follows ( is the translation):
 We associate with each atom Q(x1; : : : ; xn) of Directional N-prolog a predicate Q(t; x1; : : : ; xn)
of the two sorted predicate logic.
 ( : Q(x1; : : : ; xn)) = Q(; x1; : : : ; xn) where  is a label from the algebra.
 ( : A
B) = 9t1t2( = t1  t2 ^ t1 < t2 ^ (t1 : A) ^ (t2 : B)).
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 ( : A! q) = 8t[(t : A)! 9s (s subsequence of t ^ (  s : q)).
The notion of subsequence must be denable in the two sorted classical logic.
The following can be proved.
Lemma 2.6.5 1. If t : A 2  then  ` t : A
2. If  ` t : A and   0 then 0 ` t : A
3.
s < t
 ` t : A
0 ` s : A! B
:
0 + ` s  t : B
Lemma 2.6.6 Let DH be the Hilbert system extension of CL of Denition 2.4.1 with the axiom
A! (B ! A)
Then t1 : A1; t2 : A2; : : : ; tn : An `  : B for some  which is a subsequence of (t1; : : : ; tn) i
DH ` A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :).
2.7 Case study: Modelling information ow
This section presents a model of information ow in LDS. We want to give a rigorous denition of
a process, Flow, which begins with two LDS databases  and   and ends up in a new database
E = Flow (; ), which is to be the result of inputting or `owing' the data in   into . To use
the notion of Barwise, we are giving a channel
C( ) = x Flow (x; )
satisfying:

C( )! E = Flow (; ):
To motivate our notion of information ow, we begin with two very familiar systems, namely
strict S4 implication ! and intuitionistic implication ! and scrutinise the dierence between
them. It is well known that the formula
A! (B ! A)
is a theorem of intuitionistic logic, but is not a theorem of strict implication, unless A is of the
form A = (A1 ! A2).
Let us try to use natural deduction to prove this `axiom'.
Our Goal is to show A ! (B ! A). For this purpose we start a proof box, say Box a. We
assume t : A and try to prove t : B ! A, which is the goal of this box. Figure 2.23 illustrates what
happens.
The proof will succeed if line 6 is allowed in Box b. Line 6 is justied by bringing data item
t : A from line 1 outside the box into it. Intuitionistic logic allows us to bring in any t : A from
outside, while strict implication S4 allows us to bring in only t : A where A = A1 ! A2, i.e. only
formulas in implicational form.
We want to view the above as a dynamic construction process; a construction of a proof. We
imagine we are in the middle of a proof in, say, line 5 of Box a. We have successfully derived
previous lines and we want to derive line 5 which is to have the form
(5) t : A! B:
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Box a 1 Show t : B ! A
2 t : A assumption
3 t : B ! A from box b
Box b 4 Show s  t : A
5 s : B assumption
6 t : A from 2
7
Figure 2.23:
Box a 1 Show r : C





5 t : A! B
Box b 1 Link to line 5 in Box a
2 Show r0 : B
3 s : A assumption
Figure 2.24:
The labelled natural deduction rules tell us that to show t : A ! B, we must go to a sub-
computation recorded in Box b, in which we must assume A with a new label s and prove B with
label r0(s). We then exit Box b and continue to derive further steps in the proof, the immediate
next step being recorded as line 6 of Box a. We have thus established line 5 by justifying it in the
subproof in Box b. The following gure 2.24 is a better dynamic picture of our process.
The labels involved and the manipulation rules used all depend on the logic. Dierent logics
will have dierent rules. However, we do see here a common pattern. Databases have goals, they
are linked to others and data can be accessible from one database to another according to some
logico-geometric rules. The process is dynamic in the sense that a pointer (indicating our current
position in the proof process) is resident in some box (e.g. line 1, box b). We are trying to `bring
in' data and use the proof process to achieve the goal of the box it is in by successfully deriving
more lines until we reach the goal. Once this goal is achieved, e.g. r0 : B is proved in Box b (say
in line 7), then the pointer moves back to line 6 in the parent box (Box a), and continue trying to
achieve the goal of Box a, namely prove r : C:2
Suppose we freeze the situation in the middle of a proof. What do we see? We see a family
of linked databases where each database has a goal attached to it. We also see a pointer residing
somewhere in one of the databases. We also see proof rules for proving the goals for allowing
databass to access formulas and labels from another. The proof rules dene the logic to which the
databases are the data.
So far so good. How does this connect with the notion of information ow?
The answer is that it is now very easy to abstract from what we have just described and dene
2Note that although in our example the links indicate subproofs, this need not be the case in general.
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a notion of a database ready to receive infomation. Take the instant when the database is frozen
in gure 2.24. We are in the middle of our proof, our pointer is at line 1 in Box b and there is data
all around us. We have goals to fulll, the most immediate one being the current goal.
Imagine that suddenly we get an input: d : D from some external source. A labelled formula
descends into the system. Where do we put it? Is it meant as an additional assumption for Box
b? Is it meant for Box a? Do we start a new box? Do we move the pointer? Well, it is up to
us to decide what to do and clearly whatever we decide is part of our update (information ow)
discipline.
To be specic, let us agree that any input d : D goes into the box where the pointer is, to help
prove the goal of that box. Let us further agree that once the goal is proved the pointer goes back
to achieve the previous goal, unless instructed otherwise.
Instruct by what? Up to now we were in absolute control of the proof process deciding what
to prove next. How can we be instructed?
Obviously we can be instructed by the input! We assumed that we are receiving more data
from an external source; we might also receive some instructions from that same source about what
to prove next (call it `hints' if you like). Thus in general the external source can input one of the
following:
1. Data items with instructions of where to put them in the existing linked structure.
2. Instructions to start a new linked box. This can be understood as a `hint' on proof strategy.
3. Instructions to change the existing structure of the existing database. This can be seen as
`information' input, if we understand information not only as raw data of the form t : A but
also as the structure and priorities of existing data.
We need to make the above mathematically precise. We need rules associating with each label
d : D of input, an algorithmic instruction of what to do with it in the current database. The
instructions should be as general and `functional' as possible. They should depend on the `proof
theory' of existing data and the geometry of the database, as opposed to using local side eects
such as line numbers.
Here are some examples of instructions:
 Put t : D among the data to be used in the current box (to help achieve the current goal of
the pointer), at the place where the pointer is.
 Replace the current goal by t : D.
 Start a new linked box with goal t : D (and do your best to achieve it). The pointer will
therefore move to the new box which will serve as a new current box for future inputs.
 t: truth can be an instruction to modify (add, change) existing labels by (using) t.
Example 2.7.1 (Linguistic Database) To be specic, let us describe a particular LDS system
and a particular information ow function Flow . Let L be a propositional language with impli-
cation ! only and atoms. Let M be the theory of nite chains represented as models f1; 2; : : : ; ng.
Let A be a set of atomic labels and let  be associative concatenation. Compare with Examples
2.2.1 and 2.3.5.
To get a database ready for input, we need (1) to give each database proof rules and a goal (to
prove), (2) we need to locate the pointer and (3) we need to dene the notion of accessiblity of data
from box to box. To simplify the denitions, and to avoid the need of getting into a new denition
of a recursive construction of more complex databases, let us x the above as follows:
 let q be a xed atom. Stipulate that the goal of any database is to prove  : q, where the label
 is a concatenation of all labels of assumptions which are in the database or are accessible
to it. (like in linear logic , we use all our assumptions in achieving the goal).
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 the proof rule is modus ponens:
t : A! B
s : A
s  t : B
notice the `s' comes before the `t'.
 The geometric accessibility of data is as follows:
Let database
 = (t1 : A1; : : : ; tn : An)
be linked to the database
  = (s1 : B1; : : : ; sm : Bm)
through linking si to tj (in this direction) then tj : Aj is immediately accessible to  . The
accessibility relation is the transitive closure of the above.
 The position of the pointer can either be indicated explicitly or be geometrically dened.
 The input rules are to put data at the left of the location of the pointer until the goal is
achieved. Then, unless the next input instructs otherwise, the pointer moves to the next
(parent) database through the links. If no such database exists (no links) the pointer starts a
new empty database. Note that we are using one look ahead here!
 A special label Wo is understood, when coming as an input with truth, to instruct the pointer
to start a new database and link it to its current position.
Example 2.7.2 (Linguistic Parsing) This is just a hint of what we have in [Gabbay and Kempson, 1991].
Consider
John who sat down smiled.







John, sit, smile are data, who is an instruction to start a new database. When encountering
who as input the pointer is instructed to start a new database and to put a variable label u : e in
and link it to John (the rst label of a formula e to the left of the pointer). The goal is always to
prove t.




u : e sat down: e! t
John: e
Figure 2.25:
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The pointer can prove t with label John sat in the second database by accessibility. It is now
free to move back to the top database unless the next input instructs it to start a new one. (We
need one look ahead here). In our case, the pointer, when seeing smiles: e ! t, will put it in the
top database. Figure 2.26 shows the nal position:
smile: e! tJohn: e




We will not go into more details of what can be done with this linguistic model. See our paper
[Gabbay and Kempson, 1991] for details.
Let us summarise what we have so far. We presented a well motivated notion of linked databases
and a notion how such a database can receive input. The model seems to be compatible with
our proof theoretic intuitions as well as with some lingusitic ones (assuming the Gabbay{Kempson
[Gabbay and Kempson, 1991] paper is convincing!). From LDS point of view we are simply dening
a computational notion of updates and ow of information. From situation theory point of view
we have provided a concrete reasonable realisation for sites and information ow.
We have so far dened Flow (; ) for   a sequence of declarative units. We have not dened
Flow (; ) for arbitrary  . This we can do if we have a procedure to reduce   into linear input.
Assume we have some agreed way of reducing   into   = Flow (?; l( )) where l( ) is a l sequence
of instruction constructing   from the empty database.
Given such function l = xl(x) we can now dene:
 Flow (; ) = def Flow (; l( ))
I'll not go into details of how dene the function l. It is not a simple matter.
2.8 Fibred semantics for LDS
This section will motivate the type of semantics required for LDS. We motivate our semantics
by giving several case studies where this semantics arises naturally and then present the general
denition of a bred structure. Our starting point is the preferential semantics of Kraus-Lehmann-
Magidor, given for an arbitrary consequence relation (based on the classical connectives) satisfying
reexivity, transitivity, and restricted monotonicity.
The structures have the form m = (W;<; h), where W is a set of states, < is a relation on W;h
a function assigning to each state w 2W a family h(w) of classical structures.
We write w  A i A holds in every structure of h(w).
We assume that h is such that the set h(A) = fw j w  Ag satises
8x 2 h(A)9y 2 h(A)8z 2 h(A)[y < x and z < y imply z = y]:
We dene A jm B i for every minimal w 2 h(A), w  B.
If we require of j to satisfy
A _B j C i A j C and B j C
then the function h can be assumed to give only one classical model h(w) for each w. In such a
case h can be directly presented as an assignment to the atoms, h(w; q) 2 f0; 1g.
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The immediate question we can ask ourselves is why should we restrict ourselves to have a
function h(w) giving classical models? We can allow h(w) to yield a class of other models e.g.
Kripke models or in fact, other preferential models.
Thus a Fibred Preferential Structure is a structure m = (W;<;h) such that for each w 2 W
h(w) is a set of bred preferential structures. This is a recursive denition. Let us not worry at the
moment on how to give a non recursive (looping) denition of the concept and ask ourselves under
what circumstances we might wish to consider such structures? One such example is the following.
Suppose we want to systematically reect a consequence relation j in the language itself. Thus
we want a new connective `)' with the single dening axiom
A j B i ? j A) B:
This looks like a deduction theorem. In a sense it is, but it does the job of reecting the
consequence relation A j B (which is metalevel) in the object level through the connective) and
j A ) B. The question is what is the semantics of ), given that we know the semantics of j.
Let us try to nd out what we need. Assume a preferential semantics for j. Consider C j A) B.
Since A) B is a legitimate w, we should be able to semantically evaluate the above in a model
m = (W;<;h). Thus C j A) B holds in m i for all minimal w  C we have w  A) B.
We do not know how to evaluate w  A) B because A) B is supposed to mean A j B and
to evaluate that we need a model m0 not a point (state) w. In the bred preferential semantics,
h(w) is a set of models fmjg and we can use the following formal denition:
w  A) B i A j B holds in all models mj 2 h(w).
In fact what we have just been describing is not only an intuitive motivation for bred semantics,
but also a general methodology for reecting any consequence relation j into the object language,
by adding a new connective ) (with the axiom A j B i j A ) B) and by methodologically
`bering' a semantics for it.
Another example where bering is needed is when we want to combine two logics. Assume that
we are given two logics, L1 and L2, say L1 is intuitionistic !i and L2 is strict implication !m.
We would like to form a unied logic L in the language with both connectives !i and !m. We
want to bre the semantics of each to obtain a combined semantics.
How do we do it?
Consider p!i (q !m r). The outer connective is intuitionistic. Thus if we regard x = (q !m r)
as atomic, we can consider an intuitionistic Kripke model for p !i x. This has the form (S; h)
where h is the assignment to the atoms (p; q; r) but not to x. We have for all s 2 S
s  p! x i 8s0  s(if s0  p then s0  x):
We do not know how to evaluate s0  x because x = q !m r and !m is a modal connective.
Suppose now we associate with each t 2 S a modal model mt = (St; Rt; ht). Then we can say
that
s0  q !m r i ms0  q !m r:
Of course we know how to evaluate !m in modal models.
mt  q !m r i (say for all t0 2 St; t0  q !m r) i (for all t0; t00 2 St, if t0Rtt00 and t00  q then
t00  r).
Of course these models mt must satisfy the conditions of the intuitionistic semantics i.e. t  s
and mt  q imply ms  q for all atoms q. So we cannot arbitrarily associate models mt to each t
of the intuitionistic model. They must satisfy the coherence conditions of these models.
In the general case, we need the following notions:
1. Each semantics has a clear notion of satisfaction of a formula in the model, i.e. model 
formula.
2. Each semantics and model in the semantics can identify the notion of a basic semantic unit
t (possible world, state) in which each atom q is evaluated (t  q).
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Given (1) and (2) we can bre the semantics together by adding functions Fm(t) = n giving for
each model m of each semantics and each semantic unit t of m a model n of the other semantics.
The above discussion motivates the prototype denition of bred semantics below. For more
details on semantics and on combination of logics see the corresponding chapters of the book.
Denition 2.8.1 (Fibred Semantics) We dene a prototype semantics. A full study of seman-
tics is given in a following chapter.
1. Let W be a model of an algebraic language of the form W = (W;<wi ; f
w
j ) where W is a set,
<wi are relations on W and f
w
j are functions on W .
2. Let LDS be a labelled deductive system with algebra A and language L with connectives ]i
with ni places, respectively, as dened in Denition 1.5.1
3. We say a structure of the form m = (W; S; a; R]; g;D; h; ;F) is a bred point structure for
the LDS system (A;L) if the following holds.
3.1. W is a model for the language A, ie each relation <i and fucntion symbol fi of A have their
interpretations <Wi and f
W
i in W.
3.2. S W 2, giving for each w 2W a subset Sw W , and a is a function such that a(w) 2 Sw.
3.3. R], for each connective ](A1; : : : ; An) of L, is a function giving for each w 2 W , an n + 1
neighbourhood relation R](w)  Sw(2Sw)n i.e. it is a relation of the form Rw] (y;Q1; : : : ; Qn); y 2
Sw; Qi  Sw.
3.4. g is a function giving for each ground term t of A and each w 2W an element gw(t) 2 Sw.
We require that gw(f(t1; : : : ; tk)) = f
w(gw(t1); : : : ; g
w(tk)).
3.5. D is a non empty domain.
3.6. h is an assignment function, assigning to each variable or constant x and each w a value
h(w; x) 2 D.
3.7.  is a predicate assignment assigning for each w 2 W and each y 2 Sw and each n place
predicate or function symbol P from L a corresponding n place relation or function w(y; P )
on D.
3.8. F is a binary function on W , assigning to each w and y from W another z = Fw(y) 2 W ,
such that y 2 Sz.
Example 2.8.2 (Modal logic semantics) Consider propositional Kripke structures for modal
logic. These have the form (S;R; a; h) where R  S2; a 2 S and h is the assignment. Consider the
modal language with  and the algebra of labels with atomic labels T and relation <. We turn the
Kripke model into a bred model as follows.
1. Let W = S
2. Let y 2 Sw i for some natural number n  0, wRny (R0 is equality). Let a(w) = w.
3. Let Rw = R  Sw; hw = h  Sw.
4. g has to be dened on the elements of T .
5. Let Fw(y) = y.
Thus (S;R; a; h) is transformed into (S; Sw; a; R; g; h;F).
Essentially we are regarding the Kripke model my = (S
y; R  Sy; y; h  Sy) as the Kripke model
associated with y 2 Sw. i.e. Fw((y) = y).
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Denition 2.8.3 (Satisfaction in bred structures) Let  be an LDS database. Let m be a
bred structure for the language. We dene the notion y w , for w 2 W; y 2 Sw, by induction
as follows:
1.  is a declarative unit of the form t(y1; : : : ; ym) : A(x1; : : : ; xn)
1.1. A is atomic:
y w  i y = tw(hw(y1); : : : ; hw(ym)); and (hw(x1); : : : ; hw(xn)) 2 w(y;A)
1.2. A has the form ](B1; : : : ; Bk):
In this case we have
y w A i Rw] (gw(y); Q1; : : : ; Qk) holds
where Qi = fy 2 Sw j y w Big
2.  = (D; f ; a) where D is a nite diagram of labels and for each t 2 D; f(t) = t is a database.
y w  i gw(a) = y and the diagram D is satised in the model W through the function gw.
(i.e. whenever t <i s 2 D then gw(t) <wi gw(s) holds in the model W) and for each t 2 D,
a(Fw(gw(t))) Fw(gw(t)) t
3.  = (D1; f1; a1) : (D2; f2; a2).
This is the case where we have a whole database serving as a label.
y w  i gw(a1) = y and the diagram D1 is satised in the model W through the function
gw and for each t 2 D1 the following holds:
If gw(t) w f1(t) then a(fw(gw(t))) Fw(gw(t)) (D2; f2; a2).
To understand the intuition behind this case consider Case 2 for a database  = (D1; f1; a1),
where f1(t) = (D2; f2; a2) for all t. In this case we require y w  i gw(a1) = y and W is
a model of D1 and for all t 2 D1 a(Fw(gw(t))) Fw(gw(t)) f2(t). The only dierence between
this denition and our case is that we require the further qualication y w f2(t). Thus the
set of points at which we evaluate f is not only required to be in D2 but also to support f1.
4. We say  W 0 i for all w; y 2W , if y w  then y w 0.
Example 2.8.4 Consider an LDS system with no atomic labels and a language L with no connec-
tives, just with atomic propositions fp; q; r; : : :g. The denitions of labels and databases (denition
1.5.1) reduces to the following:
1. A database is a formula
2. If ;  are databases, so is  :  .
3. A label is a database
4. A declarative unit has the form  : A, where  is a database and A a formula.
Note that if we read  :   as  )   then the databases (labels) will syntactically be identical
with all formulas in the language with implication. This suggests that we understand a formula of
concatenation logic A! B as A : B;A is the label of B. This view has support from applications.
The statements `if A then B' or `when A then B' do have the meaning of A qualifying the extension
of the truth set of B, and so A can be viewed as labelling B.
The semantics for this case also simplies. We have no need for the algebraic language for
labels. We need no (R]; g;D). All we need is (W; S;a; h;F). The clauses for the semantics
become:
1. For each w 2W;Sw W .
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2. hw is an assignment, giving for each atom q and y 2 Sw a truth value hw(y; q).
3. F is a binary function as before, and a(w) 2 Sw selects the actual world of the model indexed
by w.
4. Satisfaction reduces to the following:
y w A : B i y w A implies a(Fw(y)) Fw(y) :
Assume now that hw(y) is independent of w. (i.e. hw(y) = h(y) for all w) and that W = Sw
for all w. Let (W;+; 0) be a semigroup with addition and left unit 0. Let Fw(y) = w + y and let
the function a be identity, a(w) = w.
Then by denition of satisfaction
 A : B i 8w; y[y w A : B]
i 8w; y[y w A implies w+y B]
i 8w; y(y w A implies w + y  B):
The above condition is exactly the truth condition for w  A! B of concatenation logic.
2.9 IPR - Interactive practical reasoning systems
We call this section Interactive Practical Reasoning systems or logics because deduction is only
one aspect of practical reasoning activity. The task of this section is to clarify these concepts and
show the place of LDS within this framework, namely within IPR. Needless to say, I present here
my current views, which will undoubtedly be modied, as the book progresses and as I receive (I
hope) the criticism of my colleagues and readers.
We begin by distinguishing two orthogonal aspects of IPR, Interactive Practical Reasoning
systems. These are:
1. A single data structure vs a network of data structures.
2. Declarative + procedural activity vs imperative interactive activity.
The rst dimension, single vs several databases is very simple to explain. It is the dierence
between dealing with distributed and non-distributed knowledge. As we shall see later, classical
logic will be a deductive system for a single data structure, while modal logic will be a deductive
system for several structures.
The declarative vs imperative distinction can be summed up in a nutshell as the dierence
between querying a database and interacting with it, (for example updating it). Any deductive
system or a theorem prover or even a logic programming system is a declarative procedural system,
while a system of action logic or a truth maintenance system or even a logically based metalevel
planning system are imperative interactive activities.
The following matrix (g 2.27) summarises our features with some examples. A full discussion
follows.
The Declarative-Procedural Aspect
We begin with a single database. Here the basic situation is that of a structured database  and
a query Q from it, i.e. ?Q. This situation was described in Chapter 1, Section 3. Our view in
Section 1 was that a logical system (i.e. a single database, declarative procedural system in the
terminology of this section) is a pair (`;S`), where ` is a consequence relation (satisfying some
minimal conditions) and S` is an algorithmic system for it, as described in Section 1.
The class of a single database declarative system includes a variety of both monotonic and
non-monotonic logics. A crude classication, just to illustrate our point is into at least three
categories:
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Interactive Practical Reasoning
Single data structure Network of data structures
Declarative  Classical Logic  Modal Logic
 Linear Logic  Temporal Logic
 Defeasible Logic  Belief Systems
 Circumscription
Imperative  Truth Maintenance  Executable Temporal Logic
Systems  Action Logics
 Question Answering  Machine Learning
 Abduction  Dialogue Logics
Figure 2.27:
1. Systems which read the connectives in dierent ways, eg classical, intuitionistic and  Lukasiewicz
logics. These systems interpret the implication dierently. The varieties of consequence re-
lations stem from the dierent readings.
2. Resource logics; or systems which dier in the way they handle the assumptions. Such
examples are relevance and linear logics.
3. Systems relying on structured database, where the reasoning and data is structured, and
the deduction process is driven by the structure. These include inheritance systems, ordered
logics (of section 2.3) and priority logics.
Turning now to the network aspect, we observe that each one of the above single database logics
can be developed and extended into a multiple, network database logic. If we take several databases
and form a network, we need two logical components. The local logic, the logic of each database
characterises how we get queries answered locally. We also need a global logic, the network logic,
because we want to talk about connections between the dierent local databases. For this purpose,
we need connectives or operators in the language which express the connection. The local logic
or logics must have these additional connectives. To illustrate, consider a very simple network of
two databases 1 and 2 with consequence relations `1 and `2. The language is that of classical
logic with an additional connective N . `1;`2 can be taken as classical. From the point of view
of a single database, NA is considered atomic. The single database, when queried ?NA, treats
it as atomic. Recognising N as a network operator, 1 \sends" A to the appropriate place for
querying, in this case to 2. Thus
1?NA = 1 i 2?A = 1
2?NA = 1 i 1?A = 1
Written in this way, 1 and 2 need not even be answering queries using the same logic. The
network logic is the discipline of where to send A when queries ?NA, and is independent of the
\local" logics, `1 and `2.
Thus, for example, modal logic is a network logic with a discipline for . In modal logic, if we
take each node i with classical logic as its logic `i (ie i?A is computed in classical logic), we get
classical modal logic. It is therefore wrong for example to refer to modal logic (based on classical
logic) as a non-classical logic. It is classical logic extended with additional network connectives.
We can equally have intuitionistic modal logic or a non-monotonic modal logic. An example of a
modal relevance logic was given in section 2.2.
A single database logic can be structured. For example the database can have two assumptions
with the proviso that one can use exactly one of them. Here the structure is used to control de-
duction. Of course a network of databases can be amalgamated into a single, structured database,
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and the notion of a network can be subsumed in the notion of a single database. This is mathemat-
ically possible to do but not always protable to do. Dierent approaches have their advantages.
This book will clarify (I hope) some of the problems involved. We certainly have to know all the
translation and reduction options and of their conceptual and logical standing. Chapter 7 of the
current draft does a bit of that.
The network of databases can give rise to a very intricate and fascinating systems. Consider a
single node t in the network. Its database is t. Its logic is `t, with S`t as its algorithmic system.
The local node t regards each network connective N as foreign and when queried it, ie t?NA, it
refers to the global network logic for advice. The network logic, if it is modal for example, may
send A to be queried in nodes s1; : : : ; sn accessible to t. Thus we reduce t?NA to the queries
si?A and if N is necessity, we expect all si?A to succeed. This is a requirement of the network
logic. It is independent of the local logics of node si (ie `si). It is characterised by the rst order
global condition
Hold(t;NA) i 8s[s accessible to t! Hold(s;A)]
There is no reason why we should have a classical global condition. One can have a non-monotonic
probabilistic condition, for example:
NA holds at t if A holds in most worlds accessible to t.
The above illustrates that we truly have two types of logics here. The local and the global.
In fact in the most general case the global logic may be locally dependent. For example NA
holds at t i A holds in Most(t) worlds accessible to t, where Most(t) depends on t.
More on this in the chapter on label dependent connectives.
We conclude with an example from the world of word processors. Take for example MacWrite.
It allows you, when typing a letter, to open a window t1, and take part of the text and work on
it. You can open a secondary window t2 and take some text from t1 and work on it. Continue in
this manner and get a sequence of windows t1; : : : ; tn. Suppose we now want to take a piece of
text from window ti and place it in window tj . Can we do it? The way MacWrite manages this
is an example of a network logic. In fact, MacWrite does allow for arbitrary movements from one
window to another and therefore its network logic is the modal logic S5. Thus MacWrite is an S5
word processor.
The Interactive and imperative reasoning Aspect
When we query a single database, symbolised as ?Q, we want an answer. We may need a
procedure to compute the answer. We may reduce the problem of the database and query to other
databases and queries.
?Q = 1 if i?Qi = xii = 1; : : : ; n; xi = 0; 1
But we are not changing the database nor are we interacting with it. There is the aspect of
interacting with our data when encountering a query. This aspect of logic is new and exciting.
Dialogue logic, and in computing, human computer interaction, human assisted deduction, etc,
are extreme examples of a logic arising out of two interacting agents. The pure logician who may
be reading this section may object to my use of the word \logic" here. His patience and goodwill
may be already stretched to the limit by my treating non-monotonic logics as \logics". However,
please bear with me a little longer.
Consider the query ?Q. In the declarative aspect, we want an answer. In the interactive case,
we trigger an action. Q is read imperatively. We can write !Q to stress this fact.
The result of the interaction is 0. Thus !Q = 0. As an example of action assume that we
have integrity constraints on databases . We want to add Q to  and applying the integrity
constrains checker to yield the resulting 0. Thus !Q = 0. We are assuming here a procedure
for maintaining integrity constraints.
Another example is Abduction. We describe how it arises in many linguistics contexts. We
have a database  and a deductive system S`. When we query ?Q, we apply S` to nd out
whether  ` Q. Suppose we want to know what is the minimal 0 to add to  so that to ensure
that ;0 ` Q. We assume that there are restrictions in the system as to what we can add,
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which can be either proof theoretic or contextual (structured) etc. Otherwise we simply add Q, ie
0 = fQg 0 can be the abductive set to be added. It can also arise in query answering of the
form
Question: Does  ` Q ?
Answer: Yes, if 0 holds.
Again we have an imperative aspect here
!Q =  [0
Notice that there are three systems involved here.
 The logic of the 's
 The logic of the imperative procedures (integrity constraints, or abductive procedures etc)
 A metalogic that relates the two previous logics
2.10 The role of LDS
How does LDS t into the IPR picture? LDS can manipulate labelled formulas, by manipulating
both formulas and their labels in some prescribed ways. The use of labels allows us to include
extra information via properties of labels. This information can be any of the following:
 Structural and/or resource information for a single database.
 Network information for several databases.
 Metalevel information for the imperative aspect.
Thus LDS can serve as the underline logical tool for describing and presenting the dierent
logics in g 2.2.7.
To show how this is done is the object of this book.
1. The need for labelled deductive systems
 The rst step was the realization that practical applications which lend themselves to possible
logical analysis contain several independent and related structures. These structures must
be recognized by any logic which we use to describe and reason about the application.
 The second step is that we have an option, either to use traditional logics, such as classical
logic to represent these structures or to use specialized logics. Careful analysis of two case
studies shows conceputally we might wish to use specialized logics, but computationally we
are better o with classical logic.
 The third step is to look for a good framework which could give us the kind of logics we
want for applications. The proposed framework was labelled deductive systems, where the
declarative units are of the form Labels: Formulas. The important intuitive point is that we
agree to manipulate the existing natural structures of the application together, side by side,
without reduction or translation.
Our case studies showed that additional structure can come from semantics (bringing semantics
into the logic, as in the case of temporal logic) or from resource or proof theoretic considerations
(bringing priorities as labels). In either case the formalism (algebraic LDS) is very similar. In
fact, some successful widespread formalisms such as the A-Box reasoning of KL-one is already a
example for an LDS in our sense. Therefore we propose to use this formalism (LDS) in application
areas where logic is needed. The practical usefulness and applicability of such a program can be
demonstrated. We are currently trying to do exactly that. The reader can reect upon his own
personal experience to see how useful the labels can be. The relevance of LDS to the question of
the universality of classical logic is that any LDS, either syntactically presented or semantically
presented, can be translated into classical logic.
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The perceptive and critical reader may have already asked himself why we need to present and
use LDS as an intermediate step in the translation of a logic L into classical logic. Semantical
translations are known, and given a semantics for the logic, we can translate the semantics directly
into classical logic and thus obtain a translation. This can certainly be done for many modal
and temporal systems. We need not formulate these systems as LDS and then translate the
LDS into classical logic. However, LDS is necessary for the translation of logics which have no
known semantics, for example, any logic formulated proof theoretically through elimination and
introduction rules. We need to take the following steps:
Step 1: Formulate the logic proof theoretically as an algebraic LDS of the kind described in this
section (especially note that the introduction rules depend denitionally on the elimination rules,
which may not be the case in the original logic).
Step 2: Translate the LDS formulation into classical logic.
The perceptive reader might continue to ask that once we manage to produce the LDS in Step
1 above, do we not now have a semantics, i.e. a term semantics arising from the rules? The answer
is that it is not necessarily the case. In a proper semantics the semantical value of `](A1; : : : ; An)' is
reduced to the values of `Ai'. We allow elimination rules which reduce a formula to other formulas,
not necessarily subformulas of it, as long as some general measure of complexity is reduced and
a very long path involving all connectives may be involved in the reduction. It is not at all clear
that any semantics can be extracted out of this reduction. More on these points will be given in
later chapter.
2. Advantages of LDS
The advantage of LDS is that it is a natural and adaptable way of doing logic. We consider a logical
system as basically a discipline for databases and labels, giving structures and mechanisms for
deduction. The mechanisms could be either proof theory or other mechanisms, such as abduction
or circumscription, or explanation, etc. This scenario is very natural and can be adapted to a
variety of application areas. To use LDS in an application area we need to
1. Recognize underlying structures in the application. These include
(a) the declarative information to be manipulated and reasoned with;
(b) the units (objects) to be manipulated and their relative structure. (e.g. semantic objects
such as worlds or individuals, syntactic objects such as priorities or probabilities);
(c) any compatibility or conict in natural manipulative movement between (a) and (b).
2. Having recognized in (1) the natural components of the system, we devise an LDS to represent
and reason about them. Note that LDS is not a single logic, but a family of logics.
The above process needs to be applied anyway for any use of traditional logic. What I am saying
to the reader is that he should not approach the problem with a pre-determined pre-fabricated logic
(such as the logic of his youth) and therefore be compelled to force all representation into it.
In fact, what many researchers often do in practice is to use labels as side eects (implementation
tricks) to retain distinctions that their (favourite) logic forces them to abandon.3
Once we adopt the discipline of LDS, we see that there are other advantages.
 The labels can be formally used to bring into the object level meta-level features of the logic.
A simple example would be to use the labels to trace the proof of the current goal. Conditions
on the label can restrict the next move. These conditions are basically meta-level, but such
meta-level features can be incorporated into an object level algebraic labelled proof rule.
3My favourite analogy is that of a person who has a wife (husband) and a mistress (lover). Obviously they are
there for a reason and may have considerable inuence (good or bad)! There may be a need for them much in
the same way that there is a need for the label. Rather than supress them and treat them as a side eect, I am
proposing that we bring them forward into the open, and recognize their inuence. We should openly declare that
a declarative unit is a formula and a label (or several labels) and analogously in some societies it may be better to
admit (the unfortunate fact) that a `family' unit is a husband/wife and a mistress/lover (read Balzac!). We should
recognize the structure involved so that we can handle it better.
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 LDS allows for a uniform method for bringing the semantics into the syntax. Recall Example
2.3.10 as a striking example of that, with a connection with situation theory.
 LDS is a unied framework for monotonic and non-monotonic logics.
 LDS is more computationally transparent (through the labels) and hence more receptive to
meaningful optimisations.
 The proof theory of LDS can be more exible. In classical logic, there is proof theory and
there are tableaux systems which can be considered as model building systems. One is syntax
based and the other is semantically based. In LDS, a tableaux procedure is just another LDS.
The basic notion of consequence in LDS is that of a database proving a labelled formula for
example t1 : A1; t2 : A2 : : : ` s : B. A tableaux refutation for an LDS consequence relation
will start with
True [ti : Ai]; False [s : B]
and manipulate that. But such a system is just another LDS!
Thus we have: 1 `LDS1  : A i in the tableaux system 2 `LDS2 `closed' where LDS2 is
an LDS system dealing with signed labelled formulas.
 The devices of labelled Skolemization and visas across worlds are very powerful tools of LDS.
 Dierent worlds can have dierent reasoning systems (time dependent reasoning).
 We can reduce higher order properties to lower order.
3. Limitations of LDS
The main limitation is that an LDS logic needs to commit itself. Take for example S4. This
logic has one modality which is reexive and transitive. Presented as a Hilbert system, we write a
certain number of axioms:
A! A
A! A
(A ^B)$ (A ^B)
` A)` A:
The above system is not committed to any interpretation. A means any of the following:
 A holds in all accessible worlds.
 A is a set in the Euclidean plane and A is its topological interior.
 A is provable
  represents the progressive of English (e.g. if A is `John walks', then A is `John is walking').
  can mean some algebraic operation.
In any LDS interpretation, we need to identify the labels, in order to state what the declarative
units are. The nature of t, the algebra of t, will commit us to some|if not exactly one|of the
possible interpretations. We thus lose generality. We gain power, but we have to sacrice our
semantic options. When we are applying LDS, we may not mind that because the application area
already dictates the interpretation. Thus we must be careful to choose the right level of labelling.
Not too detailed to be able to remain within the realm of logic, avoiding turning the system into
an implementation.
This argument can be used against the universality of classical logic. To translate a specic
logic into classical logic, such as the S4 necessity , we need to commit its interpretation. Some
application areas, such as legal reasoning, may not allow us to commit the interpretation. Further-
more, such an application area may not be particularly interested in the computational advantages
oered by the translation and may be more sensitive to the naturalness of the representation.
By the way, this limitation is equally valid when we translate into or use directly classical logic.
 has to be translated into classical logic and the translation requires commitment (unless we use
the term translation).
Part II







3.1 Introduction and overview
The previous chapter, Introducing LDS, gave many examples of how labelling is used, both in
monotonic and nonmonotonic reasoning systems. We need now to give formal denitions of the
concepts involved.
The basic mechanism for introducing an LDS is to choose an algebra A and to consider declar-
ative units t : A and databases  = (D; f ; d; U) as dened in Denition 1.5.1. and in Denition
3.2.4
The rationale behind this denition as well as several case studies motivating it were amply
demonstrated in Chapter 2, `Introducing LDS'. From the technical point of view the basic idea is
to add annotations (labelling) to formulas of a given logic L giving further information about the
formulas through the labels. The labels come from another language, which we call the labelling
language, or algebra. Thus for an algebra A and a logic L we can be used to construct a new system
(A;L), an LDS. In this LDS we create new databases of the form  = (D; f ; d; U). These new
databases are themselves declarative `units'. We are perfectly within our framework if we regard
them as a sort of `formula' and introduce a new algebra B and start labelling these new `formulas'.
Thus we can have new `atomic' declarative units of the form b :  and get new databases of the
form (D; f ; b; U); b 2 D, where for any term t 2 D; f(t) = t is a databse of the LDS (A;L).
Symbolically this means that we are constructing the new LDS, (B; (A;L)), see example 3.2.7 for
useful additional resource labelling. Furthermore, symmetrically, we can use the databases  of
the LDS (A;L) also as labels. Given another logic L1 and a w A of L1; : A can mean that
 is a database `justifying' A, or describing the context in which A was introduced, or any other
information about A. We can thus use the LDS (A;L) as a labelling system for another logic L1
and thus form the new LDS ((A;L);L1).
If we start with (A;L) and iterate the above constructions we get a complex (higher level) LDS
based on A and L. These matters will be studied in a later chapter.
The purpose of the present chapter is to present a notion of LDS most suitable for applications.
This notion is that of algebraic LDS. Algebraic LDS play another role. They are a kind of LDS
which arise in turning an arbitrary formal logical system into an LDS system. In fact, there are
some specic kind of algebras involved. These algebras are good for theoretical studies (of how
to turn any logic into an LDS) but not necessarily good for general applications. Thus for all
the applied consumers of logic, more general algebras are needed. Also the consumer of logic
will feel more comfortable with a more sophisticated LDS proof theory, of a kind which may be
mathematically reducible to simpler notions.
We are, therefore, introducing general algebraic LDS in the present chapter, outlining features
of interest for applications. The next chapter, chapter 4, will introduce and study some specic
algebraic LDS, with some specic algebras. These specic algebras are the kind of algebras that
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arise in turning an arbitrary logic into an LDS.
We present in section 3.2 a simplied version of the basic denitions and then proceed to deal
with the proof theory. Since we have labelling at our disposal, the proof theory can be simplied.
For one thing, we need present only elimination rules to dene the system and the introduction
rules can be dened `inversely' and automatically from the elimination rules. This is unusual and
is possible only because the labels can be used for metalevel control. This is done in section 3.3.
On the predicate level, Skolem constants become label dependent and allow us to present
the beautiful theory of quantication, run time skolemization and visa rule, as hinted in the
introductory chapter, `Introducing LDS', and as will be presented in a later chapter. Section 3.4
presents the metabox system, which is a way of formulating special introduction rules for presenting
special logics. For the applied logician, the metabox system is most useful. For the pure logician,
it is redundant, as it can be reduced to a more complex labelling. The mathematical study is
postponed to chapter 4.
3.2 Algebraic LDS
Denition 3.2.1 (Labelling langauges) (a) A labelling langauge is a higher order language
with the following symbols:
(a) Function symbols ff1; f2; : : :g on individuals with arities r1; r2; : : :, respectively.
(b) Relation symbols fR1; R2; : : :g on individuals with arities s1; s2; : : : respectively.
(c) The classical connectives, equality =, and possibly the set theoretic operations of union
[ and intersection \, and possibly other higher order functions on predicates.
(d) Element variables x1; x2; : : : and individual constantx c1; c2; : : :.
(e) Relation and function variables of all arities.
(f) Higher order quantier symbols 8; 9 for individual relation and function variables of all
arities.
(b) By a syntactical labelling theory we mean a theory  (rst order or higher order) in the
langauge A above.
(c) By a (model theoretic) algebra m for the language A we mean a classical (higher-order)
structure with domain S in which the symbols (functions and relations) of A are interpreted.
We are calling m an `algebra' rather than an `A-model' for conceptual clarity. In many of
our applications more emphasis will be put on the function symbols of A than on its relation
symbols.
(d) Let m be an algebra,  be a syntactical labelling theory and ' a formula of A, and h an
assignment to its free variables. The notion of satisfaction, m h ', meaning that ' holds
in m under h, is dened classically, bearing in mind that m is taken as a full higher-order
model, namely the higher-order quantiers in ' range over all relations and functions. We
with m  ' if m h ' for all h. Let M be a class of models. We write M  ' if m  ' for
all m 2M. Let M be the class of all structure m such that m   .
(e)  is said to be rst-order if its formulas contain only rst order quantiers.
(f) Let A be a labelling language. The Herbrand domain of A;HA is the set of all rst order
terms denable in A. Namely HA contains exactly all individual variables and constants of
A and is closed under the application of the rst order function symbols of A
(g) Given t1; t2 2 HA and a class M of models, we write t1 =M t2 i in every model m 2M,
we have m  t1 = t2. We similarly dene t1 = t2 i for every model m   , we have
m  t1 = t2.
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(h) Let A be a labelling langauge. By a syntactical diagram D, we mean a pair (D1; D2), where
D1  HA and D2 is a set of formulas. Each formula ' 2 D2 is either atomic or the negation
of an atomic formula.
(i) Since D1 and D2 are disjoint, we can assume D = D1 [ D2. I.e. the diagram is a set of
terms and formulas.
Let D be an A diagram and let M be a class of models. D is said to be M satisable i
for some model m 2M and an assignment h;m h D2. D is said to be  satisable i for
some model m and assignment h;m h  [D2. We write D M ' i D [ f 'g is not M
satisable.
(j) Since D is a diagram of Herbrand terms and formulas, it is possible to dene an algorithmic
consequence relation for a query ' from D. For example, we can assume D is a logic program
(let us have no negative literals for convenience) and that  is a Horn clause theory. If ' is
a suitable query, we can write D j ' to mean that ' succeeds as a query from D [  . In
many cases it is more convenient to deal with our algebras syntactically in this manner.
Example 3.2.2 (Free concatenation algebra) Let S be a nonempty set. Let S be the set of
all nite sequences of elements from S. Let ? be the empty sequence. We identify S  S by the




r(?) = s(?) = ?:
We need the following additional functions on S
 seq(x) is dened by
seq(a) = (a) for a atomic.
seq(x  y) = seq(x)  seq(y), where  is concatenation of sequences.
 multiset(x) is dened by
multiset(a) = fag, the singleton multiset
multiset(x  y) = multiset(x)[ multiset (y)
 set(x) is dened similarly.
Then (S; ; r; l; seq, multiset, set;[;\) is an algebra, we denote it by F . It is convenient to assume
that S contains all natural numbers and some additional letters as atoms. This assumption becomes
useful when we use this algebra for resource management.
Example 3.2.3 (Possible world algebra) Let S be a non empty set and let R be an n-place
relation on S (R  Sn). Then (S;R) is an algebra. Note that we have no function symbols, but
we still call it an algebra. In case R is binary, we get a possible world model where S is the set of
worlds and R  S2 is the accessibility relation.
Denition 3.2.4 (Object level algebraic LDS) 1. Let A be a labelling langauge. A logical
language L with Skolem constants parameterised from A is a predicate language with variables
and predicates, a set of connectives ]1; : : : ; ]n with appropriate arities and the quantiers 8
and 9. The notion of a w with free variables is dened in the traditional manner. The
language may also contain function symbols e1; e2; : : : of various arities, and constants. The
language shares the variables x1; x2; : : : with the labelling language A. The constants of the
langauge L are not atomic constants but are generated from special unary function symbols in
the following manner. We assume we always have a sequence c1(x); c2(x), : : : of terms made
of function symbols with one variable (for elements for the domains associated with labels). If
t; s are labels s : c1(t) means that c1(t) is an element created (Skolemized) at label t but now
residing at s. Thus the terms of L are generated by rst generating the Herbrand universe















HA from the atomic labels and from the labelling algebra function symbols f1; : : : ; fk. Then
we apply c1; c2; : : : to generate the constants of L and then we apply the function symbols of
L; e1; e2; : : : to generate the full range of terms of L. Such terms we denote by 1; 2; : : :.
2. The language of an algebraic labelled deductive system is a pair (A;L) where A is a labelling
language and L is a logical language parameterised by A. A and L share the set of free
variables and may share some of the constants and function symbols.
3. A declarative unit is a pair t : A, where t is a term of A and A is a w of the logic. t and A
may share free variables and constants. A labelled term has the form s : , where s is a label
and  is a term of L.
4. A database is a tuple  = (D; f ; d; U) where D is a diagram of the labelling language A, and
f and U are two functions, associating with each term in D a w At = f(t) and a set of
terms Ut. Ut is the set of L terms residing at label t. The functions f and U can also be
displayed by writing ft : A; t : ci(x)g; t 2 D. Note that D may contain also some relations
R(t1; : : : ; tn). d 2 D is the `actual' world of D.
Example 3.2.5 (Modal logic with temporal labels) A possible world LDS language can be
as follows. The language is the rst order language of modal logic with connectives  and . The
labelling language is the rst order language of a binary relation R. We have no function symbols
in the algebra but we do have an innite stock of constants. We can think of the constants as
moments of time and of R as the earlier-later relation. The modal language contains the functions
c1(t); c2(t); : : : ; t ranges over labels, generating the terms of the modal language. We can think of
c(t) as an individual born at time t. A diagram D has the form ft1; : : : ; tn;R(si; sj)g where si; sj
are from among t1; : : : ; tn which are terms in D. This can be graphically displayed as a proper
geometric diagram such as
where arrows display the relation R. Thus D in this case is
ft1; t2; t3; R(t1; t2); R(t1; t3); R(t3; t3); R(t2; t2)g:
A database is a tuple (D; f ; d; U), where d 2 D and f associates with each term t 2 D a w
f(t) = At of predicate modal logic, and Ut is a set of terms of the modal language of the form
fci(sj)g, for t 2 D. We can think of the elements of Ut as the individuals living at time t. Thus
c(s) 2 Ut means that the individual born at time s is alive at time t. We can also display this fact
by writing t : c(s). Thus, according to this notation, t : c(t) always holds. The formula f(t) = At
is a modal language formula which is supposed to hold at time t. Thus t : A(c(s)) means that at
time t it is possible that A holds for the element c(s), who was born at time s. We are not saying
that c(s) is alive at t. Figure 3.2 displays a database based on the diagram of Fig. 3.1.
Denition 3.2.6 (Semantics for algebraic LDS) Let (A;L) be an LDS language. Let ]1; : : : ; ]n
be the connectives of the language, with arities r(i); i = 1; : : : ; n respectively. A possible world se-
mantical interpretation for (A;L) has the form I = (M;  1; : : : ;  n;  ) whereM is a class of models
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t3 : C; t3 : c2(t3)














for the language A and each  i has the form  i(x;Q1; : : : ; Qr(i)), is a w of the monadic extension
of the language of A, (which may be A itself if A is already higher order), containing r(i) new
monadic predicates Qj and one free variable x, and  =  (a;Q) is a closed w of the language
with one monadic predicate and the constant a. Note that in many applications A is based in rst
order logic.
A structure of the semantics has the form (m; a; V; h) wherem 2M is a model of A, Vm;m 2M
is a non-empty domain and h is an assignment associating with each n-place atomic P of L and
each m 2M a subset h(m;P )  V nm; a 2M and where M is the domain of m. h can be extended
to an h0 containing h, by assigning subsets of M to the monadic predicates of  i and  .
Satisfaction h can be dened for arbitrary ws of L via the inductive clauses and the usual
`abuse' of notation, (V =
S
m2M Vm).
0. m  P (b1 : : : ; bn) i (b1; : : : ; bn) 2 h(m;P ); bi 2 V .
1. m  :A i m 6 A.
2. m  A ^B i m  A and m  B.
3. m  ]i(A1; : : : ; Ak) i m   i(m;Q1; : : : ; Qk); with Qi = fn j n  Aig, extending the
assignment h.
4. m  9yA(y) i for some y 2 Vm;m  A(y).
5. We say that the structure (m; a; V; h) satises a formula A of L i
m   (Q1; : : : ; Qk); with Qi = fm j m  Ag.
6. A database  = (D; f ; d; U) is said to hold at a structure (m; a; V; h) i there exist functions
g1 : D ! M and g2 : U ! V such that g1 validates the diagram D in M; g1(d) = a, and for
every t : A(x1; : : : ; xn) in D we have g1(t)  A(g2(x1); : : : ; g2(xn)).
7. We say 1  2 i for every structure m 2M and every g11 ; g12 which validate 1 in the






2 respectively, which validate 2.
So far our denitions and examples have concentrated on the notions of algebras, declarative
units and databases. This is parallel to dening the notion of well formed formula in classical logic.
We have not provided the reader yet with proof theory nor with semantics. Our next task is to
dene the general form of proof theory for object level algebraic LDS. This means that we want
to give proof rules which allow us to dene the notion of  `  , where  and   are databases. In
particular we want to dene the notion of  ` t : A, for declarative units t : A.
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The reader should note that more rened and formal denitions and theorems on the proof
theory of algebraic LDS are given in a later chapter. The purpose of this section is just to introduce
the various aspects of algebraic LDS.
To explain our approach we give in a later chapter a detailed case study in the pure propositional
implicational language with f!g alone. The examples are not trivial, since in principle they cover
all substructural logics.
This chapter will give fairly general denitions.
Example 3.2.7 (LDS with resource labelling using free concatenation algebras) We use
the algebra F in the example 3.2.2 for a language with ! only. (t1; : : : ; tn) : A can mean that A
was derived (using modus ponens) from assumptions named t1; : : : ; tn and the derivation used the
assumptions in that order. The modus ponens propagation rule is:
 : A; : A! B
   : B
A more general example is to use the algebra F to add a resource labelling to an arbitrary LDS
of the form (A;L). We consider the cross product F A of the two algebras and use this as labels.
Thus a declarative unit of the new LDS has the form (a; ) : A, where a is from F and  from A.
For t = (a; ) and a formula ' of either language (of F or of A) we let '(t) hold i '(a) resp.
'() holds.
The label propagation rules for the new LDS (F A;L) are dened pointwise as follows.
Let ](A1; : : : ; An) be an arbitrary connective of L. Consider one of its elimination rules in
(A;L), say, of the following form:
'A;1 : B1; : : : ; k : Bk; : ](A1; : : : ; An)
 A; r1 : C1; : : : ; rmCm
:
We are writing 'A;  A with subscript A to emphasise that they are in the A language.
We would like to use our resource algebra F to record exactly how each ri : Ci is derived. Let
us use an atomic letter b to name uniquely this particular rule. In the LDS (F  A;L) this rule
becomes
'F ;'A; (a1; 1) : B1; : : : ; (ak; k) : Bk; (a; ) : ](A1; : : : ; An)
 F ;  A; (b  a  a1; : : : ; ak)  (1); r1) : C1; : : : ; ((b  a  a1  : : : ; ak)  (m); rm) : Cm
where 'A;  A apply to the A components of the labels and 'F ;  F are in the language of F and apply
to the F components of the labels. For example 'F (a1; : : : ; an; a) might say a1 = a2 = : : : = an = a,
i.e. we can eliminate only if all components were proved from the same assumptions. This is a sort
of resource management. Thus any derived labeled formula  : A of (A;L) can be represented in
(F A;L) with a label as (a; ) : A, where a records the derivation exactly.
Denition 3.2.8 (Proof theory for algebraic LDS) Let (A;L) be an algebraic LDS. The fol-
lowing is a stock of typical proof rules. The elimination rule for connectives and the quantier
elimination, visa and attening rules are called data rules. The introduction rule for connectives
and the quantier introduction rules are called goal rules. All the various conditions '; on the
labels appearing in the rules are called the enabling conditions.
1a. Elimination rules for connectives
An elimination rule for a connective ](A1; : : : ; An) has the form
'; t1 : B1; : : : ; tk : Bk; s : ](A1; : : : ; An)
:
 ; r1 : C1; : : : ; rm : Cm
The terms r1; : : : ; rm are new (created) function symbols dependent on the free variables
(universal constants) of Ai; Bj.
Where '(t1; : : : ; tk; s) is a formula of A called the pre-condition for the (ring of the) rule
and  (t1; : : : ; tk; s; r1; : : : ; rm) is a formula of A called the post condition.  may contain
equality. The rule is to be understood as saying:
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If we have proved the ws above the line with labels satisfying ' then we can create
new labels and deduce the formulas below the lines and the new and old labels satisfy
 .
 may contain equality just in case we want to say the new labels are equal to some old ones.
To understand the roles of ' and  consider example 2.5.1. In rule (1) of this example, '
is t < s and the application of the rule transfoms gure 2.16 into gure 2.17.
In rule (2) of this example  is s < r and the application of the rule transforms gure 2.17
into gure 2.18. Note that  gives the `position' of the newly created ri relative to the old
points, thus allowing us to transform the old database into the new one.
 can also be used to cancel data from the database. Consider Example 3.2.10. Here  is used
to throw assumptions out. In this context, option (j) of Denition 3.2.1 is more convenient.
According to this option, a rule of the form
'; Old Data
 ; Additional Data
can be understood as:
If the current database  contains the labelled formulas above the line (Old Data) and the
diagram D of  proves ' in the sense D j ', then put the Additional Data into  and put
 in as well.
1b. Introduction rules for connectives
Introduction rules in LDS are dened in terms of elimination rules and hence need not be
introduced separately. Their use will be properly dened when we give the notion of a proof.
We view them as the respective `inverses' of the elimination rules. Intuitively, when we
are in the middle of a proof and we want to introduce a connective t : ](A1; : : : ; An) with
label t, we are really saying `we already have this connective'. If this is indeed true, then
for an aritrary elimination rule of this connective (e.g. like in (1a) above), if we assume
the antecedent, without the connective, we must be able to prove the consequent of the rule.
If we can demonstrate this capability for each elimination rule, then we can introduce the




We show we already have A ! B (i.e. introduce A ! B) by showing we can assume A and
get B. Another example is A^BA
A^B
B . To introduce A ^ B we must show we can get the
conclusions of each rule, without the connective, namely assume ? and get A and assume ?
and get B.
2. Quantier elimination and introduction rules
These include the usual classical quantier rules and visa rules
(a.)
t : 8xA(x)
t : A(ut); t : ut; ut a new universal constant
(b.)
t : 8xA(x); t : cs
t : A(cs)
(c.)
t : cs; t : A(cs)
t : 9xA(x)
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(d.)
t : 9xA(x; y)
:
t : A(ct(y); y); t : ct(y)
t : ct(y) is optional in (d). It may not be adopted in modal logic but may be adopted in
numerical or priority logics.
(e.) To introduce t : 8xA(x) we prove t : A(ut0), for any arbitrary new constant ut0.
Some important side conditions may be involved in (e.).
3. Visa rules
These have the form
ti : Ai; ti : c
si ; rj : Bj ; (ti; si; rj)





j 2 fcsi j i = 1; : : : ng, for j = 1; : : : ; k.
The meaning of the visa rule is that if csi exist at ti where Ai holds and if  holds and Bj
holds at rj then d
s0j exist at rj.
 Sample visa rule from modal logic:
t : cs; t < r; r : ?
:
r : cs
The rule says that if cs exists at t then it exists at any endpoint above t. It happens to
correspond to the following renement of the Barcan formula.
8xA(x)! (? ! 8xA(x)):
4. Flattening Rules
These have the form (note only one formula A is involved):
ti : A; (ti; rj)
rj : A
 Sample attening rules from substructural logics (e.g. R-mingle):
t : A; s : A
t  s : A
t : A; t  s
s : A
5. A proof 0 of level 0 from a database (D; f ; d; U) is a sequence of labelled databases (Dn; fn; d; Un)
and justication function J0 satisfying the following:
5.1 (D0; f0; d; U0) = (D; f ; d; U) and J
0(0) = `assumption'.
5.2 (Dn+1; fn+1; d; Un+1) is obtained from (Dn; fn; d; Un) by applying a data rule and adding
the consequent of the data rule to (Dn; fn; d; Un) to obtain (Dn+1; fn+1; d; Un+1). The
data rule is applicable i Dn ` ', ' is the enabling precondition in which case J0(n+1) =
name of the data rule. Note that the post condition  of the data rule (when needed) will
tell us how to `add' the consequent to the old database to obtain the new one. Compare
the discussion under (1a) of the present denition.
We write (D; f ; d; U) `0 (D0; f 0; d; U 0) i there exists a proof 0 of level 0 leading from
one to the other.
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6. A proof of level  n has the form of linked sequences of databases with a main sequence ,
and justication function J. The rst element of the main sequence  is (D; f ; d; U). Each
element of the sequence is obtained from a previous one either according to one of the cases
of a proof of level 0 or according to the following case.
Introduction case









k(j); sj : ](A1; : : : ; An)









j = 1 : : : k, be all the elimination rules involving ]. We want to introduce s : ](A1; : : : ; An).
Suppose we also have that for each j there is a proof j of level  n 1 of each (Dn; fn; d; Un)+
f j(sj=s); rji : Cji g from (Dn; fn; d; Un)+f'j(sj=s); tji : Bji g (i.e. we can prove the consequent
of each rule from the antecedent of the rule without the use of s : ](A1; : : : ; An), as if we
already have it) then the introduction step allows us to move onto (Dn+1; fn+1; d; Un+1) =
(Dn; fn; d; Un) + fs : ](A1; : : : ; An)g.
The meaning of `+' is that we add into the old database the labelled ws indicated, together
with the conditions '; as shown. Going back to Example 2.5.1, rule (1) of this example is
an elimination rule:
t : A; t < s
s : A
So to show t : A, we take an arbitrary s, such that t < s, i.e. add fs; t < sg to the old
database and prove that we can add s : A to it.
We link the proofs j into the proof  at line n, via the justication function, J(n + 1) =
fproofs (j ;Jj)g.
We write (D; f ; d; U) `n (D0; f 0; d; U 0) if there is a proof of level  n of the consequent from
the antecedent. We write (D; f ; d; U) ` (D0; f 0; d; U 0) if there is a proof of any level of the
consequent from the antecedent.
7. For the sake of tractability we can also assume that in the elimination rule the complexity of
B1; : : : ; Bn and C1; : : : ; Cm is strictly less than the complexity of ](A1; : : : ; An). We should
assume some suitable complexity function. So for example the ) elimination rule, modus
ponens
t : A; s : A) B
f(t; s) : B
is acceptable because A;B are subformulas of A ) B. However, the classical disjunction
elimination rule, written in traditional form
A _B
A : : : C
B : : : C
C
where X : : : Y means there exists a (inductively simpler!) proof from X to Y , is not in
acceptable form. A proper treatment of _ elimination is done in the next chapter in terms of
attening rules. We can rely, however, on the deduction theorem for ), when we do have it
and write the rule as follows:
t1 : A) C; t2 : B ) C; s : A _B
f(t1; t2; s) : C
where C is a w with less nested disjunctions than A _B. See also remark 4.2.2.
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It is easier to understand the proof rules and the visa rules if we translate them into two sorted
classical logic. The next denition accomplishes that.
Denition 3.2.9 (Proof theoretical translation of algebraic LDS into classical logic) Let
(A;L) be a proof theoretic LDS as in denition 3.2.8. We dene a translation * into two sorted
predicate logic, relative to the data rules of the LDS as follows: With each atomic Q(x1; : : : ; xn) we
associate a two sorted classical predicate Q(t; x1; : : : ; xn). We also use the predicates C(t; y) and
E(t; y), reading y was created at t, and y exists at t respectively. The rst coordinate accepts terms
of the sort of the algebra A. The inductive denition of the translation [t : A], for an arbitrary
w A and label t is as follows:
1. [t : Q(x1; : : : ; xn)]
 = Q(t; x1; : : : ; xn), Q atomic.
2. [t : :A] = :[t : A].
3. [t : A ^B] = [t : A] ^ [t : B].
4. [t : 9yA(y)] = 9y(E(t; y) ^ [t : A(y)]), y not in t.
[t : 8yA(y)] = 8y(E(t; y)! [t : A(y)]), y not in t.
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[t : ](A1; : : : ; An)]
 = (denition)V







 ^ 'j !








where (sj=t) means substitute t for sj.
The translation correctly represents the algebraic LDS provided the following holds in classical
logic.
6. 8y9!tC(t; y).
7. 8y8t(C(t; y)! E(t; y))
8. For every visa rule of the form:
ti : Ai; ti : c
si ; rj : Bj ; (ti; si; rj)
rj : d
s0j
j = 1; : : : ; k and i = 1; : : : ; n, where ds
0
j 2 fcsi ; : : : ; csng we have the axiom
(8c1; : : : ; cn)(8t1; : : : ; tn)(8s1; : : : ; sn)(8r1; : : : ; rk)( (ti; si; rj)^Vn
i=1[ti : Ai]
 ^ E(ti; ci) ^ C(si; ci) ^
Vk




9. For every attening rule of the form
ti : A; (ti; rj)
rj : A
we have the axiom
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Note that we need to assume in the introduction rules that some complexity goes down. Unlike
the semantic translations, Bji and C
j
i are not necessarily subformulas of ](A1; : : : ; An) and so if
some complexity goes down we end up with a nite number of steps with several formulas of the
form s : Q, Q atomic.
Example 3.2.10 (('; ) MP rule for !) The usual rule of modus ponens can be labelled as
follows
 : A; : A! B;'(; )
:
 : B; (; ; )
1. For example, if our labelling algebra is the possible world algebra of Example 3.2.3 and ! is
taken to mean strict implication, then the MP rule becomes
 : A; : A! B; < 
:
 : B
2. If on the other hand, the algebra is the free concatenation algebra of example 3.2.7 then our
MP becomes
 : A; : A! B
   : B
One can take any semigroup (S; ) with operation  and dene the above Elimination rule.
We have seen such examples in the Chapter `Introducing LDS'.
3. The formula  can be used for deletion as well as multiple conclusions. Consider lienar
implication, where each assumption can be used at most once. Thus A;A! BjB but having
invoked modus ponens, these particular assumptions cannot be reused. We can achieve this
aimin several ways:
(a) Use multisets of atomic labels and write modus ponens as
 : A; : A! B; [  = ?
 [  : B
The condition '(; ) =  \  = ? will block the reuse ofany assumption.
(b) Use a predicate C)) to mean ` is cancelled'. Write modus ponens as
:C();:C(); : A; : A! B
 [ ;C();C()
We can read teh rule as:
If C() and C() nitely fail from the Diagram of the current database, and  : A and
 : A ! B are in the current database then add to it  [  : B and C() and C().
Now  : A and  : A ! B can no longer participate in modus ponens because C()
and C() will succeed. For this we assume that we use syntactical consequence (option
*j) of Denition 3.2.1). If we choose model theoretic consequence, adding  would be a
proper update (chance :C(x) to C(x)).
A more detailed study of Algebraic LDS is continued in Chapter 4.
3.3 Introduction rules: A discussion
The denition of the proof theory for algebraic LDS, Denition 3.2.8 is a general denition, in
terms of an arbitrary labelling language A, and elimination rules only. The introduction rules can
be dened using the elimination rules. Although mathematically such a formalism is sucient
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to dene a large class of logics, in practice some logics are formulated by elimination rules and
introduction rules with special restrictions on them which makes them no longer the `inverse' of the
elimination rules. Such presnetations of logics make it easier to work with them. These restrictions
are, of course, eliminable in terms of a more elaborate labelling system, but may be preferable in
practice. The aim of this section is to identify these convenient restrictions and to give a general
denition of an LDS using them. We rst illustrate the implicational fragment of modal logic.
Consider the modal logic of possible world models of the form (S;R; a; h); a 2 S;R  S2; h the
assignment, where a is the actual world and where we require aRa to hold. We understand the
consequence relation A1; : : : ; An ` B to mean that in every model (S;R; a; h) if a h Ai; i = 1; : : : ; n
then a h B. See example 3.4.8 below.
The above denition means that A;A ! B ` B holds but C ! A;C ! (A ! B) `?C ! B
does not hold, since reexivity is required to hold only in the actual world. Thus if aRs holds and
a  C ! A and a  C ! (A! B) and s  C hold then we are assured that s  A and s  A! B,
but unless sRs we may not have s  B. Thus a ?C ! B may not hold.
Let us examine the proof theory of this implication from the point of view of modus ponens.
Let the labelling language be that of example 3.2.7 and we will check what kind of ('; ) modus
ponens is needed. Consider the following database.
1. t1 : D ! (C ! (A! B))
2. t2 : D ! (C ! A)
3. t3 : D
4. t4 : D
The database is perceived as holding in the actual world a of some model (S;R; a; h) and hence
modus ponens is allowed. We can thus deduce
5. t1t3 : C ! (A! B)
6. t2t4 : C ! A
We want to show C ! B with some label s. We know that the semantic meaning of C ! B
that C implies B in any possible world s is such that aRs holds. So we can assume C and try and
show B with the appropriate labels. Since C ! (A ! B) and C ! A hold in the actual world
we can get A! B and A in the world s, but we cannot continue the modus ponens in s to get B
because sRs may not hold.
Let us continue formally
7. To show C ! B
x :C assumption
t1t3x : A! B allowed modus ponens
t2t4x : A allowed modus ponens
(t1t3x)(t2t4x) : B not allowed
We observe that the use of modus ponens should be dierent in a nested box, and we need to
formulate the right rules to caputure the right semantical meaning. In fact, the natural formulation
will probably tinker with the introduction rule for!, since it will give restrictions on modus ponens
inside a box. This is not compatible with our policy of letting the introduction rule for ! be the
`inverse' of (automatically and uniformly be dened from) the elimination rule for !.
We can solve the problem by oering a new labelling system and new rules. Let the labels be
pairs (m; t). m is the level of nesting and t the former formal label. Thus the data will be
1. (0; t1) D ! (C ! (A! B))
2. (0; t2) D ! (C ! A)
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3. (0; t3) D
4. (0; t4) D
The modus ponens rule is:
(m;) : A; (n; ) : A! B;m = n = 0 _ n < m
(m;) : B
We thus get:
5. (0; t1t3) : C ! (A! B)
6. (0; t2t4) : C ! A
7. To show (n; ) : C ! B . For some n and  we open a box and assume (n; x) : C. For x
arbitrary and try and show (n; (x)) : B.
So let us do this:
(7.1) (1; x) : C assumption
(7.2) (1; t1t3x) : A! B from 7.1 and 5
(7.3) (1; t2t4x) : A from 7.1 and 6
(7.4) We cannot apply modus ponens on 7.2 and 7.3
because the rule does not apply
If the modal logic was reexive at all points, the modus ponens rule would have been
(m;) : A; (n; ) : A! B;n  m
(m;) : B
and we could have continued
(7.3) (1; (t1t3x)(t2t4x)) : B.
Note that if we were to label our assumptions as in modal logic, say as in example 3.2.5, then
the appropriate elination rule would be
t : A! B; s : A; tRs
s : B
and the introduction rule for ! is the expected `inverse' of the elimination rule i.e. if ; t <
y; y : A can prove ; t < y; y : B, where y is arbitrary, then we can deduce ; t : A! B. In
this labelling language the labels are worlds, the labelling language contains the accessibility
relation R and the actual world a and aRa is required to hold. The database becomes the
multiset
fa : D ! (C ! (A! B)); a : D ! (C ! A); a : D; a : D; aRag
Deduction will allow to use modus ponens to get a : C ! (A ! B) and a : C ! A because
aRa is unavailable. To show a : C ! A, we need to assume fy : C; aRyg for an arbitary y
and show y : A, which is not possible.
In conclusion, note that we did manage to adhere to the principle that the ! introduction rule is
automatically and uniformly dependent on the elimination rule by changing the labelling.
This can always be done as we shall prove later. Nevertheless, it is more convenient to present
logics where the introduction rule is modied and dierent from the expected inverse of the elim-
ination rule and where the labelling is not changed. We thus need to dene the new notions of
metabox reasoning which allows us to do that.
It will be convenient to allow for composite labelling of the form (a1; : : : ; ak; ) : A where each
ai component performs essentially a metalevel task while  is the `main' label.
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Another way of looking at the notion of algebraic labelling, is that we consider our labelling
algebra as a cross product of several subalgebras, each perforing a specic metalevel task.
The above example and short discussion shows that we generally need, for each connective,
introduction and elimination rules, which include the propagation of labels and include proof rules
for subcomputations.
It is convenient for us to enclose the subcomputation specied geometrically in a box which
we call a Metabox. The introduction rules we call Goal Rules, because the goal is to introduce
the new connectives. The elimination rules we call Data Rules, because they increase our data
directly, not via metabox subcomputation. The reason for using these new names is because not all
data or goal rules are elimination or introduction rules. Some may be rewrite rules, Skolemisation
rules etc. The important distinction will then be whether we are working directly on the data
(assumptions) or modifying the goal. The distinctions will become more clear as we progress
through the subject matter. The speical rules for subcomputation we call Metabox Rules.
These include rules for passing a formula with the connective from one box to another, as well as
for algorithmic proof within a box.
We shall later prove that in the presence of labels only data rules (elimination rules) are
needed. We will prove that for any LDS, (A;L;M) with proof rules M there exists another LDS,
(A0;L0;M0), which `proves' the `same' labelled formulas, but which use only elimination rules,
the introduction rules being dened as the `inverses' of the elimination rules. The above notions
are rst explained through a series of examples, and then the general denitions are given. The
examples will also illustrate the practical way we annotate our proofs:
Example 3.3.1 We take a traditional proof of ((c! a)! c)! ((c! a)! a):
1. (c! a)! c assumption
2. c! a assumption
3. c modus ponens (1), (2)
4. a modus ponens (2), (3).
The following is how we look at it in our metabox system:
Box 1
1. ((c! a)! c)! ((c! a)! a) from Box 2
Since Box 2 is referred to in Box 1 to justify a line.
We write Box 1 < Box 2.
Box 2
1. (c! a)! c assumption
2. (c! a)! a from Box 3
exit Box 2: ((c! a)! c)! ((c! a)! a)
We also have Box 2 < Box 3.
Box 3
1. c! a assumption
2. (c! a)! c imported from Box 2
3. c modus ponens (1), (2)
4. a modus ponens (1), (3)
exit box 3 (c! a)! a
We summarise the rules we used:
 The goal rule for A ! B is the opening of a box with assumption A and the showing of B.
The exit is the introduction rule.
 The data rule is the fact that we can use modus ponens. This is the elimination rule.
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 The meatabox rule is the fact that assumptions can be propagated (reiterated) into inner
boxes (ie Boxi < Boxj).
We can imagine dierent metabox rules, which give rise to new logics. Here is an alternative
propagation rule:
? If A is an assumption in Box a of the form A1 ! A2 and a < b and b is an immediate <
successor box of a then A can be propagated into b.
Example 3.3.2 To show the power of this notation, let us do a modal logic deduction, with  and
!:
Box 0
A! ((A! B)! B) from Box 1
Box 1
1. A assumption
2. (A! B)! B from box 2
exit: A! ((A! B)! B)
Box 2
1. (A! B) assumption
2. B from box 3
Note that if we adopt the alternative ? propagation rule for ! mentioned above, we get strict
modal-K implication.
One more point before we go on. We saw that given a system of linked boxes a1 < a2 < a3 we
can propagate assumptions, for example for a1 into a3. To make a box more independent, we can
list all reiterations at the beginning of a box. Thus box 3 of 3.3.1 becomes:
Box 3
0. (c! a)! c reiteration
1. c! a assumption
2. Same as (0)
3. c modus ponens
4. a modus ponens
exit: (c! a)! a
Box 3 is now independent of its place and relation to other boxes.
Furthermore, to keep trace exactly what assumptions were used, we can label the assumptions
and propagate the labels.
All of this is done in the denitions below:
The rest of this Chapter denes metabox algorithmic proof rules for a general LDS and illustrate
it in a language with !. The denitions for modal logics are given in a separate chapter.
We consider various restrictions on the two rules






! E : A;A! B
B
The various restrictions will yield classical implication, intuitionistic implication, relevant im-
plication, linear implication, entailment implication and strict implication. A later Chapter shows
how the restrictions and the logics are connected.
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metabox
x : A assumption
...
...
y : B conclusion
Figure 3.3:
3.4 The metabox system
We begin with a mathematical denition of proof boxes. The denition is logically correct but can
be simplied and made more ecient for implementation as an automatic system. We give the
less ecient denitions rst for explanatory considerations.
The previous section described three components for a labelled deduction system, the introduc-
tion rules, the elimination rules and the metabox rules. The rst two are familiar; we now have to
introduce and dene the metabox.
Imagine we are going forward using our proof rules. We proceed line by line, let us say from
line 1 (denoted l1), to line 99 (denoted l99). This proof looks like the usual proofs we are familiar
with, except that instead of the usual formulas at each line, we have labelled formulas
ln = tn : An
We now want to use an introduction rule at line l100, to show that we can prove the labelled
formula of the form, for example, t : A! B. Our metabox rules tell us we have to open a box as
in the gure below 3.3, assuming x : A as an assumption and proving y : B as a conclusion. What
kind of proof rules can we have for this metabox subcomputation?
We have several components here:
1. What are the rules of proof within the box? These include both formula rules and label rules.
2. Which of lines l1; : : : ; l99 can we use within the box? Earlier lines are units already proved.
Are they available inisde the box?
3. We also have a notational problem. What notation do we use to indicate the fact that line
100, namely l100 = t : A! B is justied by the metabox?
4. How do we present and deal with nestings of metaboxes? Are there going to be logical
connections, and if yes, how do we represent them?
5. What kind of lables do we use within the box? What is the label x going to be? A new
atomic label? How does it relate to existing labels?
Our strategy is to give a denition of a deduction within a box which is completely context
free. We import into the box all information we need for the algorithmic proof computation within
the box and then there is no need to know how the box relates to the rest of the proof.
We now survey our options in choosing the metabox rules. We can have dierent rules depending
on how deeply the boxes are nested. The outer box, the metabox of complexity 0 is the outer
derivation using elimination rules only. A metabox of complexity 1 is the derivation with a box
justifying an introduction of a connective. Similarly complexity n+1 indicates a box justifying an
introduction of a connective within a box of complexity n.
Let us now survey our options.
Options for Metabox of Complexity 0
Let us examine more closely the basic box of complexity 0 for forward proof: (We illustrate using
the language with !). Its structure looks as follows:





































Assumptions A1; : : : ; An.
t : A
...




r : B; (t; s; r)
...
We use the elimination rules, which for! is modus ponens, as the only rules for going forward.
The following are the parameters (distinctions) involved in this concept:
3.4.0.1 Labelling of the Assumptions
We use a labelling language A1 whose elements have the form t = (a; ), where  is from a labelling
language A0, referred to as `main labels', and a is from a free concatenation algebra (see example
3.2.7 which indicates resource. We need an agreement (considered as part of the logic) of how to
label new assumptions. For example several copies of the same assumption may have the same
main label  but never the same resource labels, as shown.
(a1; ) : A
(a2; ) : A
(a3; ) : B
or f(a1; ;A); (a2; ;A); (a3; ;B); : : :g
 The second component may indicate relative strength among the data f(ai; ;Ai)g for ex-
ample See gure 3.4.
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3.4.0.2 Forward Proofs Level 0
We use several simple forward proof rules. For implication, !, we use MP and distinguish the
following resource considerations which are done by the rst resource component of the label.
1. We note which formulas (assumptions) are used to yield a conclusion;
2. We count how many times each formula was used.




4. We check the length of steps and the sequencing of the steps of the proof.
5. We have to decide how the main labels are propagated during proof (i.e. the second compo-
nent). We can use a propagation formula  .
6. We give a formal denition of when do we consider the proof successful.
Options for Metabox of Complexity n+ 1
The motivation is to introduce a t : ](A1; : : : ; An) for example in the case of implication, to show
t : A! B (a complex w).
One way to show it is by direct elimination rule, as for ! we use modus ponens:
t1 : X ! (A! B)
: : :
t2 : X
t = t1t2 : A! B
A second way is to use the introduction rule procedure to show t : ](A1; : : : ; An), for example
t : A! B. In this case we use a subproof (box) ie use proof steps as follows.
Imagine we are at line k of the proof:
line k: show t : A! B at level n+ 1, if the metabox below is successful:
Assume A with some labelling
: : : use proof steps of level  n to show B
with some other appropriate label
The following are the parameters (distinctions) involved in this construction:
1. What are the labels of the assumption for a nested box and how these labels relate to existing
ones.
2. In the proof at level n+1, line k requires us to intoruce a t : ](A1; : : : An) e.g. for implication
to show A ! B. We are doing a metabox sub-computation. What resources (assumptions,
lemmas and goals, etc) of the level n + 1 of the proof (up to line k) can we use in the box
and in what form? This is Rw of 3.4.2 below.
For example we may say we can reiterate only implications of the form C ! D and that
these can be used only as tickets. Another example is that we allow to reiterate only from
the immediately enveloping box only. The way to use a reiteration may depend on its label,
which carries information about where it was rst introduced. We may also decide to change
the label as we reiterate the formula into the box.
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3. What distinctions and what proof rules we adopt for the box ie, in the sense of 2 above
(inductively on n). These distinctions may use other logics which are already known. In
other words the logic of the inner box may be dierent from the logic of the outer box.
4. What parameters to give to line k; with (A ! B) if the box succeeds? By parameters we
mean here a label to be used in the continuing proof in level n+ 1.




Example 3.4.1 Consider a proof of (A! (A! B)) ` (A! B). We have:
l1 = a1 : A! (A! B) assumption
l2 = a1 : A! B from metabox in g 3.5
metabox
show B
l2:1 a2 : A assumption
l2:2 a1a2 : A! B from l1 and l2:1
l2:3 a1a2a2 : B from l2:1 and l2:3
Figure 3.5:
The above metabox is context dependent. It relies on the fact that it justies line l2 and can
use in the internal proof line l1. To make it context independent, we can put line l1 in the metabox
itself. Thus it becomes, g 3.6.
show B
l1 a1 : A! (A! B) reiteration
l2:1 a2 : A assumption
l2:2 a1a2 : A! B from l1; l2:1
l2:3 a1a2a2 : B from l2:1; l2:2
Figure 3.6:
Once we have all the reiterations in the box, the box becomes self contained. Furthermore, there
is no need for the decimal numbering system, since the box is self contained. the goal to show in
the above box is the formula B. When we have many nested boxes, the goals to show in the outer
boxes also play a part in the algorithmic proof procedures of the inner box. These, therefore, also
have to be reiterated. (The rule which uses previous goals to show is called the Restart Rule.)
We therefore end up with the following box, see g 3.7 below, presented after cleaning up and
re-organising
The justication of a line within a box may refer to another box, as in the following:
rn = t : A! B n = from box m.
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Reiterations Previous Goals
R1 = a1 : A! (A! B) none
Assumption Current Goal
A1 = a2 : A a1a2a2 : B
Proof Lines Justication
r1 = a2 : A 1 =assumption
r2 = a1a2 : A! B 2 = from R1 and r1 by modus ponens
r3 = a1a2a2 : B 3 = from r1 and r2 by modus ponens
Figure 3.7:
We are now ready to give a general denition of the metabox. This general denition also
includes the rules for the label propagation. As we have seen, the `main' labels could be numbers,
algebraic constants, or even formulas of a logic. Generally, when we are given the labels, we must
also be given their algebraic or logical structure. This structure we call the Labelling Logic (or
Algebra of Labels) A. It is convenient to adopt an algebra of elements which are pairs t = (a; ).
The rst component is from the free concatenation algebra and the second component is from
the main arbitrary algebra. The rst component is there to trace the proofs while the second
component is the main labelling. So, for example, if the second component is reliability numbers,
we can have modus ponens as
(a1; 0:7) : A; (a2; 0:9) : A! B
(a2a1; 0:63) : B
Denition 3.4.2 (Metabox computation) We start with a labelling logic A on a set of well
formed formulas L. We form the logic which we call LDS1 = (A1;L). This LDS1 has elimination
rules, and its introduction rules are `inverse' to the elimination rules. Our purpose in this denition
is to show how a metabox discipline can change the introduction rules in a way as to get a new
logic LDS2. To achieve this, we form a new algebra A2 whose elements are of the form t = (a; ),
where a is an element of a free concatenation algebra F of example 3.2.7, and  2 A1.
The manipulation of the labels for the elimination rules (A2;L) are as in example 3.2.7. A2
gives us complete resource control over derivations of (A1;L) and is used in the formulation of the
metabox discipline dened below. We assume a set of conditions C on labels ti. Among them are
formulas 'MP (t; r);  MP (t; r; s), to be used in propagating resource F labels through modus ponens,
and  E(t; r; s) to be used on F labels for exiting from a box.
A Let A, B, R, G, denote nite sequences of sets of labelled formulas. If H is such a sequence,
its elements have the form (H(1);H(2); : : : ;H(n)), where n is its length. Each H(i) is a set
of labelled formulas of the form H(i) = f(ti;Hi)g, where ti is the label and Hi is the formula.
In the denition below, A sequences have labels of the form t = (a; ), a atomic from F , and
it is assumed that for A sequences i 6= j ! ai 6= aj. Other sequences have as their labels as
propagated by the rules of the labelling algebra. For example if the labelling algebra is the set
of all nite sequeces of atomic labels with concatenation, then the propagated labels will be as
in example 3.2.7.
For the case of B, R, G sequences, we allow ai = aj for i 6= j.
B We dene a proof box (in short box) of complexity 0 as a tuple of the form Box = (R;A;B;;G; Q),
which satises certain conditions, to be described below. In this tuple, R, A, B, G are -
nite sequences of sets of labelled formulas satisfying the agreed notational convention of (A)
above. Q is a set of formulas and  is a function giving for each i  length of B a value.
The intended meaning of the above sequences is as follows:
* R is a sequence of reiterations (ie essentially formulas already proved before and which can
be used in the current proof).
* A is the sequence of the assumptions.
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Reiterations Past Goals
l1 : R1 s1 : G1
Assumptions Current Goal
t1 : A1 t : Q
Proof Justication
r1 : B1 1
...
...
rn : Bn n
Figure 3.8:
*  is the justication function, giving a value for each line of the proof, indicating why it is
valid.
* G is the sequence of past queries and (q;Q) is the current query.
The labels are annotations of the form (a; ) a is a sequence of names of assumptions showing
resource, while  is a general label from a general algebra showing any other information in
the general case. For example the label  can be a possible world in the case of a metabox
system for modal logic.
The box can be presented graphically as in Figure 3.8.
For boxes of complexity 0, the following conditions must be satised
0 All assumptions A(i) = (ti; Ai) are labelled as ti = (ai; i), where ai are all dierent and
atomic. This is already a convention in (A) above. Note that we may adopt a dierent
convention. We may want ti = fAig, that is, we label a formula by itself, and have an
interesting interaction between the metabox logic and the labelling logic.
1 If B(n) = f(tkn; Bkn)g is the last element in the proof sequence B then for some k Bkn =
Q; tkn = q.
2 The justication function  satises one of the following for each B(j).
2.1 (B(j)) = A(i), ie, B(j) is an assumption.
2.2 (B(j)) = R(i), ie B(j) is a reiteration.
2.3 (B(j)) = B(i); i < j, ie B(j) is a repetition.
2.4 With each connective ](A1; : : : ; An) and with each elimination rule for that connective
of the form
'; t1 : B1; : : : ; tk : Bk; s : ](A1; : : : ; An)
 ; r1 : C1; : : : ; rm : Cm
We associate a justication clause as follows:
(B(j)) = (B(i0);B(i1); : : : ;B(ik))
with i0 < j; : : : ; ik < j and
(s; ](A1; : : : ; An)) 2 B(i0)
and
(t1; B1) 2 B(i1); : : : ; (tk; Bk) 2 B(ik)
and '(t1; : : : tk; s) hold as and B(j) = f(ri; Ci)g and  (t1; : : : ; tk; s; r1; : : : ; rm) hold.
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For example for the case of implication, the clauses will be as follows:
(B(j)) = (B(i);B(k)), for i; k < j and B(i) = (ti; Bi) and B(k) = (tk; Bi ! Bj) and
'MP (ti; tk) and  MP (ti; tk; tj) hold where '; are conditions in C having to do with modus
ponens. For example ' can be ti \ tk = ? and  can be tj = ti [ tk (in case the labels are
nite multisets).
C Let us assume that the notion of a proof box of complexity < m has been dened. We dene




2 The justication function  satises, for each B(j) one of 2.1-2.4 as before, or as in 2.5 as below:
2.5 We are justifying the introduction of a connective B(j) = ft : ](A1; : : : ; An)g, with a label




















be the wth eliminition rule. Let  be a general substitution instantiating tw to t i.e. tw = t.
Then if we claim we have t : ](A1; : : : ; An) already, we must be able to show each r
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We therefore require that the justication of B(j);(B(j)) to be a set of boxes each of com-
plexity less than m. The wth box has the form.
2.5.1 Box (w) = (Rw;Aw;Bw;w;Gw; Qw)
where
Aw is a sequence of length 1 with Aw(1) = ftw1  : Bw1  : : : ; twk(w) : Bwk(w)g.
2.5.2 Rw is the sequence of reiterations. For most metabox disciplines (though not always) it
is obtained by concatenating
R A  (B(1); : : : ;B(j   1))
(* denotes concatenating).
(a)
2.5.3 Bw is the new proof.
2.5.4 Gw is obtained by concatenating G  ((q;Q)) where Q is the current goal and q is its
label obtained from the last element B(n) of B(see condition 1).
2.5.5 Qw is the new query.
2.5.6 If Bw(k) = (tk; Q
w) is the last element of the proof Bw then the appropriate  w, acting
now as a Box exit condition, is satised.
2.5.7 We say in this case that Box(w) is subordinate to Box. The concept means that Box(w)
is used to justify a line (B(j)) in the proof of Box. Denote this relation by Box(w) <
Box and let  be the transitive and reexive closure of <.  is a tree relation.
The above simply says that the justication of t : ](A1; : : : ; An) set of boxes proving the
appropriate elimination rules.
Denition 3.4.3 We say t1 : A1; : : : tn : An ` t : B i (by denition) there exists a box of some
complexity with R = ?;A = ((t1; A1) : : : (tn; An));G = ? and (t; B) is the last element of B, ie
Q = B.
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Box 0 1 Reiterations : ? Previous Goals : ?
2 Show B ! (A! B)
3 Assumption : ?
4 B ! (A! B) from Box 1 :
Box 1 5 Reiterations : ? Previous Goals : B ! (A! B)
6 Show A! B
7 Assumption : B
8 A! B from Box 2 :
Box 2 9 Reiteration : B Previous goals : B ! (A! B); A! B
10 Show B
11 Assumption : A
12 B (1) = 0
13
14
15 We have Box 2 < Box 1 < Box 0
Figure 3.9:
Example 3.4.4 1. Here is a box for B ! (A! B).
See gure 3.9
We now give a series of examples to further illustrate the general denitions.
Example 3.4.5 (Intuitionistic Logic) 1. Assumptions: sets of formulas (no labels), the goal
is a single formula.
2. Level 0: modus ponens forward.
Success is reaching the goal.
3. The conditions for proof rules for an inner box introducing A! B: at Line k: at level n+1.
Take in the box assumption A and add to the assumptions any previous line and then reach
B by the rules of level n.
Example 3.4.6 (Classical Logic) Modify level n+ 1 in intuitionistic logic by allowing previous
goals in the box and success of box means reaching in the box the goal B or any previous goals.
The following illustrates the new condition (called Restart) (see g 3.10):
The box on Level 2 is successful because line 1.2.3 proves a which is in the show corner. We
have Box2 < Box1 < Box0.
Example 3.4.7 (A labelled Proof) This is a straightforward box proof of
? : (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B)).
The justication is Box a1 below (see g 3.11):
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Level 0 Box 0 : 1 To show ((a! b)! a)! a
2 ? assumptions
3 ((a! b)! a)! a; follows from box 1
Level 1 Box 1 : 4 To show a
5 (a! b)! a); assumptions
6 a! b; from box 2
Level 2 Box 2 : 7 Show either a (previous goal) or b (current goal)
8 a; local assumption
9 (a! b)! a; reiteration
10 a; from 8
11 a; from 5 and 6
12
Figure 3.10:
Box a1 1 Show (A! B)! (A! B)
2 a1 : B ! A assumption
3 a1 : (A! B)! (A! B); from Box a2
Box a2 4 Show A! B
5 a2 : A! B assumption
6 a2a1 : A! B; from Box a3
Box a3 7 Show B
8 a3 : A assumption
9 a2 : A! B
10 a1 : B ! A
11 a3a2 : B
12 a2a3a1 : A
13 a2a3a1 : B
exit 14 a2a1 : A! B
exit 15 a1 : (A! B)! (A! B)
exit 16 ? : (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B))
Figure 3.11:
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Example 3.4.8 (Modal logic K1) This example shows how the logic of an inner box can be
dierent for the logic of an outer box. The example we chose is from modal logic. It is well known
that the modal logic K with modality  is axiomatised by the three schemas.




3. All substitutions of truth functional tautologies.
It is complete for the class of all Kripke structures of the form (SR; a) where a 2 S is the actual
world and R  S  S is the accessibility relation.
Consider the semantical condition aRa. The class of all Kripke models in which aRa holds,
dene a modal logic K1. We do have in this logic `K1 A! A but 6`K1 (A! A).
The LDS of 2.2.3 will handle this easily and most naturally, as aRa will be part of the cong-
uration. No other additions to the rules of 2.2.3 is necessary.
A Hilbert type axiomatisation of K1 is not easily formulated. We would need to replace axiom





In other words, we have to use `K provability to dene `K1 provability.
If we write A! B for K1-strict impliction, then the metabox rules for ! are as follows:
1. A formula D can be reiterated from Box a into Box b only if the following two conditions
hold:
1.1. D has the form D1 ! D2.




can be performed in box b provided one of the following conditions is satised.
2.1. X ! Y is a reiteration
2.2. Box a is the outermost box.
Note that relaxing condition (1.2) corresponds to the transitivity of the accessibility relation
and that relaxing condition (2.1) corresponds to the semantical condition of reexivity of the
accessibility relation.
Thus modus ponens can behave dierently in dierent boxes.
The previous denitions described the metabox discipline for the case where the geometry was
based on nested metaboxes. It is more conveient in many cases to order the boxes and rely on
external ordering to achieve the eect of nesting. In fact, ordering is more general than nesting
and can address a wider variety of logics. Here are the denitions:
Denition 3.4.9 (Ordered metabox computation) Let ](A1; : : : An) be a new n-place con-
nective. A Metabox system for this connective has the following components:
1. A language A of labels.
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2. Goal Rules
The goal rules for ] have the form:
To show  : ](A1; : : : An) open one or more metaboxes bj with i;j : Ci;j as assumptions and
k;j : Dk;j as goals to show. The i;j : Ci;j and k;j : Dk;j are the other formulas involved
in an elimination rule of  : ](A1; : : : ; An) and it is assumed that according to some measure
of complexity, the complexity of bj is less than the complexity of the original problem. The
labelling langauge A is involved in the relationship between ; i;j and k;j.
For example, to show  : A ! B, open a box, assume a : A and show a : B, where a is a
new atomic label.
3. Data Rules (Elimination rules)
These have the form:
t1 : A1; : : : ; tn : An; with restrictions '(t1; : : : ; tn) on ti
s : B; with ti and s satisfying some formula  (ti; s) of the logic A
where Ai involve the connective ] in some complexity and B involves ] to a less complexity.
This is an elimination rule.
The simplest form is that Ai involve the connective ] and B does not. Examples are:
Modus Ponens:
 : A; : A! B; \  = ?
 [  : B
Ackerman Rule:
 : A; : B ! (A! C)




s being a new label with tRs, where R is the external relation on labels.
4. Metabox Rules
These rules say which assumptions are reiterated into the new box in (1) and how they are
to be used.
For example we may allow only implications A! B to be reiterated and require that they be
used as tickets. Or we may allow A(u) to be reiterated even though u is free in A. (This
corresponds to the Barcan formula in modal logic.)
5. Ordered metaboxes A metabox system is comprised of the following components.
(a) A nite partially ordered set of metaboxes names fai; <g. The relation a < b is the
subordination relation, meaning that the metabox b is used to justify a line in the proof
in metabox a. Let a <1 b read that b is an immediate successor of a.
(b) With each metabox name a a sequence B(a) of triples is associated. The triples have
the form (;A;), where  is a label, A is a formula and  is the justication. The
following conditions are satised:
(5.2.1) Each element in the sequence is either an assumption, a reiteration or is obtained
from previous elements of the sequence via a data rule.
(5.2.2) If (;A;) is an assumption then  = \assumption".
(5.2.3) If (;A;) is a reiteration then form some box names a1; : : : ; an = a we have 
= \reiteration (;A) from Box a1" and a1 <1 a2 <1 : : : <1 an = a and in the box
B(a1) the line (;A;
0) appears earlier than a line (;B;00) where the justication
00 = \from Box a2" appears. We also require that the reiteration be allowed by the
metabox rules.
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(5.2.4) (;A;) is justied by a box b. In this case = \from box b using the appropriate
exit rule".
(5.2.5) (;A;) is obtained through a data rule from earlier elements in the sequence. In
this case there is a rule R:
ti : Ai
s : B
and instances of this rule appear earlier in the sequence and  : A is an instance of
s : B and  = \from earlier instances in this box of the rule R".
(c) Each box b is introduced uniquely once in one other box a < b to justify a line (;A;)
in the sequence B(a). The assumption of b are rst in the sequence B(b) and agree with
the Goal Rules of the connectives of A. The last element in the sequence B(b) is  : B.
We further require that  : A and  : B and the assumptions of b satisfy to correct exit
rule quoted by .
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Chapter 4
Proof Theory and Semantics for
Algebraic LDS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter develops proof theory and semantics for algebraic LDS in detail, with certain specic
algebras, needed in representing an arbitrary logic consequnce relation as an LDS. We deal with
propositional languages rst, and illustrate our methodological principles. A later chapter will
study the options available in LDS for quantiers. The algebras studied in this chapter are more
specic than those given in denition 3.2.4. That denition requires an algebra (labelling language)
A and a language L. In our case we assume that A is a cross product of the form A = F  A0,
where F is the free concatenation algebra of denition 3.2.2 and A0 contains some specic function
symbols and an ordering which will be used later in formulating a proof theory for our systems.
This ordering shows up again in a later chapter on the algebraic study of consequence relations.
This specic presentation of the algebra A does not restrict its generality. The algebra F is
used to keep track of proofs and does not interfere with the main labelling algebra A0, which can
be arbitrary. The ordering in A0 is a natural one, and can always be formally dened as equality
for any algebra which does not already have a natural ordering.
Example 4.1.1 (Typical example) Suppose we are given data of the form:
d1 : A
d2 : A
d3 : A! B
d4 : A! B
d1; d2; d3 indicate dierent sources for the data items and also serve as letters to name them. The
source d1 is more reliable than d2, and we associate a number with A, indicating how reliable A
is. The source d2 also puts for ward A,but it is less reliable. Say d1 puts forward A with reliability
value 1 = 0:7. Similarly, 2 = 0:5 and 3 = 4 = 0:2. Suppose we agree that when we perform
modus ponens we multiply the numbers. We can now derive B in several ways:
d3  d1 : B reliability 3  1 = 0:14
d3  d2 : B reliability 3  2 = 0:10
d4  d2 : B reliability 4  2 = 0:10
The d sequence actually records how B is derived (notice we put d3 rst in the sequence because
it names the ticket) and the  multiplication sequence gives the numerical reliability. We might
wish to forbid the application of modus ponens between data of incompatible sources. Let us say
that sources with odd indices are not compatible with sources with even indices. Thus the derivation
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of d4  d1 : B is blocked. Thus we may write '(x; y) to indicate that x and y are compatible. Then
the modus ponens rule becomes
'(a; b); (a; ) : A; (b; ) : A! B
(b  a;   ) : B
Suppose we accept as proven formulas obtained with reliability = 0:5. There may not be a
single proof with such reliability, however, if there are several derivations of the same formula from
dierent sources, we can aggregate the reliabilities.
Let us examine what kind of algebra we need for this system.
 The operation 
 for modus ponens.
(a; )
 (b; ) = (b  a;   )
where `*' is conatenation and `' is number multiplication.
 The relation '(x; y) of compatibility of labels (to keep modus ponens within data of the same
source).
 The relation  of strength among labels, where
(a; )  (b; ) i denition a  b and  5 
a  b means the sequence b contains the sequence a and    is numerical comparison. 
is the relation of higher priority and relying on more data.
 The operation ] on labels indicating aggregation.
(a; ) ] (b; ) = denition (a [ b; + )
where + is numerical addition and [ is disjoint union of sequences.
Thus in our example B can be proved with label
(d3; 3)
 (d1; 1) ] (d4; 4)
 (d2; 2) = (d3  d1 [ d4  d2; 0:24)
See also Examples 1.6.1 and 2.3.12.
 The set E of distinguished labels e 2 E, which indicate acceptability. For example E =
f(x; ) j 0:5  g. E must satisfy:
x 2 E and x  y imply y 2 E:
Thus we accept any B which can be derived with a label e : B; e 2 E.
The above considerations inidcate that the kind of semantics we need for general implicational
logics has the following form.
Denition 4.1.2 (General semantics for implicational logics) Let j be a propositional con-
sequence relation for a language with ! satisfying identity (A j A) and transitivity (AjB and
BjC imply AjC). Assume that A ! B is antimonotonic in A and monotonic in B. Then the
following is a general semantics for j.
1. Models have the form m = (S;;]; '; e; f; h), where S is a nonempty set of possible worlds.
e 2 S is the actual world. '  S  S is the compatibiltiy relation, ] is the associative and
commutative aggregate binary function and h is the assignment. For each atomic q, h(q)  S.
 is a reexive and transitive relation on S. f is a binary `accessibility' function on S. h
satises the condition t 2 h(q) and t  s imply s 2 h(q).
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2. The notion of satisfaction t h A, under h, is dened by induction as follows:
 t h q i t 2 h(q) for atomic q.
 t h A! B i 8s('(t; s) and s h A imply f(t; s) h B).
 We say m  A i e h A.
3. Let K be a class of models.
 We say K  A i m  A for all m 2 K.
 A model m is normal i '(t; s) is not dependent on t.
 A class of models K is normal i all m 2 K are normal.
Example 4.1.3 (Modal logic in the general semantics) 1. To explain the previous de-
nition, let us see what modal logics look like in such an environment. Consider the modal
logics K or S4. These are complete for suitable classes of Kripke structures of the form
(S;R; a; h), where R  S2; a 2 S and h is the assignment. It is possible to obtain complete-
ness for the class of Kripke models where the possible worlds are trees. Thus, for a set S0 of
atoms we have S  S0 , where S0 is the set of all nite sequences of elements of S0 and S is
closed under initial segments. The actual world is ?, the empty sequence.
The accessibility relation for modal K can be dened by
xRy i for some atom s 2 S0 we have y = x  (s)
where  is concatenation.
The accessibility relation for S4 can be dened by:
xRy i for some z (which may also be empty) we have y = x  z:
Satisfaction for modality B (also written > ! B, using strict implication ! and truth >)
is dened in the traditional manner in a Kripke model.
x  B i for all y such that xRy we have y  B.
for modal K we observed that
xRy i 9z 2 S0(x = y  z)
thus we get
x  B i 8z(z 2 S0 implies y  z  B)
i (8z('(x; z) and z  > imply f(x; z)  B)
where '(x; z) = z 2 S0 and f(x; z) = x  z.
The last clause is identical with the truth condition of > ! B of the previous denition.
If we choose '(x; z) to mean z 2 S0 we get S4 semantics. If we choose '(x; z) to mean
x = ? _ z 6= ?, we get the semantics where R is transitive everywhere but reexive only at
the actual world.
2. There is another uniform way of presenting the semantics of strict implication A! B. The
table for strict implication is
t  A! B i 8s(tRs and s  A imply s  B):
We dene a function f(x; y) on trees as follows. Let u be the maximal sequence such that
for some x0; y0; x = u  x0; y = u  y0. Denote u by u = x \ y. u may be equal to ?. Denote
x0 by x  x \ y and similarly y0. See gure 4.1
Dene f(x; y) to be x  (y   x \ y) = x  y0. In particular we get
f(x; u) = x ? = x and f(u; x) = u  x0 = x:















Let '(x; y) be x \ y = x.
Thus we can write
x  A! B i for all y(x \ y = x and y  A imply f(x; y)  B):
Since x\ y = x implies xRy and implies f(x; y) = y, we get that ! is S4 strict implication.
To get K semantics for ! we let '(x; y) be the conjunction of the two conditions x \ y = x
and (y   x \ y) 2 S0, i.e. y is only one atom longer than x.
This denition of the function f is good for all substructural and many valued implications.
Example 4.1.4 (Intuitionistic logic in the general semantics) Kripke models for intuition-
istic logic can also be taken as trees. They have the form (T;;?) where x  y i 9z(y = x  z).
This indicates that in the general semantics we should require z  f(x; z). For the choice of
'(x; y) = x \ y = x and f(x; y) = x  (y   x \ y) we get that the table:
x  A! B i 8y('(x; y) and y  A imply f(x; y)  B)
gives intuitionistic implication.
Example 4.1.5 (Translation through the general semantics) It is possible to translate any
w A into classical logic with binary '(x; y) and function symbol f(x; y) through the semantics.
We translate the pair [t : A] (meaning t  A or t labels A) and the translation is . With atomic q




[t : A! B] = 8y('(t; y) ^ [y : A] ) [f(t; y) : B])
Example 4.1.6 (Linear database) 1. Consider a language with! and algebra A. We dene
the notion of linear database t :  for this language. A linear database with base t has the
form
t : fs1 : A1; : : : ; sn : An; '(t; s1); '(t1; s2); : : : ; '(tn 1; sn)g
where t0 = t and ti = f(ti 1; si).
Such databases arise in evaluating ws.
Consider B = A1 ! (: : :! (An ! q) : : :). Then
t  B i 8s1(s1  A1 and '(t; s1) imply f(t; s1)  A2 ! (: : : (An ! q) : : :):
t1 = f(t; s1)  A2 : : : (An ! q) : : :) i 8s2(s2  A2 and '(t1; s2) imply f(t1; s2)  A3 ! : : :! (An ! A) : : :):
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The `database' is the sequence
t : fs1 : A1; : : : ; sn : An; : : : ; '(ti; si+1); : : :g
2. Consider an unlabelled traditional substructural logic L for an implication . Assume the
theorems of L are axiomatised in some way, say as a Hilbert system or a Gentzen system,
etc. Assume the language also contains unary predicates Q(x), one binary predicate '(x; y)
and the connective ^, and the universal quantier 8. Let A be an algebra with ' and f (we
are abusing notation here and using the same letter ') and, assume that the variables of L
range over A and that all elements of A are constants of L. We can thus legitimately write
Q(t), for t in A.
We can translate any t : A of (A;L) into a formula [t : A] of L, ( denotes the translation)
as follows:
 [y0 : q] = Q(y0); q atomic
 [y0 : A1 ! (A2 ! : : : (An ! q) : : :)]
= 8x1; : : : ; xn([
Vn
i=1[xi : Ai]
 ^Vni=1 '(yn 1; xn)  Q(yn)) where y1; : : : ; yn are abbre-
viations for terms dened by the recursion equation
yi = f(yi 1; xi)
Thus y0 is the only free variable of the above translation.
Note that the translated formulas reside in a fragment of the  logic, dened as follows:
Universal  fragment
 An atomic A is in the fragment
 If Ak is in the fragment, and B is atomic, then^
k
Ak  B
is in the fragment.
 If A(x) is in the gragment so is 8xA(x).
We shall see later that for some algebras A and some axioms on  we may have:
(*) ? `(A;L) e : A i `L [e : A] .
Note that if L has some nice semantics, then (*) will endow a semantics on (A;L).
It is useful to think of  as intuitionistic implication.
This chapter will concentrate on the following topics:
 Proof theory for algebraic LDS, natural deduction formulation.
 Conversion methods from natural deduction formulation to a Hilbert formulation and back.
 A theorem showing that one can adopt the view that introduction rules are always the
`inverse' of elimination rules.
 A methodology for combining any two algebric LDS systems
 Tableaux methods for any algebraic LDS
 Semantics and general completeness theorems.
 Examples and applications from well known logics.
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4.2 Basic proof theory
This section develops the basic proof theoretic notions for resource propositional LDS. We need
the exact formulations of the language, the labelling, the consequence relation and various notions
of theoremhood.
Denition 4.2.1 (Resource propositional LDS) 1. Let L be a xed propositional language
with atomic propositional variables fq1; q2; : : :g and connectives f]1; : : : ; ]ng of arities r1; : : : ; rn
respectively. Let j be a consequence relation on L satisfying identity (AjA) and transitivity
(AjB and BjC imply AjC). A connective ](: : : ; x; : : :) is said to be monotonic (anit-
monotonic) in place x if the following holds for all A;B.
AjB implies ](: : : ; A; : : :)j](: : : ; B; : : :) (resp. ](: : : ; B; : : :)j](: : : ; A; : : :)).
We can assume the connectives of L are either monotonic or antimonotonic or both in each




i . The meaning of the r
+
i and
r i partition is that the connective is monotonic up in ri places and monotonic down in r
 
i
places. We shall see later that such logics and connectives are very general indeed. For
example, A ! B is monotonic up in B and down in A. Thus ! has arity r = 2 with
r+ = r  = 1.
2. A resource algebraic labelling language L for L and j has the form
A = (; ; S;;]; 'i; e; fi;k;j(y; x1; : : : ; xr 
i
); j = 1; : : : ; r+i ; i = 1; : : : ; n; k = 1; : : : ; ki; )
where S is the set of atomic labels, e 2 S is a distinguished label. fi;k;j are Skolem functions
which generate from S the set S of all algebraic labels.  is a reexive and transitive relation
on S.  is a syntactical theory in the (possibly higher order) language of the algebra, which
(S;; e;]; 'i; fi;k;j) satises and (x) is a formula (possibly higher-order) of the algebra
with one free variable. The 'i are r
 
i + 1 relations on S
 and ] is an associative binary,
commutative aggregation function on S.
] satises the following, for each term t(1; : : : ; r 
i
; x) of the algebra with a free variable x
and 1; : : : ; r 
i
and each function symbol fi;k;j(; 1; : : : ; r 
i
); t(1; : : : ; r 
i
; fi;k;j(; 1; : : : ; r 
i
))]
: : : ] t(1; : : : ; r 
i
; fi; k; r
+
i (; 1; : : : ; r 
i
))  t(1; : : : ; r 
i
; ).
A database  has the form  = (D; f ; d), where D is a nite diagram of the algebra A (i.e.
a set of labels and relations on them), d is a label and f is a function associating with label t
of D a w f(t).
Let (x) be a (possibly higher-order) formula of the algebra A. We write (D; d) j (t), for a
label t, i (D; d) satises (t) as a Herbrand model, where quantiers range over elements of
D only. This can be achieved syntactically if D is a Horn clause database and D j  means
that  succeeds as a query from D [  . Compare with item (j) of Denition 3.2.1.
Usually a logical system comes with a pair (0; ) of formulas. 0 is a formula restricting the
diagram (D; d), for example saying all labels in D are atomic (from S), while (t) says what
kind of labels can be proved from the database, for example, saying that the label t contains
all labels in D.
In many cases we have
(D; d) j (t) i  D ) (t)
where D is the conjunction of all the formulas of D. The right hand side is validity in any
classical model while the left-hand side is j D ) (t), i.e. validity in all Herbrand universes.
They are the same for certain syntactical forms.
3. For each connective ]i consider the following 'i-elimination rules ei;k;j ; j = 1; : : : ; r
+
i ; k =
1; : : : ; ki.
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'i(; 1; : : : ; r 
i
);1 : A1; : : : ; r 
i
; : ]i(A1; : : : ; Ar 
i
; B1; : : : ; Br+
i
)
fi;k;j(; 1; : : : ; r 
i
) : Bj
In view of the above rule we can write ](A1; : : : ; Ar 
i
; B1 : : : ; Br+
i
) as (A1; : : : ; Ar 
i
) !i
(B1; : : : ; Br+
i
).
4. There are some natural conditions to require on the algebra and the ' elimination rules.




for every n+1 place y = f(x; x1; : : : ; xn) and every b; a1; : : : ; an there exists a unique a
such that b = f(a; x1; : : : ; xn).
 e is a unit:
For every n+ 1 place f and a we have f(a; e; : : : ; e) = a.
 For a binary f(x; y), 8y[f(a; y)  f(b; y)]) a  b
We can require the algebra to be archimedian, in the following sense. Let a1; : : : ; an 2 A
be a nite number of elements and let b 2 A. Let ffa1; : : : ; angg be the set generated from
fa1; : : : ; ang by repeatedly applying the function symbols of A to these elements.
Let b be any element and let Ib = fa 2 A j a  bg. Then ffa1; : : : ; angg \ Ib is nite.
Furthermore, for all a1; : : : ; an; b there exists a natural number k that any term obtained
from more than k repeated application of function symbols to ai is not  b.
5. Let A1;A2 be two algebras for the same language L, i.e. both have the form of (3) above:
Am = (m; Sm;]m; 'mi ; em;m; fmi;k;j):
We dene the algebra A1  A2. Let S = S1  S2. The ws and functions of A are pairs
of ws and functions ' = ('1; '2); f = (f1; f2), where 'm; fm are in the language of Am.
Let '((s1; s2)); s1 2 (S1); s2 2 (s2) hold i both '1(s1) and '2(s2) hold. Let f((s1; s2))
be (f1(s1); f
2(s2)). In short the functions and predicates are evaluated coordinatewise. Let











1 : A1; : : : ; 
m
n : An;m : B
fm(m; 1; : : : ; n) : C










n) : An; (
1; 2) : B
(f1; f2)((1; 2); (11; 
2





6. Conversely, let A = A1 A2 be an algebra which is a cross product of A1 and A2. Assume
the elimination rules of A all have the form:
'1(
1; 11; : : : ; 
1
1);'2(






i ) : Ai; : : : ; (
1; 2) : B
(f1(1; 1i ); f
2(2; 2i ) : C
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Then one can consider only the rst A1 component of the algebra and derive an LDS, (A1;L)





f1(1; 1i ) : C
Let e1 be a rule of A1 and e2 be a rule of A2. e2 is said to be a companion to e1 if e1;2 = (e1; e2)
is a rule of A.
7. A semialgebraic resource labelling language has the form A = F  L, where F is the free
algebra of denition 3.2.2. Let (a; )  (b; ) be dened as a = b and   . The (i; k; j)th
rule ei;k;j now becomes the (i; 'i) resource rule (labelled ei;k;j):
i(a; a1; : : : ; ar 
i
);'i(; 1; : : : r 
i








; (a; ) : ](A1; : : : ; Ar 
i
; B1; : : : ; Br+
i
)
(((ei;k;j ; a); (a1; : : : ; ar 
i
)); fi;k;j(; 1; : : : ; r 
i
)) : B
Remark 4.2.2 (Notes on resource elimination rules) 1. Note that the assumptions in the
elimination rule e are ordered. Thus, for a three place connective
(A1; A2)!3 B
the rule becomes
(a; a1; a2);'(; 1; 2); (a1; 1) : A1(a2; 2) : A2; (a; ) : (A1; A2)!3 B
(((e; a); (a1; a2)); f(; 1; 2)) : B
A1 goes in the rst slot of !3 and A2 in the second.
For example the two disjunction rules become
e1
(a; ) : A _B
((e1; a); f1()) : A
e2
(a; ) : A _B
((e2; a); f2()) : B
It is possible to recognise the left and right disjunct from the rule applied.
Of course, the modus ponens condition ' plays an important role in restricting the (mis)use
of the disjunction rules. We can restrict the modus ponens of f : A; : A! Bg by requiring
that for no label t do we have ff1(t); f2(t)g  set () [ set ().
The elimination rules for conjunction can be taken as
t : A ^B
t : A
and
t : A ^B
t : B
There is a dierence between conjunction and disjunction. Disjunction has one rule e which
has two componenets, e1 and e2. Conjunction has two rules. Each rule has one component.
In general a connective, say A  (B1; B2), may have several rules each having two compo-
nents. The dierence between a new rule and a new component comes in the corresponding
introduction rule. Our approach to introduction rules is that they can be obtained uniformly
and automatically from the elimination rules.
Thus if e1 and e2 are two elimination rules for  above, each with two components we get
the form
ei;j
'(; ); : A; : A (B1; B2)
fi;j(; ) : Bj
:
To be able to introduce  : A  (B1; B2) at some stage in the proof we must show that
essentially our proof machinery already has it at that stage. This means that if we assume
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the antecedent  : A for a suitable  (i.e. such that '(; ) holds), we can show in a subproof
at that same stage that the consequent for each rule e1 and e2 of . Showing the consequent
means showing at least one of the Bj.
Thus we need to show that for an arbitrary  such that '(; ) and arbitrary rule ei there
exists at least one j such that
'(; ); : A ` fij(; ) : Bj
So to show conjunction  : A ^ B we must show the result of each rule i.e. we must show
 : A and show  : B, since the rules are:
 : A ^B
 : A
and
 : A ^B
 : B
:
To introduce  : A_B we must show one of the two consequences of the single rule i.e. either
f1() : A or f2() : B.
By way of illustration, let us intuitively prove A! A _B.
Assume  : A
Show  : A _B
If we claim we `have'  : A_B we must be able to `perform' the elimination rule. We choose
the f1() : A option. Can we derive f1() : A from  : A? Yes, if in the algebra we have
  f1().
Let us check how to prove
(a)  : A _B
(b)  : A! C
(c)  : B ! C
(d)    : C
We reason as follows:
(e) f1() : A from (a)
(f)   f1( : C from (b) and (c)
(g) f2() : B from (a)
(h)   f2() : C from (c) and (g).
Consider now x(  x) = t(x). We have
t(x=f1()) : C
t(x=f2()) : C
and we want to deduce
t(x=) : C:
We need this as a attening rule of the algebra.
We can also write it as:
t(f1()) ] t(f2()  t():
Note that C must be derived from A and from B in teh same way, as exhibited by the term
xt(x).
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2. Note that the LDS arising out of the labelling A1  A2 is not the intersection in any sense
of the logics with A1 and A2. It is more like the sharing of the proof paths and propagating
the labels of each algebra side by side. To illustrate, consider the database:
t1 : A
t2 : A! (A! B)
t3 : A
t1 < t2 < t3
The logic A1 is labelled in such a way that it starts modus ponens by taking A from above the
A! B and then alternates to below and so on. While A2 starts the opposite way. Thus both
logics individually can prove B but the cross product cannot prove B. So the cross product is
not the intersection of what can be proved in both.
3. Further note that the denition of the Elimination Rules for resource LDS can be rened as
follows:
 A '-rule of the form:
'(t; t1; : : : ; tk); t1 : A1; : : : ; tk : Ak; t : B
f(t; t1; t2; : : : ; tk) : C
can be written as a ('; ) rule eliminating t : B
'(t; ti); ti : Ai; t : B
 (s; t; ti); s : C
where  (s; t; t1; : : : ; tk) is f(t; t1; : : : ; tk)  s.
We write ` s' rather than `= s' because of the inference rule
 ` s1 : A and s1  s2 imply  ` s2 : A:
4. Furthermore, the corresponding `inverse' introduction rule becomes the following:
 ` t : B if for some t1; : : : ; tk, and t such that '(t; t1; : : : ; tk) holds, we have that:
[ft1 : A1; : : : ; tk : Akg ` s : C, where t1; : : : ; tk are arbitrary in the set hx1; : : : ; xki'(t; x1; : : : ; xk) =
f(t1; : : : ; tk) j '(t; t1; : : : ; tkg, and t is the y such that  (s; y; t1; : : : ; tk) holds (if such a y ex-
ists).
We can use the notation
t = y (s; y; t1; : : : ; tk);
or
t = s=f(t1; : : : ; tk)
to denote the y such that  (s; y; t1; : : : ; tk) holds.
Denition 4.2.3 (Proof theory for resource LDS) Let (A;L) be a resource LDS with A =
F A0. We allow for F or for A0 not to appear, in which case A = F or A = A0.
1. A database  = (D; f ; d) is a set of labelled formulas of the form t : A, where t = (a; ), a
from F and  from A0, as formally dened in Denition 4.2.1.
2. A labelled consequence relation is a relation between databases and declarative units of the
form  `A t : A; (written as  ` t : A for convenience) as follows:
We use two parameters m and n. m for the depth of the use of introduction rules and n for
the length of the proof using elimination rules. Thus  `m;n t : A means t : A can be proved
in at most n lines. Each line is either obtained from previous lines by elimination rules or
is justied by an Introduction rule whose subproof uses at most m  1 nested subproofs.
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(a)  `0;0 t : A if t : A 2  and (D; d) j (t), (or in many cases  D ) (t)) as in
Denition 4.2.1.
(b)  `0;n+1 t : A if for some elimination rule of the form
;'; ti : Ci; i = 1; : : : ; k
t : A
we have that  and ' hold in the algebra and that  `0;ni ti : Ci; i = 1; : : : ; k, for some
ni  n.
(c)  `m+1;n+1 t : A if for some elimination rule of the form
;'; ti : Ci; i = 1; : : : ; k
t : A
we have that  and ' hold and that  `mi;ni ti : Ci; i = 1; : : : ; k, for some mi  m and
ni  n.
(d)  `m+1;0 (a; ) : (A1; : : : ; Ar 
i
)!i (B1; : : : ; Br+
i
) if for arbitrary new atomic a1; : : : ; ar 
i
satisfying i(a; a1; : : : ; ar 
i
) and arbitrary 1; : : : ; r 
i
satisfying 'i(; 1; : : : ; r 
i
) we
have that for each k there exists a j such that for some m0; n, with m0  m we have for
each j






g `m0;m ((ei;k;j ; a); (a1; : : : ; ar 
i
)); fi;k;j(; 1; : : : ; r 
i
)) : Bj
(e)  `m;n t : A if  `m0;n0 t0 : A for some m0  m and some n0  n, and some t0  t.
(f) We let  ` t : A be dened as  `m;n t : A, for some m;n.
(g) Let ` A mean ? ` e : A
(h) Note, in view of remark 4.2.2, that  `A1 B and  `A2 B does not necessarily imply
 `A1A2 B.
Example 4.2.4 (Resource for implication) Consider the language with binary implication A!
B. Let j be a consequence relation for ! satisfying identity and transitivity and assume that
A ! B is antimonotonic in A and monotonic in B. Let A0 be an algebra with binary 
 and a
constant e. Let the (; ') modus ponens rule be:
(a; ) : A; (b; ) : A! B; (b; a);'(; )
(b  a;  
 ) : B
In many known substructural logics e is a left unit satisfying e
 =  for all  and that (?; a) and
'(e; ) hold for all a and . We shall see in (a) below that this property corresponds to adopting
the axiom ` A ! A. Also the database formula (x) expresses in many substructural logics the
notion of relevance and/or resource use. For example (t) could be the formula 8x(x 2 Set (t)).
This formula holds in any Herbrand universe i for all constants in the universe appear in t.
For the above algebras and elimination rule, let us check what properties of A are needed to get
some theorems of the form ? ` (?; e) : A, for various ws A.
The reader should note that we do not claim completeness. A completeness theorem should be
proved for each combination of axioms. To illustrate, consider the Hilbert system with the single
axiom ` A! A and the rule of Modus ponens
` A and ` A! B imply ` B:
Let A be an algebra with e;
; and '. From case (a) below and from Example 4.2.8 we get that
the corresponding conditions are:
  '(e; ))   e
 
  '(e; )) (e
 )
  '(e; e)
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  e
 e  e
If the algebra A satises these conditions, then the corresponding algebraic LDS satises
? `A e : A! A
and
? `A e : A
and
? `A e : A! B
imply
? `A e : B:
In other words we get soundness. What we still need to prove is completeness, namely if for
some formula D;? 6` e : D then for some algebra AD, satisfying hte above condition, we have that
? 6`AD D:
We can dene a translation , similar to the one given in denition 4.1.6(b), where the atoms
t : q is translated as Q(t) ^ (t) and  is intuitionisitc implication. We believe (conjecture) that
we can show
? ` e : A i [e : A]
is a theorem of intuitionisitc logic, at least for ws A which are temselves intuitionistic theorems.
(a) We check ? `?(?; e) : A! A. The above holds if for arbitrary a in hxi(?; x) and arbitrary
 in hxi'(e; x) we have
f(?; a);'(e; ); (a; ) : Ag ` (?  a; e
 ) : A
This will follow if a  ?  a and   e
  and f(?; a); '(e; ); (a; )g j ((?  a; e
 ).
We do have a = ?  a, but we do need to require   e 
 , if we want A ! A to be a
theorem. If we assume also that e
  =  that will also yield the axiom.
The minimal condition for A! A is
  8('(e; ))   e
 )
  8a((?; a)) a  ?  a):
  f(?; a);'(e; ); (a; )g j ((?  a; e
 )):
(b) Consider the rule
` A! B
` (B ! C)! (A! C) :
To check this assume
? ` (?; e) : A! B
This means for arbitrary a and  in hxi(?; x) and hxi'(e; x) respectively we have
f(?; a);'(e; ); (a; ) : Ag ` (?  a; e
 ) : B
while we need to show for arbitrary a;  as above that
f(?; a);'(e; ); (a; ) : B ! Cg ` (?  a; e
 ) : A! C




; ); (?a; b); (?; a);'(e; ); (a; ) : B ! C; (b; ) : Ag ` ((?a)b; (e
)
) : C:
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To show that we need (?; b) and '(e; ) to hold, so that we get
(?  b; e
 ) : B:
Further, we need (a;?  b) and '(; e 
 ) to hold and a  (?  b)  (?  a)  b and

 (e
 )  (e
 )
 .
Thus the condition is
 (?  a; b)) (?; b) ^ (a;?  b) ^ (a  (?  b)  (?  a)  b):
 '(e
 ; )) '(e; ) ^ '(; e
 ) ^ (
 (e
 )  (e
 )
 ).
From now on we assume the algebra satises for all a; :
?  a = a; e
  = ;'(e; ); (?; a)
we also assume that (t) always holds. This will simplify the examples.
(c) Let us check when
? ` (?; e) : B ! (A! B):
The above holds if
f(a; ) : Bg `?(a; e
 ) : A! B
where a is arbitrary for hxi(?; x) and  is arbitrary for hyi'(e; y).
Let b be arbitrary for hxi(a; x) and  be arbitrary for hyi'(; y). We must check whether
we have f(a; b);'(; ); (a; ) : B; (b; ) : Ag `?(a  b; 
 ) : B.
Clearly if our algebra allows for a  a  b and   
  then we can indeed succeed.
The above means that the condition we need on the algebra is
  (a; x) ^ '(; y)) a  a  x ^   
 y:
(d) Let us check the axiom
? `?(?; e) : A! ((A! B)! B):
Again this reduces to checking
f(a; ) : Ag `?(a; ) : (A! B)! B:
which reduces to showing for any (b; ) such that (a; b) and '(; ) hold that:
f(a; b);'(; ); (a; ) : A; (b; ) : A! Bg `?(a  b; 
 ) : B
where further b is arbitrary in hxi(a; x) (i.e. b 6= a) and  is arbitraray in hyi'(; y). The
only way to get the conclusion is to perform modus ponens on the assumptions, in which case
we get (b  a;  
 ) : B but we need '(; ) to hold.
We thus need the algebra to satisfy the following conditions:
  (a; x)) (x; a) ^ (x  a  a  x)
  '(; y)) '(y; ) ^ (y 
   
 y)
(e) Let us check the axiom
? `?(?; e) : (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C))
Again we get that we need
f(a; ) : A! (B ! C)g `?(a; ) : B ! (A! C)
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and we need to show that for any (b; ) such that (a; b) and '(; ) hold and such that b is
arbitrary in hxi(a; x) and  is arbitrary in hyi'(; y) we have
f(a; b);'(; ); (a; ) : A! (B ! C); (b; ) : Bgf `?(a  b; 
 ) : A! C
We must show for any (c; ) such that (a  b; c) and '(
 ; ), which are arbitrary respec-
tively, we have
f(a; b);'(; ); (a  b; c);'(
 ; ); (a; ) : A! (B ! C); (b; ) : B; (c; ) : Ag
` ((a  b)  c; (
 )
 ) : C
using modus ponens we can get: ((ac)b; (
)
) : C provided '(; ), (a; c); '(
; )
and (a  c; b) all hold.
We thus need the following to hold
  (a; x1) ^ (a  x1; x2)) (a; x2) ^ ((a  x2; x1) ^ ((a  x2)  x1  (a  x1)  x2)
  '(; y1) ^ '(
 y1; y2)) '(; y2) ^ '((
 y2; y1) ^ ((
 y2)
 y1  (
 y1)
 y2)
(f) Note that if we let a = ? and  = e in the conditions of (d) above, then if we assume (?; x)
and '(e; y) hold for any x and y we get the following:
(x1; x2)) (x2  x1  x1  x2) ^ (x2; x1)
'(y1; y2)) (y2 
 y1  y1 
 y2) ^ '(y2; y1)
which are exactly the conditions of (c) above. Indeed axioms (a) and (d) imply axiom (c)
because from
(A! B)! (A! B)
we can get by commutativity
A! ((A! B)! B):
(g) We check the axiom
? `?(?; e) : (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C))
We have to check whether
f(a; ) : A! (B ! C)g `?(a; ) : (A! B)! (A! C):
For this purpose we need to show that for any (b; ) such that (a; b) and '(; ) hold and
such that b is arbitrary in hxi(a; x) and  is arbitrary in hyi'(; y) we have
f(a; b);'(; ); (a; ) : A! (B ! C); (b; ) : A! Bg `?(a  b; 
 ) : A! C:
We must therefore show that for any (c; ) such that (a  b; c); '(
 ; ); c is arbitraray in
hxi(a  b; x);  arbitrary in in hyi'(
 ; y), we have
f(a; b);'(; ); (a  b; c);'(
 ; ); (a; ) : A! (B ! C);
(b; ) : A! B; (c; ) : Ag `?((a  b)  c; (
 )
 ) : C
To do modus ponens we need the following properties to hold
 (a; c) ^ '(; )
 (b; c) ^ '(; )
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These two will respectively give us
(a  c; 
 ) : B ! C
and
(b  c;  
 ) : B
We further need
(a  c; b  c) ^ '(
 ;  
 )
which will allow us to get by modus ponens
((a  c)  (b  c); (
 )
 ( 
 )) : C
we therefore need to have that




 )  (
 )
 
The Conditions on the algebra we require are therefore the following for all a; b; c and ; ; .
 (a; b) ^ (a  b; c)) (a; c) ^ (b; c) ^ (a  c; b  c) ^ ((a  c)  (b  c)  (a  b)  c):
 '(; )^'(








(h) We check the axiom
? `?(?; e) : (A! B)! (A! (A! B))
As before, we need to show
f(a; ) : A! Bg `?(a; ) : A! (A! B)
For this purpose we need to show, as before, that for any (b; ) such that (a; b) and '(; )
hold and b is arbitrary in hxi(a; x) and  is arbitrary in hyi'(; y) we have
f(a; b);'(; ); (a; ) : A! B; (b; ) : Ag `?(a  b; 
 ) : A! B
This can be shown if
 a  a  b and   
 .
We an alternatively try and show the consequent using the elimination rule, in which case
we need to show that for an arbitrary (c; ) such that (a  b; c) ^ '(
 ; ) holds and c is
arbitrary in hxi(a  b; x) and  is arbitrary in hyi'(
 ; y) we have
f(a; b);'(; ); (ab; c);'(
; ); (a; ) : A! B; (b; ) : A; (c; ) : Ag `?((ab)c; (
)
) : B
there are two ways we can proceed:
since the algebra allows for
 (a; b) ^ '(; )
then we can perform the modus ponens and get
(a  b; 
 ) : B
and we need further that
 a  b  (a  b)  c and 
 )  (
 )
 
On the other hand, if the algebra allows for
 (a; c) ^ '(; )
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then we can perform modus ponens and get
 (a  c; 
 ) : B
We further need that
 a  c  (a  b)  c and 
   (
 )
 
Thus the overall conclusion is that the above axiom can be proved from the empty database
? if the algebra itself satises the following condition for all a; b; c and ; ; .
 f(a; b) ^ '(; )) (a  a  b) ^ (  
 )g
_f[(a; b) ^ (a  b; c)) (a  b  (a  b)  c]^
^['(; ) ^ '(
 ; )) (
   (
 )
 )]g
_f[(a; b) ^ (a  b; c)) (a; c) ^ (a  c  (a  b)  c)]
^['(; ) ^ '(
 ; )) '(; ) ^ (
   (
 )
 )]g
(i) Let us check
? `?(?; e) : (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
As before, we need an arbitrary a in hxi(?; x) and an arbitrary  in hxi'(e; x) for which
we have
f(a; ) : A! Bg `?(a; ) : (C ! A)! (C ! B):
This reduces to allowing any (b; ) such that b is arbitrary in hxi(a; x) and  is arbitrary in
hxi'(; x) to have
f(a; b);'(; ); (a; ) : A! B; (b; ) : C ! Ag `?(a  b; 
 ) : C ! B:
We must now show that for any (c; ) such that c is arbitrary in hxi(a  b; x) and  is
arbitrary in hxi'(
 ; x) we have
f(ab; c);'(
; ); (a; b);'(; ); (a; ) : A! B; (b; ) : C ! A; (c; ) : Cg `?((ab)c; (
)
) : B:
To succeed in this we need (c; b) ^ '(; ) to hold and (b  c; a) ^ '( 
 ; ) to hold. we
further need




 )  (
 )
 :
Thus the two conditions we need are:
 (a; b) ^ (a  b; c)) (c; b) ^ (b  c; a) ^ (a  (b  c)  (a  b)  c)
 '(a; ) ^ '(
 ; )) '(; ) ^ '( 
 ; ) ^ (
 ( 
 )  (
 )
 :
Example 4.2.5 (Semilinear, many valued algebra) Consider the albegras F and A0 dened
as follows:
1. (a; b) = def (set (a)\ set (b) = ?), where set (a)\ set (b) = ? means that the expressions
a and b share no atoms in common.
2. Let a  b be multiset(a)  multiset(b).
3. Let the algebra A0 be all real numbers in the interval [0,1]. Let e be 0 and let  
  =
min(1; + ). Clearly 
 is commutative and e
  = .
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Let    mean the same as  of the real numbers.
Let '(; ) be >.
to show in A0,  : A! B, we need to asusme  : A for an arbitrary  and show  
  : B.
Thus we have the truth table TruthValue(A! B) = max (0;TruthValue (B) TruthValue (A))
with 0 being Truth.
Let us check whether A! (B ! A) is a theorem of this logic. The condition to check is
  (a; x) ^ '(; y)! a  a  x ^   
 y:
which becomes
set (a) \ set (b) = ?) multiset (a)  multiset (a  x) ^   min (1; + y)
This condition is satised.
Example 4.2.6 (An algebraic condition for an axiom) The next denition is motivated by
Example 4.2.4 and is intended to associate a formula A of the algebra A with every w A of a
logic L such that in the LDS (A;L) we hope to have that (under suitable conditions on A):
? ` e : A i A  A:
We explain the basic idea by an example. Consider the algebra A = F A0 and the A0 database
0.
1 : B
2 : A! B
3 : A
and we want to prove in A0,  : A! (A! B) from this database. We assume the algebra A0 has
the modus ponens rule:
'(; ); : A; : A! B
f(; ) : B
We proceed with a proof in A0 and assume x1 : A with an arbitrary label x1 in hxi'(; x) and try
and prove f(; x1) : A! B.
This can be done in several ways. To record the dierent ways we ue resource labelling by
working in the algebra A = F A0. So let us display our database as an A database 1 below:
(a1; 1) : B
(a2; 2) : A! B
(a3; 3) : A
(c1; x1) : A
where a1; a2; a3; c1 are atomic resource labels from F . In the pure resource logic with F labels,
ignoring the algebraic A0 labels, we can prove A! B in two ways.
1. Using the Elimination Rules only. In which case we get a2 : A! B
2. Use an introduction rule for A! B.
Option 1 will also succeed in the A0 algebra if 2  f(; x1) in A0.
Let us write t = a2 for the resource label with which A! B can be proved and let
1 = ['(; x1)) (1  f(; x1))]
for the associated formula, which if it holds in A0 the corresponding A0 proof will succeed.
Thus we look at t of F such that 1 `F t : A! B and check whether A0  t and this ensures
that 1 `A0  : B.
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Turning to the second option in A0, we assume x2 : A with a label x2 arbitrary in hxi'(f(; x1); x)
and get the A database 2 below:
(a1; 1) : B
(a2; 2) : A! B
(a3; 3) : A
(c1; x1) : A
(c2; x2) : A
and we want to prove in A0  = f(f(; x1); x2) : B. On pure resource considerations we can prove





The corresponding A0 labels:
1 : B
f(2; 3) : B
f(2; x1) : B
f(3; x2) : B
Therefore we can deduce in A0 the required  = f(f(; x1); x2) : B provided the following holds:
2 = '(f(; x1); x2)) 1   _ (f(2; 3)  ) _ (f(2; x1)  ) _ (f(3; x2)  ):
We therefore conclude that in A0 the database 0 can prove  : B if the algebra satises
8x1; x2(1 _2)
The general situation, however, is not as simple as it seems from the above discussion. Let us
look at the formula (((A! A)! B)! B. To nd the condition needed we try
(a; ) : (A! A)! B `?(a; ) : B
We cannot get B by direct modus ponens (ignoring the labels). We need to observe that we should
try and prove A! A. So we try to show x : A! A with a label x such that f(; x)   and '(; x)
holds. Clearly, to show x : A ! A, we assume y : A, and try and show f(x; y) : A. The simplest
is to assume y  f(x; y). We are thus looking for an x such that 8y('(x; y) ) y  f(x; y)) and
such that '(; x) holds.
The choice x = e can do that, except that '(; e) might not hold. In fact the condition for
((A! A)! B)! B to be a theorem is indeed that '(; e) holds.
To summarize, for e : ((A! A)! B)! B to hold, we need:
  8['(; e) ^ f(; e)  ]
The lesson we learn from this example si that there may be ways to prove the goals which do
not arise from direct modus ponens pattern matching. We may have: t1 : A! B; ; t2; : C `? t : B,
and we may need to try and show x : A with an appropriate label x. Thus to nd all possible proofs
algorithmically we need a good proof strategy. Note that the denition of the consequence relation
 ` t : A (Denition 4.2.3) is correct but it is inductive. For example, we can get
 : (A! A)! B `  : B
because  : (A ! A) ! B `1;0 e : A ! A and hence it proves `1;1 f(; e) : B and provided
f(; e)  , we get the desired result.
We thus need a good proof strategy. Let us adopt a goal directed strategy. The strategy of
N-Prolog, which is as follows:
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1. To show ?q; q atomic, nd a clause A1 ! : : :! (An ! q) : : :) in the data and show ?Ai; i =
1; : : : ; n.
2. To show A! B, add A to the data and show B.
3. Success for q atomic if q is in the data.
This strategy is an improvement. It will certainly deal with the previous examples, but still, there
are cases where it fails. Consider
((A! B)! B)! ((B ! A)! A
To nd the condition for this we try
(a; ) : (A! B)! B `?(a; ) : (B ! A)! A
which reduces to
(a; ) : (A! B)! B; (b; ) : B ! A `?(a  b; f(; )) : A
and '(; ) must hold.
Now we can again see the improvement of the goal directed approach. Forward pattern matching
for modus ponens will give us nothing. The goal directed approach will indicate that we need to
prove B with a label x : B such that '(; x) holds and
f(; x)  f(; ):
Again, in a goal directed procedure we get that we need to prove y : A! B with a label y such that
'(; y) holds and f(; y)  x. To show y : A ! B, we assume z : A for arbitrary z in hzi'(y; z)
and show f(y; z) : B. Here we loop because we have to go through the clause (A! B)! B again.
Thus we get no condition for this case unless we improve our proof procedures.
The N-Prolog goal directed proof procedure is complete for intuitionistic implication. Additional
rules can be given to caputre classical logic and some intermediate logics. The above axiom is
not an intuitionistic theorem. Perhaps then as a beginning step we restrict our conditions nding
algorithms to axioms which are intuitionistic theorems, and hope to obtain completeness proofs for
such cases.
Let us agree that by a substructural Hilbert system for ! we mean a Hilbert system whose
theorems are all intuitionistically valid. It is for this kind of system that we give the next denition.
Denition 4.2.7 (Algebraic conditions for substructural axioms) Let (A0;L) be an LDS.
Consider the resource algebra A = F  A0. Assume (A;L) is an algebra with rules of the sort
described in Denition 4.2.1. Let  be a database in A. Assume that if (a1; 1) : A; (a2; 2) : A 2 
and A0 6 1 = 2 then a1 6= a2. Let F be the F database fa : A j for some ; (a; ) : A 2 g.
Similarly A0 = f : A j for some a; (a; ) : A 2 g.
The notions F ` a : A and A0 `  : A are well dened. We shall abuse notation and write
 `F a : A and  `A0  : A instead. We now dene the formula (; ; B) of the language A0,
which is the condition which A0 has to satisfy so that  `A0  : B. We begin by dening a formula
(; t; ;B), for any t of F for which  `F t : B. The denition is by induction on the proof of
t : B as dened in Denition 4.2.3.
Case m = n = 0
In this case for some ; (t; ) : B is in . We can deduce  `  : B provided    holds. So in
this case let (; t; ;B) be (D ) (t)) ^   . If (t) is not used, i.e. is always true then the
formula is   .
Cases m;n+ 1
In this case t : B is obtained from previously proved formulas by an elimination rule, as in Denition
4.2.3. Say the rule is rule e below:
(a; a1; : : : ; a  n); a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An; a : A
t = ((e; a); (a; : : : ; an) : B
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Let r1; : : : ; rk be companion rules for e above, of the form:
ri
'i(








f i(i; i1; : : : ; 
i
n) : B
By the induction hypothesis there are formulas (; a; i; A) and (; aj ; 
i
j ; Aj) such that if
the algebra A0 satises them then  `A0 i : A; `A0 ij : Aj respectively hold. Therefore the
formula (; t; ;B) is :_
i
[(; a; i; A) ^
^
j
(; aij ; 
i
j ; Ai)) (f i(i; i1; : : : ; in)  )]
Case m+ 1; 0
In this case t : B is obtained by an introduction rule (denoted by e). Thus B has the form
B = (A1; : : : ; Ar )! (B1; : : : ; Br+).
We have for arbitrary new F labels a1; : : : ; ar  satisfying (t; a1; : : : ; ar ), that for each j =
1; : : : ; r+
0F = F [ fa1 : A1; : : : ; ar  : Ar g ` ((ej ; t); (a1; : : : ; ar ) : Bj
Let r1; : : : ; rk be all elimination rules for ! in A0. These have the form:
ri
'i(




1 : A1; : : : ;
i
r  : Ar  ; t : B
f ij(
i; i1; : : : ; 
i
r ) : Bj
By the induction hypothesis, there exist formulas i = (i; ((ej ; t); (a1; : : : ; ar )); f
i
j(
j ; i1; : : : ; 
i
r ); Bj)
giving the conditions under which
i =  [ fi1 : A1; : : : ;ir  : Ar g `A0 f ij(i; i1; : : : ; ir ) : Bj :
Thus (; t; ;B) is the following:^
i
[8i8i1; : : : ; ir ('i(i; i1; : : : ; ii 1) ^ i ) (i  )]
Case of deduction from s : A; s  t deduce t : A
In this case, let (; t; ;B) be (; s; ;B).
The above inductive denition dened formula  = (; t; ;B) for every t such that  `F t :
B. The formula says that if A0   then  `  : B. In other words the fact that  `F t : B
holds means that there is a resource proof of B from the database  and t is the term encoding the
proof steps. Whether a corresponding A0 label propagation is possible depnds on the algebra A0.
If A0   then this is possible. To nd whether  `A0? : B can succeed we must nd all possible
resource proof routes t such that  `F t : B and for each consider (; t; ;B). The disjunction
of all possible such  's will give us the minimal condition on A0 to enable  `A0  : B.
If the number of such t's is nite then we are nished. What if the number of t's is innite?
For example fa1 : A; a2 : A! A; a3 : A! Bg can prove B with an innite number of labels of the
form tm = a
m
2 a1a3. For this reason we assumed that the algebra A0 is archimedian. The `longer'
the term t, the more A0 function symbols are applied to the initial labels of  to get the nal label
of B. Thus after a large number of applications of A0 function symbols, the resulting label  will
not be less than ( ). So the number of ts to consider is nite.
Example 4.2.8 (Labels for intuitionistic implication) Let us check intuitionistic implication.
The axioms are
` A! (B ! A)
` (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C))
4.2. BASIC PROOF THEORY 135
and the rule ` A;` A! B
` B
The conditions on labels corresponding to the rst two axioms were examined in example 4.2.4.
These are respectively
8; y('(; y))   
 y)
8('(; ) ^ '(
 ; )) '(; ) ^ '(; )^
^'(
 ;  
 ) ^ ((
 )
 ( 
 )  (
 )
 ))
The condition for modus ponens is
Assume ` A;` A! B. This means that ? ` e ` e : A and 8 arbitrary in hxi'(e; x)( : A `
e
 : B) hold. The above should imply ? ` e : B. If e is in hxi'(e; x) then we can substitute for
 and get ` e
 e : B. Thus the condition is
  '(e; e) ^ e
 e  e:
Example 4.2.9 (Labels for concatenation logic) This system has the axioms
1. A! A
2. (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B)
and the rules
3.





` (B ! C)! (A! C)
From Examples 4.2.4 and 4.2.8 we get the following conditions:





 ; )) '(; )^'(
 ; )^ (
 (
   (
 )
 )
3. '(e; e) ^ e
 e  e
4. '(e
 ; )) '(e; ) ^ '(; e
 ) ^ (
 (e
 )  (e
 )
 ):
Denition 4.2.10 (Labelled Hilbert systems) 1. Let (A;L) be a resource algebraic labelled
deductive system as dened in 4.2.1 and let ` be its labelled consequence relation. Let H =
H(A;L) be the set of theorems of (A;L), i.e. H = fA j ? ` e : Ag.
2. Let (A;L) be a resource algebraic LDS, as before, and let H0 be a set of ws of L. Dene a
new consequence relation  `H0 t : A by letting
 `H0 t : A i def  [ fe : A j A 2 H0g ` t : A
i.e. we prove t : A by allowing us to use e : A;A 2 H0 at any time.
3. We write  `E t : A if there is a proof of t : A from  using elimination rules only. In
terms of denition 4.2.3 this means that  `0;n t : A for some n.
4. A set H0 of w is said to be a Hilbert formulation of (A;L) if the following holds for all 
and t : A:
 ` t : A i  `EH0 t : A:
In other words, any theorem  ` t : A can be proved using axioms from H0 without intro-
duction rules.
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5. Of special interest is the case of  = ? and t = e. We have:
? ` e : A i ? `EH0 e : A
The left hand side uses introduction rules (i.e. is a labelled natural deduction system) while
the right hand side does not, it uses H0 instead, and can therefore be seen as a Hilbert
axiomatization of the theorems of (A;L).
Example 4.2.11 (Hilbert axioms for labelling conditions) We would like to know under what
conditions on the algebra of labels can we nd a Hilbert type axiomatization for (A;L). We exam-
ine the case of a language with a binary ! only, where the algebra is (; S;; e;
) and where the
elimination rule has the form
'(; ); : A; : A! B
 
  : B
It is convenient to assume that the algebra satises the following additional conditions
 8x'(e; x)
 8a; b; (['(a; ) ^ '(b; )) a
   b
 ]) a  b)
 8x(e
 x = x
 e = x)
and residuation:
 8a; b9!y(a = y 
 b)
Our strategy is as follows:
Imagine we are in the middle of a proof from some assumptions. At a ceratin point, say line
99 of the proof, we introduce  : A ! B using an introduction rule. This means that we start a
subproof whose rst line is the assumption  : A, where  is arbitrary in hxi'(; x) and its last
line is  : B where    
 . Figure 4.1 illustrates the situation:
98 t : C
99 show  : A! B from box
99.0  : A assumption  arbitrary in hxi'(; x)
...
99.k  : B;    
 
exit  : A! B
Figure 4.2:
Our intention is to dispense with the box justifying line 99 by bringing in several Hilbert axioms
and deducing  : A! B by modus ponens only. We thus want the situation in gure 4.2
98 t : C
98.1 e : A1 axiom
...
98.n e : An axiom
...
99  : A! B from axioms and previous lines by modus ponens only.
Figure 4.3:
The proof that a replacement is possible is by induction on the length and case analysis of the
derivation in the box, i.e. on the number k. We start with the innermost boxes (i.e. assume that no
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introduction rules ar eused inside the box of g 4.1) and eliminate these boxes and continue to work
our way outwards until all boxes are eliminated. we will be left with anew proof using elimination
rules only and axioms.
The following is a complete case analysis, for the proof in the box:
Case k = 1
The box proof has the following structure, g 4.3.
99.0  : A, assumption 
99.1  : B;    
 
Figure 4.4:
We distingush several subcases:
Subcase (1, a)
 : B is derived from  : A.
Subcase (1, b)
 : B is obtained from an earlier line outside the box, say line 37 is 0 : B.
Subcase (1, c)
 : B is obtained from  : A;  : A ! B;'(; ) by elimination.  : A ! B is outside the box, say
line 37 is  : A! B.
Subcase (1, d)
A has the form Z ! B and we have outside the box, say line 37 is " : Z and  : B is obtained by
elimination from
 : Z ! B; " : Z;'(; ")
the above completes the case analysis for k = 1. We now list the cases for k > 1.
Case k > 1









We have the following subcases.
Subcase (k; a)
 : B is obtained from 0 : B in the box.
Subcase (k; b)
 : B is obtained from 0 : B outside the box.
Subcase (k; c)
 : B is obtained by elimination from " : X and  : X ! B, where '(; ") holds and both " : X and
 : X ! B are outside the box.
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Subcase (k; d)
Like subcase (k; c) but with " : X outside the box and  : X ! B inside.
Subcase (k; e)
Like (k; c) but with " : X inside the box and  : X ! B outside the box.
Subcase (k; f)
Like (k; c) but with " : X and  : X ! B both inside the box.
This ends our case analysis. We now examine by induction on k how the box can be eliminated.
We go case by case.
Subcase (1; a)
In this case we must have B = A and      
 ; and  is arbitrary in hxi'(; x).
We need to show under these conditions that we can prove  : A! A outside the box.
Obviously  : A ! A must be derivable from axioms. So if we take the axiom e : A ! A then
we can derive  : A! A provided e  .  is not arbitrary, it satises the condition
8['(; ))      
 ]:
So we need the albegra to satisfy:
  8['(; ))      
 ]) e  :
Subcase (1; b)
In this case we have outside the box 0 : B and we know 0  
 and  is aritrary in hxi'(; x).
We want to deive outside  : A! B.
Thus we need the axiom
e : B ! (A! B)
We want to carry out elimination with 0 : B. For this we need '(e; 0) which we assumed always
holds. We will get e
 0 : A! B and from this we need to be able to deduce  : A! B. We have
to understand what this means. We can get  : A! B if e
 0  . Thus we need
  880['(; )) 0   
 ]) e
 0  
since e
 x = x in our algebras we can rewrite it as:
80[8('(; )) 0   
 )) 0  ]
Subcase (1; c)
In this case we already have  : A ! B outside the box. We want to get  : A ! B outside the
box. What we know about  is that for an aribtarary  2 hxi['(; x) ^ '(; x)],  
    
 . If
from this we can deduce    then we are done.
Thus we need
::8['(; ) ^ '(; ))  
    
 ])   :
This is in fact one possible requirement on the algebra.
Subcase (1; d)
In this case we have " : Z outside the box and we want to get outside the box  : (Z ! B) ! B.
We are given that '(; ) and '(; ") hold and 
 "   
 . We need the axiom
e : Z ! ((Z ! B)! B):
Since we have '(e; ") we can get e 
 " : (Z ! B) ! B and if e 
 "   we are done. Thus the
condition we need is:
  8['(; ) ^ '(; ")) (
 "   
 )]! ("  ):
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Subcase (k; a)
In this case  : B is obtained from 0 : B inside the box. Thus we have 0   and since   

we have 0   
  and the induction hypothesis  : A! B can be obtained outside the box.
Subcase (k; b)
This is the same as subcase (1, b).
Subcase (k; c)
 : B is obtained by elimination from " : X and  : X ! B where '(; ") holds and both " : X
and  : X ! B are outside. We can perform elimination outside and get  : B outside. Now we
continue to nd the condition as in case (1, b).
Subcase (k; d)
In this case  =  
 ", with " : X in the box and  : X ! B outside the box. '(; ") holds. By the
induction hypothesis we can have outside a proof of "0 : A! X where "0 
  = ".
We need to assume that our algebra allows residuation, i.e. 8"; 9x(" = x
). In fact in many
algebras there exists the minimal such x.




. We want to get  : A! B outside.
We distinguish two possibilities.
Subcase (d1)
"0  e.
In this case ` A! X. We need the rule
` A! X
` (X ! B)! (A! B)




  for arbitrary  such that '(; "0 
 ) ^ '(; ) hold.
If we can deduce from this    then we nish. We need
"0  e ^ 8('(; "0 
 ) ^ '(; ))  
 ("0 
 )   
 ))   :
Subcase (d2)
Not "  e
Take the axiom
e : (X ! B)! ((A! X)! (A! B))
Since '(e; ) holds we get by modus ponens
 : (A! X)! (A! B)
and assuming '(; "0) holds, we get  
 "0 : A! B.
We need now  
 "0   in order to get  : A! B outside.
Thus the condition we need is
  "0  e ^ 8['(; "0 
 ) ^ '(; ))  
 ("0 
 )   
 ]) '(; "0) ^  
 "0  
Subcase (k; e)
We have " : X outside and  : X ! B inside the box. By the induction hypothesis, we have that
 = 0 
  and 0 : A ! (X ! B) can be obtained outside. We want to get  : A ! B outside.
Try the axiom
e : A! (X ! B)! (X ! (A! B))
we can thus get
0 : X ! (A! B)
and assuming '(0; ") holds we get 0 
 " : A! B. We want 0 
 "  .
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We therefore need the condition:
  8['(0 
 ; )) (0 
 )
 "   
 ]) 0 
 "   ^ '(0; ")
Subcase (k; f)
We have  = 0 
 ; " = "0 
  and  
 "   
  and outsie the box we have
"0 : A! X
0 : A! (X ! B)
we want to get outside the box  : A! B.
Take the axiom
e : (A! (X ! B))! ((A! X)! (A! B)):
We need '(e; 0) to get
0 : (A! X)! (A! B)
and '(0; "0) to get
0 
 "0 : A! B
and we need 0 
 "0  .
Thus the condition is
  8('(0 
 ; "0 
 )) (0 
 )
 ("0 
 )   
 )) 0 
 "0   ^ '(0:"0)
4.3 Algorithmic procedures for algebraic LDS
We cannot present a logical system without presenting also proof theoretic algorithmic procedure
for it. In our case, it is not just a mattter that the very concept of a logic (as discussed in Chapter
1) requires algorithmic procedures. It is also that some of the natural operations and applications
of our systems rely heavily on eective proof procedures. One such an example we have already
encountered, is nding conditions on the algebra corresponding to an axiom. This really involves
some sort of abduction, and algorithmic procedures are needed.
This section will give a goal directed system. we begin with some denitions and examples.
See Denition 2.4.12, Theorem 2.4.13 and Example 2.4.14.
Denition 4.3.1 (Goal directed algorithmic proof for substructural logics) Let A be an
algebra and L be an implictional propositional language. We give a computation for the consequence
relation of denition 4.2.3. We assume there is one modus ponens rule of the form
'(; ); : A; : A! B
:
 
  : B
Let  be a set of labelled formulas of the form fti : Aig and let s : B be a goal (declarative unit).
We dene two metapredicates:
Success (; t; B;C;H).
Failure (; t; B;C;H).
The success (failure) predicate means that from the database  the goal t : B succeeds, (resp.
fails) where the state of the compuation is that the constraints C have to be satised and where the
history of the computation (usually only previous goals) is H.
C is a consistent set of ws in the language of the algebra A. H is a list of triples, database, label
and goals.
The computation can go as follows. (It can be slightly varied):
 Succ (; t; B;C;H) if for some t0  t; t : B 2  and C is consistent in A and D?(t) succeeds.
 Succ (0 =  [ fs0 : A1 ! : : :! (An ! q) : : :)g; t; q;C;H) for q atomic, if for some s1; : : : ; sn
Succ (; si; Ai;C
0;H0) for i = 1; : : : ; n, where C0 = C [ f'(s0; s1); '(s0 
 s1; s2); : : : ; '((: : : (s0 

s1)
 s2) : : :
 sn 1; sn)g[f(: : : (s0
 s1
 : : :
 sn)  tg and H0 = H (0; t; q) and C0 is consistent.
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 Succ (; t; A ! B;C;H) if for arbitrary  in hxi'(t; x) we have Succ ( [ f : Ag; t 

;B;C [ f'(t; )g;H) and C [ f'(t; )g is consistent.
The clauses for the Failure predicate are as follows:
 Fail (; t; A;C;H) if C is inconsistent.
 Fail (; t; q;C;H) for q atomic, if for each s0 : A1 ! (: : : ! (An ! q) : : :) in  and each
s1; : : : ; sn we have for some i, Fail (; si; Ai;C
0;H0) where C0;H0 are as in the corresponding
success clause.
 Fail (; t; A! B;C;H) if for arbitrary  in hxi'(t; x) we have Fail ([f : Ag; t
;B;C[
f'(t; a);H)
 Fail (; t; q;C;H) if q does not unify with any clause in .
Many systems can be presented using a form of the Restart rule.
Let R be a formula in the metalanguage of H and  and t : q, choosing a database and goal
(0; s0; q0). Then the restart rule says
 Succ (; t; q;C;H) if Succ ( [ 0; s0; q0;C;H) where (0; s0; q0) is the database and goal
chosen by R.
To be continued : : :
4.4 Consequence relations and attening
4.5 Hilbert formulations
4.6 Semantics and Completeness
4.7 Combining algebraic LDSs
4.8 Tableau for algebraic LDS
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Chapter 5
General Labelled Deductive
Systems and their Fibred
Semantics
5.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters dealt with algebraic LDS. These have the form (A;L), where A is an
algebra of labels. All labels in an algebraic LDS are from A and all formulas are from L. Thus
a declarative unit has the form t : A, and a database has the form  = (D; f ; d) as dened in
Denition 4.2.1. D is a diagram of the theory of A, containing labels and some relations between
them of the form '(x; y)  '(x; y); x  y; x  y, and some equalities. The function f associates
with each t 2 D, a w f(t).
We want to generalise the above notions. In general, the label is supposed to give more infor-
mation about the formula it annotates. In the most general case, a label can itself be a database.
Similarly, a formula is in general a declarative statement from a logic. In the most general case the
declarative statement can be a database. Thus we must give a denition of an LDS which allows
for declarative units of the form 1 : 2 where 1 is a database serving as a label and 2 is a
database serving as a formula.
Examples 2.3.9, 2.3.10 and 2.3.11 have already illustrated the need for such concepts.
It is easy to understand what 1 : 2 means in the context of modal logic. Imagine an algebraic
modal LDS. The declarative units have the form t : A, where t is a name for a possible world and
A a formula holding at that world.
Imagine A has the form q, q true in some accessible world. Then Figure 5.1 really means that
at world t, there is an s; t < s and s : q. Suppose we want to be more specic about what s is. I
might write the database in Figure 5.2 , corresponding to the meaning of gure 5.1.
or in our database notation
 = (ft; t  s0; s0g; f ; tg
where f(t) = > and f(s0) = q.
What would x :  mean?
It can only mean that the declarative contents of  must hold at the label x. But the declarative
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t !s0 : q
Figure 5.2:
expressions of the form t : (D; f ; d) provided t = d.
Let us now consider how we can use a database as labels. Consider again t : q. The point t is
a world. Let C be some formula which happens to be true at exactly world t (e.g. C can be `the
world here is t').
Then C : q means the same as t : q. In the general case we can have a whole database, e.g.
1
1 = (D1; f1; t)
`characterising' t, as the only t `around' which 1 holds. Thus we can write 1 : q. We can now
write 1 :  and it should mean t : q.
In the general case we can write
(D1; f1; d1) : (D2; f2; d2)
we do not have to require d1 = d2, this will be expected in the semantical denotation.
The above process should be inductively iterated to obtain full generality.
To turn the above into a logical system, we need proper proof theory and semantics for it as
well as other traditional investigations.
This is the task of this chapter.
5.2 Databases used as labels
Denition 5.2.1 (Metabases) Let (A;L) be an algebraic LDS in the sense of denition 4.2.1.
We dene the notion of an (A;L) metabase as follows.
1. a diagram is a set (D; d) of labels, with d 2 D together with literals of the form '(x; y);
'(x; y); x = y; x 6= y; x  y; x  y, for some x; y 2 D.
2. A metabase of level 1 has the form (D; f ; d) where (D; d) is a diagram and f is a function
associating with ech t 2 D a declarative unit f(t) = s : A.
Note that the label s need not be the same as t.
3. A metabase of level n+1 has the form (D; f ; d), where (D; d) is as before and f is a function
associating with each t 2 D, the pair f(t) = t1 : t2, where ti are metabases of level  n.
We also allow f(t) to be of the form s : t2, where s is a label from A or to be of the form
t1 : A, where A is a formula of L.
Example 5.2.2 (Modal metabases) We try to give a semantic interpretationfor modal metabases,
to help give ourselves some intuition. This should be compared with Example 2.8.2 and Denition
2.8.3. Let (S;R; a; h) be a propositional Kripke structure. Let t : A be a declarative unit, where t
comes from an algebra A = (T;<) (really a set with an ordering) and A from a modal langauge
(with  and ). Let g be a function from labels into possible worlds of S. Then for s 2 S we have
1. s h;g t : A i (def) g(t) = s and s h A where h is the traditional Kripke model satisfaction.
2. Let  = (D; f ; d) be a metabase of level 1. Then f(t) = t0 : A, for t 2 D, where t0 is an
algebraic label. Let s 2 S. We write s g;h  i (def) the following holds:
 g(d) = s
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 g is a homomorphism from (D;; d) into (S;R; a) namely, for all x; y 2 D, we have
D ` x 6= y implies g(x) 6= g(y)
D ` x = y implies g(x) = g(y)
D ` x < y implies g(s)Rg(y)
D ` (x < y) implies  g(x)Rg(y)
 If f(t) = t0 : A then g(t) = g(t0)) and g(t) h A
3. Let  be of the form (D; f ; d) such that f(t) = t1 : 
t
2 for metabases 
t
i.
We say s g;h  i (def) the following holds
 g(d) = s
 For all t 2 D, if g(t) g;h t1 then g(t) g;h t2
 g is a homomorphism from (D;; d) into (S;R; a).
Example 5.2.3 (Uniquely declarative resource metabases) This example will illustrate what
can be done with metabases.
Let (A;L) be an LDS as in denition 4.2.1. Assume A is a resource algebra with ' and 
 and
L is a language with ! only.
1. A declarative unit has the form t : A, t a label, A a w.
2. A level (0; 1) metabase  of length n is a function f from the set f1; 2; : : : ; ng associating
with i a declarative unit f(i) = ti : Ai. We can also display  as (t1 : A1; : : : ; tn : An).
3. A level (0;m + 1) metabase  of length n is a function f from f1; : : : ; ng associating with
each i a declarative expression f(i) = ti : i, where ti is a label and i is a metabase of level
(0;m0);m0  m.
4. A labelled metabase of level 0 has the form t : , where t is a label and  a metabase of level
(0;m) for some m.
5. Let 1 and 2 be two metabases of level 0.
i = (t1 : 
i
1; : : : ; tni : 
i
ni)
Then 1 2 is dened as
(t1 : 
1













6. Let # be a function associating with each pair of algebraic labels t; s a new label #(t; s), we
now dene the notion of  `# s : B, for a metabase  of level 0 and a declarative unit s : B.
Recall that ! has the elimination rule
 : A; : A! B;'(; )
 
  : B
(a) t1 : A1 `# s : B i t1 = s and A1 = B
(b) t1 : A1; t2 : A2 ` s : B i s = t1 
 t2 and A1 = A2 ! B and '(t1; t2) hold.
(c) t1 : A1; : : : ; tn : An; tn+1 : An+1 ` s : B i for some k and s1; s2 we have t1 : A1; : : : ; tk :
Ak ` s1 : A ! B, and tk+1 : Ak+1; : : : ; tn+1 : An+1 ` s2 : A and s = s1 
 s2 and
'(s1; s2) hold.
7. Let t :  be a labelled metabase of level 0. We write t :  `# s : B i for some s1; `# s1 : B
and s = #(t; s1).
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8. Let t :  = t : (t1 : 1; : : : ; tn : n) be a labelled metabase of level 0. Let s : B be a declarative
unit. We write t :  `# s : B i for some s1 : B1; : : : ; sn : Bn we have ti : i `# si : Bi and
t : (s1 : B1; : : : ; sn : Bn) `# s : B.
9. A metabase may not prove anything. For example ft1 : q; t2 : qg does not prove anything.
A metabase  of level 0 is said to have a unique declaration if there exists a unique declarative
unit s : B such tha  `# s : B. We call such metabases uniquely declarative. B is the formula
of  and s its label. (The other alternatives are that  proves B with several labels or proves
nothing.)
10. Let A be a w and  a uniquely declarative metabase of level 0 with w A. Then  : A is
a metadeclarative unit (i.e. since we have that  ` s : A uniquely, instead of writing `s', we
can put  instead). We could have written  alone since A is also determined by  but we
might prefer this more convenient display.
(a) A metabase of level 1 has the form
1 : A1; : : : ;n : An
where i : Ai are metadeclarative units.
(b) Modus ponens can be extended to metadeclarative units by
1 : A;2 : A! B;'(s; t)
s
 t : B
where 1 `# t : A;2 `# s : A ! B. (Note that each i has a unique label and
formula.)
we can similarly deal with
t1 : A;2 : A! B
and
1 : A; s : A! B
(c) Let  be a metabase of level 1. The notion of  `# s : B can be dened as for
metabases of level 0. Similarly the notion of being uniquely declarative can be dened as
for metabases of level 0.
(d) A metabase of level n+1 has the form  = (1 :  1; : : : ;n :  n) where i are uniquely
declarative metabases of level  n and  n are also uniquely declarative metabases of level
 n. Assume by induction that the notion of  `# s : B has been dened for metabases
of level  n. We assume that  i proves the unique formula of i. I.e. if i ` si : Bi
then  i ` ti : Bi. We let
 ` r : C i by denition fsi : (ti : B)g `# r : C
(e) A metabase is a metabase of level n, for some n.
Example 5.2.4 (Linked metabases) This example continues the example of resource metabases,
Example 5.2.3 by adding the concpet of linking of databases. This concept was mentioned in Ex-
amples 2.7.1 and 2.7.2.
Consider a metabase .  contains in it algebraic labels from the algebra A. Suppose it
contains somewhere among its labels a variable x (ranging over labels from the algebra). We can
write it as [x]. In an intuitive sense, [x] is a predicate on x, in the very complex LDS langauge
of the metabase. Its exact nature will be clear only when we give bred semantics for metabases.
At this stage we can think of it just as a `metapredicate'. Suppose we have two metabases 1[x]
and 2[y]. We can link them by writing Link(1[x];2[y]; y=x). The geometry of the linkage is
displayed in gure 5.3





Its meaning is that we have a metabase 1[x] containing a label x satisfying the `metapredicate'
y2[y]. This is similar to writing in classical logic the expression:
Q1(x); for x such that Q2(x) holds
we may ask, why not write Q1(x) ^ Q2(x), clearly this means the same? The answer is that
sometimes it is more convenient to link, especially if x and y are buried deep inside dierent
metabases whose languages are dierent!
A simple example where a natural linkage may occur may be the database
1(x) = fx : Ag;
which is a declarative unit, where x is the reliability value of the w A. If x is obtained by some
other numerical model analysis in a language dierent from that of A, then the most natural way
of representing this relation is by Link(fx : Ag;2(y); x=y), where 2 is the metabase supporting
the analysis leading to the numerical value x.
Denition 5.2.5 (Semantics for metabases) A general semantics structure has the form
m = (W;S;; '; e; f; h; g;F)
where W is a set of labels and for each x 2 W , we have Sx  W;Sx 6= ? x; 'x are relations
on Sx, ex 2 Sx, f is a binary fuction on Sx and hx is an assignment into Sx such that (Sx;x
; 'x; ex; fx; hx) is a model in the sense of Denition 4.1.2.
gx is a function associating with each atomic label t an element
gx(t) 2 Sx
The function Fx is a binary function Fx(y) = z associating a new z with each x and y. It is used
to `bre' our semantics. Since metabases can serve as labels, we must `bre' the models of these
labels with the current models.
We proceed to dene the notion y x , to be read, the database  holds at point y 2 Sx in the
model m.
Entailent between metabases ;  is dened
    i 8x; y[y x  implies y x  ]
Let us now dene x.
1. For a basic declarative unit a : q for q atomic and a atomic label, we have:
y x a : Q i hx(y; q) = 1 and gx(a) = y
2. y x a : A! B (where A and B are ws built up from atoms and !) i gx(a) = y and for
all y0; y0 x A implies fx(y; h0) x B
3. y x s :  for  = (t1 : 1; : : : ; tn : n) i gx(s) = y and for all i; gF
x(y)(ti) Fx(y) i
We use the function F to move to the model z for z = Fx(y) and we evaluate ti : i in
there.
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4. y x (r : Link(1(u);2(); =u i gx(r) = y and y x 1 and y `x 2(u).
Thus semantically Linking is like taking a conjunction.
5. We now consider y x  :  , a case where the label is , a metabase.
We read it as y x a :   for all labels a such that y x a : .
In general, given two LDS logics (A1;L1) and (A2;L2), we can allow one to be the algebra for
the other Thus we can allow for declarative units of the form 1 : 2, where 1 is a metabase of
LDS1 and 2 of LDS2.
If we use LDS1 as a labelling algebra, we need to dene the notions e;; '; f;], etc. required
by Denition 4.2.1.
Let us begin by examining what we need to dene, for the case, of the same LDS i.e. the algebra
of metabases  labelling a w A where both A and  are from the same (A;L).
This, we hope, will give us clues for the general case.
Let A; e; '; f; and ] be given for a language L with !. Let 1;2 be two databases.
Consider
1 : A;2 : A! B; (2;1)
F (2;1)
We want to nd a reasonable denition for  and F . Consider
t : A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :) ` t : A1 ! (A2 ! : : : (An ! B) : : :)
this should hold in the original LDS. According to the rules the above holds i for all s1 such that
'(t; s1) holds we have the database
'(t; s1); t : B1; s1 : A1 ` f(t; s1) : B2
where Bi = Ai ! (Ai+1 ! : : : ! (An ! B) : : :). Continuing this process we get to the notion of
a linear database of Example 4.1.6.
The process of increasing the antecedent database by use of introduction rule (adding si : Ai)
indicates what (2;1) and F (2;1) should be
 A database has the form  = (D; f ; t0), where
D = ft0; s1; : : : ; sn; '(t; s1); '(t1; s2) : : : '(tn 1; sn); : : : ; ti = f(ti 1; si); i = 1 : : : ng
f(si) = Ai; i = 1; : : : ; n:
 Two databases 1;2 satisfy (;0) if t00 = tn.
 F (;0) = 00 where 00 is obtained by appending 0 to . This is made possible by the
condition tn = t
0
0.
There is another way of looking at the above. Consider
'(t1; t2); t1 : A! B; t2 : A ` t1t2 : B:
Suppose
1 ` t1 : A! B
2 ` t2 : A
If we have cut we must deduce
F (1;2) ` t1t2 : B
where F is the way 1;2 are `put together' and (1;2) is the compatibility predicate.





6.1 Introduction and discussion
This chapter extends the metabox discipline to quantiers and Skolem functions. The language is
built up in the usual way from atomic predicates P (x1; : : : ; xn), from propositional connectives and
the quantiers 8 and 9. For the purpose of this section let us assume that the only propositional
connective is!. This will allow us to study the metabox behaviour of 8; 9 in the context of linear,
relevant, intuitionistic and classical implications. The next section will give a system of predicate
modal and temporal logic as an example of the metabox discipline.















where  is a Skolem constant subject to some rules and restrictions.
The way to discover the rules is to look at some examples, try to prove them using the metabox
procedures and see what goes wrong, and what is needed.
The rst feature we discover, which we motivate by the examples below, is that we need two
types of variables. One type of variables, the ordinary type, are the usual ones, the ones which
are used in quantiers and which can appear free in formulas. These we denote by x; y; z : : :. The
other type of variables arise from the proper treatment of Skolem functions. These variables we
call -variables. We use u; v; w; : : : to denote these variables. the name -variable comes from the
use of the function  which is a generalised Skolem operator. Assume for example that 9xA(x; y)
is considered true, ie is either among our assumpitons or is derived from them. Then we can
skolemise and write A(f(y); y)), where f is a Skolem function. For our purposes this is too crude.
Hilbert " operator is a bit better. We can consider "xA(x; y) and write A("xA(x; y); y). For the
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1 Show 9x(A(x)! 8xAx))
2 ? Assumption
3 A(u)! 8xA(x); from Box 1 and choose u later
Box 1 4 Show 8xA(x)
5 A(u) Assumption
6 8xA(x) from box 2
Box 2 7 Show A(y)
8 Introduce an arbitrary y i.e. skolemise 6
9 A(y) Instantiate u = y from 5 and 8
Figure 6.1:
purpose of the metabox, special care must be taken with Skolem functions. In fact we need a logic
for Skolem functions. In this new logic of Skolem functions we use the -function and write
A(xA(x; y); y)
Thus the -function is a generalised sort of "-function developed especially for the metabox.
The formula A(u); u an -variable, will be understood as meaning A (constant to be chosen).
u is to be chosen at a later step in the metabox. Meanwhile it is put in as an -variable u. This is
best explained by an example.
We know that in any logic
` 8xA(x)! 8xA(x)
in classical logic we can pull the rst quantier out and get
`C 9x(A(x)! 8xA(x))
This is not a theorem of intuitionistic logic. Let us try a metabox proof of this formula, see
Figure 6.1.
Example 6.1.1 A metabox to check whether
? ` 9x[A(x)! 8xA(x)]
in intuitionistic logic, gure 6.1
Here we get success. We should not succeed. We went wrong when we made u = y. The correct
rule is to introduce in line 8 a Skolem function y = f(u) and hence the step u = f(u) will be blocked
by the occur check. Thus formally the metabox discipline must tell us which fuig are involved so
that when we skolemise we make the Skolem function dependent on the ui. Moreover, if some ui
are involved in an outer box it is not clear that we transfer (reiterate) them into an inner box.
Dierent logics may have dierent disciplines.
Let us try another example. This time with and without Restart, see Example 3.4.6 for restart..
Example 6.1.2
::9xA(x) ? 9x::A(x)
should fail in intuitionistic logic and succeed in classical logic. Let us check it in linear logic and
linear logic with restart (linear classical in 9.1.2). (See g 6.2)
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1 Show a1 : 9x((A(x)! ?)! ?)
2 a1 : (9xA(x)! ?)! ? Assumption
3 ? : 9xA(x)! ? from Box 1
Box 1 4 Show a2 : ?; 9x((A(x)! ?)! ?)
5 a2 : 9xA(x) Assumption
6 a2 : A(c) Skolemising
7 a2 : 9x((A(x)! ?)! ?) from Box 2 and use restart
Box 2 8 Show a2a3 : ?
9 a3 : A(u)! ? Assumption
10 a3 : A(c)! ? instantiate, u = c
11 a2 : A(c) reiteration
12 a2a3 : ?
exit 13 a2 : 9x((A(x)! ?)! ?
exit 14 ? : 9xA(x)! ?
15 a19x((A(x)! ?)! ?) from Box 3
Box 3 : 16 a1a4 : ?; u is an  variable
17 a4 : A(u)! ? Assumption
18 a1 : ? from lines 2 and 3
19 we cannot exit in Relevance of linear logic because the
20 label of ? is a1 and it does not contain (use) the label of
21 box assumption (namely a4) . However, we an exit in
22 intuitionistic and classical logic because these logics
23 disregard the labels.
exit 24 a1 : 9x((Ax)x! ?)! ?)
Figure 6.2:
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1 Show a : 9xA(x)! B
2 a : 8x(A(x)! B) Assumption
3 a : 9xA(x)! B from Box 1
Box 1 4 Show ab : B
5 b : 9xA(x) Assumption
6 b : A(c); Skolem constant
7 a : A(c)! B; from line 2
8 ab : B
exit 9 a : 9xA(x)! B
Figure 6.3:
1 Show a : 8x(A(x)! B)
2 a : 9xA(x)! B Assumption
3 a : 8x(A(x)! B) from box 1
Box 1 4 Show a : A(y)! B
5 Introduce y
6 a : A(y)! B from Box 2
Box 2 7 Show ab : B
8 b : A(y) Assumption
9 b : 9xA(x) Rule
10 ab : B
exit 11 a : A(y)! B
Figure 6.4:
Example 6.1.3 The equivalence of
8x(A(x)! B)$ (9xA(x)! B)
where x not free in B, holds in linear logic, as the following two boxes illustrate. (See gs 6.3 and
6.4)
The second box is (g 6.4).
We are now ready to give a formal denition of the notion of a quanticational metabox. It
is convenient to use Denition 2.4.1 and Theorem 2.4.2 of Chapter 2. It is sucient to give the
Goal Rules, Data Rules and Metabox rules for each of the quantiers. Having done that, we will
be able to add 8; 9 to any propositonal metabox system. Denition 6.1.4 here should be compared
with the skolemization and visa rules of Denition 3.2.8. It is especially useful to compare how
both denitions apply to the case of S4 strict implication in view of the discussion presented in
Example 2.2.5.
Denition 6.1.4 (Metabox Quantier Rules) 1. The predicate language contains two types
of variables, ordinary variables for the quantiers denoted by fx; y; z; : : :g and  variables for
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Skolem constants denoted by fu; v; w; : : :g. It also contains the Skolem functor . We dene
the notion of well formed formulas (ws) and terms as follows:
1.1. Any n-place atomic predicate Q(x1; : : : ; xn) with the indicated variables is a w with the
variables free.
1.2. If ] is an m-place connective and Ai(xi;j) are formulas with the indicated free variables,
then ](A1; : : : ; An) is a formula with the indicated (union) of free variables.
1.3. If A(x; yi) is a w with an ordinary variable x free then
8xA(x; yi) and 9xA(x; yi)
are ws with the remaining yi variables free.
1.4. If  : A(x; yi) is a labelled formula, x an ordinary variable and u is a set of   variables
then [ : A(x; yi); u] is a term.
2. A quantied metabox system is comprised of the following components:
2.1. A nite partially ordered system of metabox names fai; <g, as in (1) of Denition 3.4.9.
In addition with each metabox name a, a nite set of -variables U(a) is associated,
together with a substitution a to these variables.
The metabox system satises the conditions of Denition 3.4.9(5).
3. The following are the Goal Rules, Data rules and Metabox rules for the quantiers. Imagine
we are at a certain line in a box a
3.1. To show  : 9xA(x) we open a new box b and choose a new  variable u, associate
V (a)[ fug with b. Let the assumptions and reiterations of b be the same as those of a
together with whatever was already proved in a. We want to show  : A(u) in box b.
3.2. To show  : 8xA(x) we start a box b and show
 : A(x[A(x); U(a)])
The term x[A(x); U(a)] is marked as having been rst introduced in this box.
3.3. At any time in the forward proof at any box a we can modify the substitutiton a(u) to








Subject to restrictions on the term t which take into account where it was rst introduced.
3.6.
 : 9xA(x)
A(x[ : A(x); U(a)]
The term x[ : A(x); U(a)] is marked as having been rst introduced in box a.
3.7. The metabox rules for the propositional connectives about what can be reiterated are also
valid for the universal closures of the reiterated formulas but not for existential closures.
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Box a1 1 Show a1 : 8xA(x)! 8xB(x)
2 a1 : 8x(A(x)! B(x)) assumption
3 a2 : 8xA(x)! 8xB(x); from box a2
Box a2 4 Show a1a2 : 8xB(x)
5 a2 : 8xA(x) assumption
6 a1a2 : 8xB(x) from box a3
Box a3 7
8 Introduce y = xB(x)
9 a1 : 8x(A(x)! B(x)) Reiteration
10 a1 : A(y)! B(y) 89Rule
11 a2 : 8yA(y) Reiteration
12 a2 : A(y) 89Rule
13 a1a2 : B(y)
Figure 6.5:
Example 6.1.5 We show that in the logic W see Denition 9.2.1:
` 8x[A(x)! B(x)]! [8xA(x)! 8xB(x)]
but
6` 8xA(x)! [8x(A(x)! B(x))! 8xB(x)]:
See g 6.5.
The proof of 8xA(x)! [8x(A(x)! B(x))! 8xB(x)] is blocked by the reiteration restrictions
of the logic W.
Chapter 7
A General Theory of Structured
Consequence Relations
7.1 Introduction
In previous chapters we introduced a systematic framework where the logical units are labelled
formulas (of the form t : A, where t is a term in some algebra) and where the logical rules are
rules for manipulating both formulas and their labels. The intuition behind LDS is that in t : A;A
carries declarative information and the label t, represents further information of a dierent nature
which we do not want to \code" into A. It turns out that many monotonic, non-monotonic and
probabilistic systems can be presented as LDS systems. An LDS database  is a constellation of
labelled formulas with additional structure on the labels. For example  may be an algebra  with
a function (x); x 2  , assigning formulas Ax = (x), for each x 2  .
Proof rules are given to dene the notion  ` s : B. This approach is developed in detail in
other chapters. It is possible to have  ` si : B for several labels si, for example si may show
from which part of  B is proved. In many applications one is interested in the notion of  ` B,
where we want to ignore the label and just give a yes or no answer to the query \ Does B follow
from ". In such cases we are actually hiding the labels and all we have is a structured database
 proving or not proving a formula B. We can in this case dene axiomatically the properties of
the consequence  ` B. We thus end up with a notion of consequence between  and B, where 
is structured and the labels in  are hidden, and used only in the proof system. It turns out that
this simplied notion is very useful and can be developed on its own as a direct extension of the
notion of monotonic consequence relation. We call our studies the area of structured consequence
relation. It can be developed independently of LDS, as a direct contribution to the abstract area
of axiomatic non-monotonic reasoning.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop the notion of structured consequence relation and
further rene the notion of a non-monotonic consequence relation to relate to non monotonic
systems arising from resource boundedness, and controlled inference. The renement is in the
direction of structuring the assumptions.
The traditional notion of a database  and a logical unit of information A (on which conse-
quence  j A is dened) is that of a set  and a w A.
Many non-monotonic databases are naturally structured. The database may be, for example, a
list of assumptions, or a partially ordered set of assumptions, and consequences are proved from the
database using an inferential (logical) discipline which takes into account such a structure. Non-
monotonicity may arise because of these \resource" considerations and inferential restrictions.
We introduce the new notion of a non-monotonic consequence relation, which we call S-
consequence relation (Structured Consequence Relation). A precise denition will be given in
a later section. We need two auxiliary notions for our denition:
1. We have already indicated that we need to deal with structured databases. We thus have to
155
156CHAPTER 7. A GENERAL THEORY OF STRUCTURED CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS
specify precisely what structures are allowed as databases, for the consequence relation to be
dened. These must include the one formula database (A) and the empty database ?.
2. The notion of a structured database must also include the concept of structured addition of
data. By this we mean the notion of how to combine two databases together. The traditional
way is to take their union but when the databases are already structured, the union has
to be structured as well. We denote the structured addition of the databases  and   by
+ . This binary operation, \+", has to be dened as part of the concepts underlying the
consequence relation. It usually satises associativity
1 + (1 +3) = (1 +2) + 2
and the empty database must satisfy
?+ = +? = 
Commutativity is not required to hold.
3. We also need a concept of substitution of one structured database  inside another,  ,
achieved by replacing one formula A in   by . Formally we need to make sense of the
symbol  [A], reading   is a structured database which contains A somewhere inside, and
the symbol  [], which denotes the database resulting from substituting  for A inside  .
These notions are needed to formulate the Cut Rule.
We can now dene the three rules which we call Identity, Surgical Cut (or Substitutional







Directional Monotonicity (right hand side)
 j A
+   j A
Directional Monotonicity (left hand side)
 j A
  + j A
Denition 7.1.1 (Tentative Denition of Structured Consequence Relation) Let L be a
language. Let L be a family of order types of the form (;). Assume that the empty set and one
element set types are in L. Assume that the notion of substitution of one order type  for a point
x in another order type  0(x) is well dened (as in (3) above).
We say that a relation  j A, (between ordered multisets  of ws of an order type  and a
single w A) is a S-consequence relation i it satises Identity and Surgical Cut.
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The next two sections will describe several logics in detail and section 4 will give the precise
denitions of our general concepts.
We now give some examples of structured consequence relations
Example 7.1.2 (Hereditarily Finite Sets) 1. Let X be a set of atoms and let the family of
ws be the family of all Hereditarily Finite Sets built up from X, ie
(a) Any nite subset of X is a w.
(b) If A and B are ws so are A [B and fAg.
2. For a nite set of ws , let  j A i (denition) A 2 .
3. Dene the notion of substitution of one set for another to be as follows:
The result of substituting  for y 2   is the set (   fyg) [.
Dene +   as  [  
4. It is easy to show that j satises Reexivity, Monotonicity and Surgical Cut.
5. Note also that if our data strucutres were just subsets of Xwith substitution and + dened
as in (3), then Reexivity, Monotonicity and Surgical Cut are still satised.
Example 7.1.3 (Hereditarily Finite Stacks) 1. Let X be a set of atoms. Dene the notion
of a w by
(a) (a1; : : : ; an) is a w if ai 2 X for all i
(b) If A1; : : : ; An are ws so is (A1; : : : ; An).
(c) A database is any w.
2. Dene (A1; : : : ; An) j A i (denition) for some i, A = Ai.
3. Dene strucutral substitution as follows:
The result of substituting for y in (A1; : : : ; An; y; B1; : : : ; Bm) the list (C1; : : : ; Ck) is the list
(A1; : : : ; An; C1; : : : ; Ck; B1; : : : ; Bm).
4. Dene +   to be the concatenation, in that order, of  and  .
5. It is easy to show that j satises Identity, Directional Monotonicity and Surgical Cut.
Example 7.1.4 1. Let L be the language of classical or intuitionistic logic and let the data
structures be sets. Dene a consequence relation jH0 by fA1; : : : ; Ang jH0 B i B `HWn
i=1Ai where `H is provability in classiccal logic (H = C) or intuitionistic logic (H = I).
We show that jH0 is an S-consequence relation.
It is obvious that it satises Identity, we check the Surgical Cut rule.
Assume, for example, that ; A jH0 B and   jH0 A. We must show that ; jH0B. From
our assumptions we have B `H A _
W











Note that the following holds for all A;B
A `H B i B jH0 A:
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2. Dene another consequence relation jH1 by fA1; : : : ; Ang jH1 B i for some Ai, B `H Ai.
We show that jH1 is a consequence relation. It is obvious that it saties Identity. We
check the Surgical Cut.
Assume ; A jH1 B and   jH1 A. We must show that ;  jH1 B. From our assumptions,
B `H X, for some X 2 [fAg and A `H Y for some Y 2  . We need to show that B `H Z
for some Z 2  [  . Such Z exists because:
If X 2  let Z = X
If X = A let Z = Y .
Clearly for all A;B,
A `H B i B jH1 A.
Example 7.1.5 (Context Free Grammar) Consider a context free grammar, with rules of the
form
y 7! x1 : : : xn
where xi are either variables or terminals. Regard the rules as basic consequence relation axioms
in the form
x1 : : : xn ` y
Let a1 : : : am j b hold if b can be reduced in the grammar to a1 : : : am.
j certainly satises Identity and Surgical Cut (for the obvious substitutions), that is:
a1 : : : am j b
c1 : : : b : : : cn j c
c1 : : : a1 : : : am : : : cn j c
This should not be surprising because Horn clause logic can be viewed as context free grammar.
7.2 A general notion of an unlabelled logical system
We have seen that the general notion of a database is a conguration of formulas. In a previous
chapter we introduced the logic CL (concatenation logic), and the congurations for they were
linear orderings of formulas. The proof discipline from such databases would rely on the ordering
in dening the allowable proof moves. In the case of CL we allowed modus ponens only if the
minor premise was supported by a later part of the database than the implication. In the general
case, other restrictions may come into play.
This section develops the general notions needed for S-consequence relation. We begin with
denitions and examples.
Denition 7.2.1 1. Let L be a langauge for well formed formulas. L will contain atomic
propositions and connectives and the notion of a w is dened inductively in the traditional
way.
2. let L be a theory in rst or higher order logic and let M be a class of classical models of
L. We assume that the structure with one point and empty relations is in M. Assume that
two model theoretic operations are dened on M and assume that M is closed under these
operations. The operations are the following:
(a) If 1 and 2 are two structures in M then an operation + is available for constructing
the structure  = 1 + 2. \+" usually satises associativity, but not necessarily in the
general case. If ? is the empty set then + is dened and ?+  =  +? =  .
(b) Let 1 and 2 be two disjoint structures in M and let x 2 1 be a point in 1. Then a
substitution operation Subx21(x) is dened which yields the result of substituting 2 in
1(x) for x (ie x1(x)[2] is well dened). The result of the substitution is also in M.
Sub is associative, and behaves like substitution if done properly (no clash of variables).
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(c) For some purposes (see section on structural connectives) we need to allow for the notion
of deletion. That is we must know how to delete the point x from (x). We can regard
deletion as substituting the empty structure ? for x, ie x(x)[?].
3. A database is any pair (; ) where  2 M and  is a function assigning for each x 2  a w
(x).
4. A consequence relation for the pair (M;L) is any relation j between databases  = (; )
and single ws A, written in the form  j A, satisfying the following:
(a) Identity
(A) j A
(b) Surgical Cut for M
If













1(y) if y 2 1
2(y) if y 2 2:
Example 7.2.2 1. Let (T;<T ) be an ordering, and let t 2 T . Let (S;<S) be another ordering
with T \ S = ?. We dene the substitution
[(T;<T ) j t j (S;<S)] to be the ordering with T [ S   ftg as the set of points and order <
dened by
x < y if x; y 2 T and x <T y
or x; y 2 S and x <S y
or x 2 T and y 2 S and x < t
or x 2 S and y 2 T and t < y.
The idea of the denition is to take the ordering (T;<T ) and to take a point t 2 T and take
another ordering (S;<S) and to replace t by the entire set S. We now have an ordering with
S in the middle. Thus all points of T which were before (after) t are now before (after) all
the points of S. Inside S the ordering is the same as before, ie <S.
2. Dene (T;<T )+ (S;<S) to be the ordering with all elements of T coming before all elements
of S.
3. Let L be a language. Assume that part of the denition of L is the denition of allowable
databases of the form ft : At j t 2 Tg, where (T;<T ) is an order conguration. Assume that
the order congurations of L are closed under the substitutions dened in the above. Let 
be a relation dened in L between data structures and formulas. Then the Cut Rule for  is
dened to be the following:
Surgical Cut Rule
If ft : At j t 2 Tg ` B
and fs : Bs j s 2 Sg ` C
and x 2 S and Bx = B
then fr : Ar j r 2 S [ T   fxgg ` y : C
where the conguration on S [ T   fxg is [(S;<S) j x j (T;<T )] dened above.
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` y : C
ys : Dt1 : B
Figure 7.2:
Example 7.2.3 Consider modal logic. A conguration is an ordered set of possible worlds. Thus
if for example we have the congurations in gures 7.1 and 7.2 then the application of the cut rule
will yield the conguration of gure 7.3
We now want to propose a form for the deduction theorem. The discipline must tell us how a
database  can prove an implicational formula of the form A! B.
Let us understand A! B as a sort of deductive \functor" which \given" A can \yield" us B.
Thus  `CL A! B means that if we \add" A to  ie \give" A to , we can \get" or \yield" B
from  \and" A.
In general application areas,  is a structured database; some conguration of formulas. Thus
the notion of adding A to  needs to be dened. We need to specify where to t A in the
conguration of . In the general case precise denitions must be given. Since there may be more
than one way of \adding" A to , we may have several possible versions of the deduction theorem
as well as several possible implications.
Example 7.2.4 Consider CL and its data structures of lists of ws (see sections 2.4 and 10.1
for details). Let  = (A1; : : : ; An) and consider A. This new data item can be \added" to  in
several ways:
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1. Add A to the end of the sequence to form
(A1; : : : ; An; A)
2. Add A to the beginning of the sequence to form
(A;A1; : : : ; An)
3. Add A to the middle of the sequence to form
(A1; : : : ; Ak; A;Ak+1; : : : ; An)
4. Of course we can have combinations, for example, add A to the middle or the beginning, etc
The CL deduction theorem allows for A to be added to the end of the sequence. We can thus write
A!e B for the CL implication to indicate that given A it can give B provided A is added to the
end of the data sequence. The next connective to consider is the implication A !b B where \b"
means \beginning". Here we expect a deduction theorem of the form
(A;A1; : : : ; An) ` B;
i
(A1; : : : ; An) ` A!b B
For example, since
A!b B ` A!b B
we will get in this logic
A;A!b B ` B:
In concatenation logic the implication must come earlier than the minor premise. In this logic,
the minor premise comes rst. The set of theorems of this logic, with!b , is unchanged; we get CL
again, except that in the semantics we now concatenate to the left. A dierent system is obtained
if we have both implications (see [Wansing, 1990]). This is actually the Lambek Calculus. The
Lambek Calculus can be dened as the smallest S-consequence relation with two implications !e
and !b satisfying the appropriate Deduction Theorems for the list data structures.
For example, since
A!e B;A ` B
we get that
A ` (A!e B)!b B
The stipulation that
A!e B i A!b B
gives us linear logic, with ! being either of !b or !e.
Both !e and !b satisfy a Deduction Theorem.
Having illustrated our concepts, we can now generalise the notion of the deduction theorem to
arbitrary data constellations. To achieve that we also need to generalise the notion of implication.
Denition 7.2.5 1. Let M = fig be a class of structures i, as in denition 7.2.1. Let ' be
a w in some language L capable of expressing properties of the structures in M.
Assume that for every  in M, ' denes a unique element (or possibly a unique set of
elements) in  .
The formula ' denes a contraction mapping on structures  . Let  0 be the structure obtained
from  by taking out the points identied by '. Thus, for example, for lists structures  , if
' identies the last element in the list then  0 is the list without its last element. We can
denote the contraction mapping function by \k '" and write  0 =  k '.
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Thus, given two structures 1; 2 we may say that 2 = 1k' i 2 is obtained by dropping
out of 1 the elements identied by '. We write  [k']n to mean k' : : : k', n times. For
example, for lists  and ' which identies the last element of the list, we have (t1; : : : ; tn) =
(t1; : : : ; tn; x)k' and ? = (t1; : : : ; tn)[k']n.
2. Let a database discipline be given, involving a family of structures M. A database  in this
discipline is any pair (; ) where  is a nite element of M (eg a list) and  associates with
each t 2  a formula (t) = At. We also write  = 0k', just in case  = (; );0 = ( 0; 0)
and  =  0k' and  = 0   , ie  is the restriction of 0 to  .
Example 7.2.6 LetM be the class of all nite lists including the empty list. Dene + as concate-
nation. Let L be a language with \+" and \<". ' can be a formula in L which denes uniquely
the last element of any nite list. Thus for  = (a1; : : : ; an; b), we have k' = (a1; : : : ; an). These
lists are the data structures of CL.
Denition 7.2.7 (The Notion of the Deduction Theorem) Let ;0 be two databases and
assume that  =  0k'. Assume further that we have
k' j A! B i 0 j B
Consider a special connective denoted by!'. We say that!' satises the Deduction Theorem
with respect to ' i whenever  j B and  = (; ) and  has n elements then
[k']n j ? : (t1)!' (: : :!' ((tn)!' B) : : :)
where ftig =  [k']i    [k']i+1 i.e. ti is the element identied by ' in  [k']i.
Our discussions so far presented the consequence relation in the form of  j A, where A is
a single formula on the right hand side. This is a Tarski type consequence relation. The general
form of the consequence relation should be  j  , where both  and   are structured databases.
This is a Scott type consequence relation. In fact, there is no reason at all to assume that the
same structures can serve on both sides of the turnstile. If we refer to the left hand side as the
data and the right hand side as the goal, then the general Scott type S-consequence relation has
the form  j  , where  is a data structure and   is a goal structure. For example,  may be
a set of formulas while   may be a list of formulas. This is indeed the case, for example, in Logic
Programming, where we have
 j (A1; : : : ; An) i  j A1 and : : : and  j An
If  is a sequence, as in the case of CL, or a multiset, as in the case of linear logic, then we can
have
 j (A1; : : : ; An) i for some i; = 1 + : : :+n and i j Ai; i = 1; : : : ; n
where + is concatenation or multiset union, respectively.
Another example is the case of Gentzen systems for classical logic, where both  and   are
sets and where we have  j fA1; : : : ; Ang i  j A1 _ : : : _An.
In the above cases the Scott consequence relation  j  , for   a complex structure, can be
reduced to its Tarski part  j A, where A a single formula. It is not clear whether we should
insist on this property to hold in the general case.
To get an idea of our options, let our starting point be two structured Tarski type consequence
relations j1 and j2 on the same language L with L1, L2 and M1 and M2 the two structural
languages satisfying the conditions of denition 7.2.1. We want to \extend" j1 and j2 to a Scott
type consequence relation k, allowing for k  where  is an M1 structured database and  
is an M2 structured goal. Thus the allowable structures for k are M1 for the data and M2 for
goals. Clearly it must satisfy the rules of Identity and Surgical Cut in the following form:
AkA





We may wish to rename the Cut Rule as Left hand side Surgical Cut, to stress that cut is done
on the left.
A Right hand side Surgical Cut would be
k[B] Bk 0
k [ 0]
The question is, what other requirements do we have for k?
We obviously want to make use of both j1 and j2. The new consequence k should extend
them both in some sense. Since both consequence relations are general, the only structures they
share for certain are the unit formulae structures A. Given ;  and A, we know what  j1 A is
and what   j2 A is, but no more.
The next two denitions tell us what is the general notion of a Scott type S-consequence relation
and how to form a Scott type k out of j1 and j2.
Denition 7.2.8 Let L be a language for ws and let (M1;L1) and (M2;L2) be two languages
for data and for goal structures respectively. Note that L1 and L2 come with their own respective
notions of structrual substitutions and structural additions +1 and +2 respectively.
A relation k  is said to be a (Scott type) S-consequence relation on the data and goal






Note that some of the traditional formulations of the Cut Rule may not hold, for example
Internal Cut
+A j    j A+  
 j  
Transitivity
 j A +A j B
 j B
may not hold.
Further note that Identity can hold only for single formulas. I do not know whether the rule of
identity formulated for single formulas A would imply the rule of identity for all common structures
.
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Denition 7.2.9 Let j1 and j2 be two Tarski type S-consequence relations on structured databases
with structuresM1 andM2 respectively, based on the same language L, as in denition 7.2.1. As-
sume that j1 and j2 are compatible, namely they satisfy for all A;B.
A j1 B i B j2 A
Dene j1;2 to be the following Scott type S-consequence relation, called the Minimal Amalgma-
tion of j1 and j2:
1. The data structures of j1;2 are those of M1. The goal structures of j1;2 are those of M2
2. Let  j1;2   hold i (denition) for some w A we have that both  j1 A and   j2 A
hold.
Lemma 7.2.10 Let j1 and j2 be two compatible Tarski type consequence relations. Let k be
their minimal amalgamation. Then k is a Scott type consequence relation.





By denition there exist C1; C2; C3 such that
[A]j1C1; [B]j2C1;0j1C2; Aj2C2; B j1C3; 0 j2 C3
all hold. From compatibility we get
C2 j1 A and C3 j2 B:
By Surgical Cut we get
0 j1 A and  0 j2 B:
Hence by Surgical Cut again we get
[0] j1 C1 and  [ 0] j2 C1:
Hence by denition we get
[0k [ 0]:

Example 7.2.11 Let  `H A be the classical (for H = C) or intuitionistic (for H = I) conse-
quence relation, for the data structures of single formulas. Let jH0 be the consequence relation of
example 7.1.4(1). Form jH;H0 as in the preceding denition. We show that what we get is classical
(or intuitionistic) Scott type relation H for sets as structures on both sides of the turnstile.
We have  jH;H0   i for some A; `H A and   jH0 A. But   jH0 A i A `H
W
 .
Hence  jH;H0   i for some A,  `H A and A `H
W
  and in classical or intuitionistic logic




 , because we can take A =
W
 .
Example 7.2.12 Let L be the language of intutionistic implication ! and conjunciton ^. Let
 `I A be the intuitionistic consequence relation for this language, with the goal structure of single
formulas on the right. Let jH1 be the consequence relation for L, dened in example 7.1.4(2).
Then jI;H1 is the amalgamated consequence relation satisfying
 `I;H1   i for some A 2   we have  `I A:
In my book [Gabbay, 1981, Ch. 1] it was shown that jI;H1 is the consequence relation arising
from the Beth Semantics for intuitionsitic logic. It was further shown that there are two Scott
type consequene relations which agree (extend) the Tarski type  jI A, for A a single w. The
maximal one, arising from the Kripke semantics, dened as  `I A1 _ : : : _An, and the minimal
one, dened as in this example.
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Denition 7.2.13 Let L be a language and let (M1;L1) and (M2;L2) be structures for the data
and goal respectively. Let ji i = 1; 2 be Tarski type S-consequence relations on the data structures
Mi respectively with the goal structure being single ws and let k be a Scott type S-consequence
on both data structures M1 and goal structures M2.
(a) We say that k agrees with j1 in the data (respectively k agrees with j2 in the goal) i for
all ; ; A, (1) holds (respectively (2) holds).
1. kA i  j1 A
2. Ak  i   j2 A.
(b) We say that k agrees with (j1; j2) i k agrees with j1 in the data and with j2 in the
goal.
Theorem 7.2.14 Let j1 and j2 be two compatible Tarski type S-consequence relations, ie sat-
ifying for all A;B;A j1 B i B j2 A. Then there exist two Scott-type consequence relations, a
maximal k+ and a minimal k  which agree with (j1; j2). In other words, for any k which
agrees with (j1; j2) we have
1. for all ; 
k   implies k 
2. For all ; 
k  implies k+ 
Proof. Let k  be the minimal amalgamation of j1 and j2 of denition 7.2.9.
We show that k  agrees with (j1; j2). Assume k A, then by denition for some B,
 j1 B and A j1 B. Hence by compatibility B j2 A and by the Cut Rule,  j1 A.
Similarly assume Ak  . Then for some B A j1 B and   j2 B. By compatibility B j2 A
and by Cut,   j2 A.
We now show minimality. Assume that k agrees with (j1; j2). Assume that k  , we
show that k .
From our assumption we have that for some A
 j1 A and   j2 A
Hence from agreement kA and Ak  and hence by Cut, k .
We now have to prove the existence of k+. To this end we show that for any nite set fkig
of consequence relations which agree with j1 and j2 one can dene a consequence relation k
agreeing with (j1; j2), with the property that for all i ki  k.
An application of Zorn's Lemma will now yield the existence of k+.
Let ki be give for i = 1; : : : ;m. We dene the desired k. Dene k  to hold i there exists
a sequence of pairs (n; n); n = 1; : : : ; k such that k = ; k =   and each element (n; n) in
the seqeunce satises one of the following conditions:
1. For some ki;nki n (ie (n; n) is an \axiom").
2. There exist earlier n1; n2; n3 in the sequence such that:
 (n1 ; n1) = (0; A); A a w.
 (n2 ; n2) = (B; 0); B a w.
 (n3 ; n3) has the form (n3 [A]; n3 [B])
and (n; n) = (n3 [A=
0]; n3 [B= 
0]).
Intuitively k is essentially the sequent system with ki  as axioms, for i = 1; : : : ;m and where
the surgical cut is the inference rule.
It is clear from the denition of k that Identity and Surgical Cut are satised and that
ki  k.
We now have to show that k agrees with (j1; j2). ie we have to show that for any ; ; A
(1) and (2) hold:
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1. kA i  j1 A
2. Ak  i  j2A
We prove this by induction on the length of the sequence dening k, and on the assumption
that ki; i = 1; : : : ;m all agree with (j1; j2).
For sequences of length 1 the claim follows form the assumption.
Consider a sequence of length k which justies kA. Then we have the following situation
from earlier members of the sequence:
 0kA0 and hence by the induction hypothesis 0 j1 A0
 BkA and hence by the induction hypothesis A j2 B.
 [A0]kB and hence (A0) j1 B
We also know that [0]kA and we want to show that it also agrees with (j1; j2), ie that
[0] j1 A. From compatibility we get B j1 A and from Cut we get [0] j1 A.
Similarly consider a seqeunce of length k which justies Ak . This means that earlier elements
in the sequence are
 A0k 0 hence  0 j2 A0
 AkB hence A j1 B
 Bk [A0] and hence  [A0] j2 B
We also know that Ak [ 0] and we want to show that  [[ 0] j1 A. By compatibility B j2 A
and by Cut,  [ 0] j2 A. 
Example 7.2.15 (Symmetric Amalgamation) Given a Scott type S-consequence relation j,
the two Tarski consequence relations derived from it, namely
 j1 A i  j A
  j2 A i A j  
may not be identical or isomorphic, even in the case where  and   are based on the same data
structures. We say that the Scott type j is a symmetrical amalgamation of the Tarski type j0 i
the two derived consequence relations j1 and j2 are the same and equal to j0. For a given j0,
it is always possible to construct the symmetrical amalgamation. We cannot take the naive identity
j1=j2=j0 because then the denition of amalgamation will yield
 j   i for some A; j1 A and   j2 A i for some A; j0 A and   j0 A.
If we let A = truth we get  j   for all ; .
What is needed is an isomorphism function  such that
  j2 A i   j1 A:
We thus get
 j   i for some A; j1 A and   j1 A
now since we also have
A j1 B i B j2 A
we get that  must satisfy
A j1 B i B j1 A:
In case of classical logic the mapping  is negation
A ` B i :B ` :A:
This notion is developed in the section on structural connectives.
7.2. A GENERAL NOTION OF AN UNLABELLED LOGICAL SYSTEM 167
The above examples have shown how to extend S-consequence relations to ones with a more
complex goal structure by minimal amalgamation. When the original consequence relation j
satises the Deduction Theorem, it is possible to extend j by making use of this fact. The
Deduction Theorem is a left to right shift operator (studied in a later section). Thus by using shift
operators we can give meaning to  j   for   more complex, in terms of shifting   to the left and
reducing the problem to a known one.
Thus for example one may write  j   i some boolean combination i j  i holds, where
each  i has less elements than  .
Classical logic can be viewed to be a special case of reducing fAig `C fBj ; Cg to fAi;:Cg `C
fBjg.
The Intuitionistic consequence, (see 2.2.2), cannot be viewed in this manner. We have no means
of shifting ws from the right hand side to the left hand side.
Let j0 be a consequence relation withM01 andM02 being the structures for the data and goals
respectively. Let j00 be another consequence relation with structures M001 and M002 respectively.
We want to dene the composition j of j0 and j00. The data structures (goal structures) of
M1(M2) are obtained fromM01 andM001 (respectivelyM02 andM002) by the repeated substitution
of one data strucrure inside the other.
If the structures in M01 are lists of points (x1; : : : ; xn) and the strucures in M001 are sets then
the structures inM1 are hereditary lists of non-empty sets of points (X1; : : : ; Xn). IfM01 contains
multisets of points then M1 is a hereditary set of multisets of non-empty sets of points.
Denition 7.2.16 (Composition of two S-consequence relations) Let j0 and j00 be two
consequence relations with structures (M01;M02) and (M001 ;M002) respectively. We assume further
that we have available a notion of substitution of a  0 structure inside a  00 structure and vice
versae as needed below. We dene the composition j of j0 and j00 as follows:
1. The structures of Mi of j; i = 1; 2 are dened by induction.
(a) Let Mi (0) =M0i [M00i .
(b) Assume Mi (k), for k < n are all dened. Let  2 Mi (k) for some k < n and  0(x)
(respectively  00(x) ) is in M0i (respectively M00i ). Then  0() (resp  00()) is in Mi (n).
(c) Let Mi =
S
nMi (n).
Note: It is easy to show that if 1(x) 2Mi and 2 2Mi then 1(2) 2Mi .
2. Let  = (1; 1) and   = (2; 2) be two databses for j.
We can assume by denition that for some 1; 1; 2; 2; "; :
1 = 1(1) hence  = 0(")
2 = 2(2) hence   =  0(); where
0(x) = (1(x); 1); 0(x) = (2(x); 2)
0 = (1; 1); 0 = (2; 2):
where 1; 2 are either in M01 or in M00i for i = 1; 2 respectively.
Note that i do not give a value to x.
We say that  j   i for some C;D
" = (1; 1) j C
 = (2; 2) j D and
0[C] j  0[D]
Let us summarise our current view:
 A consequence relation is dened by stating a family of data structures and dening the
notions of substitution on the data structure, and of adding (combining) data structures.
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 Minimal conditions for a relation to be a consequence relation are those of Identity and
Surgical Cut.
 The basic structured consequence relation can be extended either in the direction of non-
monotonic consequence relations or in the direction of Resource Logics or both.
 We need structured semantics with structured family of worlds with structured preference
relation to be an adequate semantics for S in the spirit of [Kraus et al., 1990].
7.3 Structural connectives
Let j be a Scott type consequence relation on a language L. The consequence relation involves
structures for the data and structures for goal. The purpose of this section is to show that given
these structures, there are some natural connectives, called structural connectives, which one may
wish to add into the language L, with porperties dictated by the structure. In fact, the entire
consequence relation may be in some cases (eg linear logic, see next section) no more and no less
than a reection (via the structural connectives) of the properties of the data structures involved.
Let j be any Scott type consequence relation. Let M1 be structures for the data and let M2
be the structures for the goals. Let +1 be structural addition for the data and +2 for the goal. We
can thus write
 +1 A j B +2  
which may or may not hold.
We assume nothing special about j, only that it satises the mimimal properties of Identity
and Surgical Cut. We do not assume any special connectives in the language L of j, and we
aim to introduce several structural connectives.
It might be useful to think in terms of two examples, namely concatenation logic, where the
structures are lists, and linear logic, where the structures are multisets. Both cases would have
! in the language L. To be even more specic, think of the Tarski type consequence relations
to be the relations `CL and `LL for CL and for LL of denitions 10.1.1 and 9.2.5 and 9.2.6
respectively, and assume that j is some Scott extension of one of them which agrees with it, the
goal structures being the same as the data structures. Note further that there may be more than
one such j agreeing with the Tarski type `CL or `LL of denitions 10.1.1 and 9.2.5 and 9.2.6,
and that in the sequel we may choose one such j with special symmetry conditions.
Let us begin with a general Scott type consequence j.
The rst thing to bear in mind is that in the general case, the structural operators \+1" and
\+2"which come with j are in the metalevel, on the structures of M1 and M2 respectively, and
not in the langauge L of j itself. For the special case of CL, \+i" is concatenation and for the
case of LL, \+i" is multiset union. Let us now add another metalevel operator, a sort of notational
shift operator \o", having the following properties:
 +1 Ao j   means the same as  j A+2  
and
  j Bo +2   means the same as  +1 B j  
In fact,
 +1 A
o j Bo +2   should be the same as  +1 B j A+2  .
Thus the operator \o" in \Ao" is used to indicate, in the metalevel, where the formula A should
be. It has the status of a metalevel annotation, indicating that although the formula A appears in
one place in the structure, it should be in another place. Thus  +1 A
o j   really says through
the annotation \o" on A, that A is really on the right hand side, namely  ` A+2  . For general
structures the annotation may be problematic. If [x] indicates that x stands somewhere in the
structure , then we know what [A] means. We also have to say what [Ao] means. We have
to specify the following:
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1. Since Ao in [Ao] means that although Ao shows up in [x] at the place x (ie we have
[Ao=x]), A should really be somewhere else, we need to specify where A should be.
2. If Ao is not at place x in [x], then there is nothing at x. Hence our notion of substitution
should also allow for empty substitution [?=x], which is really deletion.
If both  and   are multisets, as in the case of linear logic, then we have no such problem,
otherwise a precise denition is required. Even in the case of CL, this is not simple, and requires
care.
In CL, the data structures are lists (A1; : : : ; An). Of course (A1; : : : ; An; B) is generally not the
same data structure as (B;A1; : : : ; An). We can mark B as B
o to mean that B should be shifted
to the other end of the list. Thus
(A1; : : : ; An; B
o) = def (B;A1; : : : ; An)
(Bo; A1; : : : ; An) = def (A1; : : : ; An; B):
Note that 1 +2 2 (and similarly  1 +1  2) is not meaningful, since +2 (resp +1) is a goal
(data) structural addition and cannot be applied to the data (goal).
So far we have introduced several meta operations. We now want to put them in the object
level. We have seen in connection with the Deduction Theorem in the previous section that it is
possible to take a meta operation and add a connective for it in the object language. We now
do just that for \+1", \+2" and \o" of the metalevel. We denote the object level connectives by
\1", \2" and \", respectively.
Our purpose is to study their obvious properties. The connection between fA+Bg and fABg
is that they must be declaratively identical. This means that AB should behave essentially like
A+B in all j contexts. We thus have the following rules:
Identity
A+1 B j A1 B
A2 B j A+2 B
The other direction of the identity of Ai B with A+i B, cannot be written directly but can
be characterised by a Cut rule:
Surgical Cut
1 +1 (A+1 B) +1 2 j  1 +2 (C +2 D) +2  2
1 +1 (A1 B) +1 2 j  1 +2 (C 2 D) +2  2
Example 7.3.1 In the case of CL, if we add the structural connective  to the language, we get
the following system CL(), with the following two rules:
(A;B) j AB
which we get from Identity, and we should also have the following from the Cut Rule
(A1; : : : ; An; A;B;B1; : : : ; Bm) j C
(A1; : : : ; An; AB;B1; : : : ; Bm) j C
These we call Structural Rules for the structural connective , because they arise from the
fact that  is no more than an object level reection of the structured database operation +.
In classical logic the data structures are sets and conjunction \^" serves as the structural
connective.
In case of CL we also have a Right hand side Deduction Theorem, which, when combined
with the structural connective  will yield rules like
AB j C i A j B ! C
and
? j A! (B ! AB):
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We now have to check which rules for  follow from the properties of shift. We know that
 +1 A
 j B +2   should hold i  +1 B j A+2  . We immediately get
 A j A





This is the same as
 j (C +2 D) +2  
which is the same as
 +1 (C +2 D)
o j  
We can thus have that (C +2 D)
o must be the same as Co +1 D
o. Similarly (C +1 D)
o must
behave the same as Co +2 D
o. We thus get
 (C 2 D) j C 1 D
 (C 1 D) j C 2 D
We still have a problem of what to do (what meaning we can prove or have) to A 1 B when
it appears on the right hand side and C 2 D when it appears on the left hand side. The typical
expression is:
C 2 D j A1 B
clearly it should be the same as
(A1 B) j (C 2 D)
which is the same as
A 2 B j C 1 D
which does not help, as again we get the wrong \" on the wrong side.
In general, there is nothing to be done. However, if we have the object level \!r" with the
Deduction Theorem holding, a few more equivalences can be derived.
Consider
A+1 B j C
this holds i
A j B !r C
but also i
A j Bo +2 C
Hence
B !r C is equivalent to Bo 2 C.
The dierence between the shift and the Deduction theorem is that the connective \!r" is in
the object language L, while our \+2" and \o" are in the metalevel.  j Bo +2 C is just another
way of writing, in the metalevel,  +1 B j C.
However, if we do have the object level connectives, \1", and \2", we can write down
equivalences. We therefore get that
 A2 B is equivalent to A !r B
 A1 B is equivalent to (A!r B).
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Thus \1", \2" are reducible, in a system containing \!r", to the connectives \!r" and
\".
Let us now pause and summarise what we have learnt so far.
Suppose we start with a consequence relation j with +1 for data and +2 for goals. Suppose
we introduce a shift operation which shifts from the right hand side of the data to the left hand
side of the goals and vice versae, and suppose that we have an object level connectives  for the
shift and!r satisfying right hand side Deduction Theorem. Then we can dene in the object level
the two operators \1" and \2" using \!r" and the object level \" as follows:
A2 B = def A !r B
A1 B = def (A!r B):
The above discussion showed how to add a structural connective  to reect the notion +,
which is part of the dention of any consequence relation. Any specic consequence relation ,
allows for a family M of structures. Any of these structures  2M can be reected in the object
level by a special connective  . The way it is done is described in the next denition.
Denition 7.3.2 (Left Structural Connectives and Left Structural Rules) LetM be a classs
of structures and let j be a consequence relation structured on M, as dened in 3.1. Let  be
a xed structure in M and assume  has n elements a1; : : : ; an. Indicate this fact by writing
(a1; : : : ; an). Enrich the language of j with an additional n-place connective (A1; : : : ; An) with
the following Left Structural Rules for  .
 Identity
((a1; : : : ; an); ) j ((a1); : : : ; (an)):
 Surgical Cut
Let 1 = (1; 1) and  = (; ). Let x 2 1 and let 1(x) = B. Let 2 = (2; 2) be the result of
structural substitution of  in 1, ie 2 = 1[B=].
This means that 2 = x1(x)[ ].
Consider 01 = (1(x); 
0
1) which is just like 1 except that 
0
1(x) =((a1); : : : ; (an)). Thus
01 = 1[B=((a1); : : : ; (an)).
The Surgical Cut Rule is therefore
1[B=] j A
1[B=((a1); : : : ; (an)] j A
or if formulated with a slight abuse of notation:
x1(x)[ ] j A
x1(x)[((a1); : : : ; (an))] j A
The cut rule really ensures the other direction of the identity, by forcing  to behave properly.
We are now ready to explain what a Structural Shift Connective is and what Structural
Shift Rules are.
Denition 7.3.3 (Structural Shift Connectives) Let j be a Scott type S-consequence rela-
tion and let Mi and Li be as in denition 7.2.8. Let 'i and be the w of Li each identifying a
unique point in each i 2 Mi. Further assume that for each (a1; : : : ; an) there exist a unique
2(a1; : : : ; an; z) such that  = 2k'2. Assume  0 = 1k'1. We can write  0 = f1(1), and
2 = f2() where fi are function symbols for the functional dependence which exists.
Let '1'2 be a new unary connective to the language of j. Enrich j with this connective and
the following structural shift rule:
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('1; '2) Structural Shift Rule
Let 1 = (1(x); 1) be the data structure with x the point identied in 1 by '1, and let 2 =
(2(y); 2) be the goal structure with y the point identied by '2. Assume that 1(x) and 2(y)
satisfy that either 1(x) = '1'2A and 2(y) = A or 1(x) = A and 2(y) = '1'2A. For each of the
above the following holds:
1 j 2 k '2 i 1 k '1 j 2
The functions induced by '1; '2 dene the two places, and the shift rule tells us that '1'2A
shifts A from one place to the other place.
It is worth noting that with a bit of abuse of notation, that the shift operation can be written
as
1. 1[A] j 2[?] i 1[?] j 2[A]
2. 1[A] j 2[?] i 1[?] j 2[A]
where ? is the empty set and its substitution at point x in [x] means deletion.
Example 7.3.4 Consider CL with its list structures. Let '1 dene the last element of a list and
let '2 dene the second element of a list. Then if  denotes '1'2 we get to the following two shift
rules:
1. (A1; : : : ; Am;B) j (C1 : : : Cn)
i (A1 : : : ; Am) j (C1; B; C2; : : : ; Cn)
2. (A1; : : : ; An) j (C1;B;C2; : : : ; Cn)
i (A1; : : : ; An; B) j (C1; : : : ; Cn).
The shift operation suggest a new structural connective ! A. Its meaning can be motivated
by the following observation. Given 1(x) and 2(y) the shift rule, stated intuitively, says for
example that:
1[A] j 2(?)
i 1[?] j 2[A]:
We understand the operation as shifting A from 1 into 2. After the shift, A is no longer
present in 1 but is recorded in 2. That is why we write 1[?]. If we do not take A out 1, we
get a dierent rule namely
1[! A] j 2[?]
i 1[! A] j 2[A]:
This means that although A is supposed to \shift" to the right hand side, it stays while
\duplicating" itself. The connective \! " indicates the duplications property.
Example 7.3.5 Consider the previous example where we had
(A1 : : : Am; B) j (C1; : : : ; Cn)
i (A1; : : : ; An) j (C1 ; B; C2; : : : ; Cn)
If the formula B does not delete itslef when shifting, but duplicates itself we indicate this by
writing ! B instead of B.
(A1; : : : ; An! B) j (C1; : : : ; Cn)
i (A1; : : : ; Am;! B) j (C1 B;C2; : : : ; Cn)
Thus ! B at the last place on the left simply indicates an innite number of B's. Of course we
can shift the entire ! B to the right and get
(A1; : : : ; Am;! B) j (C1; : : : ; Cn)
i (A1; : : : ; Am) j (C1 ! B;C2; : : : ; Cn)
Some properties of ! and  can be obtained from the above meaning, especially if other con-
nectives are presnt, for example
! B +B  ! B
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Another structural connective is the proof-net like connective, which identies copies. Consider
again 1[x] and 2[y]. Using a shift connective, we can either put x = A and y = ? or put x = ?
and y = A. In either case we get A on the left (1[A]) and nothing on the right.
Another possibility is to put A on the right and nothing on the left, ie 1[?];2[A]. We can
write this possibility also as 1[A];2[?].
What we should not write is
1[A] j 2[A]
because here we are duplicating A twice on the right. We could of course add an additional marker
say yy, to indicate that these two copies of A should really be one copy. So we can write:
1[ yA y] j 2[yAy]
where yymarks the fact that there is only one copy. Thus (yAy; yAy) is not the same as (yAy;yAy)
becuase the rst corresponds to A on thge right and the second corresponds to A on the left.
Example 7.3.6 To continue the previous example,
(A1; : : : ; An; yA y) j (C1; yAy; C2; : : : ; Cn)
is the same as
(A1; : : : ; Am) j C1; A; C2; : : : ; Cn)
while
(A1; : : : ; Am; yAy) j (C1; yA y; C2; : : : ; Cm)
is the same as
(A1; : : : ; Am; A) j (C1; : : : ; Cn):1
We now turn out attention to the so called \additive" connectives. As before, we start with a
general consequence relation j.
Consider now the case where we have that both  j  [A1] and  j  [A2] hold. We can
abbreviate the above situation by writing in the metalevel  j x (x)[A1 ^ A2] or just  j
 [A1 ^ A2] where \^" is a metaleval symbol, just like \+1", \+2" and \o". Similarly if we have
[A1] j   and [A2] j   we can abbreviate it using \_" and write [A1 _ A2] j  . Note that
\^" and \_" only abbreviate other notation and are not operations on the data. We could modify
the data structures if we want to accommodate the respective operations but that is not necessary.
Note that [A1 ^ A2] j   is not meaningful, as we have not said what it means when \^"
appears on the left. Similarly for  j  [A1 _A2].
The following hold by denition
 j A ^B i  j A and  j B
A _B j   i A j   and B j  :
Example 7.3.7 Suppose we add the structural connectives _ and ^ to the language; what are the
obvious properties it must satisfy? In the general case we cannot say much beyond the obvious, so
let us see what we get in the special case of linear logic. Here the Deduction Theorem comes into
play:
1The perceptive reader may ask why we are doing all of this shifting. Instead of writing plainly (C;A) j B, for
example, we code it as C j (B;A), putting A on the right and then marking it by  to indicate that it should
really be on the left. Then to confuse matters even further, we write A on the left anyway and mark it so that the
duplication is cancelled, ie (C; yA y j(B; yA y).
Why do we need this geometry of illusion? The answer can be found in understanding the annotation as indicating
resource. A structured database presents formulas to be used in the deduction in a way compatible with their
structured layout. For linear logic the layout is a multiset and so each formula is to be used exactly once. In the
course of the proof the formulas may be scattered about and/or duplicated. We need annotations to keep track of
what is happening. This is why these connectives are useful.
174CHAPTER 7. A GENERAL THEORY OF STRUCTURED CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS
1.  j A! B ^C i ; A j B ^C
i ; A j B and ; A j C
i  j A! B and  j A! C
i  j (A! B) ^ (A! C).
2.  j A _ B ! C
i ; A _B j C
i ; A j C and ; B j C
i  j A! C and  j B ! C
i  j (A! C) ^ (B ! C).
3. From the Identity Rule we get, since A _ B j A _ B that
A j A _ B
B j A _ B
4. Similarly since by the Identity Rule A ^B j A ^B we get that:
A ^B j A
A ^B j B
5. Since A j A _ B we get (A _ B) j A and similarly (A _ B)jB. Hence we get
(A _ B) j A ^B.
6. Since A ^ B j A we get A j (A ^ B). Similarly B j (A ^ B) and therefore
A _ B j (A ^B).
7. Since (A! C) ^ (B ! C) j A! C and A1 (A! C) j C we get by Surgical Cut that
A1 ((A! C) ^ (B ! C)) j C and similarly B 1 ((A! C) ^ (B ! C)) j C hence
(A _ B)1 ((A! C) ^ (B ! C)) j C and therefore
(A! C) ^(B ! C) j A _ B ! C.
So far our study of structural connectives and shift connectives used no special properties of
j beyond the existence of !r in the object language. We shall see that we are going to need
some symmetry assumptions on j. Suppose we start with the Tarski jLL of denition 10.1.1 and
9.2.5 and 9.2.6 and assume that j1 and j2 are both Scott type and are compatible with jLL.
Everything we have said and done so far would apply to both j1 and j2 equally. We can thus
add the structural connective \" and get all the equivalences mentioned earlier to hold. However
there might be a dierence between the case of j1 and that of j2, depending on their properties.
Example 7.3.8 Consider the consequence relation jLL1 dened by
 jLL1 A i for some B 2 , A jLL B, where  is a multiset.
This is a consequence relation as can be shown easily..
Let j1 be the amalgamation of jLL and jLL1 . Clearly  j1   i for some A 2  ; jLL A
holds. This means that j1 is monotonic in  .
Let us add to the j1 the shift \" and consider the following: A j1 B;C i A j1 B ! C
i A;B j1 C. If we continue the chain using the fact that j1 agrees with jLL we get that
the above holds i A;B jLL C. We can now get that jLL is monotonic in B, ie  jLL C
implies ; B jLL C. This is so because  jLL C implies  j1 B;C and hence ; B jLL C
from the equivalence chain. Although jLL itself is not monotonic, there is nothing wrong with
monotonicity in B, because we know that ; B jLL C really means  j1 B;C. However, it
does force us syntactically to note which w is of the form B and which is of the form B, and
excludes writing B instead of B. Clearly this is not desirable. We therefore need to assume
further properties on the j which agrees with jLL, namely the property that it is symmetrical,
namely A j   i   jLL A.
In terms of denition 7.2.9 we want j to be the amalgamation of jLL with itself.
We now proceed with a series of denitions leading to the notion of self amalgamation.
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Denition 7.3.9 (The dual of a consequence relation) Let j be a consequence relation in
language L. Consider a dual language L dened as follows:
1. The atoms of L are all atoms of the form q, where q is an atom of L.
2. The connectives of L are all connectives of the form ], where ] is a connective of L.
Let  be a maping from L to L dened by
3. (q) = q, for q atomic
4. (](A1; : : : ; An))
 = ](A1; : : : ; A

n), for a connective ].
5. Dene  j A i def  j A.
Examples 7.3.10 In classical logic let ^ and _ be duals and let A = :A.
7.4 A Case study: What is the logic of linear logic
A lot has been said about linear logic. From our point of view, the system is very simple; it is
the logic based on the data structures of multisets, satisfying the Deduction Theorem and fortied
with additional structural and shift connectives.
It is our purpose in this section to present linear logic from this point of view.2
We start with the data structures of multisets for both the data and goal. Consider the language
with ! only and consider the smallest Scott type consequence relation j satisfying the deduction
theorem for !.
We know that the smallest Tarski type consequence relation j1 for multisets satisfying the
deduction theorem does characterise linear logic. Thus it is clear that
 j1 A i  j fAg:
What is not clear is the nature of the consequence  j2 A dened by
 j2 A i fAg j :
We shall address this problem later.
Given j, let us add to the language the structural connectives 1;2 and the shift connective
, as we did in the previous section, when we were discussing such connectives for an arbitrary
consequence relation. We get for our case that the following holds, where X  Y means both
X j Y and Y j X:
1. A  A
2. A2 B  A ! B
3. A1 B  (A! B)
4. (A1 B)  A 2 B
5. (A2 B)  A 1 B
We can also add the \of course" connective ! and proof net markers. Let us agree that yny is the
corresponding connective on the right. We thus have:
2The reader is cautioned that the phrase \from our point of view" is important. Intuitionistic logic, from our
point of view, is essentially the smallest monotonic consequence relation with the Deduction Theorem for !, with
sets as structures and the structural and shift connectives. However, intuitionistic logic arose in a context of far
greater importance and motivation in the historical development of logic. Similarly, linear logic has its own historical
context and to understand its role one has to go back as early as 1976 [Girard, 1976]. For these reasons, Avron
[Avron, 1988b] should be viewed in context. I cannot make up my mind at the moment whether the excitement,
generated in computer science circles by intuitionistic and by linear logic, is indeed justied. A clear case should be
made for each logic whether it is best suited for its proposed computer science applications and the indiscriminate
application of these logics may obscure their intrinsic logical value.
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6. A1! 1  ! 1A
7. A2! 2A  ! 2A
8. A1 Byny j C 2 (B)yny
is the same as
A1 B j C
9. A1 Byny j C 2 Byny
is the same as
A1 B j C.
The moral of the story is that the properties of all of these connectives are determined by the
structure and their geometric meaning.
The additives ^and_ can be added to linear logic as in the example 7.3.7. When added to the
language alongside 1 and 2, one can form formulas with arbitrary nestings of ^;_;1;2 within
themselves. Given the meaning of these connectives, the corresponding meatalevel structures are
the composition of two consequence relations, one for the additives over sets and one for the
multiplicatives over multisets, as in 7.2.16.
In the case of the additives of linear logic, the structures  were multisets of sets (not hered-
itary). These can be regarded as a family of structures fg of M0 (ie multisets) obtained by
choosing all possible points from the sets of points in . For example if  is (fa; bg; fc; dg; feg)
then the following set of  's are associted.
(a; c; e); (a; d; e); (b; c; e) and (b; d; e).
We write formally  2  to indicate the connection. We can dene the function  to give
values (w) to each point. Thus databases and goals become lists of sets of formulas or multisets
of sets of formulas.
For example, if  is (fA;Bg; fC;Dg; fEg) we get the following associated databases
(A;C;E); (A;D;E); (B;C;E) and (B;D;E):
We write again  2  to indicate the association.
Our goal is to dene a consequence relation  j   by stipulating:  j   i def. for all
 2 ;  2  ; j  .
We need to show that we get an S-consequence relation and for that we need to dene the
Surgical Cut Rule; we need to dene substitution of one structure in another. We refer back to a
general denition of the composition of two S-consequence relations.
We now present a theorem about the Hilbert formulation of linear logic with ! and : which
shows that  can be taken as : and that : can be mapped into the implicational fragment.
Theorem 7.4.1 Let LL(:) be the extension of LL of 10.1.1 and 9.2.5 and 9.2.6 with the unary
symbol : and the following axioms:
::A$ A
(:(A! :B)! C)$ (A! (B ! C))
(A! B)! (:B ! :A)
Let ? be an arbitrary atom of LL. Let '?(A) be a translation from LL(:) into LL(?) dened
as follows:
'?(q) = (q ! ?)! ?; q atomic
'?(A! B) = '?(A)! '?(B)
'?(:A) = '?(A)! ?
Then the following holds:
LL(:) ` A i LL ` '?(A):
Proof. In Section 10.7. 
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Remark 7.4.2 The previous theorem yields the following:
1. Semantics for LL(:), through the semantics for LL.
2. It shows that :;1 and 2 (ie all the structural connectives of linear logic) are already
denable from the impliction !, via the \internal" translation '?, for a xed atom ?.
3. It shows that : can also be regarded as a negation, and not merely as a shift operator.
Example 7.4.3 (Cut Free Formulation of Linear Logic) In this section, we started with a
consequence relation `LL for multisets as data, added the obvious structural and shift connectives
together with the additives, dened the symmetric amalgamation and got a conseqeunce relation j.
Certain properties of j were listed in the previous example. It is possible to list enough properties
of j to enable one to derive the Cut Rule. When this is done one gets a cut free formulation of
the sytem j. Although we have been referring to j as linear logic, we have not proved that j is
indeed the system known in the literature as linear logic. To show that, all we need to do is to take
a known formulation of linear logic, say `1, see e.g. [Girard, 1987], and prove that all `1 rules are
valid in j. This will show that `1j. If we prove the Cut Elimination for `1 this will show that
j`1. Thus essentially Cut Elimination for `1 establishes that j is indeed linear logic.
7.5 Case study: What is negation
The notion of negation is basic to any formal or informal logical system. When any such system
is presented to us, it is presented either as a system without negation or as a system with some
form of negation. In both cases we are supposed to know intuitively whether there is no negation
in the system or whether the form of negation presented in the system is indeed as claimed Yet the
notion of what is negation in a formal system is not clear. When we see a unary connecive A, (A
a w) together with some other axioms for some additional connectives, how can we tell whether
A is indeed a form of negation of A? Are there some axioms which  must satisfy in order to
qualify A as a negation?
Let L be any propositional logical system and let `L be its provability relation. We do not
specify how L is presented to us, it can be as a Hilbert style system with axioms and rules, or as
a ntural deduction system or by semantics etc. The main point is that we have the provability
relation of L, namely:
A1; : : : ; Ak `L B
between a nite set  of Aj and a signle B satisfying the following three conditiosn:
1.  ` A for A in  (reexivity).
2. If  ` A and    then 0 ` A (monotonicity).
3. If  ` A and  [ fAg ` B then  ` B. (Transivity or cut).
In fact any relation ` on ws satisfying 1, 2 and 3 can be regarded as a logical system.
Our strategy is to give several candidate denitions of what should constitute a negation in a
system and test them against rou intuitions and against known examples. The examples we look
at are as follows:
Example 7.5.1 (a) Let us consider the following system in a language with : and !.
1. A! (B ! A)
2. [A! (B ! C)]! (A! B)! (A! C)]
3. ::A! A
4. A! ::A





Question: Is : a form of negation in this system?
(b) Let us make life more dicult by adding more axioms to our system. To get the idea of what
to add, rst we need disjunctions and conjunctions (the sytem has only : and !). So let us see
what can be taken as disjunction.
(a! b)! b = :(a! b) _ b = (a ^ :b) _ b = a _ b
so let a _ b = def.(a! b)! b. This is in fact a well known denition of _ in terms of !.
Also let a ^ b = def.:(:a _ :b) = :((:a! :b)! :b):
Take the following rule:
6.
` A! B
` :B ! :A
and the further axioms:
7. :(A _B)$ :A ^ :B
8. :(A ^B)$ :A _ :B
9. ((A! ::B)! A)! A. (This axiom says (A! B) _A).
Is : a negation in this system?
(c) We can ask further:
If we also add the axiom
10. A! (:A! B).
does this make : a negation? (we shall see that Answer is no for cases (a) and (b) and yes for
case (c).)
It seems from the above example that this question does not have an immediate simple answer.
Remember that we cannot just write a set of axioms for negation and say that anything satifying
these axioms is a negation. f we write too many axioms we may only get classical negation, and
even that is not guaranteed because maybe we do not know how the negation axioms are supposed
to interact with other connectives e.g. !.
Let us look at more examples:
Example 7.5.2 Consider the system L3 below of Wajsberg. It axiomatises the 3 valued logic of
 Lukasiewicz with ! and :.
Axioms:
W1 A! (B ! A)
W2 (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
W3 (:B ! :A)! (A! B)
W4 ((A! :A)! A)! A
The inference rule is modus ponens.
Question: Can one determine on the basis of `L3 whether :A is a negation in L3?
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Example 7.5.3 Consider a third system denoted by LS3. Its language contains an additonal




1. Is : a negation in this system? Is  a negation?
2. If : is considered a negation in L3, does it have to be considered a negation in the extension
LS3?
Armed with this stock of examples we now move to a formulation and some possible solutions of
our problem.
Problem P:
Given a consequence relation ` (satisfying 1, 2, and 3), and a connective A in the language of
`, are there any criteria on the relationsihip between ` and  which will agree with our intuitions
regarding the qustion of when * is to be considered a form of negation?
Carnap and Church discussed whether a syntactical characterisation of negation was possible.
Carnap thought it was possible, Church thought not.
A basic intution regarding the meaning of :A is that A does not hold or A is not wanted or A
is excluded or even A is not conrmed. Thus if L is a system with a candiate A for negation, we
cannot hope to have A, A considtent together. This leads us to our rst attempt in answering
problem P .
We must specify a set  of unwanted ws. the ws of  are not allowed to be true. This is
normal and natural for any database. For example we do not want two lecturers to be assigned to
the same classroom at the same time. In a formal system L, one can take  = falsity or one can
take  to be certain conjunctions of atoms etc. So to get negation into a system we must have a
set of unwanted ws . This set may be dierent for diernt negations. The connective (*1) may
be a negation because of 1 and (*2) may be a negation because of 2 and so on.
We are thus led to the following dention:
Denition 7.5.4 (Negation as syntactical inconsistency: 1st attempt) Let ` be the prov-
ability relation of a system and A be a connective. We say * is a form of negation if there is a
xed non-empty set of ws  which is not provably equivalent to the set of all ws, such that for
any  : and any A the following holds:
 ` A i 9y 2 (; A ` y):
i.e. A is negated by  becasue A leads to some unwanted y in .
Lemma 7.5.5 Let  be a negation in the logical system `. Then the set fx : ? ` xg is non-empty.
Proof. Since * is a negation, let q 2 , then ? ` q, since q ` q.
The above is purely syntactic (in terms of `) denition. So to check whether A of an axiom
system is a negation, look for a  and try to prove the above equivalence. Note that the equivalence
must hold for any  and A.
We may ask ourselves, how do we nd a ? The answer is that if such a  exists, (i.e. * is a
negation according to the above denition) then it follows from lemma 7.5.5 that  can be taken
as:
 = fC j ? ` Cg
where ? is the empty set. 
Lemma 7.5.6 Assume * is a negation with a  according to denition 7.5.4, then for any 
and any A, (a) is equivalent to (b):
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a. ; A ` C for some C such that ? ` C.
b. ; A ` B for some B 2 .
Proof. Let B 2  then since B ` B we get by denition 7.5.4 that ? ` B. This shows that (b)
implies (a).
Assume for some C such that ? ` C, we have ; A ` C. Since ? ` C, we have that for some
B 2 ,
C ` B:
By monotonicity of `
; A; C ` B
and by cut using ; A ` C we get
; A ` B;
This proves the lemma. 
We can thus modify denition 7.5.4 as follows:
Denition 7.5.7 (Negation as syntactical inconsistency: modied rst attempt) Let `
be a logical system and :A be a connective. We say that : is a form of negation in ` i for
any  and any A the following holds.
 ` :A i for some C such that ? ` :C we have ; A ` C:
The above denition seems theoretically sound and acceptable. All we have to see now is whether
it takes care of all the currently known and agreed upon negations. We will see later that further
modications are necessary. For this reason we continue to use  itslef and not fC j ? ` Cg.
Note that  may contain ws containing * itself. We do not nee dto exclude this possibility. In
fact for classical logic we can take  = fq0 ^ :q0g for some atom q0 and we all know that in
classical logic  ` :A i ; A ` q0 ^ :q0 holds, and so classical negation is a negation. So is
intuitionistic negation because the same equivalence holds.
According to 7.5.4, the : dened in example 7.5.1 axioms 1-9 is not a negation. One can see
this by taking the following interpreation and verifying that all axioms 1-9 of example 7.5.1 are
valid. In this interpretation there are two worlds h and e (heaven for h and earth for e). :A is
true in one if A is false in the other. ! is the usual truth functional implication. All axioms and
rules are valid; i.e. we have :A i A is true in e and h under any assignment to the atoms. Now
we can see that :A is not a negation of A, since it just says that A is false in the other world.
A ^ :A is not a negation of A, since it just says that A is false in the other world. A ^ :A can be
consistent, as A could be true in this world (e.g. e) and false in the other world (e.g. h). the rule
of denition 7.5.4 for negation does not apply here. If : were a negation, then for some , and for
all ; A we would have:
 ` A, ; A ` y; for some y 2 :
In particular for any y 2  we get ` :y. Let p be atomic then since
:p ` :p
we get :p; p ` y for some y 2 , and therefore:
:p ^ p ` y for some y 2 , and hence by denition ` :(p ^ :p):
Since p is an atom we cannot have the above since p ^ :p is consistent, i.e. since 6` A ^ :A. Thus
the : above is not a negation.
If we add axiom 10 (of example 7.5.1) i.e. A! (:A! B) we get e = h and : becomes classical
negation. We can take  = (:q0 ^ q0) and derive from the axioms that
` :A$ (A! (:q0 ^ q0)):
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In fact the above additional axiom says simply ` :(A ^ :A).
Let us check now whether : in the system L3 of example 7.5.2 is indeed a form of negation.
This system axiomatises  Lukasiewicz 3 valued logic. There are 3 truth values, 1 (truth), 1/2, and
0 (falsity). The truth tables for : and ! are as follows:
:x = 1 and x! y = Min (1; 1 + y   x):
The idea of the denition for x ! y is that if x  y then x ! y is true. (Like 0 ! 1 in classical
logic). If x > y then x y is the measure of falsity of x! y and so the value of x! y is 1 (x y).
:x = 1  x is just the mirror image of the truth value.
Conjunction x ^ y and disjunction x _ y have the denition below. They are denable from !
by:
x _ y = def. (x! y)! y = Min(x; y):
x ^ y = def. :(:x _ :y) = Max (x; y):
there is no doubt that :x is a form of negation in this system, because :x = 1 x. The farther
x is from the truth the nearer :x is to the truth.
Let us write A1; : : : ; An  B in this system to mean that under any assignment:
Min( value Aj)  value B, and  B to mean that under any assignment value B = 1.
Notice that the relation  dened semantically above, fulls the criteria for a logical system.
The deduction theorem, however, is not valid for .
The Wajsberg axiom system is complete in the sense that the following holds:
A1; : : : ; An  B i
^
Aj ! B
If we dene A1; : : : ; An ` B to mean that `
V
Aj ! B it then follows that ` B i value B = 1
under all assignment.
Our denition 7.5.4 of what a negationis should give us that : is a negation. Suppose : is
indeed a negation according to denition 7.5.4. Then there exists a xed  such that for any 
and any A of the logic L3, we have:
 ` :A i ; A ` B( for some B 2 ). Necessarily  6= ?:
Take any B 2  and  = ? then ` :B i B ` y for some y 2 ; but since y = B 2  and
B ` B we get ` :B for all B 2 .
One can verify by looking at the axioms the following lemma:
Lemma 7.5.8 If ` A then value (A) = 1 under all assignments.
Proof. The above is true for the axioms and is preserved under modus ponens and substitution.
Thus we conclude that for any B 2 , value B = 0 under all assignments. Now consider an atom
q, certainly
:q ` :q
hence for some B 2 
:q; q ` B
hence under all assignments Min (value :q, value q)  value B. In particular for any assignment
h with h(q) = 1=2 we get h(B)  1=2. This contradicts the previous conclusion that value B = 0
always. We therefore need to improve our denition 7.5.4 of negation. 
Our basic idea in dening negation was that A ` :B holds i A;B togetehr lead to some
undesirable result .
i.e. A;B ` :
However the way the above is written is that A and B are `combined' together via conjunction,
i.e. A^B. It is quite possible that A;BB can be combined together via a dierent connective e.g.
some connective C(A;B). Thus A ` :B holds if C(A;B) ` . C is a connective which `brings
out' the eect A and B can have together. Of course C(x; y) is not an arbitrary connective. It
must be monotonic and satisfy some obvious properites. C(x; y) must say more than just x ^ y,
and satisfy the conditions listed in denition 7.5.9 for it.
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Denition 7.5.9 (Negation as a potential syntactic inconsistency: rst attempt) Let L
be a system with a provability relation ` and let * be a unary connective of L. We say * is a form
of negation in L i there exist a non empty set of ws  which is not provably equivalent to the
set of all ws, and a binary connective C(x; y) s.t. the following holds for any D and A.
D ` A i C(D;A) ` y for some y 2 :
C must satisfy the following: (truth is any provable such formula; such formulae exist if * is a
negation. See lemma 7.5.5.)
1. C(x; y) ` x
2. C(x; y) ` y
3. C(>; y) = C(y;>) = y
4.
x ` x0
C(x; y) ` C(x0; y)
y ` y0
C(x; y) ` C(x; y0)
where A = B abbreviates A ` B and B ` A.
Remark 7.5.10 1. We get from the above that (in case that a falsity can be dened in the
logic): C( ?, y) = C( x, ?) = ?.
2. Denition 7.5.9 was given D for a single formula, if L has conjunction then we can take
 ` A.
For our negation in the system L3 let C(x; y) = :(x! :y), and let  = ffalsityg = f:(y0 !
y0)g. Clearly, by the denition of `, x ` :y i ` x ! :y i value (x ! :y) = 1 in all
assignments, i value :(x ! :y) = 0 in all assignments, i :(x ! :y ` falsity. The truth table
for C(x; y) = :(x ! :y) is Max (0, value x + value y   1). As can be seen, since the truth
function of C(x; y) is Max(0; x+ y   1) we get:
a. C(x; y)  x
b. C(x; y)  y
c. C(1; y) = y = C(y; 2)
d1. x  x0 ) C(x; y)  C(x0; y)
d2. y  y0 ) C(x; y)  C(x; y0)
These correspond to the conditions of denition 7.5.9 and hence : in the 3 valued logic is a negation.
In fact the above denitions of :;! and C(x; y) as :(x ! :y) show that : is a negation in all
 Lukasiewicz many valued logics.
Now that we have changed the denition of negation in a formal system we have to check whether
the : of example 7.5.1 is still not considered a negation. So assume that : is a negation in the
system of example 7.5.1, the system with axioms 1-9. Then for some  and C the condition of
denition 7.5.9 holds, namely for all D;A.
D ` :A i C(D;A) ` B for some B 2 
We shall show that
($) A! :(x! x) ` :A
using C and , and this is impossible because in our two world model ($) says that if A is false
in one world, A is false in the other world also. Thus if we prove ($) then this shows that no C,
 can exist and : is not a form of negation.
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We now proceed to prove ($):
Since C(y; z) ` y ^ z we get
C(A! :(x! x); A) ` :(x! x)
Hence by denition of :
C(C(A! :(x! x); A); x! x) ` B; for some B 2 :
Since x! x is truth and C(y, truth ) = y, we get
C(A! :(x! x); A) ` B; for some B in 
and hence by denition of : we get:
($) A! :(x! x) ` :A
Example 7.5.11 (The system of relevant logic R) Consider a language with ! only and the
following set of axioms and rules dening the system R!.
Rule
modus ponens




R1. (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
R3. (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C))
R4. (A! (A! B))! (A! B)
The above system was introduced by Church and Moh (1950, 1951). Church called it `weak positive
implicational calculus'. They proved the following deduction theorem for the system.
1. Deduction Theorem for R!
If there exists a proof of B from A1; : : : ; An in which all A1; : : : ; An are used in arriving at B
then there exists a proof of An ! B from A1; : : : ; An 1 satisfying the same conditions. The
above calls for the following denition of `R!.
2. Denition of `R!
A1; : : : ; An `R! B i
`R! A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :)
One can see by axiom R3 that the above is independent of the order of fAjg. The above
system is identical with the implicational relevance logic of Anderson and Belnap. It saties
the conditions of a logical system. Negation : is introduced into R! to obtain R(!;:) via
the Ackermann negation axioms. These axioms are used to introduce negation not only into
R! but also into all neighbouring systems.
Ackermann axioms for negation
AN1 (A! :B(! (B ! :A)
AN2 (A! :A)! :A
AN3 ::A! A
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The following can be proved
AN4 A! ::A
AN5 (A! B)! (:B ! :A)
See [Anderson and Belnap, 1975, pp. 20{21, 107{109] for details.
The above denition of negation is indeed negation according to our denition 7.5.9 of negation.
Meyer 1966 has shown that if we add to R! a symbol ? (falsity) with the additional axiom
R5 ((A! ?)! ?)! A
we get a system equivalent to R(!;:),with : via the interpretation
1. :A = def. A! ?.
The following must be proved.
2. D ` :A i D;A ` ?
i.e. D ` A! ? i D;A ` ?
or equivalently by denition of `R!:
` D ! (A! ?) i D ! (A! ?); which is correct:
Remark 7.5.12 Technically,if the system R(!;:) is formulated with : and without ?, can we
nd an ? such that :A = A! ?? In classical logic one can take ? = q0 ^ :q0 or if conjunction
is not available, one takes ? = :(a0 ! q0) for some xed q. We cannot do the same for R(!
;:),because if we take ? = :(q0 ! q0) for some xed atom q0, we will not have anough axioms on
! to be able to use ? as needed. We will have to add axiom R4 for this new ? = :(q0 ! q0) and
then show that no new theorems can be proved for any ws not containing q0. Thus we see that
denition 7.5.9 is not quite right in the sense that the system considered may be too weak to show
that it has a negation. In other words a connective * may indeed be a negation in the system `, but
` , may be too weak to prove the denition 7.5.9. In fact, a connective C(x; y) required by denition
7.5.9 may not be denable in the language of the system, but only in an extension. Intuitively if
* is a negation in a conservative extension, then we can and should regard it a negation in the
system itself. We are thus led to the following denition:
Denition 7.5.13 (Negation as a potential syntactic inconsistency modied attempt) 1.
Let L1 and L2 be logical systems such that the language of L2 extends the language of L1.
We say L2 is a conservative extension of L1 i the following holds for any ; A in the
language of L1.
 `L1 A i  `L2 A
2. We say that * is a negation in L1 i for some conservative extension L2 and some  and
C in L2 satisfying the conditions of denition 7.5.9, we have that for any D;A of L1 the
following holds:
D `L1 A i C(D;A) `L2 B; for some B 2 
We have now to check whether this new denition of negation turns the connective : of example
7.5.1 axioms 1-9 into a negation. (Recall that we found that : is not a negation). The answer is
no; : is still not a negation. The reason is that for any conservative extension of the system in
example 7.5.1 the two world interpretation (with the e world and the h world) is still valid. So the
argument for showing that no C and  can make : into a negation still goes through.
Example 7.5.14 We now give another example illustrating the need for denition 7.5.13.
Consider the language of classical propositional logic and its conseqeunce relation `.
Let `1 be dened as
 `1 i  6= ? and  ` A:
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`1 is a consequence relation. However, : is not a negation in `1, according to denition 7.5.4,
since for any non-empty  that we choose we would have to have for B 2  that ? `1 :B
since certainly B `1 B contrary to denition of `1. But this is counter intuitive since certainly
 = fq ^ :qg should be acceptable.
The example is certainly pathological and denition 7.5.13 handles it nicely. However, in our
view a more satisfactory solution to this particular problem is to require the following additional
property to be fullled by a consequence relation.
4.  ` A i 8x(; x ` A). (Coherence).
We now investigate the possibility that there might be negations for which  depends on D. This
is quite intuitive, since it says that what we do not want,  depends on the data, D, which we
have. In fact it turns out that we cannot have a notion of  dependent on D, for a coherent
consequence relation. (See example 7.5.14 above).
Proposition 7.5.15 Let ` be a monotonic logical system with conjunction ^, and negation :
satisfying the following conditions:
1. For any D thre exists (D), dependent on D, such that for any A the following hold:
2. D ` :A i 9y 2 (D)(D;A ` y)
3.  ` A i 8x(; x ` A).
Then there exists an N (independent of D) such that (1) holds, i.e. N = (D)).
Proof. We prove the proposition by means of two lemmas.
Lemma 7.5.16 Let `;: and (D) be as in proposition 7.5.15. Let N(D) be the set
N(D) = fy j D ` :yg
then : is a negation satisfying equation 7.5.15 (2) with N(D) as a set of unwanted sentences.
Proof. Very much as in Lemma 7.5.6, we show that, for any D and A:
(*) 9y 2 (D)(D;A ` y) i 9z 2 N(D)(D;A ` z)
(a) Assume D;A ` y for some y 2 (d).
By 7.5.15(2) we get that D ` :A and hence A 2 N(D) and therefore there exists a z 2 N(D),
namely z = A such that D;A ` z.
(b) Assume D;A ` z, for some z 2 N(D).
Since z 2 N(D) we therefore have that D ` :z. Hence by 7.5.15(2) again there exists a
y 2 (D) such taht D; z ` y. We now have
D;A ` z and D; z ` y
by monotonicity we get:
D;A; z ` y
and by the cut rule we get
D;A ` y:
This completes the proof of lemma 7.5.16. Note that the proof in part (2) above can be modied
to show that D; a ` B and D;A ` :B implies D ` :A. 
Remark 7.5.17 We draw several conclusions from lemma 7.5.16.
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1. First that if : is indeed a negation dependent on D (via (D)) then equation 7.5.15 (2) is
really an uniformative tautology. By lemma 7.5.16, (D) can be taken as N(D) = fy j D `
:yg and equation 7.5.15 (3) becomes:
D ` :A i (D ` :y and D;A ` y)
which is trivially true for y = A.
Note that for the case where  was xed (independent of D) we got that D ` :A i 9y (` :y
and D;A ` y) which is more informative.
2. The second conclusion is that  is dependent on D in a special way.
As D gets stronger,  incrases. This is not intuitive! Why should (a priori) what we do not
want increase with the database?
This property follows since we have:
D0 ` D;D ` :A
D0 ` :A
We thus get that
D0 ` D ) N(D0)  N(D):
3. The third conclusion follows from the proof of lemma 7.5.16 and the assumption 7.5.15 (3).
We get the following for ::
(c1)
D;A ` B;D;A ` :B
D ` :A
Furthermore, sicne we saw in (b) that D0 ` D ) N(D0)  N(D), we can get that
(c2)
D ` :A
D ` :(A ^B)
The reason is that if D;A ` y; y 2 N(D), then certainly DB;A ` y and since D;B ` D, we
have y 2 N(D;B) and hence D ` :(A ^B).
We now proceed to use lemma 7.5.16 to prove proposition 7.5.15 namely that : can be taken to be
a negation with a xed  (independent of D). We assumed that the language contains conjunction
^. ^ satises the three axioms:
A ^B ` A
A ^B ` B
A;B ` A ^B:
Lemma 7.5.18 Let ` be a system with negation :, satisfying the rule:
1.
D;A ` B;D;A ` :B
D ` :A
Then for N = fB ^ C j B ` :Cg we have for any D;A.
2. D ` :A i 9y 2 N(D;A ` y).
Proof.
1. Assume D ` :A. We are looking for a y such tat y 2 N and D;A ` y. Let y = D ^ A.
Certainly D;A ` D ^A and D ^A 2 N since D ` :A.
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2. Assume that for some y 2 N , we have D;A ` y. y is then equal to some B^C with B ` :C.
Since D;A ` B ^ C we get D;A ` C. Since B ` :C we get D;A ` :C and hence by rule 1,
D ` :A.
Proof of Proposition 7.5.15
Assume the conditions of proposition 7.5.15 for ` and : hold. By conclusion (c1) of remark 7.5.17
the conditions of lemma 7.5.18 hold and hence : is a negation with a xed  = N .
The above considerations show that there is no hope for a formulation of a negation : with a
 dependent on the database, within the framework of monotonic logics. The assumption that ^
is available does not restrict generality since ^ can always be added to the language and denition
7.5.13 for negation be used. 
7.6 Negation and structured consequence relations
In the previous section we addressed the problem of what is negation in the context of a monotonic
consequence relation. By this we mean a relation between formulas of the form  ` A, where 
is a nite set of formulas satisfying reexivity, monotonicity and cut.
The basic idea was that a connective  is to be considered a negation if there exists a theory
 such that for any  and any A we have:
 ` A i ; A ` B for some B 2 
 is considered the set of unwanted sentences and any A is negated by 
(i.e.  ` A) if it leads, \together with" , to an unwanted B in . We renef this denition by
imposing conditions on  and rening the notion of \together with".
The LDS notion of a database (or theory) is no longer a set formulas, but can be a multiset
or a list, or even an arbitrary structure. Monotonicity no longer holds and we need to extend the
basic notions involved in deciding whether a connective `' is a negation.
Our rst step should be to set up the scene in which the concept of negation is to be char-
acterized, namely, introduce the new notion of a non-monotonic consequence relation, which we
call S-consequence relation (Structured Consequence Relation). A precise denition is given in an
earlier chapter. Recall that we need three auxiliary notions for our denition:
1. We have already indicated that we need to deal with structured databases. We thus have to
specify precisely what structures are allowed as databases, for the consequence relation to be
dened. These must include the one formula database (A) and the empty database ?.
2. The notion of a structured database must also include the concept of structured addition of
data. By this we mean the notion of how to combine two databases together. The traditional
way is to take their union, but when the databases are already structured, the union has
to be structured as well. We denote the structured addition of the databases  and   by
+ . This binary operation, \+", has to be dened as part of the concepts underlying the
consequence relation. It will usually satisfy associativity:
1 + (2 +3) = (1 +2) + 3
and the empty database must satisfy:
?+ = +? = 
Commutativity is not required to hold.
3. We also need a concept of substitution of one structured database  inside another,  ,
achieved by replacing one formula A in   by . Formally, we need to make sense of the
symbol  [A], reading   is a structured database which contains A somewhere inside, and
the symbol  [], which denotes the database resulting from substituting  for A inside  .
These notions are needed to formulate the Cut Rule.
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We can now dene the three rules which we call Identity, Surgical Cut (or Substitutional




 j A  [A] j B
 [] j B
Directional Monotonicity (right hand side)
 j A
+   j A
Directional Monotonicity (left hand side)
 j A
  + j A
Since + need not be commutative, we may distinguish between directional data additions +r,
+l dened by  +r   = +  ,  +l   =   +.
Denition 7.6.1 (Tentative Denition of Structured Consequence Relation) Let L be a
language. Let L be a family of order types of the form (;). Assume that the empty set and
one element set types are in L. Assume that the notion of substitution of one order type  for a
point x in another order type  0(x) is well dened (as in (3) above). We say that a relation  j A
(between ordered multisets  of ws of an order type  and a single w A) is an S-consequence
relation i it satises Identity and Surgical Cut.
Denition 7.6.2 (Negation Relative to Data Addition) Let j be a structured consequence
relation. Let + denote addition of data. Let  be a unary connective. We say  is a negation
relative to +r (resp. +l) i there exists a set of ws  such that for all  and A
 j A i for some B 2  +A j B (resp. A+ j B)
We require that  is not the set of all ws, nor does it contain theorems (i.e. any B 2  which
satises ? j B). We say that  is a negation relative to + i it is a negation relative to +r or +l.
This denition is parallel to Denition 7.5.4 of the previous section. As remarked in that section,
there may be systems containing negation  which are not expressive enough to nd a corresponding
. We need a slight modication of the above denition which involves conservative extensions.
Denition 7.6.3 Let j be a consequence relation, + addition of data and  a unary connective.
We say that  is a negation in j relative to +r (resp. +l) i in some conservative extension
j1j, there exists a  such that for all ; A of the language of j we have
1.  j A i for some B 2  +A j1 B (resp. A+ j1 B)
2. In every conservative extension of j,  is a negation relative to +r (resp. +l) in the sense
of Denition the previous denition.
We assume  is not the set of all ws and does not contain theorems.
Example 7.6.4 Consider  Lukasiewicz' many-valued logic.
1. Consider the consequence relation j as dened by:
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h(Ai)  n)  h(B)
2. Let ` be the consequence relation dened by:




= :(X ! :Y )
then
A1; A2 j B i C(A1; A2) ` B
The consideration in Remark 7.5.10 of the previous section, shows that : is a negation in j
relative to `+1' being union and is also a negation in ` relative to `+2' being `C'.
With condition 2 in the previous denition, being a negation relative to +r resp. +l is preserved
under conservative extensions.
Lemma 7.6.5 Let j be a consequence relation with negation  relative to data addition +r (resp.
+l). Then  is a negation relative to +r (resp. +l) in every conservative extension j2.
Proof. Since  is a negation in j, there is a conservative extension j1 that satises the conditions
of Denition 7.6.2. Suppose j2 is a conservative extension of j. Let j3 be the composition of
j1 and j2, dened as follows:
1.  j03 A if  ji A for i = 1; 2
2.  jn+13 A if for some C; 1[C] and  2 we have  1(C) jm3 A and  2 ji C and m  n and
i = 1; 2 and  =  1[ 2].
In other words we require closure under the Surgical Cut Rule.
3. Let  j3 A i for some n; jn3 A.
Then clearly j3 is a conservative extension of both j2 and j1. Assume without loss of
generality that  is a negation relative to +r in j3 in the sense of denition 7.6.1. Thus, in the
language of j3 there is a set  such that for all  and A:
 j3 A i  +A j3 B for some B 2 :
Hence, in particular, for all  and A in the language of j2:
 j2 A i  +A j3 B for some B 2 :

Denition 7.6.6 If the consequence j has several +i available, we can let  be an _-negation
(resp. ^-negation) relative to f+ig i for some  we have for all  and A:
 j A i for some i (resp. for all i) and some B 2 
( +i A j B or A+i  j B)
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So far, we assumed  is given to us as a set of unwanted ws. We did not specify how  is
given. It may be the case that  is generated by another consequence relation j. Thus we may
have
B 2  i ? j B
Clearly, if  is given as a set, then the relation j can be taken as the membership relation,
i.e.
  j B i B 2   [
This membership relation is reexive, monotonic and satises cut.
Denition 7.6.7 Let j be a consequence relation in a language L. Let j1 be a conservative
extension of j in language L1  L. Let  be a unary connective of L and + be data addition in
L. We say that  is a negation in j relative to +r (resp. +l) i for some consequence relation j
of L1 the following holds:
1. The theorems of j do not contain all ws of L and do not contain any theorem of j in L.
2. For all  and A; j A i for some B of L1 such that ? j B, we have +A j1 B (resp.
A+ j1 B).
3. In every conservative extension of j,  is a negation relative to +r (resp. +l) in the sense of
Denition 7.6.1.
The following lemma says that  can be taken as fB j ? j Bg.
Lemma 7.6.8 Let j be a consequence relation and let  be a negation relative to +, through a 
in some conservative extention j1. Suppose without loss of generality that  is a negation relative
to +r. Then (1) is equivalent to (2):
(1) +A j1 B for some B 2 
(2) +A j1 C for some C such that ? j1 C.
Proof.
(1) ) (2): If  + A j1 B and B 2 , then since ? + B = B j1 B we get ? j1 B and
(2) holds.
(2) ) (1): If  + A j1 C and ? j1 C, then for some C1 2 , C j1 C1 and hence by
Cut,  +A j1 C1. This yields (1).

Denition 7.6.9 Let j be a consequence relation with addition + and  a unary connective.
We say  is a context dependent negation relative to + if for every ; A there exists a (; A)
(dependent on  and A) such that we have:
 j A i for some B 2 (; A)
( +A j B or A+ j B)
Remark 7.6.10 The preceding denition should be compared with the parallel denition of the
previous section for the monotonic case. There, for every ,  depended on  only, i.e. for all
 and A
 j A i 9B 2 (); ; A j B
In our denition,  depends on A as well. For the monotonic case, since +A+A is equivalent
to  +A, this is only a slight dierence.
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Further note that because of Cut, we have C j A and C 0 j C imply C 0 j A. It is
reasonable to assume that C 0 j C implies (C 0)  (C).
Example 7.6.11 Consider positive intuitionistic logic (for the language of !, ^). To add intu-
itionistic negation we need the axioms
A! (:A! B)
(A! :B)! (B ! :A)
With these axioms we can let ? def= :(q ! q) and interpret :A as A ! ?. The axiom for ?
that we get is
? ! B
Here  = f?g and
 ` :A i ; A ` ?
The above are the well known results for obtaining : from a falsity constant ?. What can we
do in order to add : which is a context dependent negation?, i.e. for any A we add ?A with
:A$ (A! ?A)
A ` :B i A;B ` ?B
Consider the axiom
(B ! :B)! :B
It was shown by R. Valerius [Valerius, 1989] that positive intuitionistic logic with!, ^ and the
above axiom allows for a conservative extension with falsities ?B , for each B and the equivalence
:B $ (B ! ?B)
Theorem 7.6.12 Let j be a consequence relation, + addition and  a unary connective, being a
context dependent negation relative to +. Assume that  is a structural connective corresponding
to +, i.e. we have
1. A+B j AB
2.
+A+B +0 j D
+AB +0 j D
Assume  is a negation relative to +r which is context dependent with (; A). Let
N(; A) = fB B j  j B and A j Bg
Then (1) i (2).
(1) For some Y 2 (; A), +A j Y
(2) For some Y 2 N(; A), +A j Y
Proof. To show (1)) (2):
 +A j Y i  j A
Since A+A ` AA we get by Cut
+A j AA
which yields (2). To show (2)) (1): Assume +A j BB for some B such that  j B and
A j B. Since  j B, there exists a Y 2 (; A) such that +B j Y .Since A j B, we get by
Cut,  +A j Y , which is condition (1). 
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If a negation  is context dependent with  and A, its being a negation does not depend on
(; A).
Theorem 7.6.13 Let j be a consequence relation, + addition and  a negation relative to + which
is context dependent with  and A. Let j1 be j conservatively extended by . Suppose without loss
of generality that  is a negation relative to +r in j1. Assume that C 0 j C ) (C 0)  (C).
Then there is a set N of ws in the language of j1 such that N is independent of  and A and
 j1 A i +A j1 B for some B 2 N
Proof. Set N = f(B  C) j B j1 Cg. If  = A1 + : : : + An, then  denotes A1  : : : An.
): If  j1 A, then for B =   A we have  + A j1 B and B 2 N. (: Assume B 2 N
and +A j1 B. Then for some (B1 C1), B = (B1 C1) and B1 j1 C1. Since  is a negation
in j1 in the sense of Denition7.6.1, there is a set  in the language of j1 and C2 2 (B) such
that B1 +C1 j1 C2. Hence B1 C1 j C2. Applying Cut to this and +A j1 (B1 C1) yields
 +A j1 C2. Hence j A. 
Remark 7.6.14 Let j be a consequence relation, + addition of data and  a negation relative to
+. Assume  is a negation relative to +r. Then for every A, ? j (AA):
A j A
i A+r A j B
i (AA) j B
i ? j (AA)
for some set  and some B 2 . Thus,  cannot be negation relative to data addition +, if for
some A, neither ? j (AA) nor ? j (A A).
Example 7.6.15 (Strong negation) Consider the following construction. Let L be a language
with some connectives f]1; : : : ; ]mg. Let  be a new unary logical connective. For each con-
nective ](q1; : : : ; qn) of L let  ](q1; : : : ; qn; q1; : : : ; qn) be a w of the language L +  (usually
not containing ]). Further assume that some complexity measure can be dened on L +  such
that for all A1; : : : ; An, the complexity of  ](A1; : : : ; An; A1; : : : ; An) is strictly less than that of
](A1; : : : ; An). Let H be any logical system in the language L. We call H a rewrite extension of
H in L +  i (intuitively) H is the smallest extension of H satisfying the following axioms for
all connectives ], and for k xed:
(]) ](A1; : : : ; An)$  ](A1; : : : ; An; A1; : : : ; An)
(k) 
kA$ A
For example, let H be the intuitionistic positive propositional calculus with ^;_;!. Let \" be
\" ( is intended to be Nelson's strong negation). Let N be the system with:
 (A! B) $ A^  B
 (A _B) $  A^  B
 (A ^B) $  A_  B
 A $ A
The complexity is lexicographic in the nestings of ^;_;! within , where \!" is stronger
than \^", \_". Given such an extension, we can add negation  to the system by letting  =
f^k 1i=1 iBg.
 j A i for some B;+A j iB; for all i = 1; : : : ; k   1:
In the case of , we get
 ` A i for some B; j B^  B:
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If we want a single atomic falsity ? for  (i.e.  = f?g), we can stipulate the additional
axiom:
A; A; : : : ; k 1A j B
for any A and B. This will allow us to identify the left hand side with some constant ?. Denote
this system by H+k . In the case of , we need
A^  A ` B
and thus since all A^  A are equivalent, they can be identied as ?. In the case of ?, the
negation  becomes intuitionistic negation. The only reason for that is the fact that ? ` B holds
for any B. It has nothing to do with the axioms on . We know that intuitionistic negation : can
be dened from any xed propositional constant ? provided we have the additional rule:
? ` B;B arbitrary.
In the case of N+2 , ? can serve as the ?. If the intuitonistic system already contains falsity ?
we can add:
 ? = >
 > = ?
In this case we will have two falsities ? and ?.
It is interesting to note that it so happens that for any w A, there exist atoms qj such that in
N we have  A ^ A ` _j  qj ^ qj. This can be proved by induction on A. Thus the additional
axiom  A ^ A ` B, for B arbitrary, can be restricted to A atomic. This has ramications to the
semantics for strong negation.
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Chapter 8
Metalevel Features in LDS
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we claimed that in LDS, the metalevel features are done by the labels while the object
level features are done by the formulas of the logic. The meaning of the above statement, as well
as notions of metalevel have to be claried and formalised. This is the task of this Chapter.
We clarify the fundamental concepts involved in the relationship between meta-language and
object language features. We will also study in more detail a meta-language HFP, presented in a
later section, and examine the claim that it can function as a general purpose meta-language. Our
conceptual framework will revolve around two pure notions. The notions of a proper meta-language
and that of an object language L1 implementing meta-language features for a language L2.
Given a language L, we understand by a proper meta-language M to the language L, any
language which is able to name every well formed symbol of L and to describe all the logical
operations of L. Thus formulas ' of L become terms t' of M and logical relations of L become
predicates inM.M must have axioms to ensure that every interpretation ofM gives rise, through
the embedding of L inM, to an interpretation of L. For a given L,M is not unique. Many languages
can serve as a meta-language for L, provided they are strong enough. In computer language terms,
any strong enough language, e.g. basic, can be used to write an interpreter for any other language.
In such a case one simulates one language in another. The other pure notion of one language, L1,
serving as an object language, L2, is more dicult to explain. Consider the relationship between
L and M. L is a sublanguage of M in a very strong sense. M has names for everything in L and
axioms about L. Imagine a more equal relationship between two languages. Suppose L1 and L2
are both sublanguages of a language L1;2. L1;2 is not a meta-language to L1. It is just a richer
language. For example, classical predicate logic, L1, augmented with additional dummy predicates
being the language L2 gives us L1;2 which is certainly not a meta-language. Consider L1;2 and
consider some mixed axioms 1;2 in L1;2 aecting both L1 and L2. Any interpretation of L1;2
satisfying the mixed axioms, will induce an interpretation on L1 alone. Similarly, we can consider
a proper meta-language M1 of L1, with names for L1 symbols, etc. as discussed before. In the
language M1 we can write axioms M1 about L1, restricting its possible interpretations. It may
be the case that the family of possible pure interpretations of L1 allowed by 1;2 (as induced from
interpretations of L1;2 satisfying 1;2) are the same as the possible interpretations of L1 allowed
by M1 (as induced from interpretations of M satisfying M1). In this case we say that L1;2
and 1;2 is an object language implementation of M1 . The justication for `object language' is
that L1;2 is not meta to L1, it is just an extension. Consider for example two interpreters L1 and
L2 which are linked in some way. Thus each interpreter has its allowable options of how to run.
However, since they are linked, not all of these individual options can be realized. L2 can choose
to run in certain ways which will limit the options of L1 because they are linked. Suppose we use
a proper meta-language M1 to talk and describe the options of L1 and suppose further that we
express, through a w '1 of M1, our wish to have L1 run only in certain ways. So '1 (if true)
limits the runs (or options) of L1. There is another way of limiting the runs of L1, through its
195
196 CHAPTER 8. METALEVEL FEATURES IN LDS
linkage with L2.
It may be that L2 can be restricted by condition 1 so that L1 (when linked with L2 satisfying
1) can run exactly in a way which satises '1. If this is the case, then we say that L2, through
its object language restriction 1 and its linkage with L1, can implement '1, i.e. implement the
meta-statement '1. It may be that for each 'n of M1, there exists a way of restricting L2 by n
which through the link with L1, allows L1 to run only in a way which satises 'n. In that case we
have object language implementation of the set f'ng of the language M1.
To make these concepts more concrete, think of an LDS system. The logic L of the formulas
is L2 and the algebra A of labels is L1. When linked together they form an LDS system. The
meta-language M is a language capable of talking about the proof theory of the logic L. Here is a
concrete example: let L be intuitionistic implicational logic. Let the proof theory for L be given
using modus ponens (A;A ! B ` B) and ! Introduction (to show A ! B, assume A and show
B). M will be a meta-level language capable of talking about proofs of L, containing predicates
which can describe how many times an assumption A was used in a given proof of B. Let ' be a
formula of M saying that each assumption is used at most once. Some proofs satisfy ', some do
not. We can add a labelling algebra (A;[) where A is a set of atomic labels and [ is a multiset
union of atomic labels and use the labels to keep trace exactly which assumptions are used in the
proof. The system becomes:
 Label all assumptions by dierent atomic labels.
 Formulate modus ponens as
 : A; : A! B and  \  = ?
:
 [  : B
 Formulate ! introduction as the following:
to show  : A! B assume x : A with a new atomic label x and show  [ fxg : B.
 Say  ` B if we label all ws of  with dierent atomic labels we can prove  : B with  a
subset of the set of these labels.
This LDS system implements the meta-level condition ' on the proofs.
Another example is from resolution in classical logic. Suppose we have a classical language
L1 and a set  of clauses which is inconsistent. The resolution machinery may derive the empty
clause but may not be equipped to give a set of substitutions into the clauses of  which can
yield propositional inconsistency. Let M1 be a meta-language in which we demand this set. This
demand can be implemented by adding a dummy predicate Q(x1; x2; : : :) with the appropriate
variables (language L2) as a disjunct to all clauses of . The resolution machine can stop when
unable to eliminate Q and from the various instantiations of Q the substitutions can be obtained.
The value of metalanguage features and of the study of object level implementations of metalan-
guage features lies in developing computational implementations of LDS. There are many theorem
provers for classical logic. There are also other implementations of logical languages. If we can
express in a generic way the general LDS discipline in one of these logics we will immediately
have a computational system for LDS. Since many non-monotonic logics can be expressed nicely
in LDS, we will get a computational capability for non-monotonic logics, an area highly famous
for its computationally intractable systems.
It is best that we see some examples:
We begin with modal logic. We consider Example 2.2.3. The language contains propositional
variables p; q; r; : : :, the classical connectives ^;_;!;? and the modalities  and . The labels
are atomic labels from a set ft1; s1; t2; s2; : : :g and we have the conguration relation < on labels.
A database has the form of a set of labelled formulas called assumptions and a conguration on
the labels involved in the assumptions. In Example 2.2.3 the database was:
Assumptions Conguration
(1) t : B t < s
(2) s : (B ! C)
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The deduction rules allowed us to move from one database and conguration to another, ob-
tained by adding assumptions and labels and extending the conguratin according to certain rules.
The rules used are the rules of the particular LDS system for the above language.
We shall use the above language (above LDS) as our example of an object language. We will
develop a metalanguage for it. We will do the construction in detail. We will then give another
example of language metalanguage, for relevance logic (2.2.1). After seeing these two examples in
detail we will be ready for general denitions of language metalanguage concepts and the main
body of this section. We aim at the central concept of \object level implementation of a metalevel
feature". This will take time to develop and dene. We rst dene the usual metalevel concepts,
then try to simplify them, then try to do them in the object level and then explain how it is done
in principle.
So, let us begin.
We want a metalanguage of the modal language, ie for the LDS of 2.2.3. A metalanguage
should be strong and rich enough to talk about all the natural movements we make in the object
language. Let us choose two sorted classical predicate logic as our metalanguage. This is a wise
choice. The logic is well known, well understood and has many theorem provers available. If we
can nd it suitable it will be advantageous for us. How can it ever be unsuitable? There may be
two possible reasons, one { it may not be mathematically expressive enough and two { its natural
structure may not be intuitively compatible with the natural structure of the object language.
Fortunately for our case, for the modal logic we are considering, classical logic is very suitable.
First order classical logic, however, is not general enough to serve as a metalanguage. We need
the higher order language of Hereditarily Finite Predicates (HFP). This language will be formally
dened later in this section. Meanwhile, we mention that it has the feature of allowing atomic
predicates to have formulas as part of the predicate. For example, the metapredicate Hold('; t)
reading \' is true at t" is such a predicate. Another predicate is Derive('; ), reading \ is
derivable (in some logic) from '"
We start by assigning formal predicate symbols and terms (names) to denote the properties
and constants of the object language. Let us denote the label t by \t" and < by \<". For each
formula A let \A" be a term naming A. We let Data(x; y) be a two sorted binary predicate of
classical HFP intended to formalise the relation \t : A is in the database", written as Data(t; A).
Let Derive(; x; y) be another relation intended to capture the notion of \t : A is derived using
the LDS rules from the database ".
Note that formally if t; A are considered the ground type 0 (level 0) then Data is if level 1
while Derive is of level 2, where generally level n + 1 can name and talk about all formulas of
levels m  n.
The database of 2.2.4 can be described in the metalanguage by the w '.
' = Data(t;B) ^Data(s;(B ! C)) ^ (t < s)
To the above sentence, we have to add a set of axioms (in HFP logic) describing the relation
of derivation and the naming relation. These are:
(D1) Derive('; t; A ^B)$ Derive('; t; A)^ Derive('; t; B)
(D2) Derive('; t; A _B)$ Derive('; t; A)_ Derive('; t; B)
(D3) Derive('; t; A! B)$ Derive( ; t; B) where  = '^ Data (t; A)
(D4) Derive('; t;?)! Derive ('; x; Y )
(D5) Derive('; t;A)! Derive('; s;A) whenever ' ` t < s:
(D6) Derive('; s;B)! Derive('; t;B) whenever ' ` t < s
(D7) Derive('; t;A)! 9s Derive(' ^ (t < s); s; A)))
(D8) Derive('^ Data(t; A); t; A).
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Note that the above gives us intuitionistic derivability. Note the clause for deriving a disjunction.
We do not include disjunctions in the data. To obtain classical derivability we need to add:
(D9) Derive('; t; A), where A is a substitution instance of a truth functional tautology.
Let  be the (innite) theory containing the universal closure of the D axioms. We would hope
that for any labelled w, r : A, eg t : B we would have:
 ` Derive ('; r;A) in classical HFP i t : A is derivable in the system of 2.2.4.
Our diculty at the moment is that HFP is not mathematically well dened. However, let us
continue despite that. The mathematics will come later in this chapter.
8.2 Classical logic as a metalanguage
What we now want to do is to dene the meta features formalised by Data and Derive, in
rst-order classical logic, which serves as an object language.
To achieve that we associate it with every atomic formula A of the LDS (without the label) a
unary formula A(t) of rst order predicate logic, with one free variable t. We now translate the
metapredicate Data(t; A) for arbitrary A as follows: ( is the translation):
1. Data(t; A) = A(t) for A atomic.
2. Data(t; A ^B) = A(t) ^B(t).
3. Data(t; A! B) = A(t)! B(t).
4. Data(t;?) = ?.
5. Data(t;A) = 8s(t < s! A(s)).
6. Data(t;A) = 9s(t < s ^A(s)).
7. (t < s) = t < s
We can now translate Derive('; t; A) as follows: (] is the translation).
8. Derive('; t; A)] = ' ! A(t).
It is easy to verify that properties (D1)-(D5), (D7)-(D8) of the Derive predicate hold for the
translation. We check property (D6):
We have to show that
Derive('; t;A)] ! 9s Derive(' ^ t < s; s; A)]
After translation we get
' ! 9s(t < s ^A(s))! 9s(' ^ t < s! A(s))
Obviously this holds.
Let us summarise our steps. We started with a metalanguage HFP in which we represented
our logic LDS.
HFP is a proper metalanguage, it names and describes the object language.
Our next step was to take another object language, in our case predicate logic, (call it the
second object language) and connect it via translations  and ] to the rst object language LDS.
Data was translated directly via the  translation and Derive was basically translated as classical
implication \!".
The properties of Data and Derive are mirrored in the 2nd object language. In a sense the
2nd object language implements some meta properties of LDS as expressed in the metalanguage.
The reader should think, for example, of a debugger to a program. The debugger is another
object program which implements some metaproperties of the program (via interrupts). The
following diagrams and tables illustrate our ideas (See gs 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3):
We now proceed to express relevance logic in the object language of classical logic in the same
way we did for modal logic. Consider a rst order predicate logic with the monadic predicates
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Object Language LDS Metalanguage HFP
t : A Data(t; A)
LDS proof steps Properties of the Derive
meta predicate.
additional metaconditions Axioms written in HFP
yielding other logics
eg transitivity of the
accessibility relation.
Figure 8.1:
Object Language LDS 2nd Object Language
Predicate Logic
t : A A(t)
LDS Proof steps Predicate logic proof steps
Additional meta conditions Additional formulas of
on the logic predicate logic or restrictions
on the proof steps of predicate
logic. It is quite possible
that the LDS conditions cannot
be expressed in predicate logic,
in which case our capabilities
are limited
Figure 8.2:
LDS vs Predicate Logic Program vs Debugger
Properties to be studied: Properties to be studied:
Data and Derive contents of global variables registers
Means are the translations Means are the interrupts
 and ]
Exact meaning of what we see Exact meaning to be expressed
can be expressed in HFP in a proper metalanguage which
can express the program semantics.
Figure 8.3:
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of the form A(x), the predicate atom(x) and the binary function \
". We allow for a nite set
of constants Cm = fc0 = ?; c1; : : : cmg, and equality \=". Let A(x; y1; : : : ; yn) be a formula of
predicate logic with x; yi free.
Let 8; 9 be the quantiers dened as follows:
8xA(x) i (def) 8x(Vmi=1 x 6= yi ^ atom (x) ^ x 6= ?! A(x))
9xA(x) i (def) 9x(Vmi=1 x 6= yi ^ atom (x) ^ x 6= ? ^A(x)).
Notice that the meaning of 8; 9 is context dependent on the free variables of A.
It is intended that Cm represents the set of atomic lables and that more complex labels are
generated by the function symbol \
". If t1 : A and t2 : A ! B are labelled formulas then by
applying modus ponens we get the labelled formula (t2 
 t1) : B. This was represented informally
as t2t1 : B. \
" is a general binary operation and dierent axioms on 
 can give it properties of
dierent logics. Associativity of \
" seems to correspond to the logic CL of 9.2.5 and 10.3.9. For
the case of relevance logic the labels are sets of atomic labels. In this case the binary operation
\
" is set union on labels. Thus if t1 and t2 are labels so is t1 and t2. we continue to use \
"
rather than \[" because for a weaker logic than relevance \
" could mean other operations. We
need to use equality \=" as well, since we have function symbols.
We can now translate from any propositional resource logic (such as CL) into the monadic
predicate logic as follows:
With each atomic proposition A of the resource logic we associate a unary predicate A(t) of
classical logic. A(t) will represent \t : A". The intuitive reading of A(t) is that \A is labelled t".
The  translation can be extended to any w of relevance logic as follows:
[t : (A! B)] = 8x(A(x)! B(t
 x))
Recall that 8 ranges over atomic labels, and is context dependent.
We need axioms on 
 to give it the correct meaning (of union in the case of relevance logic and
just associativity in the case of CL).
Let L be a resource logic, eg CL. Let 'L be a classical logic formula representing the labelling
discipline of L. Such a formula must be shown to exist and be supplied by us. For example, 'CL
is:
8xyz(atom (x) ^ atom (y) ^ atom (z)! (x
 y)
 z = x
 (y 
 z)) ^ ^
8x(atom (x)! (x
? = ?
 x = x))
Let B be a formula of the resource logic L. Assume n is the number of all subformulas of B.
Then we have:
L ` B i in classical logic 'L ` B?.
For the case of relevance logic R, 'R also says that 
 is commutative and idempotent (ie 'R
gives all axioms true of set union).
Let us now try the left transitivity axiom of CL, namely
? : (B ! C)! ((A! B)! (A! C))
the  translation is
8x((B ! C)x ! ((A! B)! (A! C))?
x
= 8x(8y(B(y)! C(x
 y))! 8z((A! B)x ! (A! C)x
z))
= 8x(8y(B(y)! C(x





This sentence should follow from 'CL.
To prove the formula in classical logic from 'CL, we skolemise and get that the following
assumptions must entail the conclusion.
1. atom (x0)
2. 8y(B(y)! C(x0 
 y))
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3. atom (z0)








To prove this we substitute s0 in (4) and get from (4) and (6) B(z0 
 s0). We then substitute
(z0
s0) in (2) and get C(x0
(z0
s0)). 'CL ensures associativity and thus the desired conclusion
is obtained.
We now try to prove left transitivity, namely try to prove
? : (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
We translate in stages. The  translation is:
8x ((A! B)x ! ((B ! C)! (A! C))?
x)
= 8x[8y(A(y)! B(x





 u))! 8s(A(s)! C((x
 z)
 s))))
This sentence does not follow from 'CL. However, the sentence should be a theorem of classical
logic, given the boolean axioms on 
 as a set union, ie 'R proves this sentence.
The importance of the above translation into classical logic is twofold. First it allows us to have
as a metalanguage for LDS a very familiar and comfortable logic, namely classical logic. Second
it allows us to develop automated dedution capability for the new logics via existing automated
deduction machines and techniques in classical logic. We may have to modify existing machines
but in many cases this is worthwhile. Of course there will always be the need to do automated
deduction directly on the new logic and not through translation. The translation however adds
another dimension to our understanding of the new logics.
8.3 Linked predicate languages: classical logic as a meta-
language
So far we have discussed, to various degrees of detail, three seemingly independent families of
concepts:
 We discussed the proposed LDS discipline.
 We discussed at the beginning of this chapter the possibility of two languages L1 and L2
being linked in some way and through that link one can implement some meta-level features
of the other. This was shown to be a way of looking at LDS, namely that we are linking the
labels of the algebra with the formulas.
This linkage of A and L can be done for any two predicate systems within predicate logic.
 We also saw how an LDS system say (A;L) can be translated into two sorted classical logic,
with two sorts, one for the labels and one for formulas. We thus have t : A(x) is translated
into A(t; x). t is a term in A; A a w in L. The sort t is from the algebra and so has an
algebraic language for manipulating it. A is a predicate of two sorts.
There is a more general way of looking at what we are doing, which is quite independent of the
above particular examples. It has to do with linking two languages via the sharing of variables.
The task of this section is to develop this theme.
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We show how to prepare (separate, present) classical logic as a two sorted system so that it can
serve as a target for translation. For this we need to `link' predicate languages, which we denote
by G and L to emphasize the complete generality.
Obviously a lot depends on the mechanism of `linking'. We are going to clarify this notion
for the case of two predicate logic theories. This will suce for the handling of reduction of LDS
or temporal logic into classical logic. G acts as object level language implementing meta-level
restrictions on L.
Consider the rst order language G with a binary relation < and variables ft; s; : : :g. Think of
it as a theory of the ow of time. Consider the predicate language L, with variables fx1; x2; : : :g
and predicates A(x1; : : : ; xn), B(y1; : : : ; ym). The formal operation of what we have done was to
`combine' these two languages by replacing L by L, where L is a two sorted language, with
variables ft; s; : : :g and fx1; x2; : : :g and taking as atomic predicates the two sorted predicates
A(t; x1; : : : ; xn), B(s; y1; : : : ; yn), etc.
We allow for common quantication and mixed ws. Thus we can write for example the mixed
formula '(t)
'(t) = 8s(t < s! A(t; x1; : : : ; xn))
which you will recognize as the truth table for `GA(x1; : : : ; xn) holds at t'.
Formally ' is just a formula in the mixed language. Let us give a quick denition to clarify
our concepts before we continue our discussion.
Denition 8.3.1 (the two sorted language Lk(G)) Let L and G be the two languages. Both
L and G have atomic predicates. Let Lk be obtained from L by replacing each atomic predicate
R(x1; : : : ; xn) of L by R
(t1; : : : ; tk; x1; : : : xn) where ti are variables of a new sort. Thus the
resulting Lk is a two sorted language, with the new sort for t-variables. We allow quantication
over t-variables. The intention is that the t-variables will be from the language G.
1. The atomic ws of Lk(G) are of the form R
(t1; : : : ; tk; x1; : : : ; xn), where R(x1; : : : ; xn)
is an atomic w of L and t1; : : : tk are terms of G, or of the form Q(t1; : : : ; tm), where
Q(t1; : : : ; tm) is an atomic w of G.
2. If ' and  are ws of the language with t free in ' and x free in ' then ' ^  ;' _  ;' !
 ; '; 8t';8x';9t';9x' are ws of the language.
Example 8.3.2 1. Let G be the language of order < and let L be classical predicate logic.
L1(G) gives a language with atoms R
(t; x1; : : : xn), which we used in the previous example
to mean `R is true at t'.
2. The language G can be a meta-language. Consider a propositional language, e.g. the propo-
sitional language with :;^;_ and !. For each w A of the propositional language introduce
a constant A. Introduce the operations f(A) = A f^(A; B) = A^B and similarly
f_ and f!. Let G be the language with A as terms and ff; : : :g as functions. The lan-
guage L1(G) talks about the formulas of the propositional language as labels R
(A; x1; : : : xn)
represents A : R(x1; : : : xn), where A acts as a label.
The above linkage is still not the most general case. To get an idea of what we need, consider the
following set-up. Consider a distributed system of stations s1; s2; s3; : : : related in some manner.
Each station has its own internal structure and language L. Assume they all use the same language
and logic. We also need a global conguration language to describe how these stations are related.
This language denoted by G (for global) need not be the same logic as L. For example G can
be based on intuitionistic logic, while L is based on classical logic. L may be a Horn clause logic
programming language while G could be a form of Petri net langauge. The stations si need to
communicate, so they would have output and input ports which can be accessed by the other
stations. For simplicty assume that there are some variables x1; : : : ; xk which can be accessed by
the stations. This means that the language G can talk about xi.
If we want to link these two languages into one, we can form the syntactic combination Lk(G)
of the previous denition. The additional feature to worry about is that the logic of G and L
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may not be the same. Consider the following cases: (A(t; x) could mean `at station t mailbox x
is down', and B(t; x) can mean `at station t printer x is down'.)
1. A(t; x)! B(s; y).
2. A(t; x)! B(t; y).
3. A(t; x)! B(s; x).
4. A(t; x)! B(t; x).
In cases 2 and 4 we can say that this is an internal statement of station t and hence the
implication follows the logic of L. In case 3 we can use the logic of G as this is a relation between
stations.
What do we do in case 1?
The simplest course of action is to understand it as a relationship between stations and hence
use the logic of G. We thus have a simple rule. Any formula with dierent station constants in it is
to be manipulated logically according to G but if the constants are equal, it is to be manipulated
according to L. In fact once we agree to that, dierent stations can have dierent logics, Lt. They
must all be based on the same language.
We have one restriction on the system, that is the conguration logic must be sound with
respect to the station logics. In symbols,  `G A in the conguration logic implies  `L A in
the station logic. The reason for that is unication. We must be able to reason about two possibly
dierent stations in G and if we identify them our reasoning (now in L) must still be valid.
We now consider the Horn clause fragment of Lk(G). The modal and temporal logics of the
case studies used the language G with <, the linking of classical predicate logic with the theory
of order <. In fact, we were operating in the Horn clause fragment of L1(<). We should therefore
dene the Horn clause fragment of Lk(G) in general.
Denition 8.3.3 (The Horn clause fragment of Lk(G)) 1. Any atom of the form R
(t1; : : : ; tk; x1; : : : ; xn)
of Lk and Q(t1; : : : ; tm) of G is in the Horn clause fragment and in the generated body frag-
ment.
2. If A and B are in the Horn clause fragment or in the generated body fragment then so are
A ^B; 8xA;9xA;8tA; 9tA.
3. If A is in the generated body fragment and B is in the Horn clause fragment then A! B is
in the Horn clause fragment.
Example 8.3.4 1. If A(t; x); B(s; y) are atomic, then A0 = 8t9xA is in the atomic fragment
and C = A0 ! 9s8yB is in the Horn clause fragment. In classical logic, one can write C as:
9t8x9s8y(A! B)
because we can pull the quantiers to the front and hence the previous denition can be
simplied. In intuitionistic logic this is not possible and so we need clause 3 of the previous
denition and the notion of atomic fragment, in order not to be committed to classical logic.
2. Notice that for k = 1 and G the theory of order <, the Horn clause fragment of L1(<) gives
us the Horn fragment for temporal logic.
The above discussion about linking two languages L and G is a general discussion of how
a language G can be linked to a language L and `inuence it' by forming Lk(G). We gave no
particular meaning to this operation beyond the `meta-level' one. We did see that this linkage
did generalize the special construction of PC in the previous section. G corresponded to the time
order relation < and L corresponded to the predicate logic. The linkage formulated in Denition
8.3.1 allows for linking arbitrary G and L.
Can we give modal or temporal meaning to Lk(G) for arbitrary G and L?
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What would be the counterpart of TL for arbitrary G and L?
Obviously we must generalize the notion of a temporal connective based on time ordering < to
some general modal connective based on some language G.
We are now ready to dene a modal logic Modal(L;G) of L and G. To explain our options,
let us reconsider the basic temporal connectives F and P . The truth table for FA(x) is:
FA(x) is true at t i for some s > t;A(x) is true at s.
If A(x) is atomic, we translate it into A(t; x), understanding A(t; x) as `A(x) is true at t' and
thus we get:
FA(x) is true at t i 9s(t < s ^A(s; x))
or
(FA(x))t = 9s(t < s ^A(s; x)):
In L1(<); < is the atomic relation of the order. A
(t; x) is an atomic relation of L1. `F '
represents the existential quantier on the variable s in t < s ^ A(s; x) and it is denoted by `F '.
The existential quantier on t would be 9t(t < s ^A(t; x)) and that would correspond to `P '.
Let us generalize this situation to L1(G). Here the atoms A
(t; x) are still the same, but the
atoms of G could be any Q(t1; : : : ; tm). The parallel construction would be:
9ti(Q(t1; : : : ; ti; : : : ; tm) ^A(ti; x)):
We could introduce for each atom Q(t1; : : : ; tm) of G and each 1  i  m the existential
connective Q;iA(x) to mean
(Q;iA)t = (def) 9ti[Q(   ti   ) ^A(ti; x)]:
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Similarly we can dene Q;iA
(Q;iA)t = (def) 8ti[Q(   ti   )! A(ti; x)]:





Let us consider what Since(A;B) does in this context.
S(A;B) is true at t i 9s < t[A is true at s and 8y(s < y ^ y < t implies B is true at y)].
Let  S be the following formula in a language with < and the two new monadic predicates Q1
and Q2:
 S(t;Q1; Q2) = (def) 9s < t[Q1(s) ^ 8y(s < y ^ y < t! Q2(y))]:
Then we have S(A;B) is true at t i  S(t; A
; B), where A; B are considered monadic
predicates in the G sort.
To generalize the above, let G+1 be the extension of the language of G with new monadic
predicates fQ1; Q2; : : :g. Let  (t;Q1; : : : ; Qn) be a formula of G+1 with 1 free variable t and the n
new monadic predicates. Let A1; : : : ; A

n be n formulas of L

1, which can be considered monadic in
the sort t. We can introduce the n place connective ](A1; : : : ; An) with the truth table
](A1; : : : ; An) true at t i  (t; A

1; : : : ; A

n).
We will now give the general denition and an example.
Denition 8.3.5 Let G, L be two languages. We construct the modal language Modalm(L;G)
as follows:
1. Let G+m be the language G supplemented with an innite sequence of new m place atomic
predicates fR1; R2; : : :g.
2. Let Lm(G) be the language obtained from L as in Denition 8.3.1. We can regard each
atomic formula A(t1; : : : ; tm; x1; : : : ; xn) as m-place atomic in the variables t1; : : : ; tm.
3. Let G be any model ofG. We regard G as a model of possible worlds. With each t1; : : : ; tm 2 G,
associate a model L(t1;:::;tm) of L. Assume all the L(t1;:::;tm) models have the same domain D
(constant domain semantics). We refer to (G;L(t1;:::;tm)) as a modal model.
4. For each w  (t1; : : : ; tm; R1; : : : ; Rn) of G
+
m with ti free and Ri new atomic predicates,
associate a n place connective ] . The full modal language Modalm(L;G) is L [ f] j  2
G+mg.
Denition 8.3.6 Given a modal model (G;L(t1;:::;tm)) and an assignment h of L into D, a model
Gh of G+m is induced on G as follows.
Let A(t1; : : : ; tm; x1; : : : ; xn) be an atom of Lk. It can be viewed, for x1; : : : ; xn xed, as an
atomic predicate of G+m. Let the extension of this predicate in G be f(t1; : : : ; tm) j L(t1;:::;tm) 
A(h(x1); : : : ; h(xn))g.
We dene the notion of a formula A(x1; : : : ; xn) of Modalm(L;G) holding at the indices
(t1; : : : ; tm), notation kAkht1;:::;tm = 1, as follows:
1. kAkh(t1;:::;tm) = 1 i (def) Lt1;:::;tm  A(h(x1); : : : ; h(xn)):
kAkht1;:::;tm = 0 otherwise.
2. kA ^Bkh = 1 i kAkh = kBkh = 1.
3. k  Akh = 1 i kAk = 0.
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4. k9xA(x)kh = 1 i for some d 2 D, and h1, such that h1(x) = d and h1 agrees with h on all
other variables we have kA(x)kh1 = 1.
5. k] (A1; : : : ; An)kht1;:::;tn = 1 i G+m   (t1; : : : ; tm; Q1; : : : ; Qn)
where G+m is the extension of G to a model of the language G+m by the assignment
Qi = f(t1; : : : ; tm) j kAkht1;:::;tm = 1g.
6. Let K be a class of G models (G; (s1; : : : ; sm)) with a distinguised seqeunce of si 2 G. Let
' be a formula of Modalm(L;G). We say K  ' i for all models (G;L(t1;:::;tm)) and all
h; kAkhs1;:::;sm = 1.
Example 8.3.7 To show the generality of the previous denition, we give an example from re-
source logics. Let G be a commutative semigroup with multiplication  and a unit e. That is, we
have the axioms:
1. 8xyz((x  y)  z = x  (y  z)).
2. 8xy(x  y = y  x).
3. 8x(e  x = x).
Let L be classical propositional logic. Consider the formulas  (t;Q1; Q2) and '(t; Q1; Q2) where:
 (t;Q1; Q2) = def 8y[Q1(y)! Q2(t  y)]
'(t;Q1; Q2) = def 9xy[Q1(x) ^Q2(y) ^ t = (x  y)]:
Then the logic with the connectives ] (A;B) and ]'(A;B) is linear logic with linear implication
and external conjunction.
] (A;B) = A( B
]'(A;B) = A
B:
The semantics induced on these connectives by the general denition can be directly dened as
follows.
The set of possible worlds is a semigroup G. The propositional assignment h gives a truth value
to every atom at a point i.e. h(t; q) 2 f0; 1g for t 2 G, q atomic. The truth conditions for ( and

 are as follows:
kA( Bkht = 1 i 8y(kAkhy = 1 implies kBkhty = 1)
kA
Bkht = 1 i for some x; y we have kAkhx = 1 and kBkhy = 1 and t = x  y.
We have  A i for all G and all h; kAkh1 = 1.
8.4 The meta-language HFP: computational classical logic
The previous two sections studied rst the possiblity of classical logic serving as a meta-language,
and second the general mechanism of linking two languages G and L, so that the linkage can
implement meta-language features of the modal system based on G. In both cases our examples
used classical logic for L. Since dierent languages G seem to serve as the object language which
implements the meta features involved turning classical logic L into dierent new logics L1(G),
we ask ourselves, is there a convenient general purpose language M which is specially suited for
expressing meta language features, and which will contain all the L1(G)?
The answer is yes. The language we have in mind is the language HFP.1
The relevance of the existence of HFP to the Debate is as follows. We claim that classical logic
or its variants are universal languages at least from the point of view of automated deduction. So
1In fact, the Logic Programming Community, when working in extensions of logic programming, are actually
working in HFP, more specically in Horn clause HFP which, you will be surprised to learn, is essentially Micro-
prolog. Unfortunately, no one uses Micro-prolog anymore.
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given for example an arbitrary logicN we can translate it into Lk(G), for some suitableG (usually
obtained from the semantics or equivalent LDS proof theory of N), an appropriate dimension k
and classical logic L. This method suers from some disadvantages. The target system is many
sorted and may be computationally inconvenient. We also get for dierent N1;N2; : : : dierent
target many sorted languages Lk(i)(Gi); i = 1; 2; : : :. We would like one very nice language which
is convenient and can serve any logic N. We propose the language HFP and we will show at the
end of this section how any logic N and any Lk(G) can be nicely translated into HFP.
We begin by describing the intuition behind the language HFP. Consider rst propositional
temporal logic, formalized in the usual way, via the addition of extra connectives to classical
propositional logic. Assume the connectives are FA and PA, `A will be true' and `A was true'
respectively.
In symbols:
kFAkt = 1 i 9s > t kAks = 1
kPAkt = 1i 9s < t kAks = 1:
Suppose we want to choose the rst moment s0 such that s0 > t and kAks0 = 1, assume such
a moment exists. This moment is a function of t and A. Let us denote it by s0 = f
1
1 (A; t). Here
f11 is a two place function, taking a formula and a point and yielding a point.
Consider now the connective F itself, this connectives takes a formula A yields a formula FA,
thus its function is R10(A).
The functionality of f11 and R
1
0 can be described set theoretically. If X is the set of all points
in which A is true, we get
f11 (X; t) = min (X \ fs j s > tg)
R10(X) = fs j 9t 2 X(s < t)g:
In general we can have general connectives and functions of the form fmn ; R
m
n , takingm formulas
and n points and yielding a point or a formula respectively.
To give another example, consider the connective S(A;B). Its meaning is that since a point
in the past where A was true, B has been true all the time. We can now form a new connective
Sxy (A;B) reading since a point t in the past which is dierent from x in which A is true, B has
been continuously true at all points since which are greater than y. This connective has the form
S(A;B; x; y).
The language HFP is a general language in which tables and connectives can be described. It
allows for predicates Rmn and function symbols f
m
n to take both formulas and terms as arguments.
The use of HFP is not restricted to the meta-level of modal and temporal languages. It is also
the meta-language of actual prolog programs. Although ocially logic programming deals with
the Horn clause fragment of classical logic (possibly with negation by failure), namely with clauses
of the form ^
Ai ! B
where Ai and B are atoms, in practice the prolog programmer uses HFP as the language.
(Negation by failure can be incorporated using a meta-level failure predicate).
Expressions like Hold(A;B), Demo(A(x); B(y)) are written in prolog. The above are expres-
sions ofHFP. It may be thought that Demo and Hold are metapredicates. This is partially correct.
They have special properites. The variables x and y in Demo(A(x); B(y)) can be quantied and
unied. Thus Demo is not like the general metapredicates of a pure meta-language M but rather
special and we claim it is like in HFP. (We shall see later in this section how to quantify on
seemingly object level variables occurring in a meta-level predicate.)
We see in Deniton 8.4.3 below thatHFP is given modal semantics. So the question is whether
this semantics is adequate for the way prolog uses the language. We will be in a better position
to answer in the next section. The answer in general is no, prolog predicates are not in general
modal connectives, but under certain restrictions they can be viewed as such though this is not
the most convenient way of looking at them.
We are now ready to dene the general meta-language HFP, of Hereditarily Finite Predicates.
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Denition 8.4.1 (The Language HFP) The language contains the classical connectives ;^;_;!
and the variables fx; y; z; : : :g for terms and variables fX;Y; Z; : : :g for formulas, and the quantiers
8 and 9. There is a list of atomic predicates Rmn allowing us to form Rmn ( 1; : : : ;  m; x1; : : : ; xn),
where  i are formula variables or formulas and xj are term variables or terms . There are function
symbols fmn allowing us to form f
m
n ( 1; : : : ;  m; x1; : : : xn), where  i are formula variables and xj
are term variables. We dene now the notions of a w and a term of the language HFP.
1. > is a formula with no free variables.
2. x is a term with x free. Y is a formula with Y free.
3. If  i(x
i
1; : : : x
i
k(i)); i = 1; : : : ;m, are formulas with free variables
fxi1; : : : ; xik(i)g and Fj(x1; : : : ; xr(j)); j = 1; : : : ; n, are terms with fxj1; : : : ; xjr(j)g as free vari-
ables and Rmn is a predicate symbol with (m;n) places and f
m
n is a function symbol with (m;n)
places then:





1; : : : ;m; j = 1; : : : ; k(i); t = 1; : : : ; n; s = 1; : : : ; r(t)g.
(b) fmn ( 1; : : : ;  m; F1; : : : ; Fn) is a term with the same free variables as in (a).
The free variables mentioned can be either term or formula variables.
4. If  1;  2 are ws, then so are   1;  1 ^  2;  1 !  2;  1 _  2:   1 has the same free
variables as  1, and  1 ^  2;  2 _  2 and  1 !  2 have a set of free variables which is the
union of the sets of free variables of  1 and  2.
5. If  (x; yi) is a formula with free variables fx; yig being either term or formula variables then
8x ;9x are formulas with the free variables fyig.
Example 8.4.2 (Hold predicate) To give some examples consider the Hold predicate. This
has the form Hold ( ; t) = ` is true at time t'.
We can now write Hold(Hold( ; t); s)
`At time s it was true that  was true at t';
compare this sentence with Thought(Thought( ; 0); 5)
`At time 5 people thought that at time 0 it was thought that  was true';
consider Thought-F( ; t) which reads:
`At time t;  was considered true in the future'.
Thus we can write a rule: If at any time you expect to get a budget for a Research Assistant, then
hire one. (It may be that you never get the budget!).
8t[Thought-F(budget, t) ! Hire(t)].
We now dene several types of models for this language.
Denition 8.4.3 (modal semantics) Let D be a nonempty set. A function h is an assignment
for HFP i the following holds:
1. If x is an individual term variable then h(x) 2 D. If x is a formula variable then h(x)  D.
2. If Rmn is a predicate symbol then h(R
m
n ) is a function with domain (2
D)m  Dn and range
2D.
3. If fmn is a function symbol then h(f
m
n ) is a function with domain (2
D)m Dn and range D.
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4. Given a formula  (x1; : : : ; xn) with free variables x1; : : : xn and a term F (x1; : : : ; xn) with
free variables x1; : : : ; xn we dene the value h
(F ) 2 D and h( )  D as follows:
(a) h(x) = h(x).
(b) h(>) = D.
(c) h(Rmn )( 1; : : : ;  m; F1; : : : ; Fn) =
h(Rmn )(h
( 1); : : : ; h( m); h(F1); : : : ; h(Fn)):
(d) h(fmn ( 1; : : : ;  m); F1; : : : ; Fn) =
h(fmn )(h
( 1); : : : ; h( m); h(F1); : : : ; h(Fn)).
(e) h( ') = D   h(')
h(' ^  ) = h(') \ h( ).
(f) h(8x (x)) = Td2D hx=d( (x))
where hx=d is the function which diers from h only by having hx=d(x) = d
i.e.
hx=d(y) = h(y) for y 6= x
hx=d(y) = d for y = x.
Similarly
h(9x (x)) = Sd2D hx=d( (x)).
5. (a) A model is a domain and an assignment, (D;h).
(b) A formula  holds in a model if h( ) = D.
(c) A formula  is valid if it holds in all models.
Example 8.4.4 1. Consider classical propositional temporal logic. We can associate with any
atomic proposition q a 0-place predicate Q of HFP. The domain D is time and assume an
order < on D. Q is a (0; 0) predicate. Let F be the (1; 0) predicate F(Q). Let h<(F)(Y ), for
Y  D be the set Y + = fs j 9y 2 Y s < yg. Then if h<(Q) is the set where q is true then
h<(FQ) is the set of points where Fq is true.
2. Consider the example in (a) above and consider the connective (predicate) F(Q; x). F is a
(1; 1) predicate. It corresponds in the propositional temporal logic to a labelled connective
F xq. We may have for example F xq true at t i t < x and q true at x. In HFP the
assignment would be:
h<(F)(Y; x) = ft j t < x and x 2 Y g:
3. Notice that the Hold predicate of Example 8.4.2 should be of type Hold10, i.e. Hold(A) if
the modal semantics associates a set with it. Thus Hold(A)  A, i.e. h(Hold)  identity.
The above discussion gave to HFP modal semantics. This semantics is adequate for describing
the modal and temporal applications of HFP, as it talks about truth conditions of connectives.
However, it does not seem satisfactory in explaining the way HFP predicates are used in practical
prolog programs. Whenever we write in prolog a clause of the form
Hold(Demo(A(x); B(y)) ^A(z))! B(z):
We are usingHFP expressions involving predicates of predicates. Sometimes we even write clauses
of the form
X ! P (X)
which play an important role in metaprogramming.
For example the clause
Hold(') if '
may look more familiar to the reader.
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The logical status of these phrases and their semantics have to be explained. The main charac-
teristic feature of such use is that the variables in the clauses can unify and change value. Thus it
is not immediately obvious whether one can say that in the expression '(A(x); x); A(x) is a name
of a formula. If A(x) represents the w A(x) (i.e. what we really have is '(`A(x)', x), then the `x'
in A(x) cannot change or unify, certainly not in uniformity with the other x. In practice of course
when `x' is unied to be `a', we get '(A(a); a) and not '(`A(x)'; a).)
We thus need to explain the above for the case of HFP, because like in prolog, HFP allows
for x to be free in '(A(x); x) in both places.
Notice that in the modal semantics the above are interpreted as connectives. So for example
'(B; y) can be interpreted as the connective saying: B will always be true but not later than time
y, and A(x) can be interpreted as saying: Time x is in the future (of now). Together we form
'(A(x); x) to mean: Time x will always be in the future but not later than time x, which is really
a temporal tautology.
We now proceed to give the meta-level semantics for HFP, as opposed to the modal semantics.
Our strategy is to begin with ordinary predicate logic, describe a meta-language M for it and
identify HFP as part of the meta-level description of predicate logic in M.
Denition 8.4.5 (Term translation) Let L be predicate logic with predicate symbols fPi; i =
1; 2; 3; : : :g which are ni place; variables fxi; yi; : : :g and constants fai; bi; : : :g. The language L
may contain the classical connectives and in general a stock of m-place connectives of the general
form ](A1; : : : ; Am). We refer to L as the object language. A language M is said to be a meta-
language for L if it is capable of naming the symbols of L and contains the following representing
terms (this translation is referred to as term translation):
1. For each symbol of L there exists a possibly unique name which is a term of M. The naming
function is denoted by quotation marks.
 variables xi are named `xi'
 constants ai are named `ai'
 predicate symbols Pi are named `Pi'.
2. For each Pi, which is ni place predicate, there exists a function fi of the meta-language M,
satisfying the following:
fi(`Pi',`t1', : : :, `tni ') = `Pi(t1; : : : tni)'.
In fact, we can take the above as a denition of the name of
Pi(t1; : : : ; tni).
3. There exist functions f^; f_; f!; f; f8 and f9 and f] for each m-place connective, satisfying
equations as follows:
 f^ ( `A', `B' ) = `A ^B'
 f_ ( `A', `B' ) = `A _B'
 f! ( `A', `B' ) = `A! B'
 f (`A') = ` A'
 f8 (`A', `x') = `8xA(x)'
 f9(`A', `x') = `9xA(x)'
 f] (`A1', : : : , `Am') = `](A1; : : : ; Am)'.
4. There are functions Sub, s and n satisfying the following, for terms t:
n(t) = `t'
s(`t') = t
Sub (`A(x)', `x', n(t)) = `A(t)'
where t is any term and `t' is its name.
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Note that Sub is a substitution function. We can assume that f]; fi; f^; f_, f, f9 and f8 are
actual function symbols of M and thus actually dene the terms which name the formulas. Sub
cannot be assumed as a function symbol because then a formula might have several names. In
general meta-level language with functions representing substitution, the names will not be unique.
Several function symbols including the substitution function symbol can combine to yield names
for a formula in several dierent ways. If we choose a unique name via our formula construction
functions as we did, the substitution function may not be representable.
So we have to assume that Sub is somehow denable in M. An alternative is to take Sub as
a function symbol and add axioms to M to make things right.
Lemma 8.4.6 Let '(x1; : : : ; xn) be a formula, then there exists a term
f'(x1; : : : ;xn) of M with free variables x1; : : : ;xn (ranging over names) such that
f' (`a1', : : :, `an') = `'(a1; : : : ; an)'.
Proof. By induction on the structure of '. For atomic ' = Pi(x1; : : : xni), we have
f' = (def) fi(`Pi';x1; : : : ;xni):
If there exist terms fA and fB for A and B then fA]B = f](fA; fB) for ] standing for ^;_;! and
similarly for  and for a general m-place ].
Let ' = 8x (x). Let f be given. Then f' = f8(f ; `x'). Similarly for ' = 9x (x). 
Denition 8.4.7 (meta-level semantics) Let M be a model of M. Let Hold be a unary pred-
icate of M. We can derive from M and Hold a model A of L by dening
A  P (a1; : : : ; an) i (def) M  Hold(`P (a1; : : : ; an)'):
We called Hold a Hold predicate because we expect that for any
'(a1; : : : ; an) we have:
A  '(a1; : : : ; an) i M  Hold(`'(a1; : : : ; an)'):
This will not be the case unless we require axiomatically in M that Hold satises some axioms
for example:
Hold(`A') ^Hold(`B')$ Hold(f^(`A'; `B'))
and similarly for the other connectives and quantiers.
Note the quantier axioms are:
8xHold(f'(x)(x))$ Hold(f8x'(x))
9xHold(f'(x)(x))$ Hold(f9x'(x)):
Remark 8.4.8 Note that if we have Sub then we can dene the diagonal function by:
Diag (`A(x), `x') = def Sub (`A(x)', `x', f (`A(x)')).
Recall that using the Diag function one can prove Tarski's inconsistency theorem, that there
exists no truth predicate for M in M. Thus we cannot have a Hold predicate satisfying the axiom
Hold (`A') $ A
and allow Diag to apply to Hold as well, because these conditions yield Tarski's inconsistency
theorem. We need not worry however about this aspect. First, our aim is to provide semantics for
HFP and prolog practice in order to do our `computational classical logic', rather than construct
self reective languages which have their own truth predicates. So we do not mind to have the Hold
predicate not to apply to itself. See the Perlis papers [Perlis, 1985, Perlis, 1988] for a good coverage
of the subject. Second, in the Horn clause fragment of HFP negation is not available and it is
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possible to have a truth predicate in the object level for the object language itself, without leading to
contradiction. The worst we can get are loops, if we use negation as failure. We cannot diagonalize
with A(`:A'), with : being negation as failure because its meaning is procedural. Even when it is
given a declarative semantics, say sem(A), we will get the formula A( sem(`A')) which is not a
direct diagonalization. More directly we can dene a fail connective via a program , then we can
only have fail as a connective and we get A(`failA') for the diagonal function. In this case we
get stratication of fail and we do not have a universal object level diagonalization.
We shall not pursue this topic any further, and will continue with the business at hand.
We are now in a position to explain what a formula of HFP stands for. We refer to the
interpretation presented in the sequel as the term interpretation forHFP. Compare with Denition
8.4.5. The object language L of that denition is HFP and the meta-languageM of the denition
is classical logic. Note that since HFP extends classical logic we can say we are translating it into
itself.
Suppose we name each letter x; Pi; a by itself. This can technically mean that we identify L as
part of M. Thus Pi; xi and ai are already terms of M. We let `ai'= ai, `Pi' = Pi and `x' = x in
M, for these particular symbols. We can dene predicates Pred(t), Term(t), Var(t), w(t) and
Free of M with the axioms:
 Term (ai); i = 1; : : :
 Var (xi); i = 1; : : :
 Pred (Pi); : : :
 w (fi(Pi; a1; : : : ; ani)
 w (fi(Pi; x1; : : : ; xni))
 w (fi(Pi; 1; : : : ; ni), where i are metalinguistic variables representing a choice of either
a variable x or a term a of L. So for each such choice we get an axiom of M.
 Free (fi(Pi; 1; : : : ; xj ; : : : ; ni); xj)
 w (A) ^w(B)! w(f](A;B))
 w (A) ^ Free(A; x)! Free(f](A;y); x)
where y is a metavariable and ] is one of ^;_;!;.
 w (A) ^ Free(A; x)! w(f8(A; x))
 w(A) ^ Free(A; x)! w(f9(A; x))
 w(A) ^ Free(A;y) ^ x 6= y! Free(f8(A; x));y)
where y is a metavariable, i.e. a variable of M.
Having named formulas by themselves we can essentially regard the functions fi(Pi; x1; : : : xni); f^; f!
etc. to be the connectives themselves, taken as functions. So f'(`x1'; : : : `xn') will be `'(x1; : : : ; xn)'
which is '(x1; : : : ; xn).
If we consider f'(x1; : : : ;xn) with xi metavariables ranging over names, then in the convention
of expressions of L naming themselves we get that it is equal to
'(x1; : : : ;xn):
Thus we can unify and change xi since they are metavariables.
Consider '(x;y). This is really a term of M. We can certainly substitute in it the term A(y).
We thus get '(A(y);y) which is an expression of HFP. It really stands for the term f'(fA(y);y)
of the meta-language.
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Satisfaction in a model A of '(A(y);y) means according to the meta-level semantics the sat-
isfaction in a model M of:
Hold(f'(fA(y);y)):
Since the meta-language is classical logic, the above term will look more familiar if we write it
as f1(f2(y); y)), using two unary Skolem functions, f1 = f' and f2 = fA. Clearly in classical logic we
can have unary predicates such as Q(x). We can consider the formulas Q(f2(y)) and Q(f1(f2(y); y)).
These are two non-equivalent formulas of classical logic. In an arbitrary model, one formula may
be true while the other may be false, unless we have the equality axiom f2(y) = f1(f2(y); y).
We need one more denition to clarify our meta-level concepts. Let Q be a classical unary pred-
icate and let g(x1; : : : ; xn) be an n-place function. LetM be a model of classical logic with domain
D. Dene the Q denotation of g in M to be f(d1; : : : ; dn) j di 2 D and M  Q(g(d1; : : : ; dn)g.
For the case where Q = Hold, and f2; f2 are as above we can examine more closely the connec-
tion between the satisfaction of A(d) and '(A(d); d). The model A has as its domain D terms of
the meta-language M which are names of ws of L. A(d) holds in A i Hold(A(d)) holds in M.
The set fd 2 D j M  Hold(A(d))g is the denotation of `A' (i.e. of fA) and is a subset of the
domain D. The denotation of `'' (i.e. f') is similarly a subset ofDD. For d0 2 D; fA(d0) = A(d0)
`A(d0)' is a term in D. A  A(`A(d0)') may or may not hold, i.e.M  Hold(A(A(d0))) may or may
not hold. There is no connection in general between the denotation of `A' and the term `A(d0)'.
We do not necessarily have fA(d0) 2 fd 2 D j M  Hold(fA(d))g.
Thus in the model M and consequently in A the predicate `A' has three `manifestations' or
`footprints', one as fd 2 D j M  Hold(A(d))g one as a function symbol fA and one as a term `A' in
D (i.e. the name of fA). Hold (`A') also has a value inM, so doesHold(`A( `A')') etc. These values
are all independent. An HFP axiom of the form X ! B(X) for X formula variable can be taken
to mean inM the axiomHold (X)! Hold(B(X)), which is a connection axiom of theHold inM.
For example the axiom
Hold(A(y))! Hold(A(A(y))), means Hold(fA(y))! Hold(fA(fA(y))).
We can inM read `A' as representing the set fy j A ` A(y)g. Terms of the form f'(`A';y) can be
written in the meta-language and we can understand them in the object language as '(xA(x); y).
Example 8.4.9 The modal and temporal semantics provides us with examples of the above situ-
ation. A formula may be true at points of the interval t = [1; 2] of time but whether it is true at
the interval itself is another matter. For example, it is not true that one crossed the Atlantic at
any moment at the interval [1; 2] but one may crossed the Atlantic at [1; 2]. Connections between
values at intervals and values at points are usually given as persistence criteria. For example, the
criterion if ' holds at an interval it holds at all subintervals, can be expressed using our language,
through axioms like:
'(`A'; y)! 8x  y '(`A'; y)
or
8x(A(x)! B(x))! ['(`B'; y)! '(`A'; y)]
where `A' is the name of the predicate `cross the Atlantic' and `B' is the name of `sail a boat' and
' is some metapredicate, for example ' =Hold.
The above freedom we still have with terms allows us to extend the expressive power of HFP.
First let us take any binary atomic predicate of HFP, let us call it P (X;Y ) where X and Y are
formula variables.
Form the formulas
P 2(A1; A2) = (def) P (A1; A2)
Pn+1(A1; : : : ; An+1) = (def) P (P
n(A1; : : : ; An); An+1):
In the languageM, there are no axioms connectingHold(P (X;Y )) withHold(P (P (X;Y ); Z))
and so in M, Hold(Pn(X1; : : : ; Xn)) has no connection with Hold(Pm(X1; : : : ; Xm)) for m 6= n.
However, this trick allows us to regard `P ' as a sequence predicate (i.e. without a xed number of
places) with P (X1; : : : ; Xn) holding in A, i Hold(Pn(X1; : : : ; Xn)) holds in M.
We can thus write our predicate as a set of sequences (P;X1; : : : ; Xn), where n is arbitrary.
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We can similarly treat function symbols f and write (f; x1; : : : ; xn). If we do the above for any
pure formula predicate of the language HFP, we can identify the following Lisp-like fragment of
HFP.
Denition 8.4.10 (the sublanguage HFPLisp) The sublanguage contains formula variables X1; X2; : : :,
term variables and Lisp-predicate letters P1; P2; P3; : : :.
The general notion of a w of HFPLisp, with free variables is dened in the same way as in
the case of Denition 8.4.1 of HFP, except that we replace the formation rule for atoms 8.4.1(3)
by the following formation rule (3Lisp): If n is arbitrary and '1; : : : ; 'n are formulas, or predicate
letters or formula variables and P is a predicate letter then (P;'1; : : : ; 'n) is a formula. We allow
the case n = 0 in which case (P ) is a formula.
The reader should note the translation  from HFPLisp into HFP. Each P of HFPLisp is
read in HFP as a binary predicate.
(P ) = P (truth; truth)
(P;') = P (truth; ')
and
(P;'1; : : : ; 'n)
 = Pn('1; : : : ; '

n):
HFP can be translated into a fragment of HFPLisp, via the translation ]:
P ('1; : : : ; 'n)
] = (P;']1; : : : ; '
]
n):
We are now interested in dening the Horn-clause fragment of HFP and of HFPLisp.
Denition 8.4.11 (Horn Clause fragment of HFP) We follow closely the dening clauses of
8.4.1 and of 8.4.10. Read `w' as `w in the the Horn fragment':
1. Same as in 8.4.1
2. Same as in 8.4.1
3. or 3Lisp. Same as in 8.4.1 and 8.4.10 with the restriction that the formulas involved (i.e.
'1; : : : ; 'n;  1; : : : ;  m; F1; : : : ; Fn) are all taken from the Horn fragment.
4. 1. If  1 and  2 are in the Horn fragment, so is  1 ^  2.
2. If  i; ' are atomic i.e. the result of applying clause (3) or (3Lisp) respectively,
then ^ i ! ' is in the Horn fragment.
5. Same as in 8.4.1 and 8.4.10
The next question to ask is:
Do we have an implementation of the Horn fragment?
The answer is surprisingly yes, we do have in fact an old implementation, as the next remark
shows.
Remark 8.4.12 The reader is referred to K. Clark and F. McCabe's book [Clark and McCabe, 1984]
on Micro-prolog. Chapter 9 describes exactly the Micro-prolog system language which is the
Horn clause fragment of HFPLisp. Thus there exists implementations of the Horn clause frag-
ment of this language. Micro-prolog on the IBM PC gives access to this language. Later versions
of LPA-prolog concentrated on supporting Edinburgh syntax and therefore the original Micro-
prolog syntax has been suppressed in these later versions. Another implementation for the full
HFP is essentially the rewrite language PLL of E. Babb [Babb, 1990].
The discussion of the section so far showed that if we name in M elements of HFP by them-
selves, we get that all formulas of HFP are terms inM. The term functions fi; f^; f_; f!; f8; f; f9,
and Sub of Denition 8.4.5 all become familiar operations:
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1. The naming function x`x' is the identity.
2. fi(Pi; t1; : : : ; tni) = Pi(t1; : : : ; tn)
Thus fi is the Pi application function.
3. f^ is conjunction ^
f_ is disjunction _
f! is implication !
f is negation 
f8 is universal quantication
f9 is existential quantication.
4. Sub is the substitution function
s, n are the identity function
f' for a formula ' becomes an application function for ' (just like fi is for Pi).
The above functions however are functions inM and can therefore take any term ofM. Assume
P and Q are two unary predicates of L. Their names in M are also `P ' and `Q'. Given a term a
of L its name is also `a'. The application functions fP and fQ of M allow us to form:
fP (`P '; `a')
and we are assured that:
fP (`P '; `a') = `P (a)' = P (a) = fP (P; a):
We can, however, formally obtain the following terms of M.
1. fP (`Q'; `a').
2. fP (`P '; `Q').
We have no axioms in M to tell us what the above should mean. The Hold predicate of M
would be true or false of the above terms without any restrictions. We do have axioms on Hold
to assure us that e.g.
Hold(`P (a)' ^ `Q(a)')$ Hold(`P (a)') ^Hold(`Q(a)')
but nothing more, except for some general properties of Hold.
To extend our semantic meaning to terms of the form (1) and (2) above, we can rst say
that fP ; fQ should be the same, namely Application Functions. We can thus replace the ni place
function fi by Appi and get
Appni(`Pi'; t1; : : : ; tni) = `Pi(t1; : : : ; tni)'.
Thus all we need are the functions App1;App2; : : :. So both fQ and fP are App1. This view
allows us to `compare' with general -abstraction languages.
Furthermore, one can code App3(x; y; z) as App2(App2(x; y); z) and thus all one needs is a
binary App function. Further, there is no reason why we cannot take application to be concate-
nation. Thus fi can be read as concatenation function. This also allows us to regard all predicates
as unary predicates. R(x; y) is understood either as R(x)(y) or as R((x; y)). Probably the former
is more convenient.
The above syntactical moves do not necessarily involve new semantical commitments. They
can be handled as just a matter of notation. We are still left with the problem of the semantical
meaning of P (Q) or P (P ). If we understand Q to name the set fx j Q(x)g, then we can understand
P (Q) as expressing a property of this set. We can now express persistence conditions like
P (Q)! 8x(Q(x)! P (x)):
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In general, P (Q) is independent of P (ti), for ti such that Q(ti) holds. We can see however,
that we are touching on the problem of -calculus models.
We can still go on and ask what is the meaning of App(`a', `Q'). This question has now more
than one option, since we have already agreed to read `Q' as a name for fx j Q(x)g. We can thus
read `a' as a higher predicate on sets Q. It is true of Q i it is an element of Q:
Hold(a(Q)) i Hold(Q(a)):
`a' can thus be identied with the set of all its properties. This is similar to the Montague
semantics.
It is now up to us whether to allow in HFP (say in an extension which we can call HFP+)
formulas of the form P (Q) or not. If we do, we can still use the functions of the meta-language M
but we would need a semantical interpretation, possibly some sort of -calculus model. We will
not pursue this line of research in this Chapter. prolog practice, which uses HFP formulas, does
not frequently write expressions like:
Demo (Demo, Demo).
Let  be an HFP theory. Formally extend  to a saturated theory 0. Thus whenever
0 ` 9xA(x) then for some terms t;0 ` A(t) and whenever 0 ` A _ B then either 0 ` A or
0 ` B. We can now dene Hold0(A) i A 2 0 and get a model for the Hold predicate of M
as applied to the ws of HFP regarded as M terms.
The term interpretation of HFP can be understood in another way, as notation for generating
predicates. To illustrate our view, consider conjunction. It can generate predicates by letting
[P ^ Q](x) mean P (x) ^ Q(x). This is done in the same way that [ A](x) is  A(x) and
[A](x) = A(x).
If we push this point of view further we can regard any formula '(x; y) of HFP as a functional
xy' which takes formulas A;B to form a new formula '(A;B). This view, although mathemat-
ically compatible with the term semantics, is not conceputally compatible with the intuitive way
we read prolog. For example, we read Demo(A;B) as B can succeed from A and regard Demo
(Demo, x) as meaningless.
Example 8.4.13 We can now show how an arbitrary LDS can be translated into the Horn clause
fragment of HFP. Assume the languages G and L of LDS are distinct. Consider a version of HFP
based on the union of the languages of G and L together with the additional predicate Label(x; y).
we translate  : A as Label(;A) and all axioms and rules are translated as is. For example
 : A;  : A) B
   : B
is translated as
Label( : A)^ Label (;A) B)! Label (  ;B).
8.5 How to give an LDS formulation for a logic
Previous sections discussed LDS formulations of various logics. To widely apply the LDS discipline
we must be able to give an LDS formulation to an arbitrary logic. It seems that many logics can
be naturally presented through their algebraic semantics. A typical example is many valued logics,
where the algebraic presentation is the most natural. Thus if we want to claim that a general
logic can be presented as an LDS in a nice way, we must investigate suitable methods of using the
algebraic semantics of a logic to turn it into an LDS. We are restricting ourselves to propositional
algebraic semantics for two reasons. First because almost all known and useful non-classical logics
use the usual quantiers 8 and 9 and dier in their propositional part. Second we nd it too
dicult and complex to handle general non-standard quantiers.
We begin by describing what we mean by algebraic semantics for a logic. We want a very
general denition that would equally apply to many systems, whether they are monotonic or non-
monotonic. There are many systems which have none of the classical connectives and which satisfy
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only some very restricted proof theory. There is no agreed standard denition of what is algebraic
logic or semantics. Our primary concern in this Chapter is translation into classical logic, so any
good denition will do. As it turns out our denitions are of independent interest. The new notion
of algebraic logics for general consequence relations will be studied in [Gabbay, 1992b].
Logics can be identied via a general consequence relation  j A. This consequence relation
will in general be non-monotonic. So we may not know, or have much to say about their conse-
quence relation. We need minimal conditions on j to enable us to dene a reasonable algebraic
semantics for the logics which will allow us to dene good translations into other logics.
Experience leads us to the following denition (which should be compared with more traditional
denitions).
Denition 8.5.1 Let L be a language with atomic propositions and connectives.
1. A unitary consequence relation is a relation j between nite (including empty ?) sets of ws




 j A;A j B
 j B :
Note that we do not require reexivity (; A j A) nor do we require any full version of cut
such as:
 j A;  ; A j B
 ; j B :
Also note that we need not have substitutivity of equivalents, namely A j B and B j A
need not imply '(A) j '(B), for arbitrary w '(q). Many modal systems fail to have this
property, as well as intuitionistic systems with Nelson's strong negation.
We call the consequence relation unitary because we allow for unitary cut, the `unit' being the
single A in the rule A j B; j A implies  j B. Also  being a set of single, unannotated
formulas which is unstructured, as opposed to  being a list of ws or a network of ws etc.
2. A Hilbert consequence relation is a relation dened only for ? j A. A singleton consequence
relation is a relation dened only for  j A, where  = fBg or  = ?.
3. Logical systems are usually formulated either as a Hilbert consequence, in which case we have
only the notion of ?jA but not AjB, or as a singleton or unitary consequence. When a
Hilbert j1 is given, there exists the smallest and biggest singleton j2 which agrees with it
(i.e. ?j1A i ?j2A, for all A). This will be proved later.
Many nonmonotonic logics do not satisfy transitivity and unitary cut. We need to weaken
these notions. Here is an example of a more general consequence relation in a language
with ! which satises the following rule in addition to identity but is not required to satisfy
unitary cut or transitivity:
A j B ! C
X j B
A j X ! C
:
Denition 8.5.2 1. A logic algebra is any algebra of the form a = (A; fi;
; T ), where A is a non-empty set (corresponding to the formulas of the logic) and fi; i =
1; : : : ; k, are functions on A, with arity ni (corresponding to the connectives of the logic) and
 is a reexive and transitive relation on A (corresponding to the converse of the consequence
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relation of the logic) and T  A; T 6= ? is a subset of distinguished elements (corresponding
to the theorems of the logic) satisfying:
() 8x; y 2 A [y 2 T and x  y implies x 2 T ]:
2. A subset F  A is a lter if F 6= ? and for all x; y (x 2 F and x  y implies y 2 F ).
3. A function f(x1; : : : ; xn) in a logic algebra is extensional i
xi  yi ^ yi  xi; i = 1; : : : ; n imply f(x1; : : : ; xn)  f(y1; : : : ; yn):
4. A function f(x1; : : : ; xn) in a logic algebra is directional if it is either monotonic up or down
in each of its variables.
5. An algebra is directional if all of its functions are directional.
Denition 8.5.3 1. A connective ](A1; : : : ; An) is extensional i the following holds:
xi j yi; yi j xi; i = 1 : : : n
](x1; : : : ; xn) j ](y1; : : : ; yn)
:
2. A connective ](A1; : : : ; An) is directional in A1 i either
(a) Upward monotonicity
p j q




](q;A2 : : :) j ](p;A2 : : :)
:
3. A logic is extensional (directional) i all of its connectives are extensional (directional, resp.)
in all their variables.
Example 8.5.4 1. Intuitionistic logic is directional. A ! B is directional up in B and down
in A. So are all known substructural implications such as relevant, linear and Lambek impli-
cations.
2. Extensionality allows us to give neighbourhood semantics for the logic or to give it a Lindebaum{
Tarski algebraic semantics. In the case of a language with one modal operator , and the
classical propositional connectives :;^;_ and !, extensionality of  means we can give 
the usual neighbourhood semantics. Both  and  are monotonic upwards but satisfy dierent
algebraic conditions.
3. Let ](x) be a connective and suppose it is both directional up and down in x. Then essentially
](x) does not depend on x.
To see this, assume we have either truth > or falsity ? in the language. Then for any x we
have
? j x j >:
Hence we get ](?) j ](x) j ](>) and ](>) j ](x) j ](?).
This means ](x) is independent of x.
In case neither > nor ? are in the language, we can prove `equivalence', namely ](y) j ](x)
and ](x) j ](y), only for x; y that are R-connected, where R is the transtive closure of 
and its converse. This is enough to allow us for Denition 8.5.8, (1) to go through.
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We now describe algebraic semantics for a logic L, with consequence relation j. The semantics
will be considerably simplied for the case of directional logics.
Denition 8.5.5 1. Let L be a logic with consequence j and connectives ]1; : : : ; ]k with arities
r1; : : : ; rk respectively. Let a = (A; f1; : : : ; fk;; T ) be an algebra with functions fi with
arities ri resp.
(a) An algebraic assignment for L into a is a function ha assigning for each atomic q an
element ha(q) 2 A.
(b) ha can be extended to arbitrary ws of L by
ha(]i(A1; : : : ; Ari)) = fi(h
a(A1); : : : ; h
a(Ari)):
(c) We write (a; ha)  A i ha(A) 2 T . We write A a;ha B i ha(B)  ha(A). In future
we omit the `a'.
2. An algebra is connected if any two elements are connected by the transitive closure of R =
( [ ) (i.e. of  and its converse). This condition relates to the connectivity mentioned
in Example 8.5.4 (3).
Theorem 8.5.6 (Completeness for general logics) Let j be a consequence relation then AjB
i for all directional algebras a and all assignments ha, we have A ha B.
Proof.
1. Soundness is immediate from the reexivity and transitivity of .
2. Completeness is obtained by taking the canonical algebra with A = set of all ws and dening
x  y i y j x. We let T = fB j ? j Bg. Let f](A1; : : : ; An) = ](A1; : : : An) and let h be
the assignment giving h(q) = q.
One can prove by induction on A that h(A) = A. 
Theorem 8.5.7 Let j be an extensional consequence relation. Then it is complete for the class
of all extensional algebras.
Proof. Immediate from the denitions and the canonical model of the previous theorem. 
Denition 8.5.8 1. Let L be a directional logic with consequence j and connectives ]1; : : : ; ]k
with arities r1; : : : ; rk. Let a = (A; fi;; T ) be a connected logic algebra with function
symbols fi; i = 1; 2; : : : with arities r1; r2; : : : resp (same as the connectives). Let h
a be
a function (assignment) assigning for each atom q of L a lter Fq  A. Assume fi are
directional in the same way as ]i. We can extend h
a to all ws of L inductively as fol-
lows. Let ]j(A1 : : : ; Anj ; B1; : : : ; Bmj ) be a connective monotonic down in Ai and mono-
tonic up in Bi. We let h
a(]j(A1; : : : ; Anj ; B1; : : : ; Bmj )) = fy j for all x1; : : : ; xnj such that
xi 2 ha(Ai) there exist yk such that yk 2 ha(Bk); i = 1; : : : ; nj and k = 1; : : : ;mj, we have
fj(x1; : : : xnj ; y1; : : : ; ymj )  yg.
If a connective is monotonic both up and down in a slot we regard it as monotonic down.
(We could regard it as montonic up|it does not matter.)
We show that the denition given here leads to the same assignment lter set no matter what
we choose.
Let ](A;B;C) be a connective where the B slot is directional both ways, up and down.
We have two options.
(a) Taking B as directional up:
S1 = h(](A;B;C) = fy j for all x1; x2 such that x1 2 h(A); x2 2 h(B), there exists a
x3 2 h(C) such that f](x1; x2; x3)  yg.
220 CHAPTER 8. METALEVEL FEATURES IN LDS
(b) Taking B as directional down:
S2 = h(](A;B;C)) = fy j for all x1 such that x1 2 h(A), there exists x2; x3 such that
x2 2 h(B); x3 2 h(C) such that f](x1; x2; x3)  yg:
We want to show that S1 = S2 under the assumption that the algebra is connected (as in
Denition 8.5.5).
First note that clearly if y 2 S1 then y 2 S2. Assume y 2 S2. Show y 2 S1. Since y 2 S2
then for every x1 2 h(A), there are x2 = (x1) 2 h(B) and x3 = (x1) 2 h(C) such that
f](x1; (x1); (x1)  y. We want to show that for every x1; x2; x1 2 h(A); x1 2 h(B) there
exists a (x1; x2) 2 h(C) such that f](x1; x2; (x1; x2))  y. We let (x1; x2) = (x1). we
must show that for all x1 2 h(A); x2 2 h(B); f](x1; x2; (x1))  y.
Since the second slot (x2 slot in f]) is directional both up and down and since we assumed
the algebra is connected, we get in view of the discussion in Example 8.5.4 (3) that
f](x1; x2; (x1))  f](x1; (x1); (x1))  y:
Thus we have shown that S1 = S2.
2. An algebraic model for j is a pair (a; ha), as in 1. above. An algebraic semantics is a class
of algebraic models.
3. Let m = (a; ha) be an algebraic model and let A;B,  be ws, we write:
A jm B i ha(A)  ha(B)
j B i ha(B)  T




4. Let K be a class of algebraic models. We say
 A jK B i A jm B for all m 2 K.
 jK B i jm B for all m 2 K.
  jK B i  jm B for all m 2 K.
5. Let L be a language and j a directional consequence relation. We dene the canonical algebra
aj as follows:
 Aj = the set of all ws of L.
 f] for each connective ] of L is dened by
f](A1; : : : ; An) = ](A1; : : : ; An):
 A  B is dened as B j A.
T is fB j ? j Bg.
 Let ha(q) = fA j A j qg. ha(q) is a lter because if A 2 ha(q) (i.e. A j q) and A  B
(i.e. B j A) then certainly B 2 ha(q). Also ha(q) is non empty (since q j q).
Denition 8.5.9 (Term translation for a consequence relation) Let L and j be as in the
previous Denition. Let A be a w of L with atoms q1; : : : ; qn. Let z1; : : : ; zn be variables of
classical logic associated with q1; : : : ; qn. In fact, let q
 be the variable associated with q. With each
connective ] of L associate a function symbol f] of the same arity. We associate with any formula
A a term of classical logic A by structural induction as follows:
 (qi) = zi
 (](A1; : : : ; An)) = f](A1; : : : ; An).
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Consider the classical language with the function symbols ff]g, the binary relation symbol  and
the unary predicate symbol T . Then the translation  : A 7! A, translates each formula A into
a term in this language. The consequence assertion AjB is translated into B  A and the
assertion ?jA is transated into A 2 T .
The consequence relation rules of the form
Ai j Bi; i = 1; : : : ; k
]1(C1; : : : ; Cn1) j ]2(D1; : : : ; Dn2)
are transated into classical logic Horn clauses of the form
k^
i=1
(Bi  Ai )! f]2(Dj )  f]1(Cj )
where `!' is classical implication.
For example, axioms schema such as A) (B ) A) become expressions like
f)(x; f)(y; x)) 2 T:
Modus ponens becomes
x 2 T ^ f)(x; y) 2 T ! y 2 T:
Lemma 8.5.10 (Completeness) In the canonical model,
ha(B) = fA j A j Bg:
Proof. By induction.
1. The lemma holds for atomic B.
2. Assume the lemma holds for A1; : : : ; An; B1; : : : ; Bm we show the lemma holds for
B = ](A1; : : : ; An; B1; : : : ; Bm)
We assume ] is monotonic down in Ai and up in Bk.
ha(B) = fy j for all X1; : : : ; Xn; such that Xi j Ai
there are Y1 : : : Ym, such that Yk j Bk
we have y j ](X1; : : : ; Xn; Y1; : : : ; Ym)g:
We want to show
ha(B) = fy j y j ](A1; : : : ; Bm)g:
Assume that y 2 ha(B) and show that y j B. From the assumptions we see that for
Xi = Ai, there are Yi j Bi such that
y j ](Ai; Yi):
Since ] is monotonic up in Yi we get y j B.
Assume y j B, we show y 2 ha(B). Let Xi be such Xi j Ai, we need to nd Yk such
that y j ](Xi; Yk). Take Yk = Bk. We need to show y j ](Xi; Bk). Since j is monotonic
down in Ai, we get that Xi j Ai yield ](Ai; Bk) j ](Xi; Bk) and hence y j ](Xi; Bk), by
transitivity
This completes the proof of the lemma. Note that we proved that each lter is generated by a
minimal element. 
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Example 8.5.11 Let X  Y be a binary connective. Let j be the smallest consequence relation
which makes  directional down in X and up in Y ,
X j X 0
X 0  Y j X  Y
Y j Y 0
X  Y j X  Y 0
and satises the two standard conditions
A j A and A j B;B j C
A j C :
The semantics for this system involve algebras of the form a = (A; f(x; y), , T; h) with the truth
condition on  being:
t  A B i for all x  A there exists a y  B such that f(x; y)  t.
We have A j B i for all a and all t 2 Aa; t  A implies t  B.
This semantics should be compared with the more traditional semigroup semantics for substruc-
tural implications. A model has the form (A; ;; h) where (A; ) is a semigroup (associative?)
and  an ordering. The clause for  is
t  A B i 8x  A; t  x  B:
The two semantics will coincide if we take  as identity and let
f(x; y) = (The z such that)(z  x = y):
The previous denition of canonical model and the completeness theorem allow us to give a
semi-algebraic possible world semantics for directional logics. The following denition establishes
the connection.
Remark 8.5.12 (A more general completeness theorem) The completeness theorem for Kripke-
like semantics can be generalized. We need not assume the consequence relation be transitive. The
following conditions are sucient:
 A j A identity
 Directionality of all connectives (as in Denition 8.5.3)
 Downward strengthening: Let ](q; : : :) be any connective which is downward monotonic in q,
then for any A and B
A j ](q; : : :);B j q
A j ](B; : : :) :
Let a be any algebra satisfying reexivity, directionality and downward strengthening. Let t 2 Aa,
dene a semi-lter It to be the largest set Y satisfying () below:
() 8s 2 A[s  t i 8x 2 Y (s  x)]:
Clearly I0t = ftg is such a set and the family of such sets is closed under union.
Let h be an assignment. Require h to satisfy:
() h(t; q) = 1 i (8s 2 It)h(s; q) = 1:
Then in the canonical model, we have for such h and any A
t  A i t j A:
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 8.5.10. Downward strengthening plays the role of transitivity
in the proof. In fact, if j is transitive then downward strengthening follows and each semilter It
is equal to fs j t  sg.
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Denition 8.5.13 (semi-algebraic possible world semantics) Let L be a language with con-
nectives ]1; : : : ; ]k with arities r1; : : : ; rk respectively. A semi-algebraic model for L has the form
(A;R1; : : : ; Rk;; T; h) where A is a set of possible worlds, T  A; T 6= ? and each R is a relation
on A of arity 1 + ri. h is an assignment from the atoms of the language into subsets of A. The
following must hold.
1. x  y and y 2 T imply x 2 T .
2. t 2 h(q) and t  s imply s 2 h(q).
3. Each Ri is directional in all its variables, in the same way as ]i, respectively, and Ri is
directional up in its rst variable.
Note that for a connective ](X1; : : : ; Xn; Y1; : : : ; Ym) there corresponds a relation R](t; x1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; ym).
The meaning of R] in terms of the algebraic function f](x1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; ym) and  is
R](t; x1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; ym) i f](x1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; ym)  t:
Note that R] satises that for each (x1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; ym) there exists a minimal t such that
R](t; x1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; ym) holds. Conversely, the function f] can be retrieved from such an R] in
the presence of .
Thus if f] is monotonic up in yj and monotonic down in xi, then R] will be monotonic up in
xi and t and monotonic down for yj (inverse direction for xi and yj).
Dene the following rst truth table for the connectives ](X1; : : : ; Xn; Y1; : : : ; Ym) as follows:
(] is directional down in Xi and up in Yi):
t  ](X1; : : : ; Xn; Y1; : : : ; Ym) i for all ti such that ti  Xi there exist sj such that sj  Yj such
that Ri(t; x1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; ym) holds.
We say A j B holds in the model if whenever t  A then t  B.
We say  A in the model if whenever t  A then t 2 T .
Note that we can also assume that R] satises that for every t; x1; : : : ; xn there exist unique
y1; : : : ym such that R](t; x1; : : : ; xn; y1; : : : ; ym). The reason being that the lters fy j y  Y g have
a minimal element and R] is monotonic down in yi. So R] holds for some y i it holds for the
minimal y. This last statement entails that we can get completeness for R] and the following truth
table:
t  ](X1; : : : ; Xn; Y1; : : : Ym) i for all ti such that ti  Xi and all sj such that R](t1; : : : tn; s1; : : : ; sm)
we have for all j; sj  Yj.
Theorem 8.5.14 Let j be the smallest directional consequence relation, then j is complete for
the semi algebraic semantics.
Proof. Use the canonical model. 
So far we have been mainly concerned with algebraic theorems preparing an almost arbitrary
logic for translation into classical logic, not with the theory of partially ordered algebraic logics
(cf. [Gabbay, 1993a, Gabbay, 1992b, Blok and Pigozzi, 1989]). We need the algebras as tools in
order to translate any general logic, about which we do not know much. We found it convenient to
apply our algebraic methods to singleton consequence relations j, i.e. the kind dened for AjB
and ?jB, which give rise to the ordering relation  in the logic algebra. Many logics, however,
are presented as Hilbert systems, and so we cannot apply our methods as we have only the relation
?j1A, for A w. Suppose we are given a Hilbert presentation of a logic L1. This means that we
are dening only the notion of ? j1 A (or just j1 A). We need to investigate a means of deriving
from j1 a consequence relation j2 such that Aj2B is always dened and j2 is a conservative
extension, i.e. ?j2A i ?j1A holds. In algebraic terms, given (A; fi; T ) can we dene a suitable
 on A? In implicational logics with ) satisfying the deduction theorem this can be easily done:
Aj2B i ?j1A) B.
Lemma 8.5.15 Let j1 be a Hilbert conseuence relation (i.e. dened for ?j1A;A w). Then
there exists the minimal j  and maximal j+ singleton consequence relations which agree with it.
224 CHAPTER 8. METALEVEL FEATURES IN LDS
Proof.
1. Let j B be dened by
j B i (1) = ? and ?jB
or (2) = fBg:
We show j  is a consequence relation:
 clearly Aj A holds
 assume j A and Aj B. By denition A = B and so j B.
We show j  is minimal. Suppose j1 agrees with j. We show j A implies j1A. If
 = fAg, then clearly Aj1A. If  = ?, again by agreement ?j1A.
2. From (1) it is clear that the set of all singleton consequence relations agreeing with j is
nonempty. Dene j+ as follows.
Aj+B i there exist j0; : : : jk agreeing with j and A1; : : : ; Ak such that
Aj0A1; A1j1A2; : : : ; AkjkB:
We show that j+ is a consequence relation:
 clearly Aj+A because Aj A holds.
 assume j+B andBj+C we show j+C. Then for some j0; : : : ; jk and jk+1; : : : ; jm+1
and A1; : : : ; Ak; Ak+1; : : : ; Am we have
j0A1; : : : ; AkjkB;Bjk+1Ak+1; : : : ; Amjm+1C:
But then by denition j+C.
We now show j+ agrees with j
 Clearly ?jB implies ?j+B.
 assume ?j+B and show ?jB:
Since ?j+B, there exist A1; : : : ; Ak and j0; : : : ; jk such that
?j0A1; : : : ; AkjkB hold. We prove ?jB by induction on k.
Case k = 0
In this case ?j0B and since j0 agrees with j we get ?jB.
Case k > 0
Consider the initial sequence
?j0A1 and A1j1A2.
Since j0 agrees with j which agrees with j1, we get ?j1A1 and hence by transitivity, we get
?j1A2.
We now have a shorter sequence
?j1A2; A1j2A3; : : : ; AkjkB:
Hence, by the induction hypothesis ?jB.
This completes the induction. Clearly j+ is maximal. Hence, the Lemma is proved. 
The above considerations do not give us an algorithm for nding for a given Hilbert system
j1 a singleton consequence relation j2 which agrees with it. Of course, we can always take the
minimal one j 1 , but the minimal one is not particularly infomative. The stronger the consequence
relation the better. One can try to nd one using a theorem prover as the next example shows.
8.5. HOW TO GIVE AN LDS FORMULATION FOR A LOGIC 225
Example 8.5.16 Let L be a propositional language with some connectives and let H be a Hilbert
system for L with schematic rules of the form i; (i = 1; : : : ;m):
i :
j'i1; : : : ; j'iki
` 'i
:
For example,  Lukasiewicz formulation of the implicational fragment of classical logic (using the
binary connective )) is formulated by the schemas
i :




j((P ) Q)) R)) ((R) P )) (S ) P )) :
We can systematically look (by complexity) for a formula 	(X;Y ) (binary) and try and prove
using the term translation of Denition 8.5.9 and a classical theorem prover, that the following
holds:
 j1	(X;X)
 j1	(X;Y ) and j1	(Y; Z) imply j1	(X;Z)
 j1X and j1	(X;Y ) imply j1Y .
For a 	 satisfying the above we can let
Aj2B i (denition) j1	(A;B)
?j2B i j1B:
In fact, since singleton consequence relations are closed under intersection, if we have several
such 	i we can let Aj2B be
V
i j1	(A;B).
We now ask how do we nd such a 	 automatically? We can let 	 range over all ws of
the language in order of increasing complexity and then for this 	, using the term translation of
Denition 8.5.9 and a classical theorem prover see if each 	 satises the required condition.
A good heuristic is to look at the Hilbert rules of the form
j1'1; : : : ; j1'k
j1'
and try and substitute into 'i and ' some formula that will turn the above rule into the form
j1A; j1	1(A;B); : : : j1	m(A;B)
j1B
:










Applying the above procedure to  Lukasiewicz logic, we immediately nd that 	(A) = (def)A) B
is a candidate. We need to check whether
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 j1A) B and j1B ) C imply j1A) C
 j1A) A.
These can be checked using the term translation.
Example 8.5.17 The previous example dealt with the problem of nding a singleton consequence
relation j2B ( = fBg or  = ?g agreeing with a Hilbert consequence ?j1B. We can continue
this line of thought and try to extend a singleton consquence j2B to a unitary consequence
j3B, , arbitrary which agrees with it.
Assume now that a proper j is given, where AjB and ?jB are dened for arbitrary A and
B. The second concept we dene is that of a theory. We dened a theory  as a set of ws and
gave the notion  j A the semantic meaning:
 j A i for all a and for all t 2 Aa, if t  B, for all B 2  then t  A.
There is a more general notion of a theory. Let 	(X;Y ) be formulas dened using the connec-
tives of the logic. Assume 	 is monotonic down in X and up in Y . Using 	 we can dene the
following notion of a theory .
 A theory  is a sequence of formulas (A1; : : : ; An)
 (A1; : : : ; An) j A = def ? j 	(A1;	(A2; : : : ;	(An; A) : : :)):
This denition gives the deduction theorem for j:
A1; : : : ; An j 	(A;B) i A1; : : : ; An; A j B:
Consider for example the connective  of example 8.5.11. We have
A1; : : : ; An j B i ? j A1  (: : : ; (An  B) : : :):
The notion of a theory can be generalized. Let  = f]1; : : : ; ]kg be a set of monotonic upwards
connectives of the language. Close  under substitution. Let '(x1; : : : ; xn) be a w generated from
 with n-places. Then the formula expression ['(A1; : : : ; An)] is a '-theory of (A1; : : : ; An) with
'[A1; : : : ; An] j B i ? j 	('(A1; : : : ; An); B).
Other denitions of algebraic logics and theories existing in the literature do not use the partial
order but only the set of designated elements. One example is (a an algebraic model):  a A i
for every assignment h, if h(B) 2 T for all B 2  then h(A) 2 T .
We can now formulate, through the semantics, any directional logic as an LDS. This is the task
of the rest of this section.
Dov to Continue ...
8.6 Labelling the metalevel (nested labelling systems)
This book adopts the view that the basic unit of logical information is the labelled formula t : A.
We futher adopted the view that a labelled deduction system is mathematically just like an
ordinary deductive system except that all formulas are labelled and the proof rules tell us how to
manipulate the labels as well as the formulas.
If we accept ths point of view and its consequences, we must allow for the following:
1. Well formed formulas of the form (t : A)! (s : B).
2. Labelling disciplines for such formulas, for example:
t : (s : A)
t : ((s1 : A)! (s2 : B)
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3. Allow for arbitrary iterations of nested ! labelling.
4. Study reduction rules for reducing nestings of labels.
In order to have a meaningful interpretation for nested labelling systems, we need to have a creative
point of view of labelled formulas. Let us think of t : A as an algebraic resource annotation. Imagine
we have a proof system `0 with a syntactical algorithmic notion of how A1; : : : ; An `0 B holds.
We take an algebra A and label the assumptions as t1 : A1; : : : ; tn : An and execute the proof
to obtain B with a label s = t(t1; : : : ; tn), where t is a function symbol of the labelling algebra
dependent on the proof path of B from A1; : : : ; An. Thus we write
t1 : A1; : : : ; tn : An `A s : B:
We can have double labelling, from two dierent algebras, A1 and A2 to get
(t1i ; t
2
i ) : Ai `A1
A2 (t1(t11; : : : ; t1n); t2(y21 ; : : : ; t2n)) : B
We can now decide whether we accept B as proved by looking at the labels. This use of the
labels lters proofs according to algebraic resource considerations.
What would the w (t : A) ! (s : B) mean in this context? We can understand it as a
metastatement saying that if A can be obtained with reousrce t, then B can be obtained with
resource s. Thus we have:
 `A (t : A)! (s : B) i ; t : A `A s : B:
If  is aan LDS database, then the above is meaningful.
To understand the mechanisms involved in nested labelling, we can begin with a consequence
relation `0 between formulas, written Ai `0 B. We can turn it into an LDS by adding labels
and a labelling discipline, thus dening a consequence relation `1 on labelled formulas of the form
ti : Ai `1 s : B.
There does not necessarily have to be any obvious relationship between `1 and `0, though
there may indeed be a connection, depending on the nature of the labelling discipline of `1. We
may have a connection, for example, of the form
A `0 B i ? : A `1 ? : B
or of the form:
A `0 B i ? : A ` s : B; for some s:
Now that we have `1 we can again add a labelling discipline to get a system `2. `2 again may
not be connected in any way with `1. In fact, the set of labels of `2 may be dierent from the
labels of `1.
Let us see what happens when the labelling discipline and the labels used in moving form `0 to
`1 is used again to move from `1 to `2. Do we get `2=`1? To consider the question meaningfully
let us start with a familiar `0 discipline. Let `0 be linear logic.
This means that we start with the unlabelled version of linear logic, then pass on to a labelled
version and then label again. Let us see what happens.
The axioms of linear logic are:
A! A
(A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
(A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C))






(B ! C)! (A! C)
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The rule RT can be derived from the other axioms and rules. The notion of ` A is dened
in the usual way for the logic, namely ` A i there exists a sequence A0; : : : ; An = A such that
each element in the sequence is either a substitution instance of an axiom or is obtained from two
previous elements by the use of a rule, in this case modus ponens.
A theorem of the logic is any A such that ` A.
Note that we still have to dene the notion A ` B, as we dened only what a theorem is, ie
? ` B.
We say A1; : : : ; An `0 B i there exists a sequence of formulas D1; : : : ; Dm = B such that
each element of the sequence is either a theorem or an assumption Ai or is obtained from previous
elements of the sequence using modus ponens.
We now impose a labelling discipline on this system. Label each theorem by ? and label each
assumption by a new atomic label. Propagate the labels the usual way,
 : A
 : A! B
 : B
In this manner, whenever
A1; : : : ; An `0 B
We have
a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An `1  : B
where  is a sequence of xi 2 faig indicating which assumptions were used in the derivation.
Let us now use `1 together with the same labelling system to get `2. The assumptions have
the form i : (i : Ai) (we are labelling an already labelled formula). We agree as before that
assumptions get new atomic labels. Label propagation through modus ponens should follow the
same pattern.
1 : (0 : A)
1 : (0 : A! B)
11 : (00 : B)
We similarly have that whenever 1 : A1; : : : ; nAn `1  : B then for some  and atoms xi
x1 : (1 : A1); : : : ; xn : (n : An) `2  : ( : B):
 indicates from which assumptions xi : (i : Ai) was  : B derived.
Our problem is how to interpret 1 : (0 : A). Can we meaningfuly collapse it to some  : A?
ie, reduce `2 to `1?
Let us examine in more detail what can happen. Consider the assumptions:
a0 : A0
b0 : A0 ! B0
c0 : B0 ! C0
Using modus ponens we get that the above proves in `1 c0b0a0 : C0.
If we were to label again, we would get
a1 : (a0 : A0)
b1 : (b0 : A0 ! B0)
c1 : (c0 : B0 ! C0)
We use modus ponens to get
c1b1a1 : (c0b0a0 : C0):
The two labels are practically identical. Thus labelling again with the same labelling discipline
gives us nothing. In fact the example shows that  : ( : A) can really be taken as (; ) : A and
the two labelling manipulations can be done side by side, on each co-ordinate.
However, if we use a dierent labelling discipline on the  label we get composition of the
metaleval meaning of each label. For example the  label may record relevance and the  label
may record possible worlds. This way we get modal relevance logic, as presented in example 2.2.4.
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1. Bring in internalisation of consequence
2. Temporalising








This chapter will illustrate the use of the Metabox to dene some known logics and a new class
of logics called Resource Logics. We understand the term to cover all logics where it is important
to know exactly from which assumptions and using which inference rules and at what order a
conclusion is drawn. In this case the labels function as names to the assumptions (data) and the
deductive process propagates the labels to the conclusion through an agreed labelling discipline.
Thus  ` t : A means that A can be proved from  using those assumptions and rules in 
as indicated by the label t. In a more sophisticated labelling discipline the labels can be used
to control the deductive process and thus function as a metalevel device. The label propagation
mechanism will depend on what the labels denote. It could be probabilities, it could be priorities,
it could be an indication of the origins or update version of the data. Well known among such
logics are relevance and linear logics. In relevance logic  ` A requires A to be proved using all
the assumptions in  and in linear logic it is further required that the assumptions in  are used
not more than once.
Derivation can be controlled in two pure ways (and of course in a mixed way). One can control
the use of assumptions. For example, one may have two assumptions in the database, A1 and A2,
and the control allows the algorithmic proof procedure to use exactly one of them.
Another example is when we require all assumptions to be used exactly once. This resource
restriction gives rise to Linear Logic. In general, the subclass of Resource Logics, which restricts
only the number of assumptions used (as compared with how they are used) are known as sub-
structural logics. Thus Linear Logic, Relevance Logic and their neighbours are Resource Logics in
our sense.
Another important subclass of Resource Logics are the Prioritised Logics, where the main re-
strictions are on how to use the inference rules. The reader may question whether such a distinction
makes sense, after all, all inference rules come with conditions on how to use them, and why can't
we regard the so called \controlled inference" as part of the rules. The answer is that the control
is on the global use of the rules and cannot be attached to any single rule. An extreme example
of controlled inference logics are Defeasible Logics (see the appropriate chapter) and the logics
known as Ordered Logics. These logics arise naturally in non-monotonic systems handling several
distributed knowledge bases and having to reconcile possibly conicting information.
Natural priorities among rules give rise to prioritised logics. In general resource -logics are a
mixture of both, resource restrictions and inference control.
A simple example of a mixture is when we do not allow for any formula A ! B to be used
both as a ticket and as a minor premiss of a modus ponens. With this restiction,
(A! (A! B))! (A! B)
is still a theorem (though not a theorem of linear logic) but
((C ! A)! C)! ((C ! A)! A)
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is not a theorem.
In general Resource Logics use the labels to observe and record the use of the assumptions,
while prioritised -logics use the lables to observe and control the use of rules.
The whole way of thinking involved in Resource-logics is dierent from the traditional ones.
One can no longer apply logical rules or even use assumptions in any order or as often as one wants.
Certain sequnces are allowed and certain are not, according to some controlling mechanism. Some
logicians strive, in fact, for complete symmetries in derivations and would therefore reject the idea
of prioritised-Logics. Perhaps a theorem can be proved that every prioritised-Logic can be turned
into a symmetrical logic with more connectives. We shall address this problem later. Girard's
[Girard, 1987] linear logic is an example of a Resource (bounded) logic for which there exists a
symmetrical proof (net) theory.
The general form of the Resource-logic is most naturally cast as a form of Labelled Deductive
system (LDS). If we are going to have control over the use of resource or inference then we must
be able to keep the accounting right of what we used and how we used it. If the accounting is to
be complete then special notational systems must be employed and this is LDS. We do have, in a
Gentzen formulation, the possibility of labelling formulas by placing them to the left or to the right
of the turnstile \`", and also by allowing multisets, for example we can write: A;A ` B;B;C.
One can go further and allow sequences to the right or left of ` or even more complex structures.
This is nothing but geometrical labelling and one may as well take on the general case and say
that we have a system of labels, symbolised in the form (L; ; <) and that what we are dealing
with are labelled ws of the form  : A; the label, A the w.
Another example of rule restriction is not to use rule R1 after rule R2 has been used. In default
logic for example we may allow the use of a default rule to get a conclusion A to generate more
conclusions via modus ponens (ie A;A ! B ` B) only if A was not obtained by default and we
may not allow A to generate more defaults. This is inference control. The most general case is in
defeasible reasoning and in ordered logic where the rules are classied according to strength and
rules can defeat others, for example the database:
1. Birds y
2. Big birds do not y
3. Tweety is a big bird
allows us to deduce both Tweety ies and Tweety does not y. One way to get the right answer
is to say that rules are stronger if their antecedants are logically stronger and we must use the
stronger rule to decide between any contradictory pair of derivable atoms of the form fp; pg.
This is denitely a prioritised-logic.
The remainder of this Chapter will study relevance implication logic and its related family of
logics. The basic labelling and metabox mechanism for these logics is designed to record which of
the assumptions were used in the deductive process, how many times and how. This should be
compared with other resource logics which record priority or reliability of assumptions. For this
reason all new assumptions are labelled by new atomic labels. The inference mechanism is the !
introduction (metabox) rule (this is the goal Rule for !) and the ! elimination (modus ponens)
rules (the Data Rule for !) which can be used with various restrictions.
Schematically, these are:
Data Rule for ! (! E)
 : A
 : A! B
(  ) : B
provided  MP (; ) holds
 is the label of the minor assumption.  is the label of the ticket.    is the label of the
resulting formula.  is a convenient binary function for generateing new labels. In most cases  is
concatenation of sequences and  and  are sequences. In some cases ;  are multisets or sets and
 is union [. For any individual logic,  will be specied.  MP is a side condiiton on  and  such
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as  \  = ? or such as  6= ?;  MP is a formula in some metalanguage suitable for describing
these conditions.
Goal Rule for ! (! I)
To show  : A! B use a box
 : A assumption
... Reasoning using
... local box rules
 : B
exit  : A! B provided  I(; ; )
 is a new atomic label, in whatever is considered atomic in the labelling discipline.  I(; ; )
is the exit condition, telling us how ; ;  are related. The most general is the requirement
 =   . In case  is set union we may have for example    and  =    .
There are two more parameters involved here which are not mentioned explictly. These are:
1. Properties of , eg commutativity, associativity, etc. These properties may help us satisfy
side conditions such as  I(; ; ),
2. Deductive rules in the box itself, like what can be reiterated from outer boxes, how can the
reiteration be used etc.
In general there is a trade-o between the properties of  and the deductive conditions. For
example the condition  \  = ? in  MP corresponds to the deductive condition of not using an
assumption more than once. Details of the possible trade-os will become evident in the sequel.
We begin with a list of Hilbert type axioms for future use. Some of the axiomatisation results
are already available in Anderson and Belnap's book. However it is necessary for us to present
the metabox discipline in detail. The reader should also note that the metabox presentation and
axiomatisation of a logic (eg W) yields the logic as a \module" ready to be combined with other
metabox logics (e.g. relevance and modality) without any cost.
Denition 9.1.1 (Resource Axioms) First dene (Ak ! B) to be:
A0 ! B = defB
(An+1 ! B) = defA! (An ! B)




(A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
2a. Right Transitivity Rule, (RT-Rule):
A! B
(B ! C)! (A! C)
3. left transitivity
(A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
4. Distribution
a. (A! B)! ((A! (B ! C))! (A! C))
236 CHAPTER 9. RESOURCE LOGICS
b. (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C))
4m;n (m;n) distribution
(Am ! B)! ((An ! (B ! C))! (Am+n ! C))
5m;n (m;n) contraction
(Am ! B)! (An ! B)
6 -deduction
 ! (! )
Provided ;  satisfy the condition below:
; -condition possibilities:
(a) (?): no condition on  or .
(b) (!) :  = C ! D; has an implicational form,  arbitrary.
(c) (H): `H  in the logic H,  arbitrary.
7 -Permutation
(A! ( ! C))! ( ! (A! C))
Provided  satises the condition below.
Possibilities for :
(a) (?): no condition on 
(b) (!) :  has the form of an implicational C ! D.
(c) (H): A 6`H .
8. Restart (Peirce's Rule)
((A! B)! A)! A
9k k-mingle




11. Ackerman Type Rules
a.
B;A! (B ! C)
A! C
b.
B; (B ! A)! C
A! C
12. LC-Axiom
((A! B)! C)! (((B ! A)! C)! C)
13. MV-Axiom
((A! B)! B)! ((B ! A)! A)
14. Rose's Axiom Rk
((Ak ! B)! A)! A)
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The following explains the metabox and labelling meaning of the axioms. Axioms (1) and (3)
(identity and left transitivity), and rule 2a correspond to the labelling system where + is associative
and can therefore be regarded as concatentation. When we perform modus ponens of  : A with
 : A! B, we get the label  : B in this order. When we open a box, assume a : A we must be
able to prove a : B in order to exit with  : A! B. See 9.2.6.
The corresponding metabox deductive rules are that only implications can be reiterated and
that they must be used in the deductive process as tickets only and in the same order as the order
of nesting (reiteration from an inner box must be used earlier than from outer box). See 10.3.9.
Axiom 2 allows for reiterations to be used in any order. See 10.3.4. 9.2.6(b) gives the corre-
sponding labelling restrictions for W.
Axioms (4) and (5) both have to do with how many times an assumption can be used in a
box. In labelling terms this means the question whether the labels are sets and + is taken as a set
union or the labels are multiset and + is taken as multiset union. The two axioms (4) an (5) are
not equivalent unless axiom (7) is present.
Axiom (7) is commutativity of +. In metabox terms (7) allows us to use reiterations as minor
premisses and not only as tickets.
Axiom 6 has to do with the question of whether the assumption  : A opening a box has to be
used at all in the proof of  : B (ie can we exit with  : A! B without the proof of B using A).
In labelling terms it means   .







can we show B in the inner box instead ofD? In other words, do we read the above as equivalent
to (see g 9.2)
1 Shows B
2 A




Usually Peirce's rule yields classical logic. We show that it can be added to these weaker logics
without turning them into classical logic.
Axiom 9 is a labelling axiom. It has to do with how we label several occurrences of A. Do we
identify them as one occurrence and give them the same label?
Rule 11 has to do with the reasoning process. Is A ! ((B ! B) ! A) a theorem? Can we
reason inside a box and get (B ! B) from nowhere? In labelling terms this is the condition  6= ?,
restricting the modus ponens rule.
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Axiom 12 is the axiom for Dummett's LC. When added to intuitionistic logic and when added
to many valued logics it gives linearity of the truth values.
Axioms 13 and 14 are axioms added to obtain Lukasiewicz's many valued logic. Rose's axiom
Rk helps axiomatise Lukasiewicz k + 1 valued logic. Notice that for k = 1 we get Peirce's rule.
Detailed discussions will be given in the appropriate chapters.
Denition 9.1.2 Using the axioms of 9.1.1, the table below denes some new and some known
Hilbert type systems. All systems allow for substitution and modus ponens.
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System Name Axioms Comments
CL (1), (3), (2a) Concatenation logic
W (1), (2), (3) Considered the weakest
logic for which a
reasonable deduction
theorem exists.
TE (1), (2), (3), (4) Ticket entailment. (4b)
can be proved from
(1)-(3) (4a).
(4a) is equivalent in TE
to 5(2;1).
Linear Logic LL (1), (2), (3), (7 (?))
Relevance R (1)-(4), (7 (?))
Entailment E (1)-(4), (7 (!))
Strict Implication (1)-(4), (7 (?))
(6 (!))
Intuitionistic Logic (1)-(4), (7 (?))
(6 (?))
Classical Logic (1)-(4), (8) (7 (?))
(6 (?))
Linear Classical Linear Logic A new logic
with (8)
Relevance Classical R with (8) A new logic
H Relevance (1)-(4), (7  (H)) A new logic
LE Linear Entailment (1)-(3), (7 (!)) A new logic
WC (1)-(3), (8) A new logic
B Left Transitivity (1), (3) and (11) A new logic
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9.2 Basic resource logics
Denition 9.2.1 (The Logic W) Consider the system W of metabox discipline of ! with the
following rules:
1. The basic forward rule is modus ponens. The labels are sets of atomic labels and label prop-
agation is done according to the rule MP1 (modus ponens for linearity).
 : A
 : A! B
 [  : B provided  \  = ? and  6= ?
This is really the resource condition for linearity. If  \  6= ? then both A and A ! B
used the same resource (eg C) and hence B cannot be derived because it would be using C
more than once. The condition  6= ? ensures we do not use logical theorems in boxes. The
meaning will become clearer later. In terms of Denitions 3.4.2 and 3.4.9, we have that
 MP (; ; ) is:  6= ? ^ ( \  = ?) ^  =  [ .
2. Box Goal Rule:
Assume we are in a box named b. In line k of this box we want to show A ! B. To show
A ! B open a box and name it a. Assume A with a new atomic label fag : A, also written
a : A. Show B with label . The box is successful if a 2 . Exit the box with  : A ! B,
where  =    fag.
This is the condition of relevance logic. To show A! B we must assume A and prove B in
a way which uses A.
In the proof of B we can use some reiterations. The next rule tells us what reiterations we can
use.
3. Metabox Reiteration Rule:
Given an outer box and an inner box as in the diagram (g 9.3):
1 Show A! B






The candidates for the allowed reiteration from the outer box into the inner box are all
formulas which are assumptions, earlier reiterations or proved (in lines m  k 1) and which
have the form C ! D. We allow to bring in as reiteration any C ! D. The reiteration
C ! D can be used in the inner box, however, only as a ticket ie in a deduction of the form
C
C ! D reiteration
D
and not in a deduction of the form
(C ! D)! X
C ! D reiteration
X
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In terms of Denition 3.4.2 we have dened R0 of 2.5.1 and the way modus ponens works in
the inner box.
Note that in the Box Goal Rule of the previous denition we name the boxes with completely new
names and use completely new labels on new assumptions. We will have b < a, ie a is subordinate
to b. In fact, since in the logic W, each new box arises only in order to show some implication
A! B and it has one assumption a : A, we can achieve more economy of notation if we name the
box as \a" as well. Thus the relation < can be extended to labels. Call the original (most external
box) as box 0. Let the assumption be numbered and named
Line1 : n1 : A1
Line2 : n2 : A2
...
etc
For the inner boxes, whenever we start a new box to show A! B, we name it eg Box a and name
the assumption a : A thus (g 9.4)
Line k : A! B from Box a
Box a 1 Show B
(k; 1) : 2 a : A
Figure 9.4:
Each formula in any box has a label . If  = fa1 : : : ang one can tell exactly which boxes it
\used". The relation  can be extended to labels as follows:
1. x > ni, for all i since ni are labels of the outer box.
2. a > b if a names a subordinate box to b (remember that labels 6= ni are also names of boxes).
3. Let    if max   max 
Thus when  : A;  : B are compared then    means that B was proved in a more inner box
than A. Note that the metabox condition (3) of denition 9.2.1 is equivalent to the requirement
that whenever we perform modus ponens
;A
 : A! B
 : B
we have max  < max .
Denition 9.2.2 Let  be a labelled database.
(a) Let  `W  : Q mean that there is a box proof of Q from  with label  : Q.
(b) Let  `MP1  : Q mean that Q can be proved from  with label  using only the rule of
linear modus ponens MP1.
Example 9.2.3 Let us check the deduction of (A! (B ! C))! ((B ! (A! C)) (see g 9.4)
Note that if we relinquish the requirement that reiterations must be used only as tickets the box
proof above will go through for B = B1 ! B2. That is we can prove in that case that
? ` (A! ((B1 ! B2)! C))! (((B1 ! B2)! (A! C)):
We shall see that the new condition gives rise to the system LE of Linear Entailment.
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Box a1 1 Show B ! (A! C)
2 a1 : A! (B ! C) Assumption
3 a1 : B ! (A! B) from Box a2
Box a2 4 Show A! C
5 a2 : B Assumption
6 a2a3 : A! C from Box a3
Boxa3 7 Show C
8 a3 : A Assumption
9 a1 : A! (B ! C) reiteration
10 a1a3 : B ! C modus ponens
11 To obtain C we must bring in B.
12 We can do that only if B has the
13 form B1 ! B2. Even if B has
14 this form we cannot use it with
15 B ! C because whatever reiterations
16 we bring in must be used as tickets.
Figure 9.5:
Box a1 1 show (B ! C)! (A! C)
2 a1 : A! B assumption
3 a2 : (B ! C)! (A! C) from Box a2
Box a2 4 show A ! C
5 a2 : B ! C assumption
6 a2a1 : A! C from Box a3
Box a3 7 show C
8 a3 : A assumption
9 a1 : A! B reiteration
10 a1a3 : B modus ponens
11 a2 : B ! C reiteration
12 a2a1a3 : C modus ponens
exit 13 a2a1 : A! C
exit 14 a1 : (B ! C)! (A! C)
exit 15 ? : (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
Figure 9.6:
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Example 9.2.4 Consider:
? ` (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C)):
Try the following box (g 9.6):
The logicW can be weakened, to obtain the logic CL, concatenation logic, the most basic logic
of resource, dened below. Both logics are further studied in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter.
Denition 9.2.5 Consider the following logics, dened by varying the restrictions of 9.2.1.
1. The logic CL obtained by strengthening the modus ponens rule of (1) of 9.2.1 and requiring
that a modus ponens on A and A! B is allowed only if the reiteration A! B comes from
an earlier box than the earliest of the reiterations used in proving A. In the notation of (2)
of 9.2.1, this means that if a is the name of the current box then max   min   fag.
2. The logic TE is obtained by abandoning the restriction  \  =  in the modus ponens.
3. Linear logic LL is obtained by abandoning restriction (3) of denition 9.2.1 and allowing for
any formula to be reiterated and be used in any way, either as a ticket or as a minor. The
only remaining restriction in the box discipline of linear logic is that formulas be used exactly
once. See example 9.2.3
4. The logic LE of linear entailment allows for reiteratins to be used as minors but the reitera-
tions themselves can be only of implicational form.
Remark 9.2.6 (a) Consider a renement on the labelling and Modus Ponens which yields the
logic CL (of 9.2.5 above) in a dierent way. Consider the following discipline. Labels are
sequences of atomic labels. Propagation of labels follows the rule:
 : A
 : A! B
 : B
where \" is the result of concatentation of the sequences and provided  6= ?.
To show  : A! B, we open a box with assumption a : A, \a" a new atomic label. If we get
B in the box with label a, then we can exit with  : A! B. Notice that B must be obtained
with \a" appended to the right hand side of the sequence.
Here are the boxes proving the proposed axioms of CL.
Show (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B)). See g 9.7.
Compare the proof of the axiom (A ! B) ! ((B ! C) ! (A ! C)) as given in 9.2.4.
The label propagation does follow our rules, however, the proof cannot go through because the
exit from box a2 is not legal in our discipline. The label a2 is not the right hand most one.
Similarly 9.2.3 cannot go through. (A ! (B ! C)) ! (B ! (A ! C)) is blocked. We can
bring in B in Box a3 of the above example and get a1a3a2 : C but we cannot exit box a3 again
because the label a3 is not the right and most one. Compare with 2.2.8.
Remark 9.2.7 The purpose of this remark is to show that there is a trade-o between label prop-
agation rules and metabox reiteration rules. In the logic W, we can reiterate only implications.
However, we can modify the labeling system to achieve the same eect. To see this, we now give a
dierent labelling discipline for W. A label has the form of a pair ; a where  is a multiset and
a is an atomic label. Essentially ; a is nothing but a multiset with one designated element. New
assumptions are labelled ?; a. We allow for the designated element not to exist. We adopt the
following two rules:
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Box a1 1 Show (C ! A)! (C ! B)
2 a1 : A! B Assumption
3 a1 : (C ! A)! (C ! B) from Box a2
Box a2 4 C ! B
5 a2 : C ! A Assumption
6 a2a3 : C ! B from Box a3
Box a3 7 Show B
8 a3 : C Assumption
9 a2 : C ! A reiteration
10 a2a3 : A modus ponens
11 a1 : A! B reiteration
12 a1a2a3 : B modus ponens
exit 13 a1a2 : C ! B
exit 14 a1 : (C ! A)! (C ! B)
exit 15 ? : (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
Figure 9.7:
1.
; a : A
; b : A! B
 [  [ fbg; a
provided ( [ fbg) \ ( [ fag) = ?;
and the box rule:
2.
?; a : A
; b : B
exit 0 : A! B, provided (1) 0 =  and a = b or (2) 0 =    fag and b = ? and a 2 .
In the box rule a must be the designated element of the label of the conclusion. If the assumption
is labelled ?; a and the conclusion is ;? then we can still exit with    fag;? provided a 2 .
The proof of (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C)) will go through. See g 9.8.
The proof of (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)) will not go through. See g 9.9 and compare
with g 9.5.
If we drop the side condition on b in the box rule (b) above and read the labels as sets, we get
the logic TE. Consider for example (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C)). See g 9.10.
Remark 9.2.8 [The logic BR1] This logic is what we consider the logic of basic resource. The
intuition behind it is that each assumption can be used at most once but it is allowed that assump-
tions are not used at all. It can be dened as a Hilbert system with modus ponens and the axioms
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1 ?; a1;A! B Assumption
2 ?; a2 : B ! C Assumption
3 ?; a1 : A! B reiteration
4 fa1g; a3 : B MP1
5 ?; a2 : B ! C reiteration
6 fa1; a2g; a3 : C MP1
exit 7 fa1; a2g;? : A! C
exit 8 fa1g;? : (B ! C)! (A! C)
exit 9 ?;? : (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
Figure 9.8:
1 ?; a1 : A! (B ! C) Assumption
2 ?; a2 : B Assumption
3 ?; a3 : A Assumption
4 ?; a1 : A! (B ! C) reiteration
5 fa1g; a3 : B ! C MP1
6 ?; a2 : B reiteration
7 fa1; a2g; a2 : C MP1
8 We cannot exit because a3 is not
9 the rightmost element in the sequence
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1 ?; a1 : A! (B ! C) assumption
2 ?; a2 : A! B assumption
3 ?; a3 : A assumption
4 ?; a2 : A! B reiteration
5 fa2g; a3 : B MP
6 ?; a1 : A! (B ! C) reiteration
7 fa1g; a3 : B ! C MP
8 fa1; a2; a3g; a3 : C MP
exit 9 fa1; a2g;? : A! C
exit 10 fa1g;? : (A! B)! (A! C)
exit 11 ?;? : (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C))
Figure 9.10:
(1)-(3), 6(?); 7(?) of 9.1.1. It is essentially intuitionistic logic without the distribution axiom. If
we drop 6(?) from BR1, we get linear logic.
The labelling discipline for BR1 is as follows: Labels are multisets of atomic labels. Assump-
tions always get new atomic labels. Modus ponens propagates labels in the usual way with the
following side condition:
 : A
 : A! B
 [  : B provided  \  = ?.
To show  : A! B we open a box, assume fag : A, with a new atomic label a and show  : B.
It is not required that A be used in the proof (ie a 2 ). We exit with  =    fag.
Example 9.2.9 We show that in the system CL, the following rule holds:
RT-Rule (right transitivity rules):
` A! B
` (B ! C)! (A! C)
where ` D means ? ` ? : D.
We show that by looking at the CL metabox discipline. Since we assume ` A! B, we assume
that there exists a box of the form (see g 9.11)
Box a2 1





lk 5 a2 : B
exit 6 ? : A! B
Figure 9.11:
We want to show (B ! C)! (A! C). Fig 9.12 below gives the successful box.
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1 Show A! C
2 a1 : B ! C Assumption
3 a1 : A! C from box
l1 4 a2 : A Assumption
5 continue with proof lines
6 l2; : : : ; lk as in box a2 of F igure 9:11
lk 7 a2 : B
m1 8 a1 : B ! C reiteration
m2 9 a1a2 : C modus ponens
exit 10 a1 : A! C
exit 11 ? : (B ! C)! (A! C)
Figure 9.12:
9.3 Peirce's axiom and the restart rule
Denition 9.3.1 (The Logic WC) We now show the box conditions corresponding to the addi-
tional axiom (Peirce's Axiom)
((A! B)! A)! A:
We modify condition 2 of the box rules of 9.2.1 by allowing a box to show A! B to be successful
if either B is proved or some earlier goal of an external box is proved. This rule I call the Restart
Rule.
Restart Rule
As in Fig 9.13:
1 Show previous goals B1; : : : ; Bn
2 Show B





6  : Bi; a1 2 ; for some i such that i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
exit 7   fa1g : A! B
Figure 9.13:
Note that we exit with:
A! B with label   fa1g
This is best explained by example.
Example 9.3.2 From the assumptions (A! B)! A show A. See g 9.14.
Note that although this axiom, Peirce's Axiom, usually gives us classical logic, it does not give
us that much more in this case. (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)) still cannot be proved.
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1 Show A
2 a1 : ((A! B)! A) assumption
3 ? : A! B from box
4 show B, previous goal A
5 a2 : A Assumption
6 a2 : A repetition of previous line
7 success by restart
8 a2 : A
9 Success of box because we showed an earlier goal.
exit 10 ? : (A! B)
11 a1 : A modus ponens with (3) and (2)
Figure 9.14:
Example 9.3.3 Let us re-examine 9.2.3 in the logic WC (see g 9.15).
Example 9.3.4 Let us check whether we can prove A! ((A! B)! A): (See g 9.16)
We now show the correspondence between Peirce's axiom and the Restart Rule. Suppose we have
a box of the form (see g 9.17):
The external box wants to show A ! B. In the course of the proof we want to show C ! D.
We open a box to show C and succeed in the box to show B. We really need to show D. How do
we proceed? The Restart Rule says, since B was a previous goal of an external box we can succeed
(accept B instead of D).
To justify the Restart Rule, imagine for a moment that we had the extra assumption a2 : (B !
D) in the external box. Then everything is alright. We bring it in (reiteration) and use it as a
ticket with the  : B which we already have and get ; a2 : D. Since a1 2 A already, we can exit
with (  fa1g); a2 : C ! D.
You may say that this is ne, but the problem which we have solved is not the original problem,
but the following one (see g 9.18):
or equivalently (see g 9.19):
This is not the original problem. However, if we have all instances of the Peirce's Axiom, as
further assumptions, we can use ((B ! D)! B)! B) and modus ponens and get B.
Theorem 9.3.5 Let  be a labelled database and assume  `WC  : Q (using the Restart Rule).
Then there exist another box proof of  : Q from  [0, where 0 is a nite set of substitutions
of Peirce's axiom all labelled ?.
Proof. By induction on the number n of nested boxes which use Restart.
Case n = 0
There is nothing to prove.
Case n  1
Assume that Restart is used in m inner boxes. We eliminate the use of Restart systematically.
Choose an inner box, say Box 2. We have the situation (see g 9.20):
If in the inner box Restart is not used (ie D is proved) then we do nothing. Consider a box
where B is proved, and an appeal to Restart is made. We want to prove B from A in W with the
use of the extra assumption ((B ! D)! B)! B and without Restart.
Replace box 1 by the following proof
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Box a1 1 Show B ! (A! C)
2 a1 : A! (B ! C) Assumption
3 a1 : B ! (A! C) from Box a2
Box a2 4 Show A! C; previous goal B ! (A! C)
5 a2 : B Assumption
6 a1a2 : A! C from Box a3
Box a3 7 Show C, Previous goals B ! (A! C); A! C
8 Show C
9 a3 : A
10 a1 : A! (B ! C)
11 a1a3 : B ! C
12 B cannot be brought in.




1 Show (A! B)! A
2 a1 : A Assumption
3 a1 : A! (B ! A) from Box
4 Show A
5 a2 : A! B Assumption
6 We cannot bring A in here. Even if we could,
7 A! B will not have been used in the proof.
8
Figure 9.16:
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1 Show B
2 a1 : A Assumption
line(l; l0) 3 C ! D from Box
4 Show D, previous goal B
5 b1 : C Assumption
6
...




2 a1 : A Assumption








1 Show (B ! D)! B
2 a1 : A Assumption
3 a1 : (B ! D)! D from Box a2
Box a2 4 Show B
5 a2 : B ! D Assumption
6 a1a3 : B from Box a3
Box a3 7 Show D
8 a3 : C Assumption
9
...
10 a1a3 : D
11 a1a3 : B
12 a1 : (B ! D)! B
Figure 9.19:
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Box 1 1 Show B
2 a1 : A Assumption
3 a2 : B ! D Assumption
4 Proof lines
5 leading to Box 2
6 below
7 some label:C ! D from Box 2
Box 2 8 Show D






line -1 ?: ((B ! D)! B)! B (assumption)
(or reiteration if we put all instances of Peirce's Axiom at the very beginning of the entire
deduction.)
Line 0: show A! B from box 1* (see g 9.21)
The above modication can be done for every inner box of the form (see g 9.22)
We can thus not use Restart, but we need extra instances of Peirce's axiom as axioms.
This completes the induction step and the proof of 9.3.5. 
Remark 9.3.6 We now consider the metabox discipline for Rose's axiom Rn, namely:
((An ! B)! A)! A):
We modify the Restart Rule essentially as follows. Suppose we are at an inner box and the box goal
is to show B with some label. The goal A was a goal of some outer box. The Restart rule for Rn
allows one to prove, in the inner box, the goal A n-times, possibly with dierent labels 1; : : : ; n.
These n proofs of A then count as a proof of B with label 12 : : : n. Note that for n = 1 this
is the old restart rule for Peirce's axiom. To show B we show  : A and thus get  : B, with the
same label .
The reader may ask what does it mean to show A n times? If A can be shown at least once,
with label , then one can count that n times and say we shown B with label  : : : n times.
Example 9.3.7 Show ((A ! (A ! B)) ! A) ! A in the logic with R2. Use the following box:
(see g 9.23)
Notice that in the inner box we could have also chosen to show A twice with label a3. This
would have given us a3a3 : B which would have not allowed us to exit from the a2 box.
Theorem 9.3.8 The Rn-restart rule characterises the axiom Rn.
Proof. We show soundness. Suppose in the inner box we want to show A. Since ? : ((An !
B) ! A) ! A is a theorem of the logic Rn, if we show  : (An ! B) ! A we can deduce by
modus ponens  : A.
So let us try to show  : (An ! B)! A. How do we do that? We open a box a1 (see g 9.24):
Note that a1 will not be discharged until the exit of box a1. The restart rule allows us not to
write box a1 explicitly. Completeness follows from the fact that axiom Rn can be proved using the
restart rule Rn. 
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Box 1 1 Show B
2 a1 : A Assumption
3 (B ! D)! B: from box 1  
Box 1   4 Show B
5 ? : B ! D Assumption
6
... proceed as in proof
7
... lines leading to
8
... Box 1 in gure 9.20
9 some label: C ! D from Box 2
Box 2 10 Show D
11 b1 : C Assumption
12
...




16 proof of box 1 stops here.
17 We continue:
18 B ! D reiteration
19 D MP1




... proceed as in outer box 1 of gure 9.20
23  : B
exit 24 (B ! D)! B
25 ? : ((B ! D)! B)! B reiteration of axiom
26 a1 : B MP1
exit 27 A! B
Figure 9.21:
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1 Show a1 : A
2 a1 : A! (A! B))! A Assumption
3 ? : A! (A! B); from box 1
4
...
Box 1 5 Show a2 : A! B
6 a2 : A Assumption
7 a2 : A! B from Box 2
Box 2 8 Show a3 : B
9 a3 : A Assumption
10 a2a3 : B we use the restart rule, since we have A twice,
11 once with a3 and once with a2
exit 12 a2 : A! B
exit 13 ? : A! (A! B)
14 a1 : A modus ponens
exit 15 ? : ((A! (A! B))! A)! A
Figure 9.23:
Box a1 1 Show A
2 a1 : A! (A! : : : (A! B) : : :) Assumption
3 We try and get A in this box.
4 Suppose at some inner box we want to show B
5 Show B
6 show 1 : A;2 : A : : : n : A;
7 i.e. show A n times and do modus
8 ponens with a1 : A! (: : : A! B)
9 and get a11 : : : n : B
10 continue to argue and get a1 : A
exit 11  : A! (A! : : : (A! B)! A
Figure 9.24:
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Chapter 10
Proof Theory for Resource Logics
10.1 Concatenation logic and linear logic
This section will present in detail one basic system which we call concatenation logic CL. It is
intimately connected with associative concatenation and is as basic to the family of various resource
logical systems, as concatenation is basic to functions and categories. The best way to present it
is in the traditional manner, as a Hilbert system and study its properties again in a conservative
way. We have the following objectives for CL:
 present a basic logic for resource which is weaker than linear logic and the well known Lambek
calculus from categorical grammar.
 illustrate on this logic our ideas of LDS, metalangauge features, and control derivation prop-
erties.
 give semantics for this logic and extend this semantics to linear logic.
 give semantical meaning to some of the puzzles of linear logic.
 show that CD-logics involve three orthogonal features which can be mixed. These are:
1. Control derivation and resource considerations.
2. Hilbert simulation (via connectives) of meta-level features.
3. Symmetrical simulation of control features (parallel to the proof nets of linear logic).











(B ! C)! (A! C)
Notice that this logic is very weak. We cannot prove (as will be seen from the semantics) that:
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3. (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)),
Adding axiom (3) gives us the Hilbert system LL of linear implication. This system is still
relatively weak. It cannot prove (4) nor (5) below:
4. A! ((A! B)! B), nor
5. (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
Remark 10.1.2 In categorical terms axiom 2 is Geach's principle:
(A;B)) ((C;A); (C;B)):
Lambek calculus allows for 3., eg Lambek allows both:
A; (A;B)) B
(A;B); A) B
while we allow only the second
CL ` (A! B)! (A! B)
while
CL 6` A! ((A! B)! B)
Denition 10.1.3 (Proof from assumptions in the Hilbert System CL) 1. A database
 is a sequence of formulas A1; : : : An. A database can be presented either as a seqeunce
(A1; : : : ; An) or as a set of labelled formulas of the form t1 : A1; : : : tn : An, with the additional
conguration t1 < : : : < tn. t1 : : : tn are atomic labels.
2. We say `CL B i there is an annotated sequence of formulas of the form 1; : : : ; m = B
(the annotation may not be explicitly exhibited) such that each element is annotated either
as an axiom (in which case it is indeed an instance of an axiom) or is annotated as (and is
indeed) obtained from previous elements using MP or RT.
3. Let  = fti : Aig; t1 <; : : : ; < tn be a database. We say  `CL B i there exists an
annotated sequence 0; C0; : : : ; m : Cm with Cm = B such that each element of the sequence
is either in  or is a theorem (ie `CL i) or is obtained from previous elements using modus
ponens.
4. If Cj is obtained from Ci and Ck = Ci ! Cj by modus ponens then max(k) < min(i) and
j = ki, where `' denotes concetenation of  then .
5. If i = ? then CL ` Bi.
Remark 10.1.4 1. Note that in the previous denition the label m of B must be
m = (t1; : : : ; tn)
2. If t1 : A ! A appars in the database, then  : A ! A can appear in the proof either as an
assumption, with  = t1 or as an instance of a theorem, in which case  = ?.
Later, we shall prove the deduction theorem for CL. The above distinction then becomes im-
portant. We do not have A ! ((A ! A) ! A) as a CL theorem. By the deduction theorem, we
need to show for t1 < t2
t1 : A; t2 : A! A ` A
and A! A has to be used in the proof. However, since t2 > t1, we canot apply modus ponens, as
the next example discusses.
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1 ` B because we have A! B;A;B as proof. Notice the assumptions appear in the proof in
the same order as they appear in the database. Each assumption appears once exactly and tickets
appear to the left of minor premisses. The above proof will not do for 2 ` B since the order of
the assumptions in the proof is not the same as in 2.
Example 10.1.6 Consider 3:
1. A! (A! B)
2. A
Consider the \proof" A! (A! B); A;A! B;B. This \proof" is not acceptable, because to get B
we use MP with A as minor which is to the left of the ticket. If we add A! (A! B); A;A! B;B
we have used A twice. The proof is valid for the database 4:
1. A! (A! B)
2. A
3. A
Notice that if we do not require that the minor comes after the ticket in MP then we need to count
uses of assumptions in MP, if we want to control how many times an assumption is used.
The notion  ` B was dened using the notion of `CL A. In the proof of B from , we \landed"
theorems. Can we suggest a direct discipline for proving  to B using only ?
The answer is `yes' within the framework of labelled deducitve systems.
Denition 10.1.7 (LDS Discipline for CL) We assume our assumptions are labelled as a se-
quence a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An; a;< : : : < an. Our proof procedures use metaboxes. We use the
following rules:
1. Denition of Metabox Level 0
A proof is a sequence of lines. Each line contains a labelled formula and a justication. The
following three cases can be used:
(a) The line contains an assumption ai : Ai and the justication says \assumption".
(b) The line contains  : B and the justication says \from two previous lines by MP"
and there are two previous lines, one with  : A! B and one with  : A, and A is not
justied as a \reiteration".
Notice the order of concatenation of the labels.
We have further condition that max() < min().
(c) The line is  : A and it is justied as \reiteration".
258 CHAPTER 10. PROOF THEORY FOR RESOURCE LOGICS
2. Example
a1 : C ! (A! B) assumption
a2 : C assumption
a3 : D ! A assumption
a4 : D assumption
a1a2 : A! B MP
a3a4 : A MP
a1a2a3a4 : B MP
3. Metabox of Level n+ 1
A proof is a sequence of lines. Each line contains a labelled formula and a justication. The
following four cases can be used:
(a) The line contains an assumption ai : Ai and the justication says \assumption".
(b) The line contains  : B and the justication says \from two previous lines by MP" and
there are two previous lines one with  : A ! B and one with  : A and the following
holds:
i. A is not justied as \reiteration".
ii. max() < min()
Notice the order of concatenation of the labels. The reader should note that (i) above
follows from (ii).
(c) The line is  : A and it is justied as \reiteration".
(d) The line is  : A ! B and the justication is \from the metabox of level m  n"
where line 1 of the metabox is a : A where a is a new atomic label and its ordering is
stipulated to be bigger than any atomic label in any assumption or reiteration in previous
lines of the metabox of level n + 1. The reiterations of the metabox of level m are all
implicational formulas proved in previous lines of the metabox of level n+1. These can
be enumerated as the next lines 2, 3, 4, : : : of the metabox of level m. (In practice one
can leave pointers or bring them in as needed.) The last line of the metabox of level m
is a : B and appropriate justication is present.
Example 10.1.8 Show ? ` (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B)).
Proof. Line 1 : ? : (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B)) \from box a", see Fig 10.1.
In practice, one does not bring in reiterations nor does one use excessive indices. Thus one can
write the previous proof of Figure 10.1 as in Figure 10.2. 
Example 10.1.9 Another example is in Figure 10.3.
Denition 10.1.10 1. a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An; a1 < : : : < an m B if and only if (def) there
exists a metabox proof of level  m with assumptions exactly a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An with the
last line with a1 : : : an : B.
2.  CL B i  m B for some m
Remark 10.1.11 The previous denition actually gave a natural deduction formulation for CL.
The two rules are ! Introduction and ! Elimination. The complete denition is as follows:
D

ata structure for assumptions
The assumptions are ordered in a sequence a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An with a1 < a2 < : : : < an.
! Elimination Rule
 : A
 : A! B
 : B
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Box a 1
2 a : A! B Assumption
3 a : (C ! A)! (C ! B) From Box b
Box b 4 Show C ! B
5 b : C ! A Assumption
6 a : A! B Reiteration
7 ab : C ! B From Box c
Box c 8 Show B
9 c : C Assumption
10 b : C ! A Reiteration
11 a : A! B Reiteration
12 bc : A From 9; 10




1 Show (A! B)! [(C ! A)! (C ! B)]
Box a 2 Show (C ! A)! (C ! B)
3 a : A! B Assumption
4 a : (C ! A)! (C ! B) From Box b
Box b 5 Show C ! B
6 b : C ! A Assumption
7 ab : C ! B From Box c
Box c 8 Show B
9 c : C Assumption
10 bc : A
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1 Show ? : (C ! (A! B))! (C ! ((D ! A)! (D ! B)))
2 a1 : C ! (A! B) Assumption
3 a1 : C ! ((D ! A)! (D ! B)) from Box
4 a2 : C Assumption
5 a1 : C ! (A! B) Reiteration
6 a1a2 : A! B from 4 and 5
7 a1a2 : (D ! A)! (D ! B) from Box
8 a3 : D ! A Assumption
9 a1a2a3 : D ! B from Box
10 a4 : D Assumption
11 a3a4 : A from 8; 10
12 a1a2 : A! B Reiteration
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max() < min().
! Introduction Rule
To show  : A ! B, open a new box and get a new label a and temporarily append a : A to the
current sequence of assumptions. Proceed to prove B with label exactly a. When successful exit
the box and continue the main proof (with a : A deleted from the current sequence of assumptions).
We now want to prove a deduction theorem for  `CL B.
Theorem 10.1.12 (Deduction theorem for CL)
(A1; : : : ; An) `CL B i `CL A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :):
Proof.
1. Assume `CL A1 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :).
We show (A1; : : : ; An) `CL B. The following is a proof:
A1 ! (: : :! (An ! B) : : :) theorem
A1 assumption
A2 ! (A3 ! : : : (An ! B) : : :) MP
A2 assumption
...
An ! B MP
An assumption
B MP
Note that our conditions about the support for each line of the proof are satised.
2. Assume (A1; : : : ; An) `CL B. We want to show that
`CL A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :)
We prove this by induction on the length k of the proof of t1; : : : ; tn : B from t1 : A1; : : : ; tn :
An; t1 < : : : ; < tn. Let 1 : C1; : : : ; k : Ck be the proof with Ck = B.
Case k = 1
Subcase 1 We have `CL B and (A1; : : : ; An) = ?, the empty sequence. Then clearly the
theorem holds.
Subcase 2 We have B = A1; n = 1 and clearly `CL A1 ! B is a theorem.
Case k + 1
Subcase 1 B is a theorem. Since k = ? again (t1; : : : ; tn) = ? and we have here a direct
proof of B from some other theorems.
Subcase 2 B is an assumption. Then A1 = B as k = (t1; : : : ; tn) and `CL A1 ! B.
Subcase 3 B is obtained from two previous lines using modus ponens. Let the two lines be
i : Ci and j : Ci ! B. Then we have maxi < mini and ji = t1 : : : tn. These are the
conditions of a successful proof.
So for some 1  m < n
j = t1 : : : tn
i = tm+1 : : : tn
This implies by denition that
(A1; : : : ; Am) `CL A! B
and
(Am+1; : : : ; An) `CL A:
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By the induction hypothesis:
`CL A1 ! : : :! (Am ! (A! B) : : :)
`CL Am+1 ! (: : :! (An ! A) : : :):
We need to show that
`CL A1 ! (A2 ! : : : (Am ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :)
This follows from lemma 10.1.13 below.

Lemma 10.1.13 (Cut for CL) If L is an extension of CL then (1) and (2) below imply (3)
below:
1. `L (A1 ! : : :! (An ! (A! B)) : : :)
2. `L D1 ! : : :! (Dm ! A) : : :)
3. `L A1 ! : : :! (An ! (D1 ! : : :! (Dm ! B) : : :)
Proof. By induction on m and n.
Case m = n = 1
We have to show that (1) and (2) imply (3):
1. `L A1 ! (A! B)
2. `L (D1 ! A)
3. `L A1 ! (D1 ! B)
From the RT-rule, we get using (2) that
4. `L (A! B)! (D1 ! B)
and using left transitivity we get
5. (A1 ! (A! B))! (A1 ! (D1 ! B))
we get (3) by modus ponens of (1) and (5).
Case m = 1; n arbitrary
From `L D1 ! A we get `L (A! B)! (D1 ! B) and by induction on n we prove:
`L (A1 ! : : :! (An ! (A! B) : : :)! (A1 ! : : :! An ! (D1 ! B) : : :)
For n = 1 this follows from the left transitivity axiom. Assume the above for n and get it
for n+ 1 by another application of the left transitivity axiom.
Case m+ 1; n arbitrary
We have
`L (A! B)! ((Dm+1 ! A)! (Dm+1 ! B))
hence
`L A1 ! : : :! (An ! (A! B)) : : :)! ((A1 ! : : :!
(An ! ((Dm+1 ! A)! (Dm+1 ! B)) : : :)
and therefore
`L A1 ! : : :! (An ! (Dm+1 ! A)! (Dm+1 ! B) : : :)
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on the other hand, we have
`L D1 ! : : : (Dm ! (Dm+1 ! A) : : :)
hence by the induction hypothesis we get
`L A1 ! : : :! (An ! (D1 ! : : : (Dm ! (Dm+1 ! B) : : :)
This completes the proof of lemma 10.1.13.

Remark 10.1.14 Note that in CL the rule of lemma 10.1.13 is equivalent to the left transitivity
axiom.
Let X = A! B; Y1 = C ! A; Y2 = C;U = A; V = B, then
` X ! (U ! V )
is
` (A! B)! (A! B)
and
` Y1 ! (Y2 ! U)
is
` (C ! A)! (C ! A)
by the rule we get
` X ! (Y1 ! (Y2 ! V ))
which is
` (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B)):
Theorem 10.1.15 (Cut Rule for `CL) (A1; : : : ; An; B;C1; : : : ; Cm) `CL X and (B1; : : : ; Bk `
B imply
(A1; : : : ; An; B1; : : : ; Bk; C1; : : : ; Cm) `CL X
Proof. Follows from lemma 10.1.13, because by theorem 10.1.12 we have:
`CL A1 ! : : :! (An ! (B ! (C1 ! : : :! (Cm ! X) : : :)
and
`CL B1 ! : : :! (Bk ! B) : : :)

Theorem 10.1.16 (Cut rule for CL) (1) and (2) imply (3).
1. a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An; b : B CL a1 : : : anb : X
a1 < a2 < : : : < an < b
ai; b atomic.
2. b1 : B1; : : : ; bk : Bk CL b1 : : : bk : B
b1 < b2 < : : : < bn; bi atomic.
3. a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An; b1 : B1; : : : ; bk : Bk CL a1 : : : anb1 : : : bk : X
a1 < a2 < : : : < an < b1 < b2 < : : : < bk.
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Proof. Assume (1) and (2) hold with metaboxes M1 of level m1 and M2 of level m2. We would
like to exhibit a metabox M which proves (3).







We can continue the proof of the new metabox by bringing in metabox M2. This metabox will
prove B with label b1 : : : bk. We now have the following situation:
a1 : A1 assumption
...
bk : Bk assumption
lines as in M2
b1 : : : bk : B
We would like now to continue with Metabox M1 using the assumptions A1 : : : An and the B
we have just proved. The problem may be that metabox M1 is using B with label b : B; a1 < a2 <
: : : < an < b while the available B in our new metabox has label b1 : : : bk. Suppose we call the
sequence b = b1 : : : bk. Certainly an < min(b) < max(b). The metabox operations on labels
are concatenations of b (or b) with other labels, in which case we do not care if b or b is used
and also, when we use modus ponens
 : C
 : C ! D
we require
max < min. When b is replaced by b, we get ; . Since both b and b are greater than
an, we have that
max = max
min = min
Let M1 be the box which is like M1 except that B is labelled b
.
The steps in M1 will still be correct. We can thus continue and get a1 : : : anb
 : X in box M1 .










Theorem 10.1.17 (Equivalence of Hilbert and LDS formulations) `CL B i ? CL B.
Proof.
1. We show that `CL B implies ? `CL B.
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First we show that the CL Hilbert Axioms are Box provable, ie that ?;CL A ! A and
? CL (A ! B) ! ((C ! A) ! (C ! B)). These are done in the examples. We have to
check the RT rule, ie
? CL A! B
:
? CL (B ! C)! (A! C)





We show a metabox for ? CL (B ! C)! (A! C) (gure 10-4).
1 a : B ! C Assumption
2 a : A! C From Box
3 b : A Assumption
Box M 4
5 Proof lines
6 of Box M
7 b : B
8 a : B ! C Reiteration
9 ab : C MP
exit 10 a : A! C
Figure 10.4:
Second we show that  is closed under modus ponens, namely that ? CL A ! B and
? CL A imply ? CL B. This we get by the cut rule on CL. This completes the proof
of (1).
2. We now show that if ? CL B then `CL B.
This we prove by the following lemma.
Lemma 10.1.18 Let M be a CL metabox proof of b : B from a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An; a1 < a2 <
: : : < an. Here we assume that each new assumption is labelled by a unique new atomic label.
Then for each line of the form d1 : : : dk : D in the box M where di are atomic, we have
`CL D1 ! (D2 ! : : :! (Dk ! D) : : :)
where Di is the formula whose label is di.
Proof. Each line appears uniquely in the nested box in M and has a line number. We use
induction. Each line in the metabox M is one of the following cases:
1. d : D assumption, in which case `CL D ! D,
2. d1 : : : dk; e1 : : : em : D
obtained from d1 : : : dk : E ! D and e1 : : : em : E by modus ponens and max(di) < min(ei).
By the induction hypothesis on earlier lines we have
`CL E1 ! : : :! (Em ! E) : : :)
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and
`CL D1 ! : : :! (Dk ! (E ! D) : : :):
Hence by a previous lemma
` D1 ! : : :! (Dk ! (E1 ! : : : (Em ! D) : : :)
3. d1 : : : dk : E ! D is obtained from a box (gure 10.5)
e : E assumption





Since `CL E ! E and all reiterations inside the box satisfy the lemma, by the induction
hypothesis, we get
`CL D1 ! (D2 ! : : : (Dk ! (E ! D) : : :):

This completes the proof of Theorem 10.1.17. 
Theorem 10.1.19
 `CL B i  CL B:
Proof. Assume  = (a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An), then
(A1; : : : An) `CL B i
`CL A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :)
i ? CL A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :)
i  CL B. 
Lemma 10.1.20 In CL, (1) is equivalent to (2), where ` is as in 10.1.3
1. ` (A! B)! (D1 ! (D2 ! : : :! Dn) : : :)
2. There exists a k such that ` D1 ! (: : :! (Dk ! A) : : :)
` B ! (Dk+1 ! (: : :! Dn) : : :).
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Proof. Assume (1), then by 10.1.12
t : A! B; d1 : D1; : : : ; dn 1 : Dn 1 ` td1 : : : dn 1 : Dn:
t < d1 < d2 < : : : < dn 1
By the CL proof discipline, there is a sequence
1 : E1; : : : ; m : Em;
where each k : Ek is either a theorem of the logic with i = ? or is obtained from previous two
lines by modus ponens, namely we have:
i : Ei; j : Ei ! Ek
with j < i; max(j) < min(i) and k = ji.
A! B can be used only as a ticket because it is the rst in the sequence. Thus for some i : A
and j : B, we have j = ti and min(i) > t. We claim that for some k; i = d1 : : : dk. This
claim follows from Remark 10.1.4 because supports cannot have gaps in them. It now follows that
there is a proof of td1; : : : ; dn 1 : Dn from the data
b : B; dk+1 : Dk+1; : : : ; dn 1 : Dn 1
with b < dk+1 < : : : < dn 1, where we have renamed td1 : : : dk = b. Similarly, there is a proof of
A from the data d1 : D1; : : : ; ; dk : Dk. Thus we have shown
` D1 ! : : :! (Dk ! A) : : :)
and
` B ! (Dk+1 ! : : :! Dn) : : :):
Assume (2), show (1). Again using the deduction theorem assume
t : A! B
di : Di; i = 1; : : : n  1
we want to show td1 : : : dn 1 : Dn.
From the rst assumption we get d1 : : : dk : A, then using t : A! B we get td1 : : : dk : B, then
by modus ponens we get td1 : : : dk : Dk+1 ! (: : :! Dn) : : :). We continue to get td1 : : : dn 1 : Dn.

Denition 10.1.21 In CL, let (A1; : : : ; An); (B1; : : : ; Bm) be two sequences of formulas, with
m  n. Dene A1; : : : ; An) `CL (B1; : : : ; Bm) i when we label the data a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An, with
a1 < a2 < : : : < an there exist 1  k1 < k2 < : : : < km  n such that for each 1  i  m
a1 : A1; : : : ; ak1 1 : Ak1 1 `CL a1 : : : ak1 1 : B1
...
akm+1 : Akm+1; : : : ; an : An `CL akm+1 : : : an : Bm
Example 10.1.22 We have
(A! B;A;C ! D;C) `CL (B;D):
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10.2 Concatenation logic with additional connectives
We will progressively add in this section various connectives to the basic CL implication.
Denition 10.2.1 Let L be any extension of CL. We dene several extensions of L with new
connectives and axioms as follows:
1. Let L(
) be the extension of L with the binary connective 
. Add the following axioms to
those of L of denition 10.1.1
(a) A! (B ! (A
B))
(b) ((A! (B ! C))! ((A
B)! C))
2. Let L(:) be the extension of L with a unary connective : and the following axioms.
(a) ::A$ A
(b) (:(A! :B)! C]$ (A! (B ! C))
(c) The rule
` A! B
` :B ! :A
3. Let L([p ) be the extension with the additional binary [p and the axioms:
(a) ((A! B)[p C)$ (A! (B[p C))
(b)
` A! A0;` B ! B0
` A[p B ! A0[p B0
4. Let L(!) be the system with the additional modality ! and the axioms:
(a) !A! A
(b) !A! (B !!A)
(c)
` C ! (q ! A)
; q atomic not in C or A` C ! A
Remark 10.2.2 1. Note that ` ((A
B)! C)! (A! (B ! C)) holds in L(
).
2. Also notice that 
 is associative. Using axiom (a) we get



















3. Note that in CL(:), the following is provable:
` A! (B ! :(A! :B))
4. Note that in LL(:) the following is provable:
` (A! B)! (:B ! :A)
To show that begin with
`LL(:) A! ((A! B)! B)
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hence
`LL(:) :(A! :(A! B))! B
hence
`LL(:) :B ! (A! :(A! B))
hence
`LL(:) :(:B ! :A)! :(A! B)
hence
`LL(:) (A! B)! (:B ! :A):
5. Note that in LL(:) the following holds:
`LL(:) :B $ (B ! :(B ! B))
To show that observe that
` (B ! B)! (B ! B)
hence
` B ! ((B ! B)! B)
hence
` :(B ! :(B ! B))! B
hence
` :B ! (B ! :(B ! B)):
Further observe that
` B ! ((B ! :(B ! B))! :(B ! B))
hence
` :((B ! :(B ! B))! :(B ! B))! :B
hence
` (B ! :(B ! B))! ((B ! B)! :B)
hence
` (B ! B)! (B ! :(B ! B)! :B)
hence
` (B ! :(B ! B))! :B:
Theorem 10.2.3 In CL(
) and in LL(
) the following holds:
` A
B i ` A and ` B:
Proof.
1. Assume ` A and ` B. Since by axiom (a) ` A! (B ! A
B), we get ` A
B.
2. Assume ` A
B. Let A1; : : : ; An = A
B be a proof sequence of A
B. We show that there
exists another proof of A 
 B of length n0  n, of the form A01; : : : ; A0n0 with A0n0 = A 
 B
such that for some j; k < n0; A0j = A and A
0
k = B and such that every substitution instance
of an axiom in the proof is already in A1; : : : ; An. The proof is by induction on the length n
of the proof of A
B.
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Length 1:
A




B is obtained from previous elements of the sequence using MP or RT. The use of RT does not
arise because it does not yield the form A
B. Thus A
B is obtained from two previous elements
in the sequence, Ar = C1 and As = C1 ! A
B by modus ponens. Let m be the maximal number
such that there are Cm; : : : ; C1 and Cm ! (Cm 1 ! : : :! C1 ! (A
B) : : :) earlier in the proof
such that A 
 B is obtained from them by modus ponens. We examine the cases m = 1;m = 2
and m  3.
Case m = 1
Consider the ticket As = C1 ! A
B.
1. It is either an instance of an axiom, in which case it must be an instance of the identity axiom
X ! X. In this case C1 = A
 B and since C1 is an earlier element Ar of the sequence, by
the induction hypothesis, we have for some j; k < r0; A0j = A and A
0
k = B.
2. It is obtained from earlier elements using RT. Again C1 ! A 
 B is the wrong form for a
result of RT, so this case does not arise.
Case m = 2
C1 ! (A 
 B) is obtained by modus ponens from two earlier elements Ai = C2 and At = C2 !
(C1 ! A
B). Again there are several possiblilities.
1. C2 ! (C1 ! A
B) is an instance of an axiom X ! X, in which case C2 = C1 ! (A
B)
and we have a shorter proof of A
B and we use the induction hypothesis.
2. C2 ! (C1 ! A
B) is an instance of the axiom
(! ( ! ))! (






C2 = ! ( ! )
and we get that we have:
C1 = (
 ) = Ar
C2 = (! ( ! )) = Ai




The current proof contains the steps
Ar = C1 = 
 
At = (! ( ! A
B))! ((
 )! (A
B)); an instance of an axiom
Ai = C2 = ! ( ! A
B)
As = 
  ! (A
B) by modus ponens from Ai and At.
An = A
B by modus ponens from Ar and As:
By the induction hypothesis on r, there exist a proof A01; : : : ; A
0
r0 =  
  with r0  r and
there exist j; k < r0 such that A0j =  and A
0
k = . Further every substitution instance of an
axiom in the A0r proof already appears in the A proof. We can thus produce a shorter proof
of A
B by taking out lines Ar; At and As and leaving the following:
Ai = C2 = ! ( ! A
B)
s :  ! (A
B) modus ponens of Ai with Aj
Am = A
B modus ponens with previous line and Ak.
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By renumbering we get a shorter proof of A
B. We replaced the original proof containing
ArAtAiAsAm with a proof containing Ai, line s and Am. Note that the new proof is built
up from the old lines of the old proof except for one new line  ! A
B.
Now we can use the induction hypothesis on the shorter proof and conclude that there exists
another proof A001 ; : : : ; A
00
n00 = A 
 B such that for some earlier lines in the proof A00k00 and
A00m00 are equal to A and B respectively.
The A00 proof uses some and no more of the substitution instances of axioms which the
original proof uses.
3. C2 ! (C1 ! (A
B)) is an instance of
` ! ( ! (
 )):
In this case C1 = B;C2 = A or in the case of LL(
) we may also have C1 = A;C2 = B and
obviously our condition holds.
4. Now assume that we used the rule RT, in which case for some y, C1 ! y is an earlier element
and C2 = y ! A 
 B is an earlier element. In this case we can cut out the case of RT
and obtain A 
 B directly by MP with C1; C1 ! y and C2. Again we use the induction
hypothesis.
Case m  3:
We now examine the general case. A
B is obtained by modus ponens from earlier Cm; Cm 1; : : : ; C1
and
C = ((Cm ! : : :! (C1 ! (A
B)) : : :):
Assume m was maximal for the use of modus ponens.
We now examine the possibilities for how C was obtained.
1. C is an instance of an axiom of the form
(a) X ! X
(b) (X ! Y )! [(Z ! X)! (Z ! Y )]
(c) ((X ! (Y ! Z))! ((X 
 Y )! Z))
(d) (X ! (Y ! (X 
 Y )))
In the case of LL(
) also
(d0) Y ! (X ! (X 
 Y ))
2. C is obtained by using RT.
3. The case that C was obtained by modus ponens does not arise because we assumed m is
maximal.
We examine each case.
Case 1a
In this case Cm = Cm 1 ! (: : : C1 ! (A
B) : : :). We can cut C out of the proof and get A
B
with a shorter proof.
Case 1b
In this case
Cm = X ! Y
Cm 1 = Z ! X
Cm 2 = Z
Cm 3 ! : : :! (C1 ! A
B) : : :) = Y
The current proof has in it the following lines:
r1: Cm = X ! (Cm 3 ! (: : : (C1 ! (A
B) : : :):
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r2: Cm 1 = Cm 2 ! X
r3: Cm 2
r4: C = Cm ! (Cm 1 ! Cm 2 ! (Cm 3 : : :! (C1 ! (A
B) : : :)
r5: Cm 1 ! (Cm 2 ! : : :! (C1 ! (A
B) : : :)
r6: Cm 2 ! (: : :! (C1 ! (A
B) : : :)
r7: Cm 3 ! (: : :! (C1 ! (A
B) : : :)
Lines r1r2r3 are obtained in an earlier part of the proof. Line r4 is an instance of the axiom and
r5r6 and r7 are obtained by MP.
We can shorten the proof by letting r2 and r3 give us X by MP and using X we get r7 from
r1. Thus we cut out r4 and shorten the proof by one substitution instance of an axiom.
Case 1c
In this case
C = (! ( ! ))! ((
 )! )
Cm = (! ( ! ))
Cm 1 = 
 
Cm 2 ! : : :! (C1 ! (A
B)) : : :) = 
This case is the same as case m = 2 subcase (3). By the induction hypothesis, `  and `  with





(Cm 2 ! (Cm 3 ! : : :! (C1 ! (A
B)) : : :) = X 
 Y:
We must have in this case m = 2; X = A and Y = B and the desired result follows.
Case 1d0
Similar to case 1d.
Case 2
In this case C is obtained by using RT. This means that for some X;Y; Z
` X ! Y
and
C = (Y ! Z)! (X ! Z)
hence
Cm = (Y ! Z)
Cm 1 = X
Cm 2 ! (: : :! (C1 ! (A
B) : : :) = Z
we thus have:
` Cm 1 ! Y
` Cm 1
` Y ! Z
C = (Y ! Z)! (Cm 1 ! Z)
The existing proof, using C is
` Cm 1 ! Y existing subproof
` C = (Y ! Z)! (Cm 1 ! Z) use RT
` Cm = Y ! Z existing subproof
` Cm 1 existing subproof
` Cm 1 ! Z MP
` Z MP
We get Z using RT and two MP.
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We can simplify by cutting out RT as follows:
` Cm 1 ! Y existing
` Cm 1 existing
` Y MP
` Cm = Y ! Z existing
` Z MP
By the induction hypothesis for the overall shorter eventual proof of A
B we get the theorem.
Case 3
C is obtained by modus ponens. This case cannot arise because we assumed m was maximal.
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
The language of CL and that of CL(
) contains only atomic propositions and the implication
or concatenation symbols ! and 
. We want to enrich the language with a unary propositional
function , associating with each atomic q another atom q. We shall eventually stipulate that
q = q, but at this stage this is not needed.
Example 10.2.4 We are now looking for a labelled discipline for CL(
). We have some problems.
Suppose we use the discipline of CL of 10.1.3. Since ` (A ! (B ! C)) $ ((A 
 B) ! C) we
must have the following successful derivations:
1. t1 : A! (B ! C); t2 : A
B ` t1t2 : C; t1 < t2
2. a1 : (A
B)! C; a2 : A; a3 : B ` a1a2a3 : C; a1 < a2 < a3
3. t1 : A! (B ! C); t2 : D ! (A
B); t3 : D ` t1t2t3 : C; t1 < t2 < t3:
The present CL discipline for ` cannot achieve the above. The problem can be seen immediately
when we consider modus ponens. From t1 : C ! (A 
 B) and t2 : C we get t1t2 : A 
 B but we
have no labels a1 : A and a2 : B to continue the deduction and use with A ! (B ! D) to get
D, even though A ! (B ! D) is equivalent to (A 
 B) ! D. We must therefore be able to split
the label t1t2 of (A 
 B) into two labels a1 and a2, one for A1 and one for B. Can we present a
consistent discipline for doing that? The answer is yes.
To develop a labelling discipline for CL(
), we get our ideas from the problems discussed in the
previous example and from the exact nature of the labelling propagation of CL, as studied in
Remark 10.1.4. CL labels (of 10.1.3) are atomic points. A database is a linearly ordered set of
formulas, whose labels are linearly ordered.
For example
a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An; a1 < a2 <; : : : ; < an
is a database. We can think of ai geometrically as points on the rational line, ie as rational numbers
increasing in order.
When we proceed forward using modus ponens, proving conclusions from the data, as described
in 10.1.3 and Remark 10.1.4, the support of any formula  : B proved, ie its label , is a continuous
interval [ai : : : ak], with no gaps.
Our idea is to label the assumption by disjoint intervals on the rationals and regard  as the
end extension union.
Thus our labels are
[a1 ] : A1; : : : ; [an ] : An
with a1 < a2 < : : : < an on the rational line. An interval is smaller than another i all of its points
come before the other. Thus any  : B, where  = ai; : : : ; ak proved from the database, becomes
the interval [ai : : : ak] : B.
It is now easy to split any [t1 : : : tk] : A 
 B into two labels a1 
 a2. We regard a1; a2 as two
intervals and stipulate
a1 : A; a2 : B a1 
 a2 = [t1 : : : tk]:
Mathematically the operation is simple and obvious, but the interval view gives it an easy
geometrical meaning.
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We have to allow for the creation of intervals (labels) during proofs and for carrying along
systems of equalities of interval unions. Before we give the formal denitions, we consider example
10.2.5.
Example 10.2.5 1. Prove from the database
t1 : A! (B ! C); t2 : A
B; t1 < t2
The conclusion
t1t2 : C
Here is the proof:
Proof Line Conguration
1 t2 : A
B assumption t1 < t2
2 create a1 : A; a2 : B t1 < a1 < a2
a1 < a2; t2 = a1a2 a1a2 = t2
3 t1a1 : B ! C modus ponens same
4 t1a1a2 : C modus ponens same
Since the conguration logically proves the rational interval (in the algebra t1a1a2 = t1t2),
we succeeded in our proof.
2. Prove from the database
a1 : (A
B)! C; a2 : A; a3 : B; a1 < a2 < a3
the conclusion
a1a2a3 : C:
Here is the proof
Proof Line Conguration
1 a2 : A assumption a1 < a2 < a3
2 a3 : B assumption same
3 Since the labels of lines (1) and (2)
are adjacent in the conguration
and a1 < a2, we get: a2a3 : A
B same
4 a1a2a3 : C modus ponens
Notice we used the rule
x : A; y : B; x < y
provided the conguration proves that x; y are adjacent
xy : A
B :
Denition 10.2.6 1. A CL(
) database is a sequence of formulas of the form a1 : A1; : : : ; an :
An and a conguration a1 < a2 < : : : < an.
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2. A proof from the database is a sequence of lines, each line comprises of a labelled formula
 : B, a justication and a conguration. The initial conguration is the original database
conguration, namely a1 <; : : : ; < an. The justication for the line  : B can be either that
B is a theorem of CL(
), in which case  = ?, and there is no change in conguration or
that B is an assumption ai : Ai from the database, in which case  = (ai) and there is no
change in conguration or that  : B is obtained from previous lines by a rule, in which case
 is the label givn by the rule and the conguration changes according to the stipulation of
the rule. The rule can be one of the following:
(a) Modus Ponens
 : A
 : A! B
max() < min ()
 : B, no change in conguration.
(b) 
 Elimination Rule
ai; : : : ; ak : A
B
x : A; y : B;
where x; y are new labels. We stipulate in the conguration that xy = ai; : : : ; ak and
that a1 < : : : < ai 1 < x < y < ak 1 < : : : an, and that x is adjacent to y. The new
conguration is obtained from the old one by adding the above stipulations.
(c) 
 Introduction rule
x : A; y : B; x < y; x adjacent to y
x
 y : A
B
3. We say a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An `  : B
a1 < : : : < an
i there exists a proof with last line  : B and the conguration associated with the last line
can prove  = .
10.3 Axiomatisation of W
The previous chapter on Resource-logics discussed LDS conditions for resource restrictions. The
concatenation logic CL was introduced and studied in some depth, including a Hilbert axiomatisa-
tion for it. This chapter will study the connections between metabox disciplines, Hilbert axiomati-
sations and semantical interpretation for various resource logics in a systematic and detailed way.
The metabox and labelling discipline is much richer in its ability of characterising consequence
relations than the Hilbert type system discipline, which generates only theorems. The reader may
thus wonder why we should bother with Hilbert type axiomatisations at all. They are about the
crudest tool for characterising consequence one can have. One reason is that Hilbert axiom sys-
tems are good for comparison. Here is one system; add an axiom and you get another; take out
an axiom and you get a third. Whereas in any other algorithmic proof system, where the rules
are richer, it is more dicult to digest the meaning of relative changes. Hilbert systems are simple
and therefore dierences between systems are crude and obvious, they take the form of axioms.
There is another reason for studying Hilbert formulations. Hilbert systems are not crude. We
shall see in the metalevel chapter that a Hilbert system can be used as a metalanguage for LDS.
Thus with additional connective ], the pair  : A can be represented as ](;A), a binary connective
formula, and Hilbert type axioms can be put forward on ] which forces upon it the meaning of
 is a label for A, and further axioms can be tailored to relfect any labelling discipline. (See
the metaleval chapter for details). It is therefore important for LDS to study and understand
equivalent Hilbert type formulation of LDS systems.
276 CHAPTER 10. PROOF THEORY FOR RESOURCE LOGICS
We saw in the previous chapter how one can axiomatise Hilbert style, all ws A of the LDS
system CL which can be proved with the empty label, ie CL ? : A. We now systematically
generalise the method to neighbouring logics and do the logic W in detail.
The logicW, initially presented in 7.2.1, extends the logic CL by adopting a weaker restriction
on the ! Elimination rule of CL, as given in 10.1.3. Assumptions a1 : A1; : : : ; an : An are ordered
in a sequence. a1 < a2 < : : : an, just like in the case of CL.
The modus ponens
 : A
 : A! B
 : B
is allowed when max() < max(). Recall that in the case of CL we had max() < min().
The ! introduction rule is the same.
The above restriction allows us to prove in W the right transitivity axiom.
` (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
but we cannot prove in W the commutativity axiom:
(A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)):
Let us give a formal denition.
Denition 10.3.1 1. Hilbert Formulation of W.
Axioms
(a) A! A
(b) (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))





2. Proof from assumptions for W.
To dene the notion  `W B we use a variant of denition 10.1.3. For the case of W, we
replace in condition (4) of denition 10.1.3 by the condition max(k) < max(i).
Denition 10.3.2 (LDS Discipline for W) We adopt a similar denition to 10.1.7, with the
following change:
 Replace the condition max() < min() appearing in the denitions of metabox of level 0
and of level n+ 1 by the condition max() < max().
 The notion of  W B can now be dened as in 10.1.10.
We just note that to obtain the Hilbert system corresponding to W, we extend CL with the right
transitivity axiom.
We now proceed to prove the equivalence of the metabox discipline for W and the Hilbert
axiomatisation. We begin with an example.
Example 10.3.3 Consider the following
Assumptions
a1 : A! B
a2 : C ! A
Show
C ! B
This can be done by a box (g 10.6):
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Box a3 1 Show B
2 a3 : C Assumption
3 a2 : C ! A reiteration
4 a2a3 : A MP
5 a1 : A! B reiteration
6 a1a2a3 : B MP
exit 7 a1a2 : C ! B
Figure 10.6:
We proved C ! B from the assumptions using the box device.
Suppose we have further assumptions. Can we prove (C ! B) by using modus ponens only,
without a box? That depends on the assumptions. Let us take the following:
b1 : C ! C
b2 : (C ! C)! ((C ! A)! (C ! A))
b3 : (C ! A)! ((A! B)! (C ! B)):
We can now prove (C ! B) without the box. Using MP only:
b1b2 : (C ! A)! (C ! A)
b1b2a2 : C ! A
b1b2a2b3 : (A! B)! (C ! B)
b1b2a2b3a1 : C ! B
Notice that b1 is a valid (successful) box deduction and both b2 and b3 are instances of the
successful schema
(A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
discussed in example 9.2.4.
The following theorem is essentially in Anderson and Belnap's book [Anderson and Belnap, 1975].
We give the details here because we want to use the method for several other new logics.
Theorem 10.3.4 Let  be a set of labelled assumptions and Q a goal. Assume that  W  : Q
(Q can be proved from  with label  using box deduction of denition 10.3.2), then  `W Q in





1. C ! C
2. (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
3. (B ! C)! ((A! B)! (A! C))
such that  [ f? : Aig MP1  : Q
where MP1 denotes a proof using linear modus ponens only (no use of boxes), and this will
mean of course that  `W Q.
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Proof. By induction on the complexity of the boxes involved in the deduction of  `W Q.
Case n=0
Here only modus ponens is used, so there is nothing to prove.
Case n > 0 Discussion of strategy
The outer box may include nested inner boxes. Consider an innermost box of complexity 0. Let us
take a typical line which justies (proves) A! B using a box of complexity 0. We will eliminate
this box and thus reduce the complexity of the outermost box. We will have to provide a new
justication for A! B with the same label. We will assume a metabox of complexity n > 0. We
assume that the inner boxes are all dierently named and that  is the subordination relation (see
3.4.2). In fact, since we start with a box named a1 to show an implication of the form A ! B,
we can identify the name of the box with the label of a1 : A. We can recognise from the label
 : C, exactly in which outer box C was obtained; this box is in fact max. We know that C is a
reiteration from the box max if max is less than the name of the current box.
The existing proof lines for the box for A! B look as follows (see g 10.7):
line l 1  : (A! B); from Box a1
Box a1 2 Show B
line (l; 1) 3 a1 : A Assumption
line (l; k) 4 k : X
line (l; k + 1) 5 k1 : X ! Y
line (l; k + 2) 6 k2 = k [ k1 : Y
line (l; k0) 7  : B
exit 8  : A! B with  =   fa1g
Figure 10.7:
line l in the external proof is justied by Box a1.
Inside the box the proof proceeds by MP1 only. A typical instance (use) of the rule is:
(l; k) : k : X
(l; k1) : k1 X ! Y
(l; k2) : k2 = k [ k1 : Y
The idea is to eliminate the box. Let us consider the following sequence of lines, which we refer
to as external sequence.
E(l; 1) = A! A, label ?; corresponding to a1 : A in the box.
: : :
E(l; k) = Am ! X, label k   fam1 g; corresponding to k : X in the box and where m is the
number of times a1 2 k.
: : :
E(l; k0) = A! B, label   fa1g, corresponding to the last line in the box.
Note that m = 1 or 0 depending whether X used a1 : A or not. If m = 0; A
0 ! X is X. If
m = 1 then we have A! X.
The above sequence is not a proof. For each line E(l; r) with label r   fa1g : Cr we add
new assumptions and proof links to the box with name max(r   fa1g) so that r   fa1g : Cr is
derivable in the box max(r   fa1g).
In particular the last line, namely
E(l; k0) =   fa1g : A! B
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will be derivable in box max( fa1g). Thus the justication for line l of the external box namely:
line l :   fa1g : A! B
can be taken as \reiteration from box max( fa1g)" and this justication will replace the earlier
justication \from Box a1" and Box a1 can be deleted.
Let us now proceed to modify all the boxes step by step, driven by the sequence E(l; r). To
do that we examine the possibilities arising in this sequence: There are several possibilities for a
MP1 sequence in Box a1. These have the form
k : X
k1 : X ! Y
k2 : Y
These are the following (m;n  1) (see gure 10.8):
case (0, 0): X a1 62k
X ! Y a1 62k1
Y
case (1,0): Am ! X a1 2 k;m times
X ! Y a1 62k1
Am ! Y
case(0,1): X a1 62k
Am ! (X ! Y ) a1 2 k1 ;m times
Am ! Y
case(1,1): Am ! X a1 2 k;m times
An ! (X ! Y ) a1 2 k1 ; n times
Am+n ! Y
Figure 10.8: Case Diagram
For our particular logic, the following cases arise:
case (0,0): no problem. Both X and X ! Y are reiterations. Note that we do not allow k = ?.
This case does not arise anyway because the reiteration X cannot be used as a minor
premiss. Neither can X be proved within the box because k 6= ?. To understand this
possibility, consider ((A ! A) ! A) ! A. We can justify this formula from Box a
below (see g 10.9):
Here line 2 is ? : X and line 1 is a : X ! Y , the modus ponens is not allowed.
case (1,0): can arise with m = 1:X ! Y is a reiteration used as a ticket.
case (0,1): This case cannot happen since k 6= ?. X is a reiteration and cannot be used as a
minor premise.
case(1,1): This case cannot arise because both X and X ! Y use A and so modus ponens is not
allowed.
We therefore have to add assumptions and labels to justify the deduction
E(l; k) = A! X
E(l; k1) = X ! Y
E(l; k2) = A! Y
and we have to justify the rst line, namely E(l; 1) = A! A.
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Boxa 1 Show A
2 a : (A! A)! A Assumption
3 A! A From Box b :
Boxb 4 Show A
5 b : A Assumption
6 A
exit 7 ? : A! A
8 a : A MP1
Figure 10.9:
We want to take the instances of A ! A and of (A ! X) ! ((X ! Y ) ! (A ! Y )) and of
(X ! Y ) ! ((A ! X) ! (A ! Y )) and use the them to prove the theorem for the case of box
deduction of complexity n > 0.
We have two axioms we can use (1) or (2):
1. (A! X)! ((X ! Y )! (A! Y ))
2. (X ! Y )! ((A! X)! (A! Y ))
Which one do we use? That depends on k   fa1g and k1 . k is the label of X, it contains
a1. This means that X was proved using a1 : A and some reiterations, say Zi ! Ui. k1 : X ! Y
is also a reiteration. Which of the two sets of reiterations is from a more outer box?
If X ! Y is outermost to some of the Zi ! Ui, ie if maxk1  max(k   fa1g), then we
use (2). Otherwise we use (1). The rule is to use the instance of the axiom beginning with the






X ! Y is the outermost reiteration. If we choose (1), then (X ! Y )! (A! Y ) will appear
in the inner box. X ! Y will be reiterated but will not be allowed to be used as a minor premiss
and thus we will not be able to get A ! Y in the inner box. If, however we choose (2), then
(A! X)! (A! Y ) will be obtained in the outer box and reiterated into the inner box.
Case n > 0, proof replacement for the box
Consider E(l; r) : r   fa1g : Cr in the external sequence.
1. Subcase n1
for r = 1; C = A! A
Add ? : A! A as an initial assumption to the outermost box.
10.3. AXIOMATISATION OF W 281
2. Subcase n2
Assume for each k < r that new assumptions were added to the boxes so that Ck is derived
at box max (k   fa1g) with label k   fa1g. Consider case r. If a1 62 r, then Cr is a
reiteration X ! Y and the condition is satised.
If Cr is A! Y , and a1 2 r, then we have for some earlier lines
E(l; k) : k   fa1g : A! X
E(l; k1) : k1 : X ! Y
E(l; r) : r   fa1g : A! Y
with r = k [ k1
We rst consider E(l; k).
A ! X is derivable in the outer box a = max (k   fa1g). We distinguish two cases here.
The case of k = 1 and the other cases.
If k = 1, then X = A and k fa1g = ?. In this case A! A is obtained from the outermost
box because it was added there at the very rst step. Box a will be ?, the outermost box.
Case 2 below will be applicable. We add the axiom ? : (A! A)! [(A! X)! (A! X)]
and by modus ponens get (A ! X) ! (A ! X). Note that in fact we could have added
(A! X)! (A! X) directly as this is an axiom too.
We now consider E(l; k1):
X ! Y is reiterated from the outer box b = max k1




In this case add a new instance of the axiom
? : (X ! Y )! ((A! X)! (A! Y ))
to the outermost box. In box a we have a line
Line n: k1 : X ! Y
extend box a by inserting two more lines
line (n,1): ? : (X ! Y )! ((A! X)! (A! Y ))
reiteration from outer box
Line (n, 2): k1 : (A! X)! (A! Y )
Box a is more inner than box b. In box a we have the line
line n0: k   fa1g : A! X
we add the lines:
line (n0; 1): k1 : (A! X)! (A! Y )
reiteration from box b (or repetition if a= b)
line (n0; 2): k1 [ k   fa1g : A! Y
by modus ponens.
Now with the new boxes a0;b0 and the new outer box our inductive assertion holds.
2. subcase n2.2
a < b
In this case k : A ! X is in the more outer box b. In this case we add ? : (A ! X) !
((X ! Y )! (A! Y )) to the outer box. We add the following two lines to box a.
line (n0; 1): ? : (A! X)! ((X ! Y )! (A! Y ))
reiteration from outer box b.
line (n0; 2): k   fa1g : (X ! Y )! (A! Y )
modus ponens.
In box b we add the following two lines after line n : k1 : X ! Y
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line (n; 1): k   fa1g : (X ! Y )! (A! Y )
reiteration from box a.
line (n; 2): k1 [ k   fa1g : A! Y
by modus ponens.
Again our inductive assertion is satised by the new boxes.
For the case of E(l; k0), the last line of the sequence, we get a justication of  fa1g : A! B
from the new box system. We thus do not need box a1 which originally justied  fa1g : A! B
because the line is now justied by reiteration. The outer box, of course, now has many instances
of the axioms.
This completes the induction step for case n > 0.
The induction step completes the proof.
Note that the new additional assumptions were needed to be used only once! 
Corollary 10.3.5 The logic obtained from the notion ? W A can be axiomatised using modus
ponens and the following three schemas:
1. C ! C
2. (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C)):
3. (B ! C)! ((A! B)! (A! C))
Proof. Follows from 10.3.4.
1. Assume ? W A. Then by 10.3.4 there exist instances A1; : : : ; Ak of the axioms of W such
that ? : A1; : : : ;? : Ak MP1 A. Since no boxes are used in this proof, it is an acceptable
proof of `W A.
2. Assume `W A, we want to show that ? W A. We prove this by induction on the proof
steps in `W. First show that ? W A, for any instance of an axiom of W. This has
been done in the various examples. Then show that ? W A and ? W A ! B imply
? W B. This we show now. Clearly neither A nor B can be atomic (since all theorems of
W are classical tautologies). We therefore have A = A1 ! A2; B = B1 ! B2 for suitable
formulas.
Since ? W A1 ! A2, there exists a box M1 of the form Figure 10.11:
Box M1 1 Show A2
2 t1 : A1 Assumption
3
...
4 t1 : A2
exit 5 ? : A1 ! A2
Figure 10.11:
Since ? W (A1 ! A2)! (B1 ! B2) there exists a box M2 of the form (see g 10.12)
The following is a box for ? W B1 ! B2, g 10.13
where box M2 is like box M2 except that we substitute t = ?

Lemma 10.3.6 In the logic W;`W (1) and `W (2) imply `W (3), where:
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Box M2 1 Show t : B1 ! B2
2 t : A1 ! A2 Assumption
3 t : B1 ! B2 from Box
4 Show B2
5 s : B1 Assumption
6 ts : B2
exit 7 t : B1 ! B2
exit 8 ? : (A1 ! A2)! (B1 ! B2)
Figure 10.12:
1. A1 ! : : :! (An ! (A! B) : : :)
2. D1 ! : : :! (Dm ! (D ! A)) : : :)
3. C1 ! : : :! (Cm+n ! (D ! B) : : :)
where C1; : : : ; Cm+n is any order preserving merge of the sequences A1; : : : ; An and D1; : : : ; Dm.
Proof. We need some notation. We shall use the previous theorem to show that, under the
assumptions (1) and (2) we have that
?  (3)
Let ai be an atomic name for Ai and dj be an atomic name for Dj , i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 1; : : : ;m.
Let tk be an atomic name for Ck; k = 1; : : : ;m + n. Then by denition ft1; : : : ; tm+ng =
fa1; : : : ; an; d1; : : : ; dmg, and if Ck = Dj then tk = dj and if Ck = Ai then tk = ai.
The ftkg are therefore just another enumeration of the fai; bjg.
For each k, let rk : Ek be the labelled formula:
rk : Ek = a1 : : : ai : Ai+1 ! : : :! (An ! (A! B)) if Ck = Ai
or
d1 : : : dj : Dj+1 ! : : :! (Dm ! (D ! A) : : :) if Ck = Dj :
We now produce a box (see g 10.14) showing
W C1 ! : : :! (Cm+n ! (D ! B)) : : :):

The example below (gure 10.15) presents a particular case for illustration:
Example 10.3.7
? : A1 ! (A2 ! (A! B) : : :)
? : D1 ! (D2 ! (D3 ! (D ! A) : : :)
Show
? : A1 ! (D1 ! (D2 ! (A2 ! (D3 ! (D ! B) : : :)
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Example 10.3.8 The statement of lemma 10.3.6 was not symmetrical. If we are given
`W X1 ! : : :! (Xn ! (A! B) : : :)
`W X1 ! : : : (Ym ! A) : : :)
Then we get
`W Z1 ! : : :! (Zm+n ! B) : : :)
only when Z1; : : : ; Zm is a right order preserving merge of X1; : : : ; Xm and Y1; : : : ; Ym. By right
merge we mean the additional requirement Zm+n = Ym, ie the last element of the emerged resulting
sequence is the last element of the second sequence being merged.
The following shows why we need this restriction for W.
Assume
`W X1 ! (X2 ! (A! B) : : :)
`W Y ! A
We cannot show that
`W Y ! (X1 ! (X2 ! B))
because the obvious box (gure 10.16)
Of course the above only shows that the obvious attempt to prove the assertion does not work.
We shall see that the assertion is false when we give merge semantics for W. Note however that
using the assertion we get that
` (A! (B ! C))! (A! (B ! C))
` B ! B
imply
` (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C))
ie we get the commutativity axiom of linear logic.
Theorem 10.3.9 The logic obtained from the notion ? TE
A of 10.2.6 can be axiomatised by
the schemas (1)-(4) of ticket entailment of 10.1.2, namely:.
1. C ! C
2. (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
3. (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
4. (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C)) and
(A! B)! ((A! (B ! C))! (A! C))
Proof. We consider the proof given for the case of W, in theorem 10.3.4. The case analysis, for
this logic allows in the innermost box also for the case of
k1   fa1g : A! X
k2   fa1g : A! (X ! Y )
(k1   fa1g) [ (k2   fa1g) : A! Y
We have to argue for this case separately. By the induction hypothesis A ! X is proved in
Box a. a = max(k1   fa1g) and A ! (X ! Y ) is proved in box b, b= max(k2   fa1g). We
have two axioms to add to the outermost box. These are:
(A! X)! ((A! (X ! Y )! (A! Y ))
and
(A! (X ! Y ))! ((A! X)! (A! Y ))
If a  b we use the rst axiom. Otherwise we use the second axiom. 
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Theorem 10.3.10 Linear logic L, with the metabox discipline as dened in 9.2.6 can be axioma-
tised as a Hilbert system by adding the following axiom to the axioms of W:
(A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)):
Proof. We consider the proof given for the case of W, in theorem 10.3.4. The case analysis for
linear logic also allows for case (0, 1) of gure 10.8, to occur in the innermost box. Namely we
have
X
A! (A! Y )
A! Y
In this case we use the instance of the axiom
? : (A! (X ! Y ))! (X ! (A! Y ))
and use modus ponens twice. 
10.4 The logic of H-relevance
This section is purely technical. It shows how a new logic can be created by allowing formulas to
label themselves and by using a known logic (intutionistic) on the labels together with the labelling
discipline of relevance logic on formulas. This logic is then axiomatised. The main message of this
section is that LDS can generate new logics. This example, thought, does have some intutive
meaning. If A is proved from the part of the database denoted by 0, then 0 is the label of A.
Intutionistic logic is used on the labels to decide which other parts of the database are \relevant"
to 0, namely all 
0 such that 0 ` 0.
Denition 10.4.1 The dening conditions on the metaboxes of this logic are as follows:
1. Formulas are labelled by themselves. It is convenient to give atomic labels a : A and use a
labelling function h(a) = A.
2. To show A! B, start a box. Assume a : A and show  : B. Use modus ponens (unrestricted).
The box is successful if a 2 . Exit the box with   fag : A! B.
3. Reiterations are allowed only either through condition 3 of 9.2.1 (ie the reiteration condition
of W) or through the following additional condition:
 : C is allowed into the box provided h(A) 6`H h() where H is a labelling logic on the
formulas.
We further assume that within the box we do not use modus ponens on reiterations. This can
be done externally ie we do not use
k : X
k1 : X ! Y
k2 Y
where both X and X ! Y come from an external box. The modus ponens can be done
externally and then the Y reiterated. Formally the restriction within a box with assumption
a : A to show B is that either a 2 k or a 2 k1.
Example 10.4.2 (a) Let H be intuitionistic logic. To show A! (B ! A) (see g 10.17)
This box is not successful because the label of A does not contain b.
(b) Show A! (X ! B)! (X ! (A! B)) for A 6` X. (See g 10.18)
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Example 10.4.3 Let H be intuitionistic logic.
Show (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B)) (see g 10.19)
Theorem 10.4.4 The set of ws such that ? ` H-Relevance A can be axiomatised by:
1. A! A
2. (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
3. (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
4a. (A! B)! ((A! (B ! C))! (A! C))
4b. (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C))
7. (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)), provided A 6`H B.
Proof. We proceed like in the proof of 10.3.4 and we eliminate all uses of boxes. Let there be
given a box for A! B. We prex with A rather with Am, ie we ignore multiple uses of A. If we
check the case studies, two more cases are possible.
A! (X ! Y )
A! X
A! Y
which can be taken care of by axiom 4 and
A! (X ! Y )
X
A! Y
In this case X is a reiteration and therefore A 6`H X. Hence we can use axiom 7 to get
X ! (A! Y ) and then by modus ponens we get A! Y .
We have to address the possibility that X may not be a reiteration itself but be provable from




This possibility does not arise because of our restrictions on reiterations. 
Theorem 10.4.5 The following table (g 10.20) gives the correspondences between axioms and
metabox conditions in the sense of 10.3.4.
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Proof. Along the lines of previous proofs. 
10.5 Introducing deductive relevance
This section introduces a new logic, the logic of deductive relevance. We start by motivating it.
Consider a database with some information in it. Assume that from time to time the database
is updated. The reason for the updating is that there seems to be a change of mind of whether
certain formula should be in the database. For example A could be \John paid the invoice" and at
dierent times there is a change of view of whether A is true or not. We can play it safe and insert
in the database all the updates, with the appropriate labels indicating when they were received.
Thus the formulas A and  A may both appear in the database with dierent time labels
ti : A i = 1 : : : k
si : A i = 1 : : :m
with ti; si dierent time labels.
In general, a database of this sort will have the form  = fti : Aig where ti are labels and
Ai are formulas. This database looks just like any other labelled database we have considered
so far in this paper. When we prove a formula B from the database, we want to keep track of
exactly what labelled formulas were used. If we do that, we can know which version of the data
was used in the derivation. The labelled deduction process is the same as in the case of relevance
logic. In relevance logic we are interested in resource considerations, we want to make sure that all
assumptions are used. In our case we are interested in making sure the most recent updates were




s1 : A! B
s2 : B ! A
s3 : A! (C ! B)
Query:
C ! B
We can understand the above data as t-labelled updates of the data and s-labelled updates of the
rule.
We assume t1 < t2 and s1 < s2 < s3. We would like a derivation of C ! B using the most
recent data. We use the box below (see g 10.21):
This proof is acceptable because it used the most recent data.
We can pretend in 10.5.1 that we are operating in relevant logic, if we agree that we are dealing
with relevance classes of data, namely ft1; t2g and fs1; s2; s3g. Whenever a label x is used in a
class, this \use" of the label is considered as using all lower (\past") labels. Thus in the above
proof, C ! B can be considered as a relevant derivation, because all labels were used. t2 and s3
were directly used, while t1; s1 and s2 were \used" because a more recent update of that class was
consulted.
The above example suggests that we can divide the labels into classes according to some agreed
\Labelling Logic", LL. LL helps us organise the classes of labels. When we prove any  : B from
the database with label , the logic LL will tell us whether  is considered as a relevant use of the
database labels. In fact, LL may come as part of a package deal together with a labelling scheme.
We label the data in some agreed manner, compatible with the application area ( a knowledge
representation database for the application area) and LL is a suitable logic for the labels of the
application area.
The next example shows how the labels can be used as degrees of certainty.
Example 10.5.2 Consider the assumptions:
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1. a ^ b! d
2. a! d0




Let P(n) give the degree of certainty we attach to clause n. 0  P(n)  1.
To deduce d0 we can follows two paths: we can use clauses 3,4,5,6 and get d0f3;4;5;6g or we can
use 4 and 2 and get d0f2;4g. In each case we can get the degree of certainty using P.
The label indicates which clauses were used. In the second case we can use the relevance deduction
theorem and get
fclauses1; 3; 4; 5; 6g ` (a! d0)! d0f4g
but the proof of d0f2;4g does not justify:
fclauses1; 2; 3; 4; 5g ` c! d0:
The latter does hold, however, because of the existence of the other proof of d0f3;4;5;6g.
Note therefore that we do not require that the assumption (for the use of the deduction theorem)
be used in all proofs but only in at least one.
In each case the degree of certainty is obtained from the labels. Obviously what we need is
a general system of deductive relevance which depends generally on a labelling scheme and on a
labelling logic LL, which can be specialised to the various familiar systems (such as relevance logic,
fuzzy logic etc) by a suitable choice of the labels and the logic LL. The system in its full generality
need not necessarily have an intrinsic intuitive meaning, beyond that of having some logic on the
labels. Each choice of labels and logic LL will, however, model some known system and intuitions.
As a rst step, let us examine what logic LL would correspond to relevance logic itself. Let us
recall the essential principle of the relevance labelling.
The relevance labelling follows the following principles:
1. All assumptions are named (labelled) using dierent atomic names. The same w A may be
put in with more than one name: e.g.
n1 : A
n2 : A
This can arise, for example, when trying to prove ` A! (A! A), which fails.
2. If A is labelled  and A ! B is labelled  then using modus ponens we emerge with B
labelled  [  (because B uses in its proof both A and A! B).
3. If we want to show A ! B, we assume A with name  (usually  = fag, with \a" a new
name). We prove forward B, which ends up, at the end of the proof with label . Then if





 = fa; b; c; : : :g : B
allows us to deduce A! B with label fb; c : : :g =    fag.
We now make the following observation.
We can regard a 2  as  ` a in the boolean logic of the atomic labels a; b; c; : : :. Since all labels
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involved are atoms, or sets of atoms, the set theoretic relation    is identical with the logical
relation  ` , in any logic, eg classical logic.
We can generalise the relevance logic procedure by allowing a logic LL (Labelled Logic) on the
labels of the formulas. Imagine each formula assumption gets an label a. When we use modus
ponens we get:
 : A
 : A! B
 ^  : B in the logic LL.





 : A! B
We argue from A to B and want to exit with A ! B with label . For A to be used in the
proof of B we need
 `LL :
 would then be
 = ^ fnames of assumptions x j  `LL x and  6`LL xg
Thus to be able to get  eectively we need LL to be computable, and of course that the
number of assumptions nite.
In the case of ordinary relevance logic, the general denition reduces to the old denition. To
see this note that if:
 = fa1; :::; ang old denition
 = a1 ^ : : : ^ an new denition.
Thus
( [ ) =  ^ 
Since ai; bj are atoms then if   
    = fa j  ` a and  6` ag
in the logic LL of classical conjunctions and classical truth tables.
Let us call the logic obtained from labelling on LL by \DR( LL)". In words: \Deductive
relevance based on the labelling logic LL".
It may be convenient to name a formula A by the symbol \a". If A is syntacticaly dierent
from B then \a" and \b" are considered dierent atomic names. If A is put in the database twice,
then we obviously have to use dierent atomic names and not just put \a" in twice. Eg \a1" and
\a2".
Important Remark
Note that there is no reason why the labelling logic LL should be monotonic. It can be any
non-monotonic system which allows for conjunctions, ie allows us to form
 : A;  : A! B
 ^  : B
and which is decidable. We need decidability in order to form  as shown:
 : A
: : :  j 




 : A! B,  = ^fx j  j x and  6j xg
j is the non monotonic LL
Example 10.5.3 We recall 2.2.1 of Chapter 2.
Show that ` (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B)) in relevance logic.




prove B with label (a1; a2; a3)
This was done in 2.2.1. To illustrate our labelling logic ideas, let us use relevance logic itself as
the labelling logic. Thus R is relevance logic and D = DR(R) is the resulting logic when relevance
logic is used on the labels. We use the formulas themselves as their names: We thus want to show:
B ! A;A! B;A `D B with label (B ! A) ^ (A! B) ^A:
Since (B ! A) ^ (A! B) ^A `R A, we use the dedution theorem in D = DR(R) and get:
B ! A;A! B `D A! B with label ;where:
 = fx j x is a name and (B ! A) ^ (A! B) ^A `R x and A 6`R xg
We have 3 names. A 6`R A! B and A 6`R B ! A, hence  = (A! B) ^ (B ! A). We can use
the deduction theorem again and get:
B ! A `D (A! B)! (A! B) with label B ! A
and again
`D (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B)):
Example 10.5.4 DR(R) is not the same as R. Consider the formula:
(A! A)! ((A! A)! (A! A))
This is a theorem of R, because A ! A;A ! A;A `R A with label (A ! A;A ! A;A). (We use
modus ponens twice). We also have by the deduction theorem
A! A;A! A `R A! A with label (A! A;A! A)
A! A `R (A! A)! (A! A) with label (A! A)
However in D = DR(R) the exit label is computed dierently and hence we get
A! A `D (A! A)! (A! A) with label ?
In fact, any theorem of R of the form `R A! (B ! C) such that `R B ! A will not be a theorem
of D.
Example 10.5.5 Now let us use intuitionistic logic Int as the labelling logic in 10.5.3, and ab-
breviate D = DR(Int) We get:
B ! A;A! B;A `D B with label (B ! A) ^A ^ (A! B)
Use the deduction theorem
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B ! A; A! B `D A! B with label :
 = fx j (B ! A) ^A ^ (A! B) `Int x but A 6`Int xg
Clearly  = fA ! Bg. In intuitionistic logic A `Int B ! A, which is not true in relevance
logic. Thus we get
B ! A `D (A! B)! (A! B) with label 
 = ^fx j A! B `Int x and A! B 6`Int xg = truth.
We cannot continue and use the deduction theorem any further. Thus for the logic DR(Int),
where the labelling logic is intuitionistic logic, we do not have:
1. `DR(Int) (B ! A)! ((A! B)! (A! B)).
On the other hand we do have
2. `DR(Int) A! ((A0 ! A0)! A)
(1) is a theorem of relevance logic while (2) is not. We can see that we are getting something
new. We have not proved yet that what we get is a logic. In fact we must show that for any
monotonic logic LL, the logic DR(LL) is indeed a consequence relation. At the moment I have
proof only for the case of DR(Int). The dicult part to prove being the cut:
 `DR(Int) A and ; A `DR(Int) B )  `DR(Int) B:
10.6 The cut rule for deductive relevance
To investigate the relationship between a logic X and its deductive relevance counterpart DR(X)
in general and DR(int) in particular we need to proceed to do through a series of denitions and
lemmas.
Denition 10.6.1 1. Dene for a Hilbert system H, the notion `H A as follows:`H A i there exists a sequence B1; B2; : : : Bn = A such that each member of the sequence is
either an instance of an axiom or is obtained from the two previous formulas of the sequence
by modus ponens.
2. Dene A1; : : : ; An `H B as
`H A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :):
Note that this denition is independent of the order of Ai because of the axiom
` (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)):
Also note that `H is non monotonic, ie A `H A may hold, but A;B `H A may not hold
because its meaning is `H A! (B ! A).
3. To dene a monotonic consequence relation based on H, let A1; : : : ; An;H B be dened
to hold i there exists a sequence of formulas B1; : : : ; Bn = B such that each member Bi is
either an assumption Aj or a theroem, `H Bi, or is obtained from two previous elements of
the sequence by modus ponens.
Note that in this case we will have a monotonic consequence relation A;B H A will hold.
We do have however:
? H B i ? `H B i `H B:
Denition 10.6.2 (a) A set of assumptions has the form  = fai : Aig, where Ai are formulas
and ai are all dierent atomic labels.
(b) We dene by induction the notion of a proof tree of  ` t : B, where t is a label.
(1)  = f ` t : Bg is a one node tree if t : B 2 . This node is the bottom node of the tree.
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(2) If 1 is a proof tree with bottom node  ` t : A and 2 is a proof tree with bottom node
 ` s : A! B then
is a tree with bottom node  ` st : B.
(3) If  is a tree with bottom node  [ fa : Ag ` t : B and a appears in the string t then:
is a tree with bottom node  ` t  a : A! B.
(c) We say A1 : : : An ` B if for some distinct atomic labelling ai : Ai we have a proof tree for
fai : Aig ` a1 : : : an : B
Theorem 10.6.3 ([Anderson and Belnap, 1975]) A1; : : : ; An ` B in the sense of (c) of 10.6.2
i A1; : : : ; An `H B, for H being relevance logic in the sense of 10.6.1.
Denition 10.6.4 1. Let ` be a non monotonic consequence relation. ` is said to be a labelling
logic if it satises the following conditions:
(a)
 ` B ;0 ` B ! C
;0 ` C
(b)
;0 ` D2 ;D1 ` ^0
; D1 ` D2
(c)
; D1 ` D2
 ` D1 ! D2
2. A Hilbert System I is said to be a labelling logic if `I is a labelling logic. A labelling logic I
(or `) is said to be monotonic if `I (resp. `) is monotonic.
Note that for H= Relevance logic whose axioms are mentioned in 2.2.1, `H is a labelling
logic. H is a monotonic labelling logic.





where ai are all dierent atomic labels.
4. Let I be a labelling logic, on the same language as the data. A function h on fai j ai : Ai 2 g
is a logical support function if h(ai) is a set of w and h(ai) `I Ai.
Denition 10.6.5 Let  be a database and h a support function and B a w. We dene the
provability `h
nDR(I) by induction of n. The basic notion we are dening is
 `hn B;; 
where  is a database with labelled ws. B is the proved w.  is a set of labels used in the proof
and  is a set of w of I, the logical support of B;n = 0; 1; 2; : : :.
Case n = 0
 `h0 B;;  i there exists a sequence (Bi; i; i)i = 1; : : : ; k with (Bk; k; k) = (B;; ) and
each element in the sequence satises the following:
Condition 1:
ai : Bi 2  and i = h(ai) and i = faig:
Condition 2:
There exist Bj ; Bm; j;m;< i such that Bm = Bj ! Bi and i = m [ j and i = m [ j.
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Case n+1
We now dene  `hn+1 B;; .
The above holds if there is a sequence satisfying any of the above conditions (1) and (2) or the
following additional Condition (3):
Condition 3:
Bk = D1 ! D2 and
0 =  [ fd : D1 j d a new label g [ fbj : Bj j bj new labels and j < kg;
h0 = h [ f(d;D1)g [ f(bj ; j)g
and
0 `h0m D2; ; 0; for some m  n and 0 `I D1 and k =    fdg and
k = fx 2 0 j D1 6`I xg:
Case n=1:
Let  `h B;;  if for some n; `hn B;; .
Lemma 10.6.6 Let  be a labelled database and let h be a support function. Let U = U(; h) be
U = [(a:A)2h(a). For any  let U = [a2h(a). Then if  `hn B;;  we have   U and `IB.
(In fact   [a2h(a) = U).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the denition of `hn.
Case n=0:
Assume  `h0 B;; . Then there is a sequence as in the denition. If ak : Bk 2  then k = fakg
and k = h(ak) and k `I Bk and k  Uk . If Bm = Bj ! Bk then k = m [ j and
k = m [ j and since by the induction hypothesis Um  m `I Bm and Uj  j `I Bj we get
Uk  k `I Bk.
Case n+1:
Assume  `hn+1 B;; . We check the case of B = Bk = D1 ! D2. We have 0 =  [ f(d :
D1)g [ f(bj : Bj) j j < kg; h0 = h [ f(d;D1)g [ f(bj ; j) j j < kg and 0 `h0m D2; ; 0 for m  n,
and U  0 `I D1 and k =  fdg and k = fx 2 0 j D1 6`I xg and Uj  j `I Bj , for j < k.
We have to show that Uk   and  `I D1 ! D2.
Consider all ws in 0. Classify them into two sets fxig; fyjg, where D1 `I yj and D1 6` xi.
hence  = fxig. Clearly   Uk since D1 62. We know that by the induction hypothesis we have:
0 = ^ixi ^ ^jyj `I D2:
Also since D1 `I ^yj we get ^xi ^D1 `I D2 and hence ^xi `I (D1 ! D2): 
Lemma 10.6.7 Assume I is a monotonic labelling logic.
Let h  h mean that for any label a; h(a)  h(a). Assume  `hn B;;  then  `hn B;; , where
 satises ( [ U)     and U = [ah(a) and U = [a(h(a)  h(a)).
Proof. By induction on the proof of  `hn B;.
Case n=0:
 `hn B;; i. Then there exists a sequence as in the denition. Replace h by h and use the same
sequence. We get a sequence with  satisfying the lemma.
Case n+1:
To show the lemma for  `hn+1 B;; i we use the second half of the denition. We need to
consider the case B = B + k = D1 ! D2, with
0 =  [ f(d : D1)g [ f(bj : Bj) j j < kg;
h0 = h [ f(d;D1)g [ f(bj ; j) j j < kg:
and the following holds:
0 `h0m D2; ; 0;
0 `I D1; k =    fdg;
 = fx 2 0 j D1 6`I xg:
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By a previous lemma o `I D2. By the induction hypothesis the same proof sequence will give:
h0 = h [ f(d;D1)g [ f(bj ; j) j j < kg:
Since Bj has a shorter proof we get:
j [ U  j  j
Again by the induction hypothesis:
0 `h0m D2; ; 0
(0 [ U)  0  ):
Since 0 `I D1 we get 0 `I D1. Since by the previous lemma 0 `I D2, we get 0 `I D2.
Dene  = fx 2 0 j D1 6`I xg. Clearly then  `hn+1 B; ; . Clearly ( [ U)    : 
Lemma 10.6.8 For a monotonic labelling logic, the following holds:
If  `h A and ; A `h B then for some h1  h  `h1 B.
Proof. Assume hn ` A;; 1 and ; A `hm B; ; 2. Let h1 be dened by h1(x) = h(x) [ 1. By
the previous lemma, since U  1 we get  `h1n A;; 1 with 1  1  (1 [ U)   [ 1. We
also have ; A `h1m B; ; 2.
We can now string the two proofs together:

: : :




proof as in ; A `h1 B:
: : :
B
The crucial reason that we can indeed string the proofs together is that the label 1 of A at
the end of the proof of  `h1 A is the same as the label h1 gives to A as an item of data in the
proof of ; A `h1 B. The construction of h1 from h by adding 1 to all labels was designed to
ensure this. 
Lemma 10.6.9 1. If a : A 2  then  `h A:
2. If  `h A then ; B `h A.
Proof. By denition. 
Theorem 10.6.10 Let I be a monotonic logic and   J be a set of ws. Let  `JDR(I) A i
for some h (with U(h)  J) `hDR(I) A. Then `JDR(I) is a consequence relation.
Proof.From previous lemmas. 
Example 10.6.11 Relevance Logic
Let  = fai : Aig with ai new and dierent atoms. Let hR(ai) = ai ^ (^jAj). then, provided
h(ai) ` h(aj) i i = j, we get:
Lemma 10.6.12 `hR is relevance logic.
Proof. Show by induction that  `hR A;;  i  = ^ ^. 
Theorem 10.6.13 Let I = Relevance logic and let h(a : A) = A. Then DR(R) = R.
Proof. Show that if  `h A;;  then  = fA j a 2  and a : A 2 g. 
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10.7 Negation
This section studies properties of negation in concatenation and linear logics. We begin with the
idea of adding an arbitrary unary connective  to the language and studying its properties. We
begin with CL(
). The language of CL(
) contains only atomic propositions and the implication
and concatenation symbols ! and 
. We want to enrich the language with a unary propositional
function , associating with each atomic q another atom q. We shall eventually stipulate that
q = q, but at this stage this is not needed. For a general theroy of negation see Gabbay-Wansing
[12].
Denition 10.7.1 1. Let CL(
;) be the extension of CL(
) with a unary propositional func-
tion symbol . Extend the notion of a formula and a literal to to be the following:
(a) Any atom q is a formula and a literal.
(b) If A and B are formulas so are A! B and A
B.
(c) If A is a literal (a formula without ! and 
) then A is a formula and a literal.
Essentially  is not a connective but a function symbol generating more literals (atoms) from
literals (atoms). We shall later deal with function symbols  satisfying q = q. Such
functions are indexed by \2".
Thus when we write CL2(
;), we mean that  satises q = q.
2. We can, of course, extend the language of CL(
) with a new proper unary connective  to
obtain CL(
; ). For example in 3.1 we added to CL(
) the negation symbol : and obtained
CL(
;:). The formulas of CL(
; ) are dened as follows:
(a) Any atomic q is a formula and a literal.
(b) If A and B are formulas so are A! B, A
B and A.
(c) If A is a literal so is A.
The dierence between CL(
;) and CL(
; ) is that  is allowed to apply only to literals.
We are not allowed to form (A! B).
The proof theory of CL(
;)) is the same as that of CL(
). For all purposes CL(
;) is
just CL(
) with several types of atoms. We have the following
CL(
;) ` A i CL(
) ` A0
where A0 is obtained from A by replacing each atom q::: (with n times ) by a completely new
atom qn.
Even the case of CL(
;) is no dierent. We may think that perhaps an additional axiom
q = q is needed but this is not the case. Take CL(
) and divide its atoms into pairs, q and
q. Then any formula A of CL(
;) can be translated into a formula A0 of CL(
) by letting
(q:::)0 = q i the number of  is even, q if the number is odd.
We have
CL(
;) ` A i CL(
) ` A0
We can take the above as the denition of provability in CL(
;).
We can do the above translation only because q is completely independent of q.
Denition 10.7.2 1. Let CL(
; ) be the extension of CL(
) with an additional connective
. We say that  is a rewrite extension of CL(
), provided it satises axioms of the form:
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where  !;	
 are formulas of CL(
; ) of lower complexity than (A ! B) and (A
 B)
respectively, according to some well dened complexity measure.
2. Let CL(
;) be the extension of CL(
) with the function symbol . Let 	(; q;?1; : : : ;?n)
be a formula with one atom q, the symbol , and n atoms ?1; : : : ;?n considered as param-
eters. Let CL	(
;) be the extension of CL(
;) with the additional axiom:
	(q;?1; : : : ;?n):
The above axiom puts down conditions on the functionality of  on the atoms. For example,
we may have
q $ (q ! ?)
for a xed atom ?. This says that the function q is denable in terms of! and ?. Another
possibility is
 q $ q:
This says  is idempotent.






Then we obtain the extension CL(
;:).
Our purpose is to explain the negation in LL(
;:) in terms of rewrite extensions and func-
tionality of a unary connective. In fact, we are going to show that : is the rewrite of example 5.3
which has the additional functionality of
:A$ (A! ?)
for a xed ?.
The next sequence of denitions and lemmas will establish these claims.
Lemma 10.7.4 Let ? be an arbitrary atom in LL, then the following holds:
1. `LL ((A! ?)! ?)$ ((((A! ?)! ?)! ?)! ?)
2. Let LL? be the fragment of LL built up using ! inductively as follows:
(a) ? is a w of LL?. If q is any atom then (q ! ?)! ? is a w of LL?
(b) If A and B are ws of LL? so is A! B.
Then for any A of LL? we have
`LL A$ ((A! ?)! ?)
3. Let A;B and C be formulas of LL? then
`LL (((A! (B ! ?))! ?)! C)$ (A! (B ! C)):
Proof.
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1. First observe that
`LL A! ((A! ?)! ?);
because
`LL (A! ?)! (A! ?):
Second, observe that since
`LL (A! B)! [(B ! C)! (A! C)]
we get for C = ? that
` (A! B)! [(B ! ?)! (A! ?)]
Hence by using our rst and second observations we get since
`LL ((A! ?)! (((A! ?)! ?)! ?
that
` ((((A! ?)! ?)! ?)! ?)! ((A! ?)! ?)
which proves (1).
2. Let A be a w of LL?. We show
`LL ((A! ?)! ?)! A:
We prove this by induction on the structure of A. for A of the form (q ! ?) ! ?, this is
proved in (1).
Assume
` A$ ((A! ?)! ?)
` B $ ((A! ?)! ?)
we shall show
(a) ` (((A! B)! ?)! ?)! (A! B)
We can show instead
(a0) ` (((A! B)! ?)! ?)! (A! ((B ! ?)! ?))
we have
` (A! B)! ((B ! ?)! (A! ?))
hence
(b) ` A! ((B ! ?)! ((A! B)! ?))
since
` (p! (q ! r))! ((r ! s)! (p! (q ! s)))
we get for p = A, q = B ! ?, r = (A! B)! ? and s = ?
the formula
` (b)! (a0)
and by modus ponens we get ` (a0).
3. Since ` A! (B ! ((A! (B ! ?))! ?)) we get
` (((A! (B ! ?))! ?)! C)! (A! (B ! C)):
For the other direction, in order to show
` (A! (B ! C))! (((A! (B ! ?))! ?)! C):
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We show instead that
` (A! (B ! C))! ((A! (B ! ?))! ?)! ((C ! ?)! ?)))
using the fact that
` ((C ! ?)! ?)! C:
The above follows from
` (A! (B ! C)! ((C ! ?)! (A! (B ! ?)))
which is indeed provable.

Lemma 10.7.5 Let ? be an arbitrary atom. Let ? be a translation from LL(:) of denition
10.3.1 into LL dened as follows
1. ?(q) = def (q ! ?)! ?, for atomic q.
2. ?(A! B) = ?(A)! ?(B).
3. ?(:A) = ?(A)! ?.
Then the following holds:
LL(:) ` A i LL ` ?(A):
Proof.
1. Assume LL(:) ` A. Consider ?(A). This formula is in the fragment LL? of LL as dened in
lemma 10.7.4. By that same lemma, the ? translations of the axioms of LL(:) are theorems
of LL. The translation of modus ponens itself and the translation of (A! B)! (:B ! :A)
is a theorem of LL. Therefore any LL(:) proof of A will be translated into an LL proof of
?(A) and hence LL ` ?(A).
2. Assume that LL(:) 6` A. We will show that LL 6` ?(A). We show that by constructing a
countermodel. We begin with LL(:). We can consider LL(:) as a version of LL without :,
by viewing any w of the form :B as atomic. Thus we pretend that : is a symbol generating
new atoms. We construct the canonical LL structure (X;h) of this language, as in 10.8.10.
In this canonical structure, the elements are all multisets of LL(:) formulas fA1; : : : ; Ang.
For atomic q (and also for negated :B, which we consider as atomic), we have:
h(fA1; : : : ; Ang; q) = 1 i `LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! q) : : :)
and
h(fA1; : : : ; Ang;:B) = 1 i `LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! :B) : : :):
We can prove by induction on ! that for any w C built up from these \atoms" we have:
h(fA1; : : : ; Ang; C) = 1 i `LL(:) A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! C) : : :):
What we do not have in this structure is an inductive condition for the value h(t;:B). Our
next step is to obtain such an inductive clause.
The language LL(:) has real atoms fq1; q2; : : :g. We pretended that any negated formula of
the form :B is also an \atom" and got the canonical structure (X;h) for the language with
\atoms" fqig and f:Bg. We now want to create a new atom ? and reduce :B to B ! ?.
We begin by taking a new atomic letter ? and dening a new assignment h0 on the atoms
fqig [ f?g. h0 is dened using the following clauses:
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 h0(fA1; : : : ; Ang; q) = h(fA1; : : : ; Ang; q) for atomic q 6= ?.
 h0(fA1; : : : ; Ang;?) = 1i `LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An 1 ! :An) : : :).
Notice that in LL(:) the second condition is equivalent to the following:
`LL(:) A1 ! : : : Ai 1 ! (Ai+1 ! : : :! (An ! :Ai) : : :)
We now have a structure for the language LL?, ie LL with ?. Consider a formula A of
the language LL(:). It gets a truth value h(fA1; : : : ; Ang; A) at the point fA1; : : : ; Ang
under h by considering as \atoms" in it any real atom qi and any subformula of the form
:B. In parallel we can consider h0(fA1; : : : ; Ang; ?(A)). This function also gives a value
because ?(A) is a formula built up from real atoms qi and ? and h0 is an assignment for
this language. How are these two values related? We claim that for any A we have:
(*) h(fA1; : : : ; Ang; A) = 1 i h0(fA1; : : : ; Ang; ?(A)) = 1.
To show (*) we need to show (**) below:
(**) For any B of LL(:) we have:
h(fA1; : : : ; Ang;:B) = 1 i h0(fA1; : : : ; Ang; ?(B)! ?) = 1:
Case of atomic q 6= ?
First note that for q atomic, ?(q) ! ? is ((q ! ?) ! ?)) ! ? which is equivalent to q ! ?
in LL. Thus to prove (**) in the atomic case it is sucient to show that h(t;:q) = h0(t; q ! ?).
Using that we prove (*) namely that h(t; q) = h0(t; (q ! ?)! ?).
1. First we prove (**). Note that:
(a) h(fA1; : : : ; Ang;:q) = 1 i by denition `LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! :q) : : :).
On the other hand we also have
(b) h0(fA1 : : : ; Ang; q ! ?) = 1 i for any fB1; : : : ; Bmg if h0(fB1; : : : ; Bmg; q) = 1 then
h0(fA1; : : : ; An; B1; : : : ; Bmg;?) = 1. The above holds i whenever `LL(:) B1 ! : : :!
(Bm ! q) : : :) then `LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! (B1 ! : : :! Bm 1 ! :Bn) : : :).
Assume (a) and show (b):
If `LL(:) B1 ! : : : ! (Bm ! q) : : :) then `LL(:) B1 ! : : : ! (:q ! :Bm) : : :) or
equivalently `LL(:) :q ! (B1 ! (: : :! (Bm 1 ! :Bm) : : :) and hence from (a) we get
` A1 ! : : : An ! (B1 ! : : : (Bm 1 ! :Bm)) : : :)
Assume (b) and show (a). From (b) we get by taking m = 1 and Bm = q that `LL(:) A1 !
: : :! (An ! :q) : : :), which is (a).
2. We now prove (*):
Assume that h(fA1; : : : ; Ang; q) = 1. Then `LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! q) : : :).
To show h0(fA1; : : : ; An; ?(q))) = 1, observe that since ?(q) is (q ! ?) ! ? we need
to show that h0(fA1; : : : ; Ang; (q ! ?) ! ?)) = 1. Let fB1; : : : ; Bmg be such that
h0(fB1; : : : Bmg; q ! ?) = 1. We want to show h0(fA1; : : : ; An; B1; : : : ; Bmg;?) = 1
By (**) which we have already proved for atomic q, we deduce that
`LL(:) B1 ! : : : (Bm ! :q) : : :)
hence
`LL(:) q ! (B1 ! : : :! (Bm 1 ! :Bm) : : :)
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hence
`LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! : : :! (Bm 1 ! :Bm) : : :)
hence by denition
h0(fA1; : : : ; An; B1; : : : ; Bmg;?) = 1:
For the other direction, assume h0(fA1; : : : ; Ang; (q ! ?) ! ?) = 1. We show that `LL(:)
A1 ! : : :! (An ! q) : : :):
From (**) we get that h0(f:qg; q ! ?) = 1 and hence
h0(fA1; : : : ; An;:qg;?) = 1
and hence
`LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! q) : : :)
and hence
h(fA1; : : : ; Ang; q) = 1:
This concludes the proof of both (*) and (**) for the case of atomic q. Note that we also got
the following
(***) h0(t; q) = h0(t; (q ! ?)! ?), for q atomic.
The non atomic case
We rst prove (**): Assume
h(fA1; : : : ; Ang;:B) = 1
Then
`LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! :B) : : :):
We show
h0(fA1; : : : ; Ang; ?(B)! ?) = 1
Assume
h0(fB1; : : : ; Bmg; ?(B)) = 1
Then by the induction hypothesis, from (*) we get
`LL(:) B1 ! : : :! (Bm ! B)
or
`LL(:) :B ! (B1 ! : : : (Bm 1 ! :Bm) : : :)
Therefore
`LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! B1 ! : : : (Bm 1 ! :Bm) : : :)
and so by denition
h0(fA1; : : : ; An; B1; : : : ; Bmg;?) = 1
Assume
h0(fA1; : : : ; Ang; ?(B)! ?) = 1;
we show
h(fA1; : : : ; Ang;:B) = 1:
By the induction hypothesis h0(fBg; ?(B)) = 1 and so h0(fA1; : : : ; An; Bg;?) = 1 and so by
denition
`LL(:) A1 ! : : :! (An ! :B) : : :)
hence
h(fA1; : : : ; Ang;:B) = 1:
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It is now possible to prove (*) for the non atomic case. For the case = :B, note that ?(:B) is
?(B) ! ?. For B atomic the result follows from (***) and for other B the result follows from
(**). The case of B = C ! D is also immediate because ? commutes with ! and both h and h0
follow the same truth table for !.
We now concluded the proofs of (*) and (**) and we can resume the main line of the proof.
Let A be such that LL(:) 6` A. Consider the structure (X;h). We have h(?; A) = 0. Consider
the structure (X;h0). We have h0(?; ?(A) = 0. It therefore follows that LL 6` ?(A).
This concludes the proof of lemma 10.7.5. 
10.8 Concatenation semantics
This section will provide Kripke like possible world semantics for some of the Resource Logics.
We continue with the system CL, dened in 9.2.5 and axiomatised in 10.1.1.
Our starting point is a general implicational system, with no axioms or rules at all. Thus we
have a language with ! only and possibly the classical connectives ^ and _. We know nothing
about !. So we have to give it the most general semantics available and that would be a form of
neighbourhood semantics.
Denition 10.8.1 (SNS Semantics) 1. A (binary) selection neighbourhood propositional struc-
ture SNS has the form (s; S;R; h), where S is a set of possible worlds, or states, s is a
selection function, giving for each Q  S a subset s(Q) the subset of preferred worlds; and
R is the three place neighbourhood relation R  S  2S  2S. We require s to be monotonic
decreasing, namely Q1  Q2 ) s(Q2)  s(Q1).
h is an assignment giving truth values to each atom and world h(t; q) 2 f0; 1g.
2. The truth value of a formula A at a world t under h is denoted by kAkht and is dened as
follows
2.1. kAkht = 1 i h(t; A) = 1 for A atomic.
2.2. kA! Bkht = 1 i (t; kAk; kBjj) 2 R where kQk = ft j kQkht = 1g.
2.3. kA ^Bkht = 1 i kAkht = kBkht = 1
2.4. kA _Bkht = 1 i kAkht = 1 or kBkht = 1.
3. We say A holds in the structure if kAkht = 1 for all t 2 s(S).
4. We say A is valid in the semantics i A holds in all structures
5. We say A j B i for all structures kAk\s(kAk)  kBk, j is a notion of consequence between
ws. In the presence of conjunction we can let A1; : : : ; An j B be A1 ^ : : : ^An j B.
We shall proceed with the pure implicational fragment or possibly with the f!;^g fragment for
a while, without disjunciton because disjunction can be problematic and requires special attention.
Our interest focusses on implication. We dened a consequence relation A j B between formulas.
In order for j to be a logical sysem it must satisfy
Reexivity: A j A
Monotonicity: A1; : : : An j A
implies A1; : : : ; An; B j A
Cut: A1; : : : ; An; B j A
and B1; : : : ; Bm j B
imply A1; : : : ; An; B1; : : : ; Bm j A
Cut and monotonicity do not necessarily hold. Whether or not they hold depends on the
semantics. Thus we have the capability of dealing with non-monotonic systems.
For example, to satisfy the Cut Rule we need s to satisfy the following:
Q1 \Q2 \ s(Q1 \Q2)  Q and Q3 \ s(Q3)  Q2
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imply
Q1 \Q3 \ s(Q1 \Q3)  Q
or better:
Q0 \ s(Q0)  Q and Q00 \ s(Q00)  Q0
imply
Q00 \ s(Q00)  Q
Remark 10.8.2 (Semantical Conditions) We can oer various natural conditions on our SNS
semantics, leading to some well-known interpretations.
1. We can assume that for some S0  S, we have s(S) = S0, and that, in fact, s(Q) = S0 for
all Q  S. Thus our structures now have the form (S0; S;R; h).
Obvious choices for S0 are S0 = S or S0 = fs0g for some xed s0 2 S.
This new semantics is neighbourhood semantics without selection function. If S0 = S is
chosen, then the rule:
` A$ A0;` B $ B0
` (A! B)$ (A0 ! B0)
is valid.
This rule is not valid if we choose S0 = fs0g. This choice gives validity in the actual world
as opposed to validity in the frame.
2. We can assume that R(t; Q1; Q2) and s(Q) are derived from some rst order formulas
	R(t; Q1; Q2; P1; : : : ; Pm);	s(t;Q; P1; : : : ; P2)
where Pi are some xed predicates on S. Namely we have:
 R(t; Q1; Q2) i (S; P1; : : : ; Pm)  	R.
 t 2 s(Q) i (S; P1; : : : ; Pm)  	s.
For example we may have a preferential order  on S and s(Q) is the set of minimal points
relative to Q, dened using the order
	s(t;Q) = def  9s 2 Q(s  t):
Examples of such semantics is the Kraus Lehman Magidor preferential semantics for non
monotonic consequence relations. See the section below on Cumulative Concatenation Logic
CCL.
3. We can alternatively assume that R(t;Q1; Q2) is derived from a pointwise ternary relation
R(x; y; z) through the denition:
 R(t; Q1; Q2) i 8y8z[y 2 Q1 ^R(t; y; z)! z 2 Q2].
or possibly:
 R(t; Q1; Q2) i 8y9z[y 2 Q1 ! R(t; y; z) ^ z 2 Q2].
Examples of such systems are Site Logic SL, (see example below) and the merge sematnics
of denition 10.8.4 below.
4. We can further assume that R is functional, i.e. 8t; y9!zR(t; y; z), we can let z = t+ y.
An example of such a system is concatenation logic.
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Example 10.8.3 Consider the rule of modus ponens
` A ` A! B
` B
in the seamantics with (S0; S;R; h). We need a condition on R which will ensure that:
1. (8x 2 S0)(kAkx = 1)
2. (8x 2 S0)R(x; kAk; kBk)
imply
3. 8x 2 S0(kBkx = 1).
Obviously we need a condition to ensure that





For the semantics for which S0 = S, we get the condition
(*) 8xR(x; S;Q)) S = Q
For the semantics for which S0 = fs0g,we get the condition
(**) R(s0; Q1; Q2) ^ s0 2 Q1 ) s0 2 Q2
If in addition we assume that R is obtained from a pointwise ternary relation R, namely:
R(t; Q1; Q2) i 8yz[y 2 Q1 ^R(t; y; z)! z 2 Q2]
then the conditions become:
 8x[8z8y[R(x; y; z)! z 2 Q]! S = Q]
and
 [8z8y[R(s0; y; z) ^ y 2 Q1 ! z 2 Q2]! Q2 = fs0g]
Example 10.8.4 (Site Logic) We introduce the logic SL, Site Logic, see Barwise-Gabbay [11].
The language of SL contains atomic propositions and the binary connective!. The logic is dened
semantically through applicative structures of the form (S;W; o; h) where S is a set of states, o 2 S
and W are application functions associating with each t 2 S a function W (t) : S ! 2S. We write
W (t; s)  S, for W (t)(s) or, when convenient, t(s)  S; h is an assignment, for atomic q and
t 2 S; h(t; q) 2 f0; 1g.
Let (t1; : : : ; tn) be a sequence. Dene W(t1;:::;tn) to be the function W (t1) W (t2)  : : : W (tn)
(or t1  t2  : : :  tn), where \" is functional composition dened as follows:
W (t) W (s)(x) = fy j 9z[z 2W (s)(x) ^ y 2W (t)(z)]g
Given a structure (S;W; o; h), extend h to h dened on all formulas as follows:
h(t; A! B) = 1 i for all s such that h(s;A) = 1 we have that for all y 2W (t; s); h(y;B) = 1.
We can assume the identity function id is available, with id (t) = ftg.
We let (S;W; o; h)  A i def h(o;A) = 1.
We say  A i A holds in all structures.
Note that in this logic, not even A ! A is a theorem. If we insist that o = id, then A ! A is
a theorem.
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A! B ` A! C
Functional application is not necessarily associative. Given t; s and u, we can either consider
the set:
t[s(u)] = fy j 9z 2 s(u)(y = t(z))g
or the set
[t(s)](u) = fy j 9z 2 t(s)(y = z(u))g:
These two sets need not be equal. If we stipulate that they are, then
h(id; (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))) = 1:
The relation z 2 x(y) is a three place relation R(x; y; z) and shows the connection between the
site sematnics and the ternary possible worlds semantics.
There is another way of looking at the functional x(y). For each zi 2 x(y), we can imagine
a point binary function +i giving zi = x +i y, so that x(y) = fx +i y j zi 2 x(y)g. This way we
replace the set function by a family of binary functions. In case we have only one such function,
ie x(y) = fzg and + is associative, we get concatenation logic, studied in the next section.
Denition 10.8.5 1. A CL structure is a pair (X;h) where X is a set of atomic letters and h
is a function assigning to each atomic proposition q and each nite sequence  2 X a truth
value h(; q) 2 f0; 1g, where X is the set of all nite (or empty) sequences of elements of
X.
The function h is called an assignment.
The function h can be extended to a function h on arbitrary formulas via the following
recursive equation:
() h(;A! B) = 1 i
8[h(;A) = 1 and ( = ? _  6= ?)) h(
 ;B) = 1]
where  




 c = a
 (b
 c) = (a
 b
 c)
2. We say that a formula A is valid in the semantics if for all structures (X;h), we have
h(?; A) = 1.
Theorem 10.8.6 For the Hilbert system CL of 10.1.1 we have `CL A i A is valid in the CL
semantics.
Proof.
1. It is easy to verify that the axioms and rules of CL are valid in the proposed semantics.
2. To show completeness we assume 6`CL A and produce a counter model.
The construction is given below in 10.8.10 with the key lemma being 10.8.11. 
We now dene the semantics for logics stronger than CL. The logics we consider are linear
logic LL, relevance logic R, and intuitionistic logic of 9.1.2 as well as for the logic BR1 of 9.2.8.
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Denition 10.8.7 An LL (linear) structure is a pair (X;h), where X is a nonempty set and h is
an assignment giving a truth value h(Y; q) 2 f0; 1g to each atomic q and each multiset Y built out
of elements of X. If we assume that h is monotonic in Y , ie
Y1  Y2 ) h(Y1; q)  h(Y2; q)
we get BR1 structures. If we assume the multisets Y are sets we get R relevance structures and
if we assume both that we are dealing with subsets Y of X and that h(Y; q) is monotonic, we get
intuitionistic structures. In each one of these cases, the function h can be extended to a function
h on arbitrary formulas by letting
h(Y;A! B) = 1 i 8Y 0[h(Y 0; A) = 1) h(Y [ Y 0; B) = 1]
Theorem 10.8.8 A is a theorem of BR1 (respectively, linear, relevance,intuitionistic logic) i
for any corresponding respective structure (X;h); h(?; A) = 1.
Proof. Soundness can be veried directly. For completeness see the construction below and
Lemma 10.8.11. 
Exercise 10.8.9 What are the corresponding conditions for strict implication and for entailment?
Construction 10.8.10 (Formula Sequences Canonical Structures) Let X be the set of all
formulas of the language. Let  be a sequence of formulas, (A1; : : : ; An). Dene a canonical
assignment hL for any logic L stronger than CL by:
() hL((A1; : : : ; An); q) = 1 i `L A1 ! (A2 ! : : :! (An ! q) : : :):
We prove the following.
Lemma 10.8.11 For any A,
1. hL((A1; : : : ; An); A = 1 i `L A1 ! (: : : (An ! A) : : :)
2. hL(?; A) = 1 i `L A:
Proof. By induction on A
1. For A atomic the lemma hold by denition.
2. Assume hL((A1; : : : ; An); A! B) = 1 and show that `L A1 ! : : : (An ! (A! B) : : :):
Take  = (A). Since `L A ! A, by the induction hypothesis we get hL(A;A) = 1, and
hence
hL((A1; : : : ; An; A); B) = 1
and hence by the induction hypothesis,
`L A1 ! (A1 ! : : :! (A! B) : : :):
3. Assume `L A1 ! : : :! (An ! (A! B) : : :). We want to show that
hL((A1; : : : ; An); A! B) = 1:
To show that, let (D1; : : : ; Dm) be any point such that
hL((D1; : : : ; Dm); A) = 1
and we will show that
hL((A1; : : : ; An; D1; : : : ; Dm); B) = 1:
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By the induction hypothesis, it is sucient to show that in L the following holds:
From:
`L A1 ! (A1 ! : : :! (An ! (A! B) : : :))
and
`L D1 ! : : : (! (Dm ! A) : : :)
it follows that
`L A1 ! : : : (An ! (D1 ! : : :! (Dm ! B) : : :))
This follows from Lemma 10.1.13. Thus Lemma 10.8.11 is proved.

Lemma 10.8.12 In the canonical structure of the previous construction, we have the following
correspondence between axioms and properties..
1. hL((A1; : : : ; An); B) = hL((A
0
1; : : : ; A
0
n); B) provided the multisets fA1; : : : ; Ang and fA01; : : : ; A0ng
are equal.
2. hL((A1; : : : ; An); B) = 1 implies hL((A1; : : : ; An; A); B) = 1.
Property (1) corresponds to the commutativity axiom
` (A1 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :)! (A01 ! : : :! (A0n ! B) : : :)
whenever fAig = fA0ig as multisets. The relevance axiom
(A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C))
allows us to regard the multisets as sets. Similarly, Property (2) corresponds to the axiom ` B !
(A! B) which entails
` (A1 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :)! (A1 : : :! (An ! (A! B) : : :))
Proof. Easy. 
We continue and give semantics for the logic W. We need to dene several concepts.
Denition 10.8.13 1. Let ;  be two sequences, we say that  is a right merge of ;  if 
is an order preserving merge of ;  and the last element of  is the last element of . We
write  2 RMerge (; ). We can similarly dene left merge LMerge(; ).
We can also dene the right merge of any sequence of sequences, 1; : : : ; m to be any se-
quence  which is an order preserving merge of 1; : : : ; m and which satises the condition
that the last element of i precedes the last element of j whenever i < j.
2. Let (X;h) be a model in the sense of 10.8.1. We can extend h to an hy on arbitrary formulas
through the following recursive equation:
(y)hy(;A! B) = 1 i
8; [ 2 LMerge (; ) and
hy(;A) = 1 imply hy(;B) = 1]:
We call this semantics the left merge semantics and say a formula A is valid in the semantics
if for all models (X;h) we have hy(?; A) = 1.
3. We can similarly dene the notion of merge semantics where in the recursive condition (y)
of (2) above, we require that  2 Merge (; ).
Lemma 10.8.14 The logic W is characterised by the right merge semantics, ie we have for all
A;`W A i A is valid in the right merge semantics.
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Proof.
1. Soundness
First we show that for any instance of an axiom and any hy, we have hy(?; A) = 1.
We check the left and right transitivity axioms.
(a) Assume hy(;A ! B) = 1. We want to show hy(; (C ! A) ! (C ! B)) = 1. Let
 2 RMerge (; ) and assume hy(;C ! A) = 1. We want to show hy(; C ! B).
Let  2 RMerge (; ) and assume hy(; C) = 1. We want to show hy(;B) = 1.
 is a right merge of ; ;  and it therefore induces a right merge 1 of  and .
We therefore deduce that hy(1; A) = 1 and since hy(;A ! B) = 1 again we get
hy(;B) = 1 since  is a right merge of  and 1.
(b) We now assume that we have hy(;A ! B) = 1 and want to show that hy(; (B !
C) ! (A ! C)) = 1. Let  2 RMerge (; ) and assume hy(;B ! C) = 1. We
want to show hy(;A ! C) = 1. Let  2 RMerge (; ) and assume hy(;A) = 1.
We must show hy(; C) = 1.  induces a right merge 1 of  and . Hence we get
hy(1; B) = 1. Since hy(;B ! C) = 1 and  is a right merge of  and 1 we get again
that hy(; C) = 1.
Second we show that validity in the right merge semantics is closed under modus ponens.
Assume that A and A ! B are valid in all models. We show that B is valid in all
models. Let (X;h) be any model and consider hy(?; B). Since hy(?; A) = 1 and
hy(?; A! B) = 1 and ? 2 RMerge (?;?) we get hy(?; B) = 1.
2. Completeness
Assume 6`W A, we want to exhibit a model (X;h) with hy(?; A) = 0. We take the canonical
model of sequences of formulas constructed in 10.8.10. We want to prove the analog of lemma
10.8.11 for it. We need to examine case 3 of the proof of 10.8.11, namely that we have
`W A1 ! : : :! (An ! (A! B) : : :)
and we want to show that hW((A1; : : : ; An); A ! B) = 1. To prove that we assume that
hW((D1; : : : ; Dm; D); A) = 1 and want to show that hW((C1; : : : ; Cm+n); B) = 1, where
(C1; : : : ; Cm+n; D) is any right merge of (A1; : : : ; An) and (D1; : : : ; Dm; D). By the induction
hypothesis, we know that
`W D1 ! : : :! (Dm ! (D ! A) : : :)
and we want to show that
`W C1 ! : : :! (Cm+n ! (D ! B) : : :):
However, this is exactly what lemma 10.8.11 proved.

Example 10.8.15 The previous semantics suggests a natural semantic denition of a new logic,
which we call Merge logic. Its theorems are all ws valid in the merge semantics. It is an extension
of W and is indeed linear logic (which is complete for multiset semantics). It is complete for the
following rule:
` A1 ! : : :! (An ! (A! B) : : :)
and
` D1 ! : : : (! (Dm ! A) : : :)
imply
` C1 ! : : :! (Cm+n ! B) : : :
where C1; : : : ; Cm+n is a merge of A1; : : : ; An; D1; : : : ; Dm.
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We can easily believe that the above rule can be proved from the commutativity axiom
(A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C))
We thus have two semantics for linear logic, the multiset semantics and the Merge semantics.
Example 10.8.16 We can dene the destructive Merge semantics, (the DMerge semantics) to be
the following:
When we merge two sequences and in the process of merging the element y is about to be put
next to the element x, if x = y we can destroy y and not put it in. Thus the usual merge function
allows for the following non-deterministic rules:
Merge(at; bs)  abMerge(t; s)
Merge(at; bs)  baMerge(t; s)
In particular the usual merge function will give
Merge(at; as) = aamerge(t; s)
The DMerge rewrites are the following:
DMerge(at; bs)  abDMerge(t; s); a 6= b.
DMerge(at; bs)  baDMerge(t; s); a 6= b.
DMerge(at; as) = aDMerge(t; s).
We can show that the axiom
(A! (A! B))! (A! B)
is validated in the DMerge semantics. This axiom when added to linear logic characterises relevance
logic.
Denition 10.8.17 (Concatenation semantics for CL(
)) Let (X;h) be a CL structure as
in denition 10.8.1. Dene satisfaction in the structure as in (*) of 10.8.1 for the case of A! B
and add the following clause (**) for the case of A
B:
(**) h(;A
B) = 1 i
9; ( =  +  and h(;A) = 1 and h(;B) = 1):
Open Problem 10.8.18 (Completeness theorem of CL(
) for the concatenation semantics.)
For any A, CL(
) ` A i A holds in all CL(
) concatenation structures.




 (C ! B):
1. Soundness can easily be veried. The additional axioms of CL(
) are indeed valid.
2. Completeness is a bit more complicated. The canonical structure of construction in 10.8.10 is
not suitable for our purpose. In that canonical structure the nodes are sequences of formulas
(A1; : : : ; An) and the canonical assignment is such that B holds at (A1; : : : ; An) if and only
if ` A1 ! (: : :! (An ! B)).
This canonical model works well for ! but not for 
. Consider the sequences (C ! (A
B); C).
Clearly ` ((C ! (A 
 B)) ! (C ! (A 
 B)) hence, if our induction is to go through, we must
have that A
B gets value 1 at (C ! A
B;C). We must therefore be able to split the sequence
into two sequences, one which proves A and one which proves B. This is not possible.
We therefore have to construct a new canonical structure, one which is more nely tuned for
our purpose. This is done in construction 10.8.19 below, where completeness of the semantics is
proved for a new proof theory  `canonical B.
This allows us to conclude the completeness proof. We observe that for the empty database ?,
we have by theorem 10.2.3 that ? `CL(
) A i ? `canonical A.
Hence if CL(
) 6` A then h(?; A) = 0. 
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Construction 10.8.19 (Proof sequences canonical structure) 1. A labelled sequence of
CL(
) formulas  = (1 : A1; : : : ; r : Ar) is a canonical CL(
) proof sequence (with
repetitions) from a database  = fti : Big; t1 < : : : < tn, i each labelled formula in the
sequence satises one of the following conditions:
(a) Ai is a CL(
) theorem and i = ?.
(b) Ai is either atomic or an implication and is obtained from two previous elements j :
Ak ! Ai and k : Ak; j; k < i by modus ponens and i = j 
 k and max(j) <
min(k).
(c) Ai is a repetition of Aj, j < i, and Ai = Aj ; i = j.
(d) Ai is of the form Aj 
 Ai 1 with j < i and for some m < k < n, we have that
(1 : A1; : : : ; j : Aj) is a canonical proof sequence from ft1 : B1; : : : ; tm : Bmg and
(j+1 : Aj+1; : : : ; i 1 : Ai 1) is a canonical proof sequence from ftm+1 : Bm+1; : : : ; tk :
Bkg and i = j 
 i 1.
(e) The label ti of (ti : Ai) is atomic, corresponding to an assumption, tj : Bj and Ai = Bj
and ti = tj.
(f) r = (t1; : : : ; tn)
2. Let  = (A1; : : : ; An) be a sequence of ws of CL(
). We say  `canonical B if when
labelling  as  = ft1 : A1; : : : ; tn : Ang; t1 < : : : < tn, then there exists a canonical proof
sequence with last element (t1; : : : ; tn) : B.
3. Let X be the set of all sequences of the form . Dene an assignment h on X by
h(; q) = 1 i  `canonical q:
4. We claim the following holds in the canonical structure (X;h).
(]) : h((A1; : : : ; Ar); B) = 1 i (A1; : : : ; Ar) `canonical B
To show (]) we proceed by induction.
(a) Case of !:
Assume h((A1; : : : ; Ar); C ! D) = 1. Then for any sequence (C1; : : : ; Ck) in which C
holds, we have that D holds at
(A1; : : : ; Ar; C1; : : : ; Ck).
Consider the database 0 = fx : Cg where x is a new atomic label and the canoncial
prof sequence (x : C) based on 0. By the induction hypothesis, since for  = x; (x :
C; x : C) is also a canonical proof sequence based on 0, we have that C holds at
(x : C). Hence D holds at (A1; : : : ; An; C). Therefore by the induction hypothesis
(A1; : : : ; An; C) `canonical D. Thus there exists a label  such that
(1 : A1; : : : ; r : Ar; x : C;  : D)
is a canonical proof sequence based on t1 : A1; : : : ; tn : An; x : C t1 < : : : < tn < x.
By condition (2f),  = (t1; : : : ; tn; x). We want to show that there exists a label  such
that (1 : A1; : : : ; r : Ar;  : C ! D) is a canonical proof sequence based on t1 :
A1; : : : ; tn : An. This is obvious, since  = (t1; : : : ; tn; x), we must have An = C ! D
and r = (t1; : : : ; tn) by the proof discipline dened in (1).
Hence (1 : A1; : : : ; r : Ar; r : C ! D) is a canonical proof sequence for C ! D. The
last element in the sequence is a repetition.
Assume now that there exists a  such that (1 : A1; : : : ; r : Ar); Ar = C ! D) a
canonical proof sequence. We want to show that h((A1; : : : ; Ar); C ! D) = 1. By the
induction hypothesis we should show that whenever ( : C1; : : : ; k : Ck); Ck = C is a
canonical proof sequence for C from fs1 : C1; : : : ; sm : Cmg then there exists a canonical
proof sequence of D from (A1; : : : ; An; C1; : : : ; Ck). It is easy to nd such a sequence.
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In fact, (1 : A1; : : : ; r : Ar; 1 : C1; : : : ; k : Ck;  : D) is a canonical proof sequence
from t1 : A1; : : : ; tr : Ar; fs1 : C1; : : : ; sm : Cmg with t1 < : : : < tr < s1 < : : : < sm and
with  = (t1; : : : ; tr; s1; : : : ; sm).
(b) Case of 

Let h((A1; : : : ; Ar); C
D) = 1. Then for some m;C holds at (A1; : : : ; Am) and D holds
at (Am+1; : : : ; Ar). By the induction hypothesis, there are canonical proof sequences for
C from ft1 : A1; : : : ; tm : Amg and for D from ftm+1 : Am+1; : : : ; tr : Arg.
Let ;  0 be the two sequences, then
 
  0 
 ((t1; : : : ; tr) : C 
D)
is a canonical proof sequence for C 
D.
Assume there exists a canonical proof sequence
1 : C1; : : : ; k : Ck; (t1; : : : ; tr) : C 
D
for C 
 D from ft1 : A1; : : : ; tr : Arg. Then by denition, there exists an m and
an n such that  : C1; : : : ; n : Cn is a canonical proof sequence for Cn = C from
t1 : A1; : : : ; tm : Am and n+1 : Cn+1; : : : ; k : Ck is a canonical proof sequence for D
from tm+1 : Am+1; : : : ; tr : Ar. By the induction hypothesis C holds at (A1; : : : ; Am)
and D holds at (Am+1; : : : ; Ar).
This concludes the proof of (]).
Thus the construction is concluded.
Denition 10.8.20 (Semantics for LL(:)) An LL(:) structure has the form (X;h;X?), where
(X;h) is an LL structure in the sense of denition 10.8.7 and X?  X. Further assume that h
satises the following for each atomic q.
1. There exists a ? such that for all t; h(t;?) = 1 i t 2 X?.
2. For ? of (1), and all q; h(t; q) = h(t; ((q ! ?)! ?)).
3. h(t;:A) = h(t; A! ?), for any A.
Lemma 10.8.21 LL(:) is sound and complete for the semantics of the previous denition.
Proof. Follows from 10.8.19. 
Remark 10.8.22 We would like to nd a way of constructing structures of the form (X;h;X?)
of denition 10.8.20, so that the semantics is not dened by stipulation. At the moment what we
do is take any structure (X;h0) as in 10.8.10. Choose an arbitrary atom ? and let X? = ft j
h0(t;?) = 1g and dene a new h by letting
h(t; q) = h0(t; (q ! ?)! ?):
Then we know by previous lemmas that (X;h;X?) satises our requirements. We would like to
choose X with some additional internal structure on X and use the additional internal structure
to dene X? and h and be able to prove directly that all the required properties hold.
To give an idea of what our diculties are, consider the canonical structure of sequences of
formulas (A1; : : : ; An). Clearly ? holds at (A1; : : : ; An) i ` A1 ! (: : : (An 1 ! :An) : : :).
However this condition uses the proof theory of the langauge and not the pattern list structure
of (A1; : : : ; An). For example ? should hold at (p! :q; p; q) but in the canonical model this is just
a sequence of formulas. We can bring the pattern out by writing ((p;:q); p; q). To be acceptable,
X must allow for sequences of sequences, etc. If we follow this approach we will need the families
of hereditarily nite sequences, multisets and sets.
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Remark 10.8.23 (Semantics for Negation in Relevance Logic) The semantics of the pre-
vious remark can be modied to be a sematnics for relevance logic with negation (LL(:) with the
additional axiom (A! (A! B))! (A! B)). All we need to do is to let X be the family of all
nite subsets of X. This new semantics for : solves an old problem for the semantics of negation
of relevance logic, namely to have a semantical condition on : which at the same time allows for
::A$ A and :A = defA! ?, for a constant ?.
10.9 Semi algebraic semantics for resource logics
Denition 10.9.1 (Semi-algebraic semantics for CL(
)) 1. Let (T;;
; 0) be a partially
ordered set with a binary associative operation 
 on it.
We require that it satises the conditions:
(a) 0
 x = x
(b) (x
 y)
 z = x
 (y 
 z):
(c) x  x0 and y  y0 ) x
 y  y 
 y0.
2. A CL(
) semi-algebraic structure has the form (T;;
; 0; h) where (T;;
; 0) is as in (1)
and h is an assignment, giving for each t 2 T and atomic q a truth value. h should satisfy
the following condition:
(a) h(t; q) = 1 and t0  t imply h(t0; q) = 1
3. We dene by induction the truth values kAkht and kAkgt ,for any formula A and any t 2 T
according to the following clauses
(a) kAkht = 1 i h(t; A) = 1, for A atomic.
(b) kA! Bkht = 1 i for all x 2 T , if kAkhx = 1 then kBkht
x = 1
kA
Bkht = 1 i 9x; y; t  x
 y and
kAkhx = 1 and kBkhy = 1
4. We say that A holds in the structure i kAkh0 = 1.
Lemma 10.9.2 In any structure, for any A; t and t0 we have kAkht = 1 and t0  t imply kAkht0 = 1.
Proof. By induction on A.
1. For A atomic this is as required.
2. kA
Bkht = 1 and t0  t imply kA
Bkht0 = 1 by denition.
3. Assume kA! Bkht = 1 and assume t0  t. We want to show kA! Bkht0 = 1.
Let x be any point such that kAkhx = 1. We show kBkht0
x = 1. We know that kBkht
x = 1 (since
kA ! Bkht = 1), and hence by the induction hypotheis, since t0 
 x  t 
 x we get kBkht0
x = 1.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Theorem 10.9.3 (Completeness theorem for CL(
).)
CL(
) ` A i A holds in all semi-algebraic structures.
Proof.
1. Soundness
We show that all instances of the axioms hold and that there is a closure under the inference
rules. It is easy to verify that the axioms involving! hold. We check the 
 axiom. We have
to show that for any t, k(A
B)! Ckht = kA! (B ! C)kht .
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Assume kA! (B ! C)kht = 1. Let x be such kA
Bkht = 1. Thus for some u; v; x  u
 v
and kAkhu = 1 and kBkhv = 1. We want to show kCkht




 x  t
 u
 v, we get kCkht
x = 1. Thus k(A
B)! Ckht = 1.
Assume k(A 
 B) ! Ckht = 1. We show kA ! (B ! C)kht = 1. Let x; y be such kAkhx = 1
and kBkhy = 1. Then certainly kA
Bkhx
y = 1 and hence kCkht
x
y = 1. Thus by denition
since x; y were arbitrary we get kA! (B ! C)kht = 1.
2. Completeness
Let T0 be the set of all ws of CL(
). Let T = T0 [ f?g. Dene
(a) t  t0 i ` t! t0, for t 6= ?.
(b) ?  t0 i t0 = ? or ` t0
(c) h(t; q) = 1 i ` t! q, for t 6= ?.
(d) h(?; q) = 0.
Let 
 be the connective 
. Clearly ` t! t0;` s! s0 imply ` (t
 s)! (t0 
 s0).
We thus have a structure. We prove by induction on A that for any t:
kAkht = 1 i ` t! A; for t 6= ?
kAkh? = 1 i ` A
(a) This certainly holds for atomic A.
(b) Assume kA 
 Bkht = 1. Then for some x; y such that ` t ! (x 
 y) we have by the
induction hypothesis:
` x! A and ` y ! B:
Clearly then ` t! (A
B). If t = ? then we have ` x
 y and this implies ` A
B.
Assume ` t ! (A 
 B). then certainly t  A 
 B and by the induction hypothesis
kAkhA = 1 and kBkhB = 1.
(c) Assume kA ! Bkht = 1. Then for all x, if ` x ! A then ` (t 
 x) ! B. Let x = A.
We get ` (t
A)! B, ie ` t! (A! B). If t 6= ?, we get ` A! B.
Assume ` t ! (A ! B). then certainly for any x, if ` x ! A then ` t 
 x ! B. If
t = ?, we are given ` A! B, then certainly if ` x! A then ` x! B.
To complete the proof observe that if 6` A then by construction kAkh? = 0.

Remark 10.9.4 First note that in view of the completeness theorem in 10.8.11, we can assume
that the semialgebraic semantics has the form (T;
; 0), with  taken as equality. T can be taken
as the set of all nite sequences of construction 10.8.10, 
 is concatenation and 0 is ?.
The previous semi-algebraic semantics should be compared with the algebraic semantics given
by Girard [Girard, 1987] and Avron [Avron, 1988b, pp. 174{175]. We stress that we are not
giving algebraic semantics here but essentially a possible worlds semantics based on algebra. The
Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic also has order  involved and if strong negation and some
temporal operators are also present, we get some successor or other functions involved.
The dierence comes out clearly when we dene the semantics for the modality !
We can take the Kripke like clause
k!Akht = 1 i 8xkAkht
x = 1
We do not need an algebraic operation for ! See 10.9.9 below. Compare with Avron [Avron, 1988b,
pp. 181{182]. The classical conjunction and disjunction can also be given their traditional truth
tables, namely
kA ^Bkht = 1 i kAkht = kBkht = 1
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and similarly for _. The algebraic interpretation with given ^ and _ the lattice theoretic join
and meet. The distributive law will hold in our interpretation, however, without the option of not
having it.
We shall give an even more interesting possible world semantics in the next section.
We can similarly give semi-algebraic semantics for CL(:) as follows:
Denition 10.9.5 1. Let (T;;
;?; 0) be a partially ordered set with a binary associative
operation 
 on it and an involution ? on it satisfying the following conditions.
(a) 0
 x = x
(b) x
 (y 
 z) = (x
 y)
 z
(c) x  x0 and y  y0 ) x
 y  x0 
 y0
(d) x?? = x
(e) x  y ) y?  x?.
2. CL(:) structure has the form (T;;
;?; 0; h; g), where (T;;
;?; 0) are as in (1) and h
and g are two assignments satisfying:
(a) h(t; q) = 1 and t0  t imply h(t0; q) = 1
(b) g(t; q) = 1 and t  t0 imply g(t0; q) = 1.
3. We dene by induction the truth values kAkht and kAkgt for any w A and any t 2 T as
follows:
(a) For q atomic, let
kqkht = h(t; q)
kqkgt = g(t; q)
(b) kA! Bkht = 1 i for al x 2 T , if kAkhx = 1 then kAkht
x = 1
kA! Bkgt = 1 i 9x; y(t?  x
 y and kAkhx = 1 and kBkgy? = 1).
(c) k:Akht = kAkgt?
k:Akgt = kAkht? .
4. We say A holds in the structure i kAkh0 = 1 . We say A is valid if A holds in all structures.
Lemma 10.9.6 For any A; t and t0
1. kAkht = 1 and t0  t imply kAkht0 = 1
2. kAkgt = 1 and t  t0 imply kAkgt0 = 1.
Proof. By induction on A.
1. For atomic A this holds by denition.
2. Let kA! Bkht = 1 and let kAkhx = 1, for x arbitrary. Then kBkht
x = 1. Now assume t0  t,
then t0
x  t
x and hence by the induction hypothesis kBkht0
x = 1. Since x was arbitrary
we get kA! Bkht = 1.
3. Let kA ! Bkgt = 1. Then for some x; y; t?  x
 y and kAkhx = 1 and kBkgy? = 1. Assume
t  t0, then t0?  t? and so by denition kA! Bkgt0 = 1 because the same x; y will do.
4. k:Akht = 1 and t0  t imply k:Akgt? = 1 and t?  t0?, which imply by the induction
hypothesis kAkg
t0? , which implies k:Akht0 = 1
k:Akgt = 1 and t  t0 imply kAkht? = 1 and t0?  t?, which imply by the induction hypothesiskAkht0? = 1, which implies k:Akgt0 = 1.
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This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Theorem 10.9.7 (Completeness theorem of CL(:) for the semi-algebraic semantics) CL(:) `
A i A holds in all semi-algebraic structures.
Proof.
Soundness
The axioms and rules can be checked to be valid in the semantics.
Completeness
Let T0 be the set of all formulas of the language. Let T = T0 [ f?g. Understand ?! A to be A
and A! ? to be :A. Let A  B hold i ` A! B and let A
B be :(A! :B), and A? be :A.
Clearly ?
B = :(?! :B) = ::B = B, and from the axioms one can show that (T;;
;?;?)
is a semi-algebraic structure.
Dene
h(A; q) = 1 i ` A! q
g(A; q) = 1 i ` q ! A:
Completeness follows from the following lemma below 
Lemma 10.9.8 For any B;A
kAkhB = 1 i ` B ! A
kAkgB i ` A! B:
Proof. By induction on A.
1. For atomic A this holds by denition.
2. Assume kC ! DkhB = 1 then by the induction hypothesis since kCkhC = 1 we have,
kDkhB
C = 1 therefore ` B 
 C ! D ie ` B ! (C ! D).
Assume ` B ! (C ! D). Then ` (B 
 C) ! D, then by the induction hypothesis
kDkhB
C = 1. Let x be such that kCkhx = 1. Then by the induction hypothesis ` x ! C.
Hence ` (B 
 x)! (B 
 C) and so kDkhB
x = 1.
3. Assume kC ! DkgB = 1 then for some x; y ` :B ! (x 
 y) and kCkhx = 1 and kDkg:y = 1
i for some x; y
` (x! :y)! B
` x! C
` D ! :y:
We need to show
` (C ! D)! B
however the last two assumptions imply
` (C ! D)! (x! :y)
which yields ` (C ! D)! B).
Assume ` (C ! D) ! B. Let x = C; y = :D. Then :B  x 
 y and ` x ! C and
` D ! :y which yields by the induction hypothesis
kC ! DkgB = 1:
4. The case of : follows from the rule
` A! :B i ` B ! :A:

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Theorem 10.9.9 Let CL(
; !) be the system with both 
 and !, with both groups of axioms for 

and for !, as given in 10.2.1. Then CL(
; !) is complete for the CL(
) semi-algebraic structures,
with the added semantic condition for ! given below
k!Akht = 1 i for all x; kAkht
x = 1:
Proof. One can verify that lemma 10.9.2 still holds.
Soundness
Easy to check the axioms for ! are valid.
Completeness
Construct the canonical model as in the completeness proof of CL(
). We show that kAkht = 1
i ` t! A, for any t; A by induction. We have to verify the case of !, as follows:
Assume ` t!!A
We want to show k!Akht = 1.
We have to show kAkht
x = 1 for any x. Thus by the induction hypothesis ` t 
 x ! A or
` t! (x! A).
However, `!A! A
and `!A! (x!!A)
hence `!A! (x! A)
and since ` t!!A
we get ` t! (x! A).
Assume k!Akht = 1. Hence for all x;` t! (x! A). Especially for atomic x not appearing in t
or A. We thus conclude ` t!!A. This completes the proof. 
10.10 Metalevel features via connectives
This section describes how one can implement metalevel features of a logical system via special
additional connectives. Consider the resource logic BR1 of 9.2.8. The system is based on ! only.
Its basic characterising feature as a resource logic is that assumptions cannot be used in proofs
more than once. The inference rule is modus ponens. Its labelling system proposes a discipline for
propagating the labels through modus ponens. Let us write the two rules:
Modus Ponens
 : A
 : A! B
 
  : B
! Introduction
To show t : A! B, assume x : A and show t
 x : B.
Let us now adopt the policy that a w is labelled (named) by other ws. We want to do the
labelling from within the logic itself. To achieve this we add a binary connective 
 to the language
and understand (A1 
A2) as the formula indicating that the label of A2 is A1.
According to this reading the two rules above become:
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! Introduction for 

[t




Here we used A to label itself.
We can dene a Hilbert type logic L
;! with the above connectives and the above two rules
taken as axioms with modus ponens as the inference rule. This logic has the same standing as any
other logic (eg intuitionistic logic with ! and _). The dierence is in the axioms we adopt for 
.
It is hoped that for any labelling discipline for a logic LDS with !, there exist the corresponding
axioms for the logic L with f!;
g and a translation T such that the following theorem holds for
all A:
LDS ` A i L ` TA
We should make it clear that ! of L is classical or intuitionistic. It is not the same as the !
of the LDS, which could be relevant, linear or any other weak system. The weakening eect on
the (classical or intuitionistic) ! of L is achieved via the presence of the 
 connective. Axioms
on the 
 serve to ne tune the restrictions on the ! of L.
To see an example, consider the formula A ! A. We know A ! A is a theorem of any LDS
system. We also know that in LDS a theorem must be derived with label ?. Let us allow the
constant ? in the language L







Dene the mapping T from LDS into L by
TA = (?
A)
This means that we expect that
LDS ` A i L ` ?
A
We therefore try:
Example 10.10.1 Let us check whether L ` (?















By the rule ! Introduction for 
.
Example 10.10.2 Let us check the provability of A ! (B ! A). We will try to nd out what
axioms to add to L to allow for a successful derivation of ?
 (A! (B ! A)).















 (B ! A)) from 2
4. ?
 (A! (B ! A)) from 3.
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Lemma 10.10.3
t
 (A1 ! : : :! (An ! B) : : :)





Ai)! (: : : (t
A1)
 : : :
An)
B)
Proof. By induction on n.
Case n = 1
t








 (A1 ! : : :! (An ! (An





Ai)! (: : : (t
A1)
 : : :
An)
 (An ! B))
Let y = (: : : (t
A1)















which is the desired result. 
Example 10.10.4 Let us check the axiom (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B)).
Consider:
?
 ((A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
by the lemma is equivalent in L to:
((A! B)
 (A! B)) ^ ((C ! A)
 (C ! A)) ^ (C 
 C)! (((A! B)
 C ! A))
 C)
B
Let us prove this formula in L. Assume the antecedent and show the consquent. We thus assume
1. (A! B)
 (A! B)
2. (C ! A)
 (C ! A)
3. C 
 C
and want to prove
(((A! B)
 (C ! A))
 C)
B
4. 2 is equivalent to:
(C 
 C)! ((C ! A)
 C)
A




6. From 1 and 5, by modus ponens for 
 we get
((A! B)
 ((C ! A)
 C))
B
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Example 10.10.5 Try the axiom (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)). We claim the correspoid-
ing 








We want to show:
L ` ?
 [(A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C))]
By Lemma 10.10.3 it is sucient to show:
L ` ((A! (B ! C))
 (A! (B ! C)) ^ (B 
B) ^ (A
A)!




We assume the antecedent and show the consequent:
We also have that:
(A! (B ! C))
 (A! (B ! C))
is equivalent to:
(A
A) ^ (B 





A) ^ (B 
B) are part of the antecedent which we have assumed, we get the following:




By semi-commutativity we get the desired consequent:
Example 10.10.6 Consider
(A! (A! B))! (A! B)
Let us check what is needed to have
L ` ?
 ((A! (A! B))! (A! B))
To show that it is sucient to assume
((A! (A! B))
 (A! (A! B))) ^ (A
A)



















To illustrate the correspondence between LDS and the Hilbert system with teh additional 
,
we formulate and prove the following theorem:
Theorem 10.10.7 Consider the resource concatenation logic CL with the axioms
1. A! A
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2. (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))





(B ! C)! (A! C)
Consider the logic L1 in the language of 
;?, and ! and the following axioms for 
, besides








D) ^ (B 















Then the following holds for any w A.
CL ` A i L1 ` (?
A):
Proof.
1. Assume CL ` A. We want to show L1 ` ?
A we follow the ususal method of showing that
the translations of the axioms and rules of CL are all provable in L1. The axioms (1) and










which is the desired result since ?
?$ ?.
We now check the right transitivity rule. We assume
(a) L1 ` ?
 (A! B)
and show
(b) L1 ` ?
 ((B ! C)! (A! C)).




and (2) is equivalent to
L1 ` ((B ! C)
 (B ! C))! ((B ! C)
 (A! C))
which is equivalent to
L1 ` ((B ! C)
 (B ! C)) ^ (A
A)! ((B ! C)
A)
 C
We now show the last formula.
Assume
2.1. (B ! C)
 (B ! C)




2.3. ((B ! C)
A)
 C
From (1) we get
2.4. A
B
From axiom (2) and (2.1) and (2.4) we get the desired (2.3).
2. Assume now that CL 6` A, we want to show that L1 6` ? 
 A. We use the semantical
interpretation of CL, given in denition 10.8.5 and theorem 10.8.6. Since CL 6` A, there
exists a model (X;h), such that h(?; A) = 0.
We use this model to dene an assignment g on the language L1 such that all instances
of axioms of L1 get value 1, while the w ? 
 A gets value 0. The language L1 has the
classical connectives and the additional connective 
 and ?. 
 is not truth functional and
so even if we know the truth values of A and B, we do not know the value of A 
 B. We
can regard anything of the form A 
 B as atomic and give it values arbitrarily. Of course
if we do that we might not get all instances of the axioms of L1 getting value 1. We thus
need a way of assigning vlaues to all ws of the form A 
 B in such a way that all axioms
of L1 get value 1. We can use h for that purpose, except that h relates only to a fragment
of the language of L1 and not to all of it. This is not surprising because the 
 language is a
metalanguage and can say a lot more. At this stage we have to consider the sublangauge L of
the langauge of f
;?;!g dened as the set of all formulas of the form (A1
 : : :
An)
B,
where Ai is a w without 
 or ?. Note that since we have associativity, this is a good
denition. For this fragment L, we can dene for any B; g((A1 
 : : : 
 An) 
 B) = 1 i
h((A1; : : : ; An); B) = 1 in the model (X;h). By the completeness theorem, we know that for
any B; h((A1; : : : ; An); B) = 1 i CL ` A1 ! (: : :! (An ! B) : : :).
We now have to verify that all axioms of L1 get value 1. To do that we use the translation
into CL, as follows:
(a) g((?
A)




 (D ! C))! ((B
A)
C)) = 1 i h(A;D) = 1 and h(B;D ! C) = 1
imply h((B;A); C) = 1
i `CL A! D and `CL B ! (D ! C) imply `CL B ! (A! C)
which indeed holds by lemma 10.1.13.
(c) g(t
 (A! B)) = h(t; A! B)
g(A
A) = h(A;A) = 1
g((t
A)
B) = h((t; A); B)
we thus get that
g(t














by denition, as we relied on associativity and dened g((A1 
 : : :
An)
B).
We can now prove the other direction of our theorem. If CL 6` A, then in the canonical
model (X;h); h(?; A) = 0 and hence g(?
A) = 0 and hence L1 6` ?
A.
The assignment g in the proof of 10.9.7 was dened for only the fragment L of the language
L1 with 
. It would be nice to be able to extend it to the whole language. The extension also
depends on what meaning we want to give to the other ws, the ones not in the fragment,
eg formulas like (A 
 B) ! C and A ! (B 
 C). Such an extension is given in example
10.10.10 below.
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The best way to approach the problem is to consider the model (
(X;h) we have been dealing
with. This model gives values to formulas with ! only. If we can give a semantic condition
to
h((A1; : : : ; An); B 
 C);
then 
 will have a meaning. The only role for B 
 C we have so far is in the context of
(B 
C)
D, were we read it as (B 
C) is the label of D and semantically translate it into
the model (X;h) as h((B;C); D) = 1.
Thus B 
 C is supposed to be a label. We therefore try the following denition.

Denition 10.10.8 h((A1; : : : ; An); B
C) = 1 i def for some 1  k  n; h((A1; : : : ; Ak); B) = 1
and h((Ak+1; : : : ; An); C) = 1.
We thus read B 
 C as saying \I am the local label (A1; : : : ; An)".
Thus the axiom for 
 would be the following (written informally in a \metalanguage"):
t
 (A
B), 9s1; s2[s1 
 s2 = t and (s1 
A) and (s2 
B)]
Lemma 10.10.9 For 
 dened semantically:
h(t; A
B) = 1 i def 9x9y[x
 y = t and h(x;A) = 1 and h(y;B) = 1]
The following holds:
1. h(?; A
B)! C) = h(?; A! (B ! C))
2. h(?; A! (B ! A
B)) = 1
Proof.
1. To show (1), we proceed as follows:
h(?; (A
B)! C) = 1 i
8x[h(x;A
B) = 1) h(x;C) = 1
i 8x[9x1x2(h(x1; A) = 1 and h(x2; B) = 1
and x = x1 
 x2)) h(x;C) = 1]
i 8x8x18x2[h(x1; A) = 1 and h(x2; B) = 1
and x = x1 
 x2 ) h(x;C) = 1]
i 8x1x2[h(x1; A) = 1) [h(x2; B) = 1) h(x1 
 x2; C) = 1]]
i 8x1[h(x1; A) = 1) 8x2[h(x2; B) = 1) h(x2 
 x2; C) = 1]]
i 8x1[h(x1; A) = 1) h(x1; B ! C) = 1]
i h(?; A! (B ! C)) = 1
2. To show (2) we check
h(?; A! (B ! (A
B))) = 1
i 8x8y[h(x;A) = 1 and h(y;B) = 1) h(x
 y;A
B) = 1
i 9x9y[h(x;A) = 1 and h(y;B) = 1) h(x
 y;A
B) = 1
i truth because of the denition of h(t; A
B).

We are now in a position to semantically dene a logic CL
, which is the extension of the logic
CL to the language with! and 
. The truth table for 
 is given as in the preceding lemma. The
theorems of CL
 are all ws A such that for all models (X;h); h(?; A) = 1. Clearly CL
 is a
conservative extension of CL, since they are both complete for the same semantics.
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Example 10.10.10 We are now ready to extend the assignment g of the metalanguage Lf?;
;!g
from the fragment suggested in the proof of 10.9.7 to the entire language.
g(A
B) = 1 i CL
 ` A! B:
For ws inthe fragement, namely of the form (A1 
 : : :
An)




 ` (A1 
 : : :
An)! B
i CL
 ` A1 ! : : : (An ! B) : : :)
i h((A1; : : : ; An); B) = 1
i g(A
B) = 1.
We still do not have a Hilbert axiomatisation for CL
. This is our next task.




1 ? : (1)
2 ? : (2)
3 t1 : C1 Assumption
4 r1 : E1 MP from reiteration
5 t2 : C2 Assumption
6 r2 : E2 MP from reiteration
7 tm+n : Cm+n Assumption
8 rm+n : Em+n MP
9 Show B
10 t : D Assumption
11 d1 : : : dm : D ! A Reiteration
12 a1 : : : an : A! B Reiteration
13 d2 : : : dmt : A
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1 t1 : A1 Assumption
2 t1 : A2 ! (A! B) MP
3 t2 : D1 Assumption
4 t2 : D2 ! (D3 ! (D ! A) : : :)
5 t3 : D2 Assumption
6 t2t3 : D3 ! (D ! A)
7 Assumption
8 t2t3 : D3 ! (D ! A)
9 t4 : A2 Assumption
10 t1t4 : A! B
11 t5 : D3 Assumption
12 t2t3t5 : D ! A
13 t : D Assumption
14 t2t3t5t : A










t2 : X2 ! (A! B)
t2 : X1
premiss which is not allowed
here and use it as a minor
We have to reiterate A
t2t3 : (A! B)
t3 : X2
Figure 10.16:
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1 show B ! A
2 a : A Assumption
3 B ! A from Box
4 show A
5 b : B Assumption
6 a : A reiteration
7
Figure 10.17:
1 show X ! (A! B)
2 a : A! (X ! B) Assumption
3 a : X ! (A! B) from Box
4 show A! B
5 b : X Assumption
6 ab : A! B from Box
7 Show B
8 c : A Assumption
9 b : X reiteration
10 a : A! (X ! B) reiteration
11 ac : X ! B MP
12 acb : B MP
exit 13 ab : A! B
exit 14 a : X ! (A! B)
exit 15 ? : (A! (X ! B))! (X ! (A! B))
Figure 10.18:
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1 show (A! B)! (A! B)
2 a : B ! A Assumption
3 a : (A! B)! (A! B) from Box
4 show A! B
5 b : A! B Assumption
6 ab : A! B from Box
7 show B
8 c : A Assumption
9 b : A! B reiteration
10 bc : B MP
11 B ! A cannot be reiterated
12 because in H;A 6` B ! A
exit 13 b : A! B
exit 14 ? : (A! B)! (A! B)
Figure 10.19:
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Axioms Condition
W as in theorem 10.3.4
(4) allow the use of assumptions more than once.
(Replace MP1 by MP)
C(axiom 8) allow Restart
6 allow for a box for  ! B of the form
Show B
a :  Assumption
 : B
exit  ! B
even though the label a is not in  provided  satises the
corresponding condition of 6
7 allow to reiterate a  provided it satises condition 7
4m,n use any assumption at most k times (ie MPk)
for m+ n k  : A
together with
 : A! B
 [  : B
5k,1




2 a : C assumption
3 t2s3 : C ! B
4 t2s3a : B
exit 5 t2s3 : C ! B
Figure 10.21:












 ` st : B
21
Figure 10.22:






This Chapter shows that many valued logics t comfortably within the Labelled Deductive Systems
framework. The basic idea of LDS is that formulas come labelled in the form t : A. A database is
a set of such labelled formulas and the basic consequence relation has the form:
fti : Aig ` s : B
In the implicational fragment, to show
t : A! B
we open a box, assume x : A, prove using our metabox discipline y : B and we are able to exit
with the conclusion t : A! B provided t; x; y satisfy a suitable relationship  characteristic to the
logic in question.
If we write the box condition in a semi formalised form, it would be the following:
A! B can be derived with label t i for all labels x ranging over a certain set L1 there exists
a label y such that x : A can prove y : B and t; x; y satisfy the required conditions.
In symbols
t : A! B i 8x 2 Li9y(x : A \proves" y : B and '(t; x; y) holds)
What is important here is the combination of quantiers \8x9y".
In the case of resource logics 8x ranged over new atomic labels and y was requried to satisfy
y = t+ x. In practice we skolemised and chose an arbitrary label x for x : A and showed t+ x : B.
Thus we can see now the familiar form from previous chapters:
In modal logic we had the same universal quantier on labels. To show t : A we show s : A
for every s such that tRs. The precise denition depends on the exact labelling discipline. For
1 x : A Assumption
2





5 tx : B
exit 6 t : A! B
Figure 11.1:
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modal K to show A in the middle of a proof one could take an arbitrary label x, assume tRx,
open a box, bring into the box the appropriate set of reiterations, namely fx : B j t : B has
already been provedg, and show x : A.
It turns out that the quantier combination for showing A! B in many valued logics is exactly
the same as in the case of resource or modal logics. In many valued logics atomic formulas get
truth values from some set. The more complex formulas get their value according to a prescribed
truth table. Some values are considered designated and the theorems of logic are those formulas
which get designated values under all assignments of values to the atoms.
Example 11.1.1 ( Lukasiewicz Innite Valued Logic  L1) The truth values are all rationals
(or equivalently one can take all reals) in the interval [0; 1]. 1 is the designated value. The truth
table for : and ! are as follows:
A B :A A! B
x y 1  x min(1; 1  x+ y)
 Lukasiewicz n+ 1 valued logic  Ln has values f0; 1n ; 2n ; : : : ; 1g with the same truth table as the
innte case.
The following formulas are many valued tautologies in the logic  L1 (ie they get the value 1
under all assignments of values to the atoms).
L0 A! A
L1 A! (B ! A)
L2:1 (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
L2:2 (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
L3 (A! (B ! C)! (B ! (A! C))
L4 ((A! B)! B)! ((B ! A)! A)
L5 ((A! B)! (B ! A))! (B ! A)
L6 (:B ! :A)! (A! B)
The rule of modus ponens is also valid.
If A is a tautology and A! B ia a tautology, then B is a tautology.
Further new tautologies arise when we look at  Lukasiewicz n-valued logics. For example:
M2 : ((((A! B)! A)! A)! (B ! C))! (B ! C)
is a tautology of  L2.
It is known that axioms L0  L6 together with modus ponens axiomatise all the tautologies of
 L1 (Rose-Rosser 1957). In fact, the subset of fL1; L2:1; L4; L6g proves the other axioms. Axiom
M2 was put forward by A Avron 88 as an addition to the axioms of  L1 to axiomatise  L2.  L2 was
originally axiomatised by M Wajsberg 1931. A Rose 1956a put foward the following axiom Rn to
be added to the axioms of  L1 to axiomatise  Ln.
Rn : ((A
n ! B)! A)! A
The above example will be used to show how may valued logics can be perceived as a labelled
deductive system. The label t of t : A! B will be the truth value of A! B.
Thus we want to have:
Show t : A! B if box
We must therefore propose a proof discipline for the box.
The idea of regarding truth values as labels is similar to an idea of Scott 1974, also occurring to
Urquhart 1974, where truth values were converted into valuations. Our approach is a bit dierent
as will be seen from the sequel.
We are now faced with the problem of how to characterise many valued logics in general and
 Lukasiewicz  L1 and  Ln in particular as a metabox system. We have the advantage that the set of
tautologies is already axiomatised and we have a (many valued) semantics for the logic which we
11.1. INTRODUCTION 331






5 y : B provided a condition essentially saying
6 t = min(1; 1  x+ y)
exit 7 t : A! B
Figure 11.2:
can use. The disadvantage is that our labelling systems for ! are all based on some form of the
dedution theorem (to show t : A ! B assume x : A and prove y : B) while in  Lukasiewicz logics
the deduction theorem is known to fail!
My answer is that the deduction theorem does not fail. In fact everything ts beautifuly. We
will give the intuitive explanations in this section and give the mathematics in the next section.
Let us observe the axiom system for the implicational fragment of  L1 in 11.1.1. Axioms L0 L3
are nothing but the axioms of the resource logic BR1.
Recall from an earlier Chapter that its labelling discipline is known:
1. Labels are multisets. Assumptions get dierent atomic labels.
2. Modus ponens propagates labels as follows:
 : A
 : A! B
 [  : B provided  \  = ?
The condition  \  = ? stops one from using the same assumption more than once.
3. To show  : A ! B assume x : A; x a new label and show  : B provided  =    fxg. We
do not require x 2 , ie there is no need to use the assumption A.
Another way of looking at BR1 is that it is like linear logic, where assumptions can be used at
most once but where we do not require that all assumptions be used.
Further recall that the system BR1 is complete for the semantics of the form (S; h) where S
is a multiset and h is an assignment giving truth values h(X; q) 2 f0; 1g for atoms q and multisets
X  S. We assume X  Y ! h(X; q)  h(Y; q). The truth condition for ! is:
h(X;A! B) = 1 i 8Y (h(Y;A)) = 1! h(X [ Y;B) = 1
we have BR1 ` A i 8h(h(?; A) = 1).
To get the implicational  Lukasiewicz logic  L1 we need to add to BR1 axioms L4 and L5. In
fact, Rose has shown that the axiom Rn : ((A
n ! B) ! A) ! A the implicational fragment of
 Ln 1 when added to L0; : : : ; L5.
This was proved by Rose, [Rose, 1956b, Rose, 1956a]. It was not known at the time whether L5
is redundant and whether it can be proved from the other axioms in the pure implicational fragment
(ie without the use of L6). J Barkley Rosser [Barkley-Rosser, 1960] reports a communication from
A R Turquette that L5 is independent. I have not seen a published proof, however, the following
example shows that L5 does not follow from the other implicational axioms even in  Lukasiewicz 3
valued logic.
Example 11.1.2 Consider the following matrix for ! with values f1; X; a; bg with 1 designated
as follows (see gure 11.3):

































Axioms L0 to L4 and Rn always get value 1 in this table. Also if A always gets 1 and A! B
always gets value 1 so does B.
Axiom L5 gets value X if A is assigned a and B is assigned b.
These matrices, called non-linear MV-matrices, are studies in 11.3 below:
We thus have to gure out the metabox discipline conditions which correspond to axioms L5
and L6. These are not dicult to nd. The formula (A ! B) ! B corresponds in classical logic
to disjunction A _ B. Thus axiom L5 says (A _ B) ! (B _ A). Suppose we treat (A ! B) ! B
as disjunction in our metabox discipline, would that be equivalent to adding axiom L5 to the
corresponding Hilbert system?
The answer is yes.
The rule for disjunction is well known.
1. A! C
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Thus our metabox rule would be:
To show  : C: we show (for some wisely chosen A and B) the following:
1. 1 : A! C
2. 2 : A! C
3. 3 : (A! B)! B
(or 3 : (B ! A)! A)
and conclude  : C provided
 = 1 [ 2 [ 3:
A more practical form of the rule is: To show  : A! B
Show instead both 1 : A! (A! B) and 2 : (A! B)! B provided  = 1 [ 2.
Example 11.1.3 Show ? : ((A! B)! B)! ((B ! A)! A) (g 11.4)
1 Show a1 : (B ! A)! A
2 a1 : (A! B)! B assumption
3 a1 : (B ! A)! A from Box
4 Show a1a2 : A
5 a2 : B ! A assumption
6 use disjunction rule
7 ? : A! A
8 a2 : B ! A
9 a1 : (A! B)! B
10 a1a2 : A
exit 11 a1 : (B ! A)! A
exit 12 ((A! B)! B)! ((B ! A)! A)
Figure 11.4:
Negation can be added the usual way, by adding a symbol ? with the understanding that ?
implies anything, ie ? : ? ! A is always available.
Example 11.1.4 To show (:A! :B)! (B ! A), (g 11.5)
The reader may wonder about our notion of A1 : : : ; An ` B and what does it mean in terms of
the many valued truth tables.
In Scott 1974, the truth value meaning of A1; : : : An `Scott B for  Lukasiewicz logic is \For any
many valued assignments h if all h(Ai) = 1 then also h(B) = 1."
Our metabox notion of `LDS corresponds to the following:
\For any assignment h we have ih(Ai)  h(B)."
Thus we can have the deduction theorem holding in some form. It also makes sense in terms of
 L1 being a resource logic because the \numerical resource weights" h(Ai) we give to the assumption
Ai are added and they should not \exceed" the \allocation" h(B) given to the proposed conclusion
B.
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1 show a1 : B ! A
2 a1 : (A! ?)! (B ! ?) assumption
3 a1 : B ! A from Box
4 Show a1a2 : A
5 a2 : B
6 ? : ((A! ?)! (B ! ?))! (B ! ((A! ?)! ?)
7 a1 : B ! ((A! ?)! ?)
8 a1a2 : (A! ?)! ?
9 ? : ((A! ?)! ?)! ((? ! A)! A)
10 a1a2 : (? ! A)! A
11 ? : ? ! A
12 a1a2 : A
exit 13 a1 : B ! A
exit 14 ? : ((A! ?)! (B ! ?))! (B ! A)
Figure 11.5:
11.2 Introducing  Lukasiewicz many valued logics
Our starting point is the basic resource logic W of Chapter 3. Its axioms are:
A! A
(A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
(B ! C)! ((A! B)! (A! C))
Given any logic L, we are interested in self reection for this logic. Let '(x; qi) be an impli-
cational formula with propositional variables x and qi (qi are regarded as parameters). Let us
assume that '(x1; qi) is monotonic in x in classical logic, either monotonic increasing or monotonic
decreasing. This means that in classical loigc we have either
1. ` (x! y)! ('(x; q)! '(y; q)) or we have
2. ` (x! y)! ('(y; q)! '(x; q))
We are interested in the smallest extension L' of L such that the above monotonicity condition
(increasing or decreasing) holds in L'. Depending on what ' is, L' may be stronger or equal to
L.
The above equation makes sense if we understand A! B functionally, as a type taking objects
of type A into objects of type B. For example, the Curry-Howard functional interpretation for
intuitionistic logic reads ! in this way. We get ` A ! B i the type A ! B is non empty. A
monotonic ' can then be understood as another functional from types to types and the axiom
` (A! B)! ('(A)! '(B))
can be understood as the requirement of the commutativity of the diagram below: for increasing
' (see g 11.6)
for decreasing ' we have the diagram g 11.7
The axioms of prexing and suxing can be understood as ' extensions L' of the logical
system L with reexivity (` A! A) as the only axiom where ' is any one of the formulas:













'1(A; q) = A! q
'2(A; q) = q ! A
L'1 yields the axiom
(A! B)! ((B ! q)! (A! q))
and L'2 yields the axiom
(A! B)! ((q ! A)! (q ! B))
We now turn to BR1 and consider the formula '(A; q) = (q ! A)! A and consider L'. We
have the following axiom for L'
` (A! B)! (((q ! A)! A)! ((q ! B)! B))
hence by commutativity
` (q ! B)! (((q ! A)! A)! ((A! B)! B))
substitute q = B and get
` ((B ! A)! A)! ((A! B)! B)
which is axiom L4 of  L1.
Conversely, from L4 we can get L' as follows:
` (A! B)! ((B ! q)! ((A! q)))
` ((B ! q)! ((A! q))! ((A! q)! q)! ((B ! q)! q))
hence
` (A! B)! (((A! q)! q)! ((B ! q)! q))
and from L4 we get
` (A! B)! (((q ! A)! A)! ((q ! B)! B)):
To be continued
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11.3 Non linear  Lukasiewicz many valued logics
11.4 Finite many valued logics
Chapter 12
Extending the Curry-Howard
Interpretation to LDS Systems
12.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the Curry-Howard interpretation to logics weaker and stronger than intu-
itionistic logic. The idea of the Curry-Howard interpretation is very simple. A formula of the
implicational fragment of logic is regarded as a type. The atoms are the basic types and any
formula A ! B is read as the type of functions from A to B (ie BA). If we allow ourselves the
machinery of -calculus in dening terms via -abstraction, then some types will have denable
terms in them; for example, the identity function xA:xA is a denable element of the type A! A.
It turns out that the set of formulas A for which it can be demonstrated that there exists a den-
able function of type A is exactly the set of all intuitionistic theorems. The set of denable terms
is closed under modus ponens because if tA 2 A and tA!B(tA) 2 B. Clearly, if we label every
formula A by a term tA of type A, ie write tA : A, then the usual modus ponens propagation of
labels namely
 : A
 : A! B
 +  : B
corresponds to the natural application of the functional terms.
Conversely, the label of A ! B is t i 8x[if x is the label of A then there is a derivation of B
with label t+ x].
If we are regarding A as a type and x as a term of that type and a derivation propagates terms
via functional applications, then t + x would be t(x), where t is a functional built up during the
proof of B from A. t is denable now as t = xt(x).
Thus we see that exiting a metabox in LDS terminology corresponds to -abstraction in the
Curry Howard methodology. The next step to take is to realise that since restrictions on exiting
a box and on the derivations within the box give rise to weaker logics, such as linear or relevance
logics or other resource logics, we must also be able to obtain weaker logics via restricting -
abstraction. We can thus hope to give a Curry-Howard like interpretation to other resource logics,
weaker than intuitionistic logic.
What are our options in restricting -abstraction? The restrictions must be natural. The -
calculus is a powerful language and can be used to simulate or characterise any recursive logic. We
do not want to hack a -term for any given logic and artically restrict -abstraction by means of
that term, to yield that logic. We want natural conditions. so let us see what we have when we
write xt(x1; : : : ; xn)
1. x may not be free in t. Do we allow abstraction in this case?
2. x may have more than one occurrence in t. eg t(x; x). Do we abstract xt(x; x) (ie get rid
of all occurrences or do we abstract one?).
337
338CHAPTER 12. EXTENDING THE CURRY-HOWARD INTERPRETATION TO LDS SYSTEMS
One occurrence only, ie rename and abstract
x0t(x0; x)
Another dimension is the order of abstraction. The varaibles xi are typed. Some are typed
higher than others. Do we say abstract the lower types rst and then the higher types? What is
the order we use?
The reader will note that these are natural questions to ask and therefore give rise to natural
restrictions.
We shall see that such natural restrictions give rise to the same resource logics of previous
chapters. Furthermore, we should see a correspondence between -restrictions and axioms.
The above discussion motivated restrictions on  abstraction, restricting the supply of denable
terms and thus getting less types A demonstrably non-empty. Less non-empty types means less
theorems which means a weaker logic. How about stronger logics, intermediate logics between
intutionistic and classical logic?
What mechanism do we have for characterising them? Obviously we need to increase the stock
of denable (or existing) terms so that more types can be shown non-empty, ie more theorems
are available. We do not want to just throw in (stipulate) existence of functionals, in an ad-hoc
manner just to obtain the intermediate logic we want. We should put forward some reasonable
principles, the kind natural to -calculus functional environment, and show that adopting them
yields corresponding logics.
We chose one simple principle, that of completing a functional diagram. If ' is a monotonic








being able to complete such diagrams requires existence of terms. Our mechanism for getting
more terms (in order to get more logics) is to postulate the completions of diagrams.
Take for example
'(x) = (C ! x)! x:
C is a parameter. Postulating the existence functionals completing the diagram above yields
classical logic.
The two methods may be combined. We can restrict -abstraction and at the same time
postulate the completion of some diagrams. This will give us new logics, which are neither weaker
nor stronger than intuitionistic logic. The following gure summarises the situation (se g 12.2):
12.2 Formulas as types
The idea of reading a formula as a type originates with Curry [Curry, 1934] and is used to give
a -calculus interpretation of an intuitionistic theorem. A formula of intuitionistic implicational
logic is a theorem if and only if, when read as a type, it can be shown to be non-empty using the
rules of term-construction, namely abstraction and application. By varying the natural abstraction
principles available in the -calculus, we are able to extend the point of view of formulae-as-types to
some weak systems of implication (relevance, linear, etc.) as well as to systems which are stronger
than intuitionistic.
















Let us then take a standard denition of the terms and operators needed to obtain a -calculus,
and let us examine the abstraction rule more closely.
Denition 12.2.1 1. Lambda terms are words over the following alphabet:
v0; v1; : : : variables,
 abstractor,
(; ) parentheses.
2. The set of -terms is dened inductively as follows:
(a) x 2 ;
(b) M 2 ! (x:M) 2 ;
(c) M;N 2 ! (MN) 2 ;
where x in (a) or (b) is an arbitrary variable.
Note that there are many hidden assumptions in the case (2) of the denition of -terms, in
particular -abstraction terms, eg:
1. M may have no free occurrence of x:
(a) M is an open term, but contains no free occurrence of x;
(b) M is a closed term, thus contains no free variable at all;
2. M may have one free occurrence of x:
(a) M may be of the form `(Tx)' (or `APPLY(T; x)');
(b) M may be of the form `(xT )' (or `APPLY(x; T )');
3. M may have more than one free occurrence of x:
(a) the -abstraction may cancel exactly one of the free occurrences of x;
(b) the -abstraction may cancel all free occurrences of x;
Moreover, in (3), where application is being dened (which can be done by juxtaposition as in
`(MN)', or by an explicit non-canonical operator `APPLY(M;N)' in the terminology used here in
this paper), `M ' is assumed to be of `higher' level than `N ': `M ' is supposed to be the `course-of-
value' of a function, while `N ' is assumed to be the argument.
Now, by working with some of these hidden assumptions one can use the simple typed -
calculus together with the Curry-Howard-Tait interpretation to formalise a number of systems of
implication, as we shall demonstrate below.
340CHAPTER 12. EXTENDING THE CURRY-HOWARD INTERPRETATION TO LDS SYSTEMS
We read the rst rule of !-introduction, namely:
[x 2 A]
b(x) 2 B
x:b(x) 2 A! B
as follows: having made the assumption `x 2 A', and arriving at the conclusion `b(x) 2 B' by means
of one of the rules available, then we can discharge the assumption by making a -abstraction of the
assumption-term (`x') over the conclusion-term (`b(x)'). In other words, when constructing a proof-
tree one can discharge an assumption if there is at least one proof step between the assumption
and the conclusion where the assumption is discharged. So, in the construction of a proof of
`x:x 2 A! A', as we shall see below, we need at least reexivity in order to arrive at a conclusion
of the form `x 2 A' from the assumption `[x 2 A]'.
Example 12.2.2 A! A (reexivity)
[x 2 A]
x = x 2 A
x 2 A
x:x 2 A! A
and we have the `identity' construction, which corresponds to combinator `I'  x:x [Curry and Feys, 1958,
Hindley and Seldin, 1986].
Example 12.2.3 (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B)) (left transitivity)
[z 2 C] [y 2 C ! A]
APPLY(y; z) 2 A [x 2 A! B]
APPLY(x; APPLY(y; z)) 2 B
z:APPLY(x; APPLY(y; z)) 2 C ! B
y:z:APPLY(x; APPLY(y; z)) 2 (C ! A)! (C ! B)
x:y:z:APPLY(x; APPLY(y; z)) 2 (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
whose resulting closed term corresponds to combinator `B'  x:y:z:APPLY(x; APPLY(y; z)) [Curry and Feys, 1958,
Hindley and Seldin, 1986].
Example 12.2.4 (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C)) (right transitivity)
[z 2 A] [x 2 A! B]
APPLY(x; z) 2 B [y 2 B ! C]
APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z)) 2 C
z:APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z)) 2 A! C
y:z:APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z)) 2 (B ! C)! (A! C)
x:y:z:APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z)) 2 (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
whose resulting closed term corresponds to a combinator which results from applying combinator
`C' to combinator `B', or what Curry has called combinator `B0' in [Curry and Feys, 1958], and in
[Curry, 1963]: `B0'  x:y:z:APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z)) (`CB' in [Hindley and Seldin, 1986]).
In order to invalidate the derivation above one would have to impose the restriction on the
-abstraction rule such that the abstractions have to occur in the order `from higher to lower
subterms'.
Example 12.2.5 (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)) (permutation)
[y 2 B]
[z 2 A] [x 2 A! (B ! C)]
APPLY(x; z) 2 B ! C
APPLY(APPLY(x; z); y) 2 C
z:APPLY(APPLY(x; z); y) 2 A! C
y:z:APPLY(APPLY(x; z); y) 2 B ! (A! C)
x:y:z:APPLY(APPLY(x; z); y) 2 (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C))
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whose resulting closed term corresponds to combinator `C'  x:y:z:APPLY(APPLY(x; z); y) ([Curry and Feys, 1958,
Hindley and Seldin, 1986]).
In order to invalidate the derivation above one would have to impose the restriction on the
-abstraction rule such that the abstractions have to occur in the order `from higher to lower
subterms' within the order `from inner to outer subterms'.
Example 12.2.6 (A! (A! B))! (A! B) (contraction)
[y 2 A]
[y 2 A] [x 2 A! (A! B)]
APPLY(x; y) 2 A! B
APPLY(APPLY(x; y); y) 2 B
y: APPLY(APPLY(x; y); y) 2 A! B
x:y:APPLY(APPLY(x; y); y) 2 (A! (A! B))! (A! B)
whose resulting closed term corresponds to combinator `W'  x:y:APPLY(APPLY(x; y); y) ([Curry and Feys, 1958,
Hindley and Seldin, 1986]).
The assumption ` [y 2 A] ' is used twice and in a nested way. So, the restriction one has to
impose here is rather obvious: a -abstraction will cancel one free occurrence of the variable at a
time.
Example 12.2.7 (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C)) (distribution)
[z 2 A] [x 2 A! (B ! C)]
APPLY(x; z) 2 B ! C
[z 2 A] [y 2 A! B]
APPLY(y; z) 2 B
APPLY(APPLY(x; z); APPLY(y; z)) 2 C
z: APPLY(APPLY(x; z); APPLY(y; z)) 2 A! C
y:z:APPLY(APPLY(x; z); APPLY(y; z)) 2 (A! B)! (A! C)
x:y:z:APPLY(APPLY(x; z); APPLY(y; z)) 2 (A! (B ! C))! ((A! B)! (A! C))
whose resulting closed term corresponds to combinator `S'  x:y:z:APPLY(APPLY(x; z); APPLY(y; z))
([Curry and Feys, 1958, Hindley and Seldin, 1986]).
Note that the assumption ` z 2 A ' is used twice, and both occurrences are discharged in one
single abstraction ` z: '. To obtain a linear implication one has to restrict the discharging ab-
straction to one occurrence of the assumption only. In other words, each discharge aects only one
(linear) path in the proof-tree, instead of aecting all branching occurrences like in the proof above.
Example 12.2.8 (A! B)! ((A! (B ! C))! (A! C)) (distribution on the minor)
[z 2 A] [x 2 A! B]
APPLY(x; z) 2 B
[z 2 A] [y 2 A! (B ! C)]
APPLY(y; z) 2 B ! C
APPLY(APPLY(y; z); APPLY(x; z)) 2 C
z: APPLY(APPLY(y; z); APPLY(x; z)) 2 A! C
y:z:APPLY(APPLY(y; z); APPLY(x; z)) 2 (A! (B ! C))! (A! C)
x:y:z:APPLY(APPLY(y; z); APPLY(x; z)) 2 (A! B)! ((A! (B ! C))! (A! C))
whose resulting closed term corresponds to a variation of the `S', precisely:
`SC'  x:y:z:APPLY(APPLY(y; z); APPLY(x; z)).
Observe that the same remarks as to the `non-linearity' of the discharge/abstraction made for
the previous case also applies for the case here.
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Example 12.2.9 A! (B ! A)
Now we want to build a derivation of the above axiom and show where it can be invalidated by
the appropriate side condition. By imposing the condition that the abstraction can only be made
when there is indeed at least one free occurrence of the variable being abstracted from the expression




x:b(x) 2 A! B
The proof-tree is constructed as follows:
[y 2 B]
[x 2 A]
y:x 2 B ! A
x:y:x 2 A! (B ! A)
whose resulting closed term corresponds to combinator `K'  x:y:x (Curry & Feys 1958, p. 153;
Hindley & Seldin 1986, p. 191).
Note that the discharge/abstraction of the assumption ` [y 2 B] ' is made over the expression
`x' in ` y:x ', which prevents it from being considered `relevant', given that the expression `x'
does not contain any free occurrence of `y'. Such a `non-relevant' discharge/abstraction is called
`vacuous discharge' in [Hindley and Seldin, 1986].
So, the restricted -abstraction to be adopted in order to invalidate the derivation above is
exactly the relevant abstraction, i.e., there must be at least one free occurrence of the variable in
the term on which the abstraction is operating. In logical terms, what the relevant abstraction does
is to allow us to ensure that within the Curry-Howard-Tait interpretation we can have a \systematic
handle on relevance in the sense of logical dependence" ([Anderson and Belnap, 1975]). The idea
is that for `A' to be relevant to `B' it must be necessary to use `A' in the deduction of `B' from
`A'. At rst sight it may look as though the restriction on -abstraction is not by itself sucient,
given that a proof of `(A ! B) ! ((B ! A) ! (A ! B))' can be constructed using relevant
-abstractions only, as in eg:
[z 2 A] [x 2 A! B]
APPLY(x; z) 2 B [y 2 B ! A]
APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z)) 2 A () [x 2 A! B]
APPLY(x; APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z))) 2 B ()
z:APPLY(x; APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z))) 2 A! B
y:z:APPLY(x; APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z))) 2 (B ! A)! (A! B)
x:y:z:APPLY(x; APPLY(y; APPLY(x; z))) 2 (A! B)! ((B ! A)! (A! B))
However, it is easy to show that the steps marked with `()' were unnecessary and could be
eliminated, and the `y:'-abstraction would have to be made over the term obtained prior to those
steps, namely `APPLY(x; z)'. A `minimal' proof of `(A ! B) ! ((B ! A) ! (A ! B))' would
have to involve at least one non-relevant abstraction, such as e.g. in:
[z 2 A]
[y 2 B! A]
[x 2 A! B]
APPLY(x; z) 2 B
z:APPLY(x; z) 2 A! B
y:z:APPLY(x; z) 2 (B ! A)! (A! B)
x:y:z:APPLY(x; z) 2 (A! B)! ((B ! A)! (A! B))
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where the y:-abstraction is a non-relevant abstraction.
As pointed out in Lambek [Lambek, 1989, p. 234], in his The Calculi of Lambda-Conversion
Church already distinguished the relevant from the non-relevant -abstraction. See, e.g.:
\If M does not contain the variable x (as a free variable), then (xM) might be used to denote
a function whose value is constant and equal to (the thing denoted by) M , and whose range of
arguments consists of all things. This usage is contemplated below in connection with the calculi of
-K-conversion, but is excluded from the calculi of -conversion and --conversion { for technical
reasons which will appear."
(Church 1941, pp. 6{7.)
12.3 Correspondence between terms and proofs
12.4 Curry Howard interpretation for general LDS sys-
tems
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Part IV





Labelled Modal and Temporal
Logics
13.1 Introduction
In resource logics, the labelling was essentially for the purpose of resource management. To prove
 : A meant that A was obtained or assumed using the assumptions named in . This chapter
deals with logics where the label has a dierent meaning. To prove  : A means A is true or
is associated with the possible world . A database is, as before, a set of labelled formulas. A
database  can prove a labelled formula t : A. To understand the intuitive meaning behind these
concepts take the following example:
Example 13.1.1 There is signal trouble in the Camden Town underground station. Liverpool
Street underground station is ooded. Is this going to disrupt the schedule at Kings Cross station?





k: Delays in schedule
Technically this is no dierent from:
Data
a : A
b : A! B
Query
ab : B
In our case the labels signify location, not resource management.
We need to present a view of modal and temporal logics, in which the labels make intrinsic
sense. The reaser may try and guess that since modal and temporal logics have a natural possible
worlds semantics, we are viewing the worlds as labels and writing  : A to mean A holds in the
world . This is technically correct, but has the conceptual standing of a mere mathematical
device, desgined to conform modal and temporal logics into our LDS framework. I should like
to claim more. I should like to put forward that the primary conceputal framework for modal
(and temporal) logics is LDS. The possible world semantics for these logics just happens to be
compatible with the LDS approach, through the device of taking the worlds as labels. To be
successful in putting forward this point of view, we have to motivate and identify modal and
temporal logic from within the LDS framework, using considerations that are intrinsically natural
to the LDS point of view. This we now proceed to achieve.
Our starting point is the notion of a logical system presented in Chapter 1. Recall that a
logical system to us is a pair, (`;S`), where ` is a consequence relation and S` is an algorithmic
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system (recursively enumerable) for generating the pairs (; Q) such that  ` Q holds, where 
is a nite set of ws and Q is a w. We refer to  as the database, Q as the query and S` is
referred to as the algorithmic system for `. Thus for example according to our view, the classical
logic consequence relation ` with S1 being a resolution based automated system and S2 being a
Gentzen or a Hilbert system give rise to two dierent logics, (`;S1) and (`;S2).
` can be presented mathematically in some manner. It is just a set of pairs f(; Q)g satisfying
the axioms of consequence relation, namely, Revlexivity, Monotonicity and Cut.
We regard the problem of whether  ` Q, denoted by  `?Q, as a problem of querying a set
of data. Suppose we are given a set of assumptions  written in some formal language L. This
set represents our data concerning some aspect of an application. We may have queries from the
data, represented in (probably the same) language L0. The basic (non-temporal) logical problem
associated with this situation is:
Does the query follow from the data,
or in symbols:
 `?Q.
A logical system (`;S`) gives us the pairs (; Q) such that the answer is yes. There are two
mainstream types of logics involved. The monotonic ones and the non-monotonic ones. The
dierence has to do with the properties of the consequence relation `. A monotonic logic would
satisfy the three rules of consequence relation given above. The non-monotonic logics do not
necessarily satisfy monotonicity or cut.
The conceptual dierence between the two is that in the monotonic case  ` A means that A
gets an answer yes from a part of  and it does not matter what the rest of  is.
Thus  ` A i for some minimal 0  ;0 ` A and so we also have  [0 ` A, because
the answer really depends only on 0.
In the non-monotonic case the answer depends on the entire set . Equivalently in the non
monotonic case the answer may be obtained from some 0  , but it does matter what else is
in  besides 0. Thus if more data is added eg we have a new set,  [0, the answer may not
continue to be yes.
Example 13.1.2 1. Consider the database 
(a! b)! a
c
and the query ?a
Whether or not  ` a depends on the underlying logic. If it is classical logic the answer is
yes. For intuitionistic logic the answer is no.
2. Consider the same database with the query ?:b. In classsical and intuitionistic logic we do
not get the answer yes. If the logic is non-monotonic with the closed world assumption the
answer would be yes! (The closed world assumption is the understanding that any atom which
is not a head of a clause is negated by the database.)
Note that so far we have no temporal dimension involved. We have only a database  and
a logic (a system for getting answers from ). The logic may be one of a great variety available
in the literature. There is classical logic, intuitionistic logic, relevance logic, inheritance systems,
circumscription, Horn Clause logic, etc. We have listed a mixed variety of systems because any
one of them will do for getting answers from data.
Each logic has two features, the rst is the representation and query language, and the second
is the deductive system (possibly non-monotonic) for getting answers from data. In the above
list, classical, intuitionistic and relevant logics are all based on the same language but represent
dierent answering mechanisms. Circumscription is still based on the same language but yields
answers in a totally dierent way and an inheritance system is completely dierent even in its
representation.
We now proceed to widen our horizon and consider several related databases. Denote them by
f(t;`t) j t 2 Tg. Each database t has its own answering logical system `t. For simplicity let
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us assume that all the t are based on the same language and employ the same logic `t=`. We
can thus present the system as ft j t 2 Tg the ` being implicit. The area of Labelled (eg modal
and temporal) logics deals with logical connections between such databases. The queries we want
to ask are of the form:
\Which databases give answer yes to Qi and how are they related."
Thus the next step is pluralistic. We move from one single set of assumptions and logic to a whole
related system of them. The added dimension is the study of connections between the databases.
Let us consider for example the simplest connection, namely:
If the answer to Q is yes from one database, the answer is yes from all of them.
We are not able to express such a relationship without a richer possibly external language. The
language and logic of t involves t alone and is not able to deal with the above relation which
is a meta-relation to ft j t 2 Tg. The problem can be further complicated when T , the label set,
has its own structure (eg it may be partially ordered by < or may have a binary function 
 on it
e.g. whenever t; s are labels so is t
 s).
Thus indexed (modal and temporal) logics as an area of research deals with systems of databases
ft j t 2 Tg where the index T has a structure of its own. (We symbolise this fact by writing
(T;<;
) as a typical example with one relation symbol and one function symbol.)
The queries either relate to any particular databases t; t 2 T or to some patterns of relation-
ships between them.











We see a pattern here that whenever A(J) and B(M) are true,  A(J) is true next. This we
cannot express without special additional language capability.
The reader may still think our presentation and point of view so far is traditional. However, we
have already departed from the traditional view and laid the ground for further generalisations,
which can address the variety of systems available in the area of logic and computation.
First, under the present conceptual framework, the structure (eg (T;<;
)) of labels receives
more prominence and is allowed to have (logical) life of its own.
Second, we are under no obligation to disallow a system (t;`t) where `t are dierent logics
(though it makes some sense to ask that they be based on the same language). This corresponds
naturally to metabox disciplines where dierent metaboxes allow for dierent derivation rules. The
internal logic of a new box is one of the options of our discipline, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Third, the logics `t need not be monotonic.
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Fourth, in the system (t;`t) we may have relationships not only among queries but also among
`t. We may have that the logics relate to each other in conformity with the labelling structure
(T;<;
). For example, if t represents time, `t may be a logic evolving with time.
Note that in practical computer science problems which use logic we have occasions, and need
to call upon, many combinations of the above features of an indexed system. We dened the notion
of a logical system to be a pair (`;S`). We therefore must specify how we see the system ft;`tg
as a logical system. There are many ways of dening the composite system. One simple way is to
take the formulas of the composite system to be of the form t : A, where A 2 t. The relation
fti : Aig ` s : B is dened somehow using f`tg and the algorithmic system S` for the composite
consequence relation ` is also dened in some way using fS`tg. Thus we do obtain a composite
(`;S`).
Having described the scope of possibilities with systems of databases (t;`t) we yet have to
ask what exactly are our options are with regard to a language describing the relationships between
the t's.
Here there are two extreme possibilities. The external and the internal ones, and of course,
many combinations of them. The external view is to have a metalanguage M which can describe
the notion of t `t A. M is a metalanguage, allowing explicit reference to t and to (T;<;
),
having names for the elements of t and, by using its own (ieM's) connectives and logical means,
to describe relationships among the t's. This approach is studied in its general setting in the
metalevel chapter.
The second approach is to enrich the language of each t with special additional connectives
and operators allowing it to relate to its \neighbours" in the structure (T;<;
). This involves a
slight change of point of view. t is no longer a database of data isolated on its own but it will
now contain data (in the enriched language) of how it is related to neighbouring s; s 6= t. So
for example, A 2 t may put in the database at t the information that all other neighbouring
databases answer the query ?A as yes. A side eect of this change in view is that we cannot any
longer take any old family of databases and put them together to form a system.
The experienced modal logician will notice that the system (T;<;
;t;`t; t 2 T ) is a mixture
of syntax and semantics. (T;<) can be regarded as a possible world structure, where at each
t 2 T , we do not have the traditional classical model but a theory t in the logic `t. This is
in itself an innovation, in the context of possible world semantics. It is especially suited for a
computational point of view. To nd the value of an atom q at a possible world t, we do not
consult a mathematical assignment h(t; q) as in the traditional Kripke seantics, but submit the
query ?q to an algorithmic proof procedure t `?q.
The above considerations hsow the place of modal and temporal logics within the framework of
LDS. It is the study of systems of databases adn their relationship. The primary intrinsic meaning
of a lable  : A is a database  and w A. The modal connectives talk about how queries from
dierent i relate to each other. Thus we enrich our language and develop systems of modal and/or
temporal logics. How fortunate we are that the natural semantics for these logics is the possible
world one which is compatible with the original reasons for introducing the systems.
13.2 H-modal logic
This seciton develops a modal system on a set of labels which is itself a logic. In terms of the
discussion of the previous section, we have a labelled system of databases (;`), where  are
some ws of some logic H.
This is the most general framework one can consider. H need not be a logt can be a labelling
algebra. The temporal and modal connectives give us the connections between the systems (;`
).
Denition 13.2.1 Labelled Classical H-Modal Logic.
(a) A labelling logic is any logical system with ws in some language. We denote these Ws by
; ; 
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(b) Let H be a labelling logic. We dene the notions of the H-modal (or temporal) logic M(H)
by dening its Ws and terms. We initially consider the connectives :;^;_;!;; and the
quantiers 8 and 9. Other possibilities are ) (strict implication), P, F (the temporal Past,
Future connectives) or intuitionistic implication.
For the case of ; we adopt the following clauses.
1. Let Q be an n-place predicate and x1 : : : xn be variables then Q(x1; : : : ; xn) is an atomic
formula of M(H) with the free variables x1 : : : xn.
2. If A(xi); B(yi) are Ws with the indicated free variables so are A ^ B;:A;A ! B;A _
B;A;A, with the corresponding free variables.
3. If A(y; xi) is a W with y; xi free then 8yA;9yA is a W with xi free.
4. If  is a label and c is a symbol for a constant, then c() is a constant term. The intuition
behind c() is that c is introduced at label . If  labels a possible world then c was rst
introduced at world . c() may also appear in another world .
5. If A(y; x1; :::; xn) is a formula with xi; y free and  is a label then y(;A(y; xi)) is a term
with xi free and  a parameter.  is an "-function or a Skolem function. Its meaning is that
if  : 9yA(y; x1; : : : ; xn) holds at label , then there is a constant c(; x1; : : : ; xn) such that
 : A(c(; x1; : : : ; xn); x1; : : : ; xn) holds. The constant c depends of course on x1; : : : xn and
is introduced at , hence dependence on . We use the -function to denote c.
6. If A is a w then \A" is a label (ie atomic W of the labelling logic). The intuition behind
the name \A" of A is the following: There will be many occasions where we need to introduce
a new label because of logical considerations having to do with a W A. In that case we want
\A", the name of A, also to be involved. The simplest example is when  : A is true. This
means that there exists a possible world  in which  : A is true. We might write  = ^
\A"
Denition 13.2.2 A database is a set of labelled ws or terms of the form
 : A
 : t
where A is a W and t is a term.
The next denition denes the notion of a logical system for the language of M(H). The idea
is to separate the object language (;) from the metalanguage (H and the labels). Logical rules
will give the connection. The labels ;  are the possible worlds for  and . The ordering and
general behaviour of the possible worlds is governed by the logic H. H says which world is relatively
possible to which world. We write  <H  to be `H  ! . Of course this forces <H to be
transitive and reexive. This is not a limitation. The very idea of having a logic \controlling" <
is a far reaching generalisation. There is scope for H to interact with the logic M(H) itself (H=
M(H)?) in various ways. We shall see in the sequel.
Denition 13.2.3 The logic M(H)
We need the following conventions:
 H is a labelling logic
  : ti means the term ti exists in the label . The existence has to be indicated or inferred.
  <  is the possible world relation on the labels. It is dened in some way using H, the
labelling logic. For example we can have
 <  = denition `H  ! 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 There are problems in reading  : A(t);A(t). Does t have to exist at ? Similarly
? : A(t), does that mean t exists in any possible world and A(t) is true there or does it
mean A(t) is true in all possible worlds in which t exists?
We adopt the following axioms and rules for the logic M(H).
1.
 : A; < 
 : A
2.
 : A(ti);  : ti;  < 
 : A(ti)
3a.
 : 9yA(y; xi)
 : A(y(;A(y; xi)); xi)
3b.
 : 9yA(y; x1; : : : ; xn)
 : y(;A)
This axiom says the  Skolem constant exists at .
4.
 : t;  < 
 : t
The domains of the possible worlds increase.
5.





where (;A) is a label which depends on  and on A, for example ^ \A". Here we adopt
the view that if A is true at a world , then A is true in a possible world (;A). The value




for A a truth functional tautology.
7b.
 : A; : A! B
 : B
8.
 : A; : (A! B)
 : B
If the language contains strict implication ) then we can have the rule
9.
 : A) B;`H  ! ;  : A
 : B
Strict implication can be dened as (A! B)
Example 13.2.4 Let H be a classical logic and let faig be atomic labels. Consider a propostional
modal language with  and . According to 13.2.1, each ai is a label, and assume that if A is a
formula then \A" is an atomic label. We let (;A) be the label ^ \A".
Let us reconsider 2.2.3. We show that the data:
1.  : B
2.  : (B ! C)
3.  <H 
imply the goal
 : C
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The following are the proof steps:
4. From (2) we get:
^ \B ! C" : B ! C
5. From (1) and (3) and the fact that `H ^ \B ! C" !  we get that
^ \B ! C" : C.
6. From 5 we get
 : C
The proof is the same as the one in 2.2.4 but it illustrates the notation.
Remark 13.2.5 There are several important points to remember about 13.2.1 - 13.2.3.
a We dened  <H  as `H  ! . This makes <H transitive and reexive. For a temporal
logic, the transitivity is acceptable, but the reexivity is not. It is no problem to dene a new
ordering  <  i `H  !  and 6`H ! . This denition will work because in the rule
 : A
 ^ \A" : A
We do have  < ^ \A"
b Furthermore, notice that we are not committed to H being a monotonic logic. Thus a variety
of H can be used. This aspect of our formalism is new and interesting because it means that
the set of possible worlds is a logical space subject to some logical considerations.
c We have more freedom with the choice of (;A). If we make  dependent only on A only
we get the logic S5, for example.
We also have freedom with the naming function A 7! \A". We assumed \A" was atomic in the
previous example. \A" can be taken to be as A itself. If we do that the logic H will make some
worlds equal and will thus aect M(H).
Example 13.2.6 Consider a positive intuitionistic predicate language with ^;!;?; 8. Let H be
intuitionistic logic. Let \A" be A and let (;A) be  ^A. The rules are:
1.
 : A! B;  : A;`  ! 
 : B
2.
 : A;`  ! 
 : A
3.
 : A ^B
 : A
and
 : A; : B
 : A ^B
Consider a conguration  with  : A 2  i `H ! A, for A atomic. One can show, using
the rules of intutionistic logic for the labels H and the rules (1)-(4) above, that we get for any A
and :
`H ! A i  `M(H)  : A





 : A(x); for x not free in 
 : 8xA(x)
Example 13.2.7 Consider the logic CL of 9.1.2 in a language with ! and 8 only. Let H be CL
itself and let the labels be nite sequences of ws of CL. Let * be concatenation of sequences. Let
\A" be A and let (;A) be   (A).
Consider the following rules:
1.
 : A! B;  : A





 : A(x); x not free in 
 : 8xA(x)
Consider a conguration of  with  : A 2  i
`CL 1 ! (2 ! : : :! (n ! A) : : :)
where A is atomic and where  = (1; : : : ; n).
Then one can show using (1) and (2) above that for any w A of CL we have
`CL 1 ! : : :! (n ! A) : : :) i  `M(H)  : A
Remark 13.2.8 Note that Relevance Implication is complete for the semantics of possible worlds
fg with operation 
, where
  A! B i 8(  A) 
   B)
where  is a subset of a set X and 
 is union.
If we take  a multiset subset of X and 
 multiset union, we get Linear Logic L.
If we take  any nite sequence of elements from X and 
 concatenation, we get the logic CL
above. See section 10.1.
13.3 Temporal labelled deduction systems
This section will present the labelled deduction methodology which serves as a framework for
developing temporal proof theory. We begin by asking ourselves what is a temporal database?
Intuitively, looking at existing real temporal problems, we can say that we have information about
things happening in dierent times and some connections between them. Figure 13.2 is an example
of A Temporal Conguration
The gure shows a nite set of points of time and some labelled formulas. These are supposed
to hold at the times indicated by the labels. Notice that we have not only labelled assertions but
also Horn clauses showing dependencies across times. Thus at time t it may be true that B will
be true. We represent that as t : FB. The language we are using has F and P as connectives.
It is possible to have more connectives and still remain within the Horn clause framework. Most
sueful among them are \t : F sA" and \t : P sA" reading \t < s and s : A" and \s < t and s : A",
in words: \ A will be true at time s > t".
The temporal conguration comprises of two components.
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s : PB(x)





1. A (nite) graph (;<) of time points and the temporal relationships between them.
2. With each point of the graph we associate a (nite) set of clauses and assertions, representing
what is true at that point.
In Horn clause computational logic, there is an agreement that if a formula of the form A(x)!
B(x) appears in the database with x free then it is understood that x is universally quantied.
Thus we assume 8x(A(x) ! B(x)) is in the database. The variable x is then called universal (or
type 1). In the case of modal and temporal logics, we need another type of variable, called type 2
or a Skolem variable. To explain the reason, consider the item of data
\t : FB(x)".
This reads, according to our agreement,
\8xFB(x) true at t."
For example it might be the sentence: t: \Everyone will leave."
The time in the future in which B(x) is true depends on x. In our example, the time of leaving
depends on the person x. Thus, for a given unknown (uninstantiated) u, that is for a given person
u which we are not yet specifying, we know there must be a point t1 of time (t1 is dependent on
u) with t1 : B(u). This is the time in which u leaves.
This u is by agreement not a type 1 variable. It is a u to be chosen later. Really u is a Skolem
constant and we do not want to and cannot read it as t1 : 8uB(u). Thus we need two types of
variables. The other alternative is to make the dependency of t1 on u explicit and to write
t1(x) : B(x)
with x a universal type 1 variable, but then the object language variable x appears in the world
indices as well. The world indices, ie the t's, are external to the formal clausal temporal language,
and it is simpler not to mix the t's and the x's. We chose the two type of variable approach. Notice
that when we ask for a goal ?G(u), u is a variable to be instantiated, ie a type 2 variable. So we
have these variables anyway, and we prefer to develop a systematic way of dealing with them.
To explain the ro^le of the two types of variables, consider the following classical Horn clause
database and query:
A(x; y)! B(x; y) ?B(u; u)
A(a; a)
This means \Find an instantiation u0 of u such that 8x; y[A(x; y) ! B(x; y)] ^ A(a; a) `
B(u0; u0). there is no reason why we cannot allow for the following
A(u; y)! B(x; u) ?B(u; u)
A(a; a)
In this case we want to nd a u0 such that
8x; y[A(u0; y)! B(x; u0)] ^A(a; a) ` B(u0; u0)
or to show
` 9uf[8x; y[A(u; y)! B(x; u)] ^A(a; a)! B(u; u)]g
u is called type 2 (Skolem) variable and x; y are universal type 1 variables. Given a database and
a query of the form (x; y; u)?Q(u), success means ` 9u[8x; y(x; y; u)! Q(u)].







The next sequence of denitions will develop the syntax of the Temporal Horn Clause fragment.
A lot depends on the ow of time. We will give a general denition, (denition 13.3.3 below), which
includes the following connectives:
 Always
F It will be the case
P It was the case
G It will always be the case (not including now)
H It has always been the case (up to now and not including now)
O Next moment of time (in particular it implies that such a moment of time exists)

 Previous moment of time (in particular it implies that such a moment of time exists).
Later on we will also deal with S (Since) and U (Until).
The ows of time involved are mainly three.
 General partial orders (T;<).
 Linear orders
 The integers or the natural numbers.
The logic and theorem provers involved, even for the same connectives, are dierent for dierent
partial orders. Thus the reader should be careful to note in which ow of time we are operating.
Usually the connectives O and 
 assume we are working in the ow of time of integers.
Having xed a ow of time (T;<), the Temporal Fragment will generate nite congurations
of points of time according to the information available to it. These are denoted by (;<). We are
supposed to have   T (more precisely  will be homomorphic into T ), and the ordering on  be
the same as the ordering on T . The situation gets a bit complicated if we have a new point s and
we do not know where it is supposed to be in relation to known points. We will need to consider
all possibilities. Which possibilities do arise depend on (T;<), the background ow of time we are
working with. Again we should watch for variations in the sequel.
Denition 13.3.1 Let (;<) be a nite partial order. Let t 2  and let s be a new point. Let
0 =  [ fsg, and let <0 be a partial order on 0. Then (0; <; t) is said to be a (one new point)
future (respectively past) conguration of (;<; t) i t <0 s (respectively s <0 t) and 8xy 2 (x <
y $ x <0 y).
Example 13.3.2 Consider a general partial ow (T;<) and consider the subow (;<): The
possible future congurations (relative to T;<)) of one additional point s are in gure 13.4:
For a nite (;<) there is a nite number of future and past non-isomorphic congurations.
This nite number is exponential in the size of . So in the general case without simplifying assump-
tions we will have an intractable exponential computation. A conguration gives all possibilities of
putting a point in the future or past.


























































In case of an ordering in which a next element or a previous element exists (like t+1 and t  1
in the integers) the possiblilities for congurations are dierent. In this case we must assume that
we know the exact distance between the elements of (;<).
For example in the conguration ft < x1; t < x2g of gure 13.3above we may have the further





so that we have only a nite number of possiblities for putting s in.
Note that although 
 operates on propositions, it can also be used to operate on points of time,
denoting the predecessor function.
Denition 13.3.3 Consider a Temporal Fragment with the following connectives and predicates:
1. Atomic predicates.
2. Function symbols and constants
3. Two types of variables:
Universal variables (Type 1) V = fx1; y1; z1; x2; y2; z2; : : :g
and Skolem variables (Type 2) U = fu1; v1; u2; v2; : : :g.
4. The connectives ^;!;_; F; P;O;
; and :.
FA reads: it will be the case that A.
PA reads: it was the case that A.
OA reads: A is true tomorrow (if a tomorrow exists, if tomorrow does not exist
then it is false).

A reads: A was true yesterday (if yesterday does not exist
then it is false).
:: represents negation by failure.
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We dene now the notions of an Ordinary Clause, an Always Clause, a Body, a Head and a
Goal.
1. A Clause is either an always clause or an ordinary clause.
2. An Always Clause has the form A, where A is an ordinary clause.
3. An Ordinary Clause is a Head or an A! H, where A is a body and H is a Head.
4. A Head is either an atomic formula or an FA or a PA or an OA or an 
A where A is a
nite conjunction of ordinary clauses.
5. A Body is either an atomic formula or an FA or a PA or an OA or an 
A or :A or a
conjunction of bodies where A is a body.
6. A Goal is a body whose variables are all Skolem variables.
7. A disjunction of goals is also a goal.
Remark 13.3.4 Denition 13.3.3 included all possible temporal connectives. In practice dierent
systems may contain only some of these connectives. For example a modal system may contain
only  (corresponding to F ) and . A future discrete system may contain only O and F etc.
Depending on the system and the ow of time, the dependencies between the connectives change.
For example we have the equivalence
(a! Ob) and (
a! b)
whenever both 
a and Ob are meaningful.
Denition 13.3.5 Let (T;<) be a ow of time. Let (;<) be a nite partial order. A labelled
temporal database is a set of labelled ordinary clauses of the form (ti : Ai); t 2  and always clauses
of the form Ai; Ai a clause. A labelled goal has the form t : G, where G is a goal.
 is said to be a labelled temporal database over (T;<) if (;<) is homomorphic into (T;<).
Denition 13.3.6 We now dene the computation procedure for the temporal prolog for the lan-
guage of denitions 13.3.3 and 13.3.5. We assume a ow of time (T;<).   T is a nite set of
points of time involved so far in the computation. The exact computation steps depend on the ow
of time. It is dierent for branching, discrete linear etc. We will give the denition for linear time,
though not necessarily discrete. Thus the meaning of OA in this logic is that there exists a next
moment and A is true at this next moment. Similarly for 
A. 
A reads there exists a previous
moment and A was true at that previous moment.
We dene the success predicate S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0;) where t 2 ; (;<) is a nite partial
order and  is a set of labelled clauses (t : A); t 2 .
S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0;) reads: The labelled goal t : G succeeds from  under the substitution
 to all the type 2 variables of G and  in the computation with starting labelled goal t0 : G0.
When  is known, we write S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0) only.
We dene the simultaneous success and the failure of a set  of metapredicates of the form
S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0) under a substitution  to type 2 variables. To explain intuitive the meaning
of success or failure, assume rst that  is a substitution which grounds all the Skolem type 2
variables. In this case (;) succeeds if by denition all S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0;) 2  succeed
and (;) fails if at least one of S 2  fails. The success or failure of S for a  as above has
to be dened recursively. For a general ; (;) succeeds, if for some 0 such that 0 grounds
all type 2 variables (;0) succeeds. (;) fails if for all 0 such that 0 grounds all type 2
variables we have that (;0) fails. We need to give recursive procedures for the computation of
the success and failure of (;). In the case of the recursion, a given (;) will be changed to
a (0;0) by taking S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0) 2  and replacing it by S(0; <0;0; G0; t0; G0; t0). We
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will have several such changes and thus get several 0 by replacing several S's in . We write the
several possibilities as (0i;
0
i). If we write (;) to mean (;) succeeds and  (;) to read
(;) fails, then our recursive computation rules have the form: (;) succeeds (or fails) if some
boolean combination of (0i;
0
i) succeed (or fail). The rules allow us to pick an element in , eg





where 0i is obtained from . In case of failure we require that  grounds all type 2 variables. We
do not dene failure for a nongrounding .
To summarise the general structure of the rules is:
(;) succeeds (or fails) if some boolean combination of the successes and failures of some (0i;0i)
holds and (;) and (0i;0i) are related according to one of the following cases:
I If  = ? then (;) succeeds, (ie the boolean combination of (i;i) is truth.
II (;) fails if for some S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0) in  we have G is atomic and for all (A!
H) 2  and for all (t : A! H) 2 ;H does not unify with G. Further, for all 
 and s
such that t = 
s and for all s : A ! 
H and all (A ! 
H) we have H does not unify
with G, where 
 is a sequence of O and 
.
Remark 13.3.7 We must qualify the conditions of the notion of failure. If we have a goal t : G,
with G atomic, we know for sure that t : G nitely fails under a substitution , if G cannot unify
with any head of a clause. This is what the condition above says. What are the candidates for
unication? These are either clauses of the form t : A ! H, with H atomic or (A ! H), with
H atomic.
Do we have to consider the case where H is not atomic? The answer depends on the ow of time
and on the conguration (;<) we are dealing with. If we have eg t : A ! FG then if A ! FG
is true at t, G would be true (if at all ) in some s, t < s. This s is irrelevant to our query ?t : G.
Even if we have t0 < t and t0 : A! FG and A true at t0, we still can ignore this clause because we
are not assured that any s such that t0 < s and G true at s would be the desired t (ie t = s).
The only case we have to worry about is when the ow of time and the conguration are such
that we have for example t0 : A! O5G and t = O5t0.
In this case we must add the following clause to the notion of failure:
For every s such that t = Ons and every s : A! OnH, G and H do not unify.
We also have to check what happens in the case of always clauses.
Consider an integer ow of time and the clause (A ! O5 
27 H), This true at the point
s = 
5O27t and hence for failure we need that G does not unify with H.
The above explains the additional condition on failure.
The following conditions (1) - (10), (12) - (13) relate to the success of (;) if (0i;0i)
succeed. Condition (11) uses the notion of failure, to give the success of negation by failure.
Conditions (1)-(10), (12)-(13) give certain alternatives for success. They give failure if each one of
these alternatives end up in failure.
1. Success rule for atomic query:
S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0) 2  and G is atomic and for some head H, (t : H) 2  and for some
substitutions 1 to the universal variables of H and 2 to the existential variables of H and
G we have H12 = G2 and 
0 =   fS(;<;; G; t;G0; to)g and 0 = 2.
2. Computation rule for atomic query:
S(;<;; G; t;G0; to) 2  and G is atomic and for some (t : A ! H) 2  or for some
(A ! H) 2  and for some 1;2, we have H12 = G2 and 0 = (  
ffS(;<;; G; t;G0; to)g) [ fS(;<;; A1; t; G0; to)g and 0 = 2.
The above rules dealt with the atomic case. Rules (3), (4) and (4*) deal with the case the goal is
FG. The meaning of (3), (4) and (4*) is the following:
we ask FG at t. How can we be sure that FG is true at t? There are two possibilities, (a) and (b)
(a) We have t < s and at s : G succeeds. This is rule (3).




(b) Assume that we have the fact that A ! FB is true at t. We ask for A and succeed and
hence FB is true at t. Thus there should exist a point s0 in the future of t where B is true.
Where can s0 be? We don't know where s0 is in the future of t. So we consider all future
congurations for s0. This gives us all future possibilities where s0 can be. We assume for
each of these possibilities that B is true at s0 and check whether either G follows at s0 or
FG follows at s0. If we nd that for all future constellations of where s0 can be G _ FG
succeeds in s0 from B, then FG holds at t. Here we use the transitivity of <. (4a) gives the
possibilities where s0 is an old point s in the future of t. (4b) gives the possibilities where s0
is a new point forming a new conguration. Success is needed from all possibilities.
3. Immediate rule for F :
S(;<;; FG; t;G0; to) 2  and for some s 2  such that t < s we have 0 = (  fS(;<
;; FG; t;G0; to)g) [ fS(;<;; G; s;G0; to)g and 0 = .
4. First conguration rule for F :
S(;<;; FG; t;G0; to) 2  and some (t : A! F ^j Bj) 2  and some 1;2 we have both
(a) and (b) below are true. A may not appear in which case we pretend A = truth.
(a) For all s 2 , such that t < s we have that
0s = ( fS(;<;; FG; t;G0; t0)g)[fS(;<;; E1; t; G0; t0)g[ fS(;<;[f(s :
Bj1) j j = 1; 2; : : :g; D; s;G0; t0g succeeds with 0s = 2 and D = G _ FG and
E = A.
(b) For all future congurations of (;<; t) with a new letter s, denoted by the form (s; <s)
we have that
0s = ( fS(;<;; FG; t;G0; tog)[fS(;<;; E1; t; G0; to)g[fS(s; <s;[f(s :
Bj) j j = 1; 2; : : :g; D; s;G0; t0)g succeeds with 0s = 2 and D = G_FG and E = A.
The reader should note that conditions (3), (4a) and (4b) are needed only when the ow of time
has some special properties. To explain by example, assume we have the conguration
and  = ft : A! FB; t0 : Cg as data and our query is ?t : FG.
Then according to rules (3), (4) we have to check and succeed in all the following cases:
1. From rule (3) we check ft0 : C; t : A! FBg?t0 : G
2. From rule (4a) we checkft0 : C; t : A! FB; t0 : Bg?t0 : G
3. From rule (4b) we check ft0 : C; t : A! FB; s : Bg?s : G
for the three congurations below
If time is linear conguration 3.3 does not arise and we are essentially checking 3.1, 3.2 and the
case 4a corresponding to t0 = s.
If we do not have any special properties of time, success in case 3.2 is required. Since we must
succeed in all cases and 3.2 is the case with least assumptions, it is enough to check 3.2 alone.
Thus for the case of no special properties of the ow of time, case 4 can be replaced by case 4
general below:
4 general. S(;<;; FG; t;G0; t0) 2  and for the future conguration (1; <1) dened as 1 =
 [ fsg and <1=< [ft < sg; s a new letter we have that: 0s = (   fS(;<
;; FG; t;G0; t0)g[fS(;<;; E1; t; G0; t0)g[fS(1; <1;[f(s : Bj) j j = 1; 2; : : :g; D; s;G0; t0)g
succeeds with 0s = 1 and D = G _ FG and E = A.
















4*. 2nd Conguration rule for F :
For some S(;<;; FG; t;G0; t0) and some (A ! F ^j Bj) 2  and some 12 we
have both cases 4a and 4b above true with E = A _ FA and D = G _ FG.
4*general Similar to (4 general) for the case of general ow.
This is the the mirror image of (3) with \PG" replacing \FG" and \s < t" replacing
\t < s".
6; 6* This is the mirror image of (4) and (4*) with \PG" replacing \FG", \s < t" replacing
\t < s" and \past conguration" replacing \future conguration".
6 general This is the image of (4 general).
We give now the computation rules (7)-(10) for O and 
 for orderings in which a next point
and/or previous points exist. If t 2 T has a next point we denote this point by s = Ot. If it has a
previous point we denote it by s = 
t. For example, if (T;<) is the integers then Ot = t+ 1 and
+t = t   1. If (T;<) is a tree then 
t always exists, except at the root, but Ot may or may not
exist. For the sake of simplicity we must assume that if we have O or 
 in the language then Ot
or 
t always exist. Otherwise we can sneak negation in by putting (t : OA) 2  when Ot does
not exist!
7. Immediate rule for O:
S(;<;;OG; t;G0; to) 2  and Ot exists and Ot 2  and 0 =  and 0 = (  fS(;<
;;OG; t;G0; to)g [ fS(;<;; G;Ot; G0; to)g
8. Conguration rule for O:
S(;<;;OG; t;G0; to) 2  and some 1;2 some (t : A ! O ^j Bj) 2  and 0 =
(  fS(;<;;OG; t;G0; to)g [ fS(;<;; A1; t; G0; to)g [ [fS( [ fOtg; <0; [ f(Ot :
Bj)g; G;Ot; G0; t0)g succeeds with 0 = 2, and <0 is the appropriate ordering closure of
< [f(t;Ot)g
Notice that case 8 is parallel to case 4. We do not need 8a and 8b because of Ot 2  then
what would be case (8b) becomes (7).
9. The mirror image of (7) with \
" replacing \O".
10. The mirror image of (8) with \
" replacing \O".
11. Negation as failure rule:
S(;<;;:G; t;G0; t0) 2  and  grounds every type 2 variable and the computation for
success of S(;<;; G; t;) ends up in failure.
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12. Disjunction rule:
S(;<;; G1 _ G2; t; G0; to) 2  and 0 = (   fS(;<;; G1 _ G2; t; G0; to)g) [ fS(;<
;; Gi; t; G0; to)g and 0 =  and i 2 f1; 2g:
13. Conjunction rule:
S(;<;; G1 ^ G2; t; G0; to) 2  and 0 = (   fS(;<;; G1 ^ G2; t; G0; to)g) [ fS(;<
;; Gi; t; G0; to) j i 2 f1; 2gg
14. Restart Rule
S(;<;; G; t;G0; to) 2  and0 = ( fS(;<;; G; t;G0; to)g)[fS(;<;; G1; t0; G0; t0)g
where G1 is obtained from G0 by substituting completely new type 2 variables u
0
i for the type
2 variables ui of G0, and where 
0 extends  by giving 0(u0i) = u
0
i for the new variables u
0
i.
15. To Start the Computation:
Given  and t0 : G0 and a ow (T;<), we start the computation with  = fS(;<
;; G0; t0; G0; t0)g, where (;<) is the conguratin associated with , over (T;<) (denition
D3).
Let us check some examples
Example 13.3.8
Data:
1. t : a! Fb
2. (b! Fc)
3. t : a
Query: ?t : Fc
Conguration: ftg
Using rule (4*) we create a future s with t < s and ask the two queries: (the notation A?B
means that we add A to the data (1), (2), (3) and ask ?B).
4. ?t : C _ Fb
and
5. s : c?s : c _ Fc
(5) succeeds and (4) splits into two queries by rule (4).
6. ?t : a
and
7. s0 : b?s0 : b:
The above computation is the same as the one in gure 3 of part 1 of this paper. The only
dierence is that since our data are labelled we do not have to keep copying the database. More
signicant dierences will show in the next example.
Example 13.3.9
Data:
(1) t : FA
(2) t : FB















Query: t : F' where ' = (A ^B) _ (A ^ FB) _ (B ^ FA).
The query will fail in any ow of time in which the future is not linear. The purpose of this
example is to examine what happens when time is linear. Using (1) we introduce a point s, with
s : A and query from s the following:
?s : ' _ F'
If we do not use the restart rule, the query will fail. Now that we are at a point s there is no
way to go back to t. We therefore cannot reason that we also have a point s0 : B and t < s and
t < s0 and that because of linearity either s = s0 or s < s0 or s0 < s. However, if we are allowed to
restart, we can continue and ask t : F' and now use the clause t : FB to introduce s0. We now
reason using linearity in rule (4) that the congurations are
either t < s < s0
or t < s0 < s
or t < s = s0.
and ' succeeds at t for each conguration.
The reader should note the reason for the need to use the restart rule. When time is just a
partial order, the two assumptions t : FA and t : FB do not interact. Thus when asking t : FC,
we know that there are two points s1 : A and s2 : B, see gure 13.7.
and C can be true in either one of them. s1 : A has no inuence on s2 : B. When conditions on
time (such as linearity) are introduced, s1 does inuence s2 and hence we must introduce both at
the same time. When one does forward deduction one can introduce both s1 and s2 going forward.
The backward rules do not allow for that. That is why we need the restart rule. When we restart,
we keep all that has been done (with, for example s1) and have the opportunity to restart with s2.
The restart rule can be used to solve the linearity problem for classical logic only. Its side eect is
that it turns intuitionistic logic into classical logic, see my paper on N -Prolog. In theorem proving
based on intuitionistic logic where disjunctions are allowed, forward reasoning cannot be avoided.
See next example.
It is instructive to translate the above into Horn Clause logic and see what happens there.
Example 13.3.10 1. t : FA translates into (9s1 > t)A(s1)
2. t : FB translates into (9s2 > t)A(s2).
The query translates into the formula  (t):
 = 9s > t[A(s) ^ B(s)] _ 9s1 > t[A(s1) ^ 9s2 > s1B(s2)] _ 9s2 > t[B(s2) ^ ^9s1 >
s2A
(s2)]
which is equivalent to the disjunction of
(a) [t < s ^A(s) ^B(s)]
(b) t < s1 ^ s1 < s2 ^A(s1) ^B(s2)
(c) t < s1 ^ s2 < s1 ^A(s1) ^B(s2).
all of (a), (b), (c) fail from the data, unless we add to the data the disjunction
8xy(x < y _ x = y _ y < x)
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Since this is not a Horn Clause, we are unable to express it in the database.
This means that we can handle properties of time which are not necessarily expressible by an
object language formula of the logic. In some cases (niteness of time) because they are not rst
order, in other cases (irreexivity) because there is no corresponding formula (axiom) and in other
cases because of syntactical restrictions (linearity).
We can now make clear our classical versus intuitionistic distinction. If the underlying logic
is classical then we are checking whether  `  in classical logic. If our underlying logic is
intuitionistic, then we are checking whether  `  in intuitionistic logic where  and  are
dened below:
 is the translation of the data together with the axioms for linear ordering namely, the
conjunction of:
1. 9s1 > tA(s1)
2. 9s2 > tB(s2)
3. 8xy(x < y _ x = y _ y < x)
4. 8x9y(x < y)
5. 8x9y(y < x)
6. 8xyz(x < y ^ y < z ! x < z)
7. 8x:(x < x).
 is the translation of the query as given above.
The computation of example 13.3.9, using restart, answers the question  `? in classical logic.
To answer the question  `? in intuitionistic logic we cannot use restart, we must use forward
rules as well.
Example 13.3.11 Example 13.3.9 for the case that the underlying logic is intuitionistic. Data
and Query as in Example 13.3.9.
Going forward, we get:
(3) s : A from (1)
(4) s0 : B from (2)
By linearity, either
t < s < s0
or t < s0 < s
or t < s = s0
 will succeed for each case.
Our language does not allow us to ask queries of the form G(x), where x are all universal
variables (ie 8xG(x)). However such queries can be computed from a database . The only
way to get always information out of  for a general ow of time is via the always clauses in the
database. Always clauses are true everywhere, so if we want to know what else is true everywhere,
we ask it from the always clauses: Thus to ask:
?G(x); x a universal variable:
we rst skolemise and then ask
fX;X j X 2 g?G(c)
where c is a Skolem constant.
We can add a new rule to denition 13.3.6:
(15) Always Rule
S(;<;;G; t;G0; t0) 2  and0 = ( fS(;<;;G; t;G0; t0)g)[fS(fsg;?;0; G0; s; g0; s)g
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where s is a completely new point and G0 is obtained from G by substituting new Skolem constants
for all the universal variables of G and
0 = fB;B j B 2 g:
We can use (15) to add another clause to the computation of Denition D4, namely
(16) S(<;; F (A ^ B); t; G0; t0) 2  and 0 = (   fS(;<;; F (A ^ B); t; G0; t0)g) [
fS(;<;; FA; t;G0; t0);S(;<;;B; t;G0; t0)g
Example 13.3.12
Data Query Conguration
a t : F (a ^ b) ftg
t : Fb
First Computation.
Create s; t < s and get
Data Query Conguration
a s : a ^ b t < s
t : Fb
s : b
s : b succeeds from the data. s : a succeeds by rule 2, denition 13.3.6.
Second Computation
Use rule 16. Since ?a succeeds ask for Fb and proceed as in the rst computation.
13.4 Dierent ows of time
We now check the eect of dierent ows of time on our logical deduction (computation). We
consider a typical example:
Example 13.4.1
Data Query Conguration
t : FFA ?t : FA ftg
The possible world ow is a general binary relation.




t : FFA ?t : FA t < s
s : FA
Again we apply rule (4a) of denition 13.3.6 and get the new conguration with s < s0 and the
new item of data s0 : A. We get
Data Query Conguration
t : FFA ?t : FA t < s
s : FA s < s0
s0 : A
whether or not we can proceed from here depends on the ow of time. If < is transitive, then
t < s0 holds and we can get t : FA in the data by rule 3.
Actually by rule (4*) we could have proceeded along the following sequence of deduction. Rule
(4*) is especially geared for transitivity.
Data Query Conguration
t : FFA t : FA t
using rule (4*) we get
Data Query Conguration
t : FFA s : FA _ FFA t < s
s : FA
The rst disjunct of the query succeeds.
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If < is not transitive, rule 3 does not apply, since t < s0 does not hold.
Supose our query were ?t : FFFA.
If < is reexive then we can succeed with ?t : FFFA because t < t.
If < is dense (ie 8xy(x < y ! 9z(x < z ^ z < y)) we should also succeed because we can create
a point z with t < z < s.
z : FFA will succeed and hence t : FFFA will also succeed.
Here we encounter a new rule (density rule), whereby points can always be \landed" between
existing points in a conguration.
We now address the ow of time of the type natural numbers, f1; 2; 3; 4; : : :g. This has the
special property that it is generated by a function symbol s.
f1; s(1); ss(1) : : :g:
Example 13.4.2
Data Query Conguration
(q ! Oq) 1 : F (p ^ q) f1g
1 : Oq
1 : Fp
If time is the natural numbers, the query should succeed from the data. If time is not the natural
numbers but, for example f1; 2; 3; : : : w; w + 1; w + 2; : : :g then the query should fail.
How do we represent the fact that time is the natural numbers in our computation rule? What
is needed is the ability to do some induction. We can use rule (4b) and introduce a point t with
1 < t into the conguration and even say that t = n, for some n. We thus get:
Data Query Conguration




Somehow we want to derive n : q from the rst two assumptions. The key reason for the success
of F (p ^ q) is the success of q from the rst two assumptions. We need an induction axiom on
the ow of time.
To get a clue as to what to do, let us see what Horn Clause logic would do with the translations
of the data and goal.
Translated Data





After we skolemise, the database becomes:
1. 1  t ^Q(t)! Q(t+ 1)
2. Q(1)
3. P (c)
and the query is
P (s) ^Q(s)
We proceed by letting s = c. We ask Q(c) and have to ask after a slightly generalised form of
unication ?1  c ^Q(c  1).
Obviously this will lead nowhere without an induction axiom. The induction axiom should be
that for any predicate PRED
PRED(1) ^ 8x[1  x ^ PRED(x)! PRED(x+ 1)]! 8xPRED(x)
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written in Horn clause form this becomes:
9x8y[PRED(1) ^ [1  x ^ PRED(x)! PRED(x+ 1)]! PRED(y)]:
Skolemising gives us
4. PRED(1) ^ (1  d ^ PRED(d)! PRED(d+ 1))! PRED(y)
d is a skolem constant.
Let us now ask the query P (s)^Q(s) from the database with (1)-(4). We unify with clause (3)
and ask Q(c). We unify with clause (4) and ask Q(1) which succeeds and ask for the implication
?1  d ^Q(d)! Q(d+ 1)
This should succeed since it is a special case of clause (1) for t = d.
The above shows that we need to add an induction axiom of the form
Ox ^(x! Ox)! x
Imagine that we are at time t, and assume t0 < t. If A is true at t0 and (A ! OA) is true,
then A is true at t.
We thus need the following rule:
(18) Induction Rule:
t : F (A ^B) succeeds from  at a certain conguration if the following conditions all hold.
1. t : FB suceed.
2. For some s < t; s : A succeeds.
3. m : OA succeeds from the database 0, where 0 = fX;X j X 2 g [ fAg and m is a
completely new time point and the new conguration is fmg.
The above shows how to compute when time is the natural numbers. This is not the best way
of doing it. In fact, the characteristic feature involved here is that the ordering of the ow of time
is a Herbrand universe generated by a nite set of function symbols. FA is read as \A is true at a
point generated by the function symbols". This property requires a special study. See our Metatem
paper, Barringer 1989.
13.5 A theorem prover for modal and temporal logics
This section will briey indicate how our temporal Horn clause computation can be extended to
be an automated deduction system for full modal and temporal logic. We present computation
rules for propositional temporal logic with F; P;O;
;^ ! and ?. We approach predicate logic in
a subsequent paper as it is relatively complex. The presentation will be intuitive:
Denition 13.5.1 We dene the notions of a Full Clause, a Body and a Head.
(a) A Full Clause is either an atom q or ? or B ! H, or H where B is a body and H is a head.
(b) A Body is a conjunction of full clauses.
(c) a Head is either an atom q or ? or FH or PH or OH or 
H, where H is a body.
Notice that negation by failure is not allowed. We used the connectives ^;!;?. The other
connectives, _ and  are denable in the usual way  A = A! ? and A _ B = (A! ?)! B.
The reader can show that every formula of the language with the connectives f;^;_; F;G; P;Hgis
equivalent to a conjunction of full clauses. We use the following equivalences:
A! (B ^ C) = (A! B) ^ (A! C)
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A! (B ! C) = A ^B ! C
GA = F (A! ?)! ?
HA = P (A! ?)! ?
Denition 13.5.2 A database is a set of labelled full clauses of the form (; ;<), where  = ft j
t : A 2 ; for some Ag. A query is a labelled full clause.
Denition 13.5.3 The following is a denition of the predicate S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0), which
reads:
The labelled goal t : G succeeds from (; ;<) with parameter (initial goal) t0; G0.
1(a) S(;<;; q; t; G0; t0) for q atomic or ? if for some t : A! q, S(;<;; A; t;G0; t0).
(b) If t : q 2  or s : ? 2  then S(;<;; q; t; G0; t0).
(c) S(;<;;?; t; G0; t0) if S(;<;;?; s; G0; t0).
This rule says that we can get a contradiction from any label, it would be considered a con-
tradiction of the whole system.
2. S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0) if for some s : A! ?; S(;<;; A; s;G0; t0).
3. S(;<;; t; FG;G0; t0) if for some s 2 ; t < s and S(;<;; G; s;G0; t0).
4. S(;<;; FG; t;G0; t0) if for some t : A ! FB 2  we have both (a) and (b) below hold
true:
(a) for all s 2  such that t < s we have S(;<;; s;D;G0; t0) and S(;<;; E; t;G0; t0)
hold, where  =  [ fs : Bg and D 2 fG;FGg and E 2 fA;FAg.
Note: The choice of D and E is made here for the case of transitive time. In modal
logic, where < is not necessarily transitive, we take D = G;E = A. Other conditions
on < correspond to dierent choices of D and E.
(b) For all future congurations of (;<; t) with a new letter s, denoted by (s; <s) we have
S(s; <s;
; s;D;G0; t0) and S(s; <s;; E; t;G0; t0) hold, where ; E;D are as in
(a).
5. This is the mirror image of (3).
6. This is the mirror image of (4).
7(a) S(;<;; A1 ^A2; t; G0; t0) if both S(;<;; Ai; t; G0; t0) hold for i = 1; 2
(b) S(;<;; A! B; t;G0; t0) if S(;<; [ ft : Ag; B; t;G0; t0).
8. Restart Rule
S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0) if S(;<;; G0; t0; G0; t0)).
If the language contains O and 
 then the following are the relevant rules.
9. S(;<;;OG; t;G0; t0) if Ot exists and Ot 2  and
S(;<;; G;Ot; G0; t0).
10. S(;<;;OG; t;G0; t0) if for some t : A! OB 2  both
S(;<;; A; t;G0; t0) and S( [ fOtg; <0; [ fOt : Bg; G;Ot; G0; t0) hold where <0 is the
appropriate ordering closure of < [ft < Otg
11. This is the mirror image of (9) for 
.
12. This is the mirror image of (10) for 
.
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Example 13.5.4 (Here  can be either G or H.)
Data Query Conguration
1. t : a ?t : b ftg
2. t : (a! b) t is a constant
Translation:
Data Query Conguration
1. t : F (a! ?)! ? t : F (b! ?)! ? ftg
2. t : F ((a! b)! ?)! ?
Computation:
The problem becomes
Additional Data Current Query Conguration
3. t : F (b! ?) ?t : ? ftg
from 2 ?t0 : F ((a! b)! ?)
From (3) using ** create a new point s:
Additional Data Current Query Conguration
4. s : b! ? ?s : (a! b)! ? t < s
add s : a! b to the database and ask
5. s : (a! b) ?s : ?
from (4) and (5) we ask:
?s : a
From computation rule (2) and clause 1 of the data we ask
?t : F (a! ?)
From computation rule (2) we ask
?s : a! ?
We add s : a to the data and ask:
Additional Data Current Query Conguration
6. s : a ?s : ? t < s
The query succeeds.
13.6 Modal and temporal Herbrand universes
This section deals with the soundness of our computation rules. In conjunction with soundness it
is useful to clarify the notion of modal and temporal Herbrand models. For simplicty we deal with
temporal logic with P; F only and transitive irreexive time or with modal logic with one modality
 and a general binary accessibliltiy relation <. We get our clues from some examples:
Example 13.6.1 Consider the database
1. t : a! b
2. (b! c)
3. t : a
The constellation is ftg.
If we translate the clauses into predicate logic we get:
1. a(t)! 9s > tb(s)
2. 8x[b(x)! c(x)]
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3. a(t)
Translated into Horn clauses we get after skolemising:
1.1 a(t)! b(s)
1.2 a(t)! t < s
2 b(x)! c(x)
3 a(t)
t; s are Skolem constants.
From this program, the queries
a(t);:b(t);:c(t);:a(s); b(s); c(s)
all succeed. : is negation by failure.
It is easy to recognise that :a(s) succeeds because there is no head which unies with a(s). The
meaning of the query :a(s) in terms of modalities is the query :a.
The question is how do we recognise syntactically what fails in the modal language? The heads
of clauses can be whole databases and there is no immediate way of syntactically recognising which
atoms are not heads of clauses.
Example 13.6.2 We consider a more complex example:
1. t : a! b
2. (b! c)
3. t : a
4. t : a! d
We have added clause (4) to the database in the previous example. The translation of the rst
three clauses will proceed as before. We will get
1.1 a(t)! c(s)
1.2 a(t)! t < s
2 b(x)! c(x)
3 a(t)
We are now ready to translate clause 4. This should be translated like clause (1) into
4.1 a(t)! d(r)
4.2 a(t)! t < r.
The above translation is correct if the set of possible world is just an ordering. Suppose we know
further that in our modal logic the set of possible worlds is linearly ordered. Since t < s ^ t < r !
s = r _ s < r _ r < s, this fact must be reected in the Horn clause database. The only way to do
it is to add it as an integrity constraint.
Thus our temporal program translates into a Horn-clause program with integrity constraints.
This will be true in the general case. Whether we need integrity constraints or not will depend
on the ow of time.
Let us begin by translating from the modal and temporal language into Horn clauses. The
labelled w t : A will be translated into a set of formulas of predicte logic denoted by Horn (t; A).
Horn(t; A) is supposed to be logically equivalent to A. The basic translation of a labelled atomic
predicate formula t : A(x1 : : : xn) is A
(t; x1 : : : xn). A is a formula of a two sorted predicate logic
where the rst sort ranges over labels and the second sort over domain elements (of the world t).
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Denition 13.6.3 Consider a temporal predicate language with connectives P and F , and : for
negation by failure.
Consider the notion of labelled temporal clauses, as dened in denition 13.3.3.
Let Horn(t; A) be a translation function associating with each labelled clause or goal a set of
Horn clauses in the two sorted language described above. The letters t; s which appear in the
translation are Skolem constants. They are assumed to be all dierent.
We assume that we are dealing with a general transitive ow of time. This is to simplify the
translation. If time has extra conditions, ie linearity, additional integrity constraints may need to
be added. If time is characterised by non-rst order conditions, (eg niteness) then an adequate
translation into Horn clause logic may not be possible.
The following are the translation clauses:
1. Horn (t; A(x1 : : : xn)) = A
(t; x1 : : : xn), for A atomic.
2. Horn (t; FA) = ft < sg [Horn(s;A)
Horn (t; PA) = fs < tg [Horn(s;A)
3. Horn (t; A ^B) = Horn(t; A) [Horn(t; B)
4. Horn (t;:A) = :VHorn(t; A)
5. Horn (t; A! F VBj) = fVHorn(t; A)! t < sg[SBjfVHorn(s;A)^C ! D j (C ! D) 2
Horn(s;Bj)g
6. Horn(t; A! P VBj) = fVHorn(t; A)! s < tg [SBjfVHorn(s;A) ^C ! D j (C ! D) 2
Horn(s;Bj)g
7. Horn(t;A) = Horn(x;A) where x is a universal variable.
Example 13.6.4 To explain the translation of t : A ! F (B1 ^ (B2 ! B3)), let us write it in
predicate logic. A ! F (B1 ^ B2 ! B3)) is true at t if A true at t implies F (B1 ^ (B2 ! B3)) is
true at t. F (B1 ^ (B2 ! B3)) true at t if for some s, t < s and B1 ^ (B2 ! B3) are true at s.
Thus we have the translation
A(t)! 9s(t < s ^B1(s) ^ (B2(s)! B3(s)))
Skolemising on s and writing it in Horn clauses we get the conjunction
A(t)! t < s
A(t)! B1(s)
A(t) ^B2(s)! B3(s):
Let us see what the translation Horn does:
Horn (t; A! F (B1^(B2 ! B3))) = f
V
Horn(t; A)! t < sg[fVHorn(t; A)! Horn(s;B2g[
fVHorn(t; A) ^VHorn(s;B2)! VHorn(s;B3)g =
fA(t)! t < s;A(t)! B2(s); A(t) ^B2(s)! B3(s)g
We prove soundness of the computation of denition 13.3.6, relative to the Horn clause computation
for Horn database in classical logic. In other words if the tranlation Horn(t; A) is accepted as
intuitively should and the computation of S(;<;; G; t;G0; t0;) can be translated isomorphically
into a Horn clause computation of the form Horn(t;)?Horn(t; G) then the soundness of the
classical Horn clause computation would imply the soundness of our computation.
This method of translation will also relate our temporal computation to that of ordinary Horn
clause computation.
The basic unit of our temporal computation is S(;< ; G; t;G0; t0;). t : G is the curent
labelled goal and t0 : G0 is the original goal. (;<;) is the database and  is the current
substitution. t0 : G0 is used in the Restart rule. For temporal ow of time which is ordinary
transitive <, we do not need the Restart Rule. Thus we have to translate (;<;) to classical
logic and translate t : G and  to classical logic and see what each computation step of S of the
source translate into the classical logic target.
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Denition 13.6.5 Let (;<) be a constellation and let  be a labelled database such that
 = ft j for some A; t : A 2 g
Let Horn ((;<);) = ft < s j t; s 2  and t < sg [ [t:A2Horn(t; A):
Theorem 13.6.6 (Soundness) S(;<;; G; t;) succeeds in temporal logic if and only if in the
sorted classical logic Horn ((;<);)?Horn(t; G) succeeds with .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of the computation tree of S(;<;; G; t;).
We follow the inductive steps of Denition 13.3.5. The translation of (;) is a conjunction
of Horn clause queries, all required to succeed under the same subsitution .
I The empty goal succeeds in both cases.
II (;) fails if for some S(;<;; G; t), we have G is atomic and for all (A! H) 2  and
all t : A ! H 2 ; G and H do not unify. The reason they do not unify is because of
what  substitutes to the variables ui.




and the goal is ?G(t)
Clearly since x is a general universal variable, the success of the two sorted unication depends
on the other variables and . Thus unication does not succeed in the classical predicate case i
it does not succeed in the temporal case.
Rules (1) and (2) deal with the atomic case: The query is G(t) and in the database among
the data are ^
Horn(t; A)! H(t) and
^
Horn(x;A)! H(x)
for the cases of t : A! H and (A! H) respectively.
For the Horn clause program to succeed G(t) must unify with H(t). This will hold if and
only if the substitution for the domain variables allows unication, which is exactly the condition
of denition 13.3.5.
Rules (3), (4g) and (4*g) deal with the case of a goal of the form ?t : FG. The translation of
the goal is t < u ^VHorn(u;G) where u is an existential variable.
Rule (3) gives success when for some s; t < s 2  and ?s : G succeeds. In this case let u = s,
then t < u succeeds and
V
Horn(s;G) succeeds by the induction hypothesis.
We now turn to the general rules (4g) and (4*g). These rules yield success when for some clause
of the form







?t : A succeeds and  [ f(s : Bj)g?s : G _ FG both succeed. s is a new point.
The translation
V
Horn(t; A) succeeds by the induction hypothesis.
The translation of







contains the following database:
1.
V
Horn(t; A)! t < s
2. For every Bj and every C ! D in Horn(s;Bj) the clauseV
Horn(s;A) ^ C ! D.
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Since
V
Horn(t; A) succeeds we can assume we have in our database
1* t < s
2* C ! D, for C ! D 2 Horn(s;Bj) for some j.
(1*), (2*) were obtained by substituting truth in (1) and (2) for ^Horn(t; A):
The goal to show is t < u ^VHorn(u;G).
Again for u = s; t < u succeeds from (1*) and by the induction hypothesis, since  [ fs :




Horn(s;G) _ (s < u0 ^ VHorn(u0; G)
should succeed, with u0 an existential variable.




Bj). Therefore we have shown that rules (4g) and (4*g)
are sound.
Rules (6g) and (6*g) are sound because they are the mirror images of (4g) and (4*g).
The next relevant rules for our soundness cases are (11) - (13). These follow immediately since
the rules for ^;_;: are the same in both computations.
Rule 14, the Restart Rule, is denitely sound. If we try to show in general that  ` A then
since in classical logic  A! A is the same as A ( is classical negation) it is equivalent to show
; A ` A.
If  A is now in the data, we can at any time try to show A instead of the current goal G.
This will give us A (shown) and  A (in Data) which is a contradiction and this yield any goal
including the current goal G.
We have thus completed the soundness proof. 
13.7 Tractability and persistence
We dened a temporal database  essentially as a nite piece of information telling us which
temporal formulas are true at what times. In the most general case, for a general ow of time
(T;<), all a database can do is to provide a set of the form fti : Aig, meaning that Ai is true at
time ti and a conguration (ftig; <), giving the temporal relationships among ftig. A query would
be of the form ?t : Q, where t is one of the ti. The computation of the query from the data is in the
general case exponential, as we found in Section 2, from the case analysis of clause 4 of Denition
13.3.6 and from example 13.3.2. We must therefore analyse the reasons for the complexity and see
whether there are simplifying natural assumptions, which will make the computational problem
more tractable.
There are three main components which contribute to complexity:
1. The complexity of the temporal formulas allowed in the data and in the query. We allow t : A
into the database, with A having temporal operators. So for example, t : FA is allowed and
also t : OA. t : FA makes life more dicult because it has in it a hidden Skolem function.
It really means 9s[t < s and (s : A)]. This gives rise to case analysis, as we do not know
in general where s is. See examples 13.3.10, 13.6.1 and 13.6.2. In this respect t : OA is a
relatively simple item. It says (t+ 1) : A. In fact any temporal operator which species the
time is relatively less complex. In practice, we do need to allow data of the form t : FA.
Sometimes we know an event will take place in the future but we do not know when. The
mere fact that A is going to be true can aect our present actions. A concrete example where
such a case may arise is when some one accepts a new appointment beginning next year, but
has not yet resigned from his old position. We know he is going to resign but we do not know
when.
2. The ow of time itself gives rise to complexity. The ow of time may be non-Horn clause (eg
linear time, which is dened by a disjunctive axiom.
8xy[x < y _ y < x _ x = y]
This complicates the case analysis of (1) above.
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3. Complexity arises from the behaviour. If atomic predicates get truth values at random
moments of time, the database can be complex to describe. A very natural simplifying
assumption in the case of temporal logic is persistence. If atomic statements and their
negations remain true for a while then they give rise to less complexity. Such examples are
abundant. For example, people usually stay at their residences and jobs for a while. So
for example, any payroll or local tax system can benet from persistence as a simplifying
assumption. Thus in databases where there is a great deal of persistence, we can use this fact
to simplify our representation and querying. In fact, we shall see that a completely dierent
approach to temporal representation can be adopted when one can make use of persistence.
Another simplifying assumption is recurrence. Saturdays, for example, recur every week, so
are paydays. This simplies the representation and querying. Again, a payroll system would
benet from that.
We said at the beginning that a database  is a nitely generated piece of temporal information
stating what is true and when. If we do not have any simplifying assumptions, we have to represent
 in the form  = fti : Aig and end up needing the computation rules of Section 2 to answer
queries.
Suppose now that we adopt all three simplifying assumptions for our database. We assume
that the Ai are only atoms and their negations, we further assume that each Ai is either persistent
or recurrent, and let us assume, to be realistic, that the ow of time is linear. Linearity does
not make the computation more complicated in this particular case, because we are not allowing
data of the form t : FA, and so complicated case analysis does not arise. In fact, together with
persistence and recurrence, linearity becomes an additional simplifying assumption!
Our aim is to check what form should our temporal logic programming machine take in view
of our chosen simplifying assumptions.
First note that the most nautral units of data are no longer of the form:
t : A;
reading A is true at t but either of the form:
[t; s] : A; [t < s];
reading A is true in the closed interval [t; s] or the form:
tkd : A;
reading A is true at t and recurrently at t+ d, t+ 2d; : : :
that is, every d moments of time.
A is assumed to be a literal (atom or a negation of an atom) and [t; s] is supposed to be a
maximal interval where A is true. In tkd, d is supposed to be the minimal cycle for A to recur.
The reasons for adopting the notation [t; s] : A and tkd : A are not mathematical but simply
intuitive and practical. This is the way we think about temporal atomic data when persistence
or recurrence are present. In the literature there has been a great debate whether to evaluate
temporal statements at points or intervals. Some researchers were so committed to intervals that
they tended, unfortunately, to disregard any system which uses points. Our position here is clear
and intuitive. First perform all the computations using intervals Evaluation at points is possible
and trivial. To evaluate t : A, ie to ask ?t : A as a query from a database, compute the (maximal)
intervals at which A is true and see whather t is there. To evaluate [t; s] : A do the same, and
check whether [t; s] is a subset.
The query language is left in its full generality. ie we can ask queries of the form t : A where
A is unrestricted (eg A = FB, etc). It makes sense also to allow queries fo the form [t; s] : A,
though how exactly we are going to nd the answer remains to be seen. The reader should be
aware that the data representation language and the query language are no longer the same. This
is an important factor. There has been a lot of confusion, especially among the AI community,
in connection with these matters. We shall see later that as far as computational tractability is










concerned, the restriction to persistent data allows one to strengthen the query language to full
predicate quantication over time points.
At this stage we might consider allowing recurrence within an interval, ie we allow something
like
\A is true every d days in the interval [t; s]."
We can denote this by:
[tkd; s] : A;
meaning A is true at t; t+ d; t+ 2d, as long as t+ nd  s; n = 1; 2; 3; : : :.
We may as well equally have recurrent intervals. An example of that would be taking a two
week holiday every year. This we denote by:
[t; s]kd : A; t < s; (s  t) < d;
reading A is true at the intervals [t; s]; [t+ d; s+ d]; [t+ 2d; s+ 2d], etc.
The reader should note that adopting this notation takes us outside the realm of rst order
logic. Consider the integer ow of time. We can easily say that q is true at all even numbers by
writing [0; 0]k1 as a truth set for q and [1; 1]k1 as a truth set for  q. (ie q is true at 0 and recurs
every 1 unit and  q is true at 1 and recurs every 1 unit).
The above seem to be the most natural options to consider. We can already see that it makes
no sense any more to check how the computation rules of denition 13.3.6 simplify our case. Our
case is so specialised that we may as well devise computation rules directly for it. This should not
surprise us. It happens in mathematics all the time. The theory of abelian groups for example, is
completely dierent from the theory of semigroups, although abelian groups are a special case of
semigroups. The case of abelian groups is so special that it does not relate any more to the general
case.
Let us go back to the question of how to answer a query from our newly dened simplied
databases. We start with an even more simple case, assuming only persistence and assuming that
the ow of time is the integers. This simple assumption will allow us to present our point of view
of how to evaluate a formula at a point or at an interval. It will also ensure we are still within
what is expressible in rst order logic.
Assume that he atom q is true at the maximal intervals [xn; yn]; xn  yn < xn+1. Then  q
is true at the intervals [yn + 1; xn+1   1], a sequence of the same form, ie yn + 1  xn+1   1 and
xn+1   1 < yn+1 + 1.








n] then I1 \ I2 =
S
n[xn; yn] and the points xn; yn can be eectively linearly
computed. Also, if Ij is the interval set for Aj , the interval set for U(A1; A2) can be eectively
computed.
In the diagram, U(A1; A2) is true at [uk; yn   1]; [uk; yn+1  1] which simplies to the maximal
[uk; yn+1   1].
The importance of the above is that we can regard a query formula of the full language with
Until and Since as an operator on the model (database) to give a new database. If the database 
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gives for each atom or its negation the set of intervals where it is true, then a formula A operators
on  to give the new set of intervals A thus to answer ?t : A the question we ask is t 2 A.
The new notion is that the query operates on the model.
This approach was adopted by I Torsun and K Manning [Torsun and Manning, 1990] when
implementing the query language USF. The complexity of computation is polynomial (n2). Note
that although we have restricted the database formulas to atoms, we discovered that at no addi-
tional cost we can increase the query language to include the connectives Since and Until. It is
well known that in the case of integers the expressive power of Since and Until is equivalent to
quantication over time points, Kamp [Kamp, 1968].
To give the reader another glimpse of what is to come, note that intuitively we have several
options:
1. We can assume persistence of atoms and negation of atoms. In this case we can express
temporal models in rst order logic. The query language can be full Since and Until logic.
This option does not allow for recurrence. In practical terms this means that we cannot
generate or control easily recurrent events. Note that the database does not need to contain
Horn clauses as data. Clauses of the form (present w1 ! present w2) are redundant
and can be eliminated (this has to be properly proved!).
Clauses of the form  (Past w1 ! Present w2) are not allowed as they correspond to
recurrence.
2. This option wants to have recurrence, is not interested in rst order expressibility. How do
we generate recurrence?
The language USF (which was introduced for completely dierent reasons) allows one to
generate the database using rules of the form  (Past formula! Present or Future formula).
The above rules together with some initial items of data of the form t : A, A a literal, can








his chapter develops tableaux methodology for Labelled Deductive Systems. It is based on a paper
of D'Agostino and Gabbay.
We generalize the notion of classical analytic deduction (i.e. deduction via elimination rules)
by combining the methodology of Labelled Deductive Systems with the classical system KE
[D'Agostino and Mondadori, 1994]. LDS is a unifying framework for the study of logics and of
their interactions. In the LDS approach the basic units of logical derivation are not just formu-
lae but labelled formulae, where the labels belong to a given \labelling algebra". The derivation
rules act on the labels as well as on the formulae, according to certain xed rules of propagation.
By virtue of the extra power of the labelling algebras, standard (classical or intuitionistic) proof
systems can be extended to cover a much wider territory without modifying their structure. The
system KE is a new tree method for classical analytic deduction based on \analytic cut". KE is
a refutation system, like analytic tableaux and resolution, but it is essentially more ecient than
tableaux and, unlike resolution, does not require any reduction to normal form.
We start our investigation with the family of substructural logics. These are logical systems
(such as Lambek's calculus, Anderson and Belnap's relevance logic and Girard's linear logic) which
arise from disallowing some or all of the usual structural properties of the notion of logical conse-
quence. This extension of traditional logic yields a subtle analysis of the logical operators which is
more in tune with the needs of applications. In section 2 of this Chapter we generalize the classical
KE system via the LDS methodology to provide a uniform refutation system for the family of
substructural logics.
The main features of this generalized method are the following: (a) each logic in the family
is associated with a \labelling algebra"; (b) the tree-expansion rules (for labelled formulae) are
the same for all the logics in the family; (c) the dierence between one logic and the other is
captured by the conditions under which a branch is declared closed; (d) such conditions depend
only on the labelling algebra associated with each logic; (e) classical and intuitionistic negations
are characterized uniformly, by means of the same tree-expansion rules, and their dierence is
reduced to a dierence in the labelling algebra used in closing a branch. In this rst part we lay
the theoretical foundations of our method. In the second part we shall continue our investigation
of substructural logics and discuss the algorithmic aspects of our approach.
In Section 2 we start our investigation of substructural logics. We deal with the so-called \in-
tensional" (or \multiplicative") operators and lay down the foundations of our system of Labelled
Analytic Deduction. In the second part (forthcoming) we shall:
 Analyse the \extensional" (or \additive") operators.
 Discuss the general decision problem: given a database  , a query ?A and a labelling algebra
A, determine whether there exists a tree for  ?A in which all the branches are closed according
to the labelling algebra A. In its full generality the problem is not algorithmically solvable.
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However, there are interesting and still quite general subproblems which are solvable and
whose solution stems naturally from our approach.
14.2 Tableaux for algebraic LDS
Before embarking on the general study to tableaux in LDS, we develop tableaux for algebraic LDS
more specically for implicational logics.
Our starting point is the general semantics for implicational logics of Denition 4.1.2. To
simplify even further, we disregard ' and ] and concentrate only on f . Thus the ! elimination
rule is:
x : A
y : A! B
f(y; x) : B
where x; y are elements of an algebra of labels, f is a function (associated with modus ponens)
giving the new label after modus ponens has been performed. Dierent f 's or dierent labelling
algebras yield dierent rules of modus ponens and, possibly, dierent logics. For example, if we
take an arbitrary semigroup as the algebra of the labels, with  as multiplication and f(x; y) = xy,
we can have
x : A
y : A! B
y  x : B
The rule of !-introduction is the inverse of !-elimination.
t : A
f(y; t) : B
y : A! B
with t atomic:
To show y : A! B we assume t : A (with a new atomic label t) and we must prove z : B, for a z
such that z = f(y; t). In the semigroup case z = y  t. Clearly, the above rules are a generalization
of the traditional rules of natural deduction.
Can labels be used in a similar way to generalize classical analytic deduction? The notion of
analytic deduction in classical logic is associated with the idea that all deductive arguments can
be modelled by a system of elimination rules which \analyse" complex formulae by specifying the
consequences of their truth and falsity in terms of the truth and falsity of their subformulae. It
is mantained that this notion is adequately formalized by the method of analytic tableaux which
is, in turn, a direct descendant of Gentzen's (cut-free) sequent calculus. However, it has been
shown elsewhere [D'Agostino and Mondadori, 1994] that the theory of classical analytic deduction
based on cut-free systems is awed by several anomalies, both conceptual and technical1, which
are responsible for severe ineciency, as well as lack of elegance and transparence. It turns out
that a better theory of analytic deduction can be built \around" the cut rule. The subformula
principle | which is what counts both for the theory and the applications | does not require the
elimination of cuts, but only their restriction to \analytic" applications, i.e. applications involving
exclusively subformulae of the theorem. The extra inferential power generated by analytic cuts
can then be exploited to simplify the elimination rules. In [D'Agostino and Mondadori, 1994] these
ideas lead to the formulation of a new system of analytic deduction for classical logic, the system
KE, which is proved to be essentially more ecient than the tableau method2. The rules of the
classical KE system are listed in Table 14.1. Notice that all the operational rules have a linear
format and the only branching rule is a rule expressing the classical Principle of Bivalence. Hence,
1This anomalous behaviour culminates in the disconcerting fact (shown in [D'Agostino, 1992]) that cut-free
systems cannot polynomially simulate the truth-tables.
2The analytic KE system can linearly simulate the tableau method, but the tableau method cannot p-simulate
the analytic KE system. Notice that these results apply also to the case in which the the analytic cut rule is
restricted to \mechanical" applications which are generated by a systematic refutation procedure. In fact it can
be shown that any (deterministic) proof-procedure based on the tableau method can be turned into an essentially
more ecient one based on the analytic KE system. On this point see also [D'Agostino, 1994].















































T (A) F (A)
PB
Table 14.1: The rules of the classical system KE. The applications of the only branching rule can
be restricted to subformulae and further controlled by systematic procedures.
all the branches are mutually exclusive, so that the amount of branching is reduced to a minimum.
As with the tableau method, derivations are trees of signed formulae and a formula A is proved by
a closed tree for FA. For the details see [D'Agostino and Mondadori, 1994].
Can we use the expressive power of this classical system by applying it to a labelled deduc-
tive system? Consider the labelled implication rules given above. These followed the \natural
deduction" pattern of eliminations and corresponding introductions. The paradigm of analytic
deduction, on the other hand, allows for elimination rules only, which specify the consequences of
the truth (or falsity) of a complex sentence in terms of the truth (or falsity) of their subformulae.
Let us say that a labelled formula x : A holds, if it is provable by means of the above implication
rules (plus, possibly, other auxiliary rules; the reader is referred to Chapter 4 for the details). We
write TA : x for \x : A holds" and FA : x for \x : A does not hold". Given this interpreta-
tion of the signs T and F , we can easily obtain \analytic rules" for implication which appear as
generalizations of the classical KE rules given in Table 14.1:
TA! B : x
TA : y
TB : f(x; y)
FA! B : y
TA : t
FB : f(y; t)
where t is a new atomic label.
The general notion of Labelled Analytic Deduction3 will be formulated and investigated in
a later section, but in this section, we concentrate on implicational logics in order to provide
3Labels have been used occasionally by several researchers in the context of analytic tableaux. Interesting
examples are the method of prexed tableaux for modal logics in [Fitting, 1983] and the tableau method for many-
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a clear illustration of our methodology. These are proof-theoretically dened logics (including
Lambek's calculus, Girard's linear logic and Anderson and Belnap's relevance logic4) which still
lack a reasonable algorithmic proof theory. However, they yield a subtle analysis of the logical
operators and are receiving considerable attention in various elds, such as linguistics, philosophy
and theoretical computer science, as well as in several application areas. In the sequel we shall show
how a uniform and transparent system of analytic deduction for all these logics can be obtained
via a generalization of the classical KE system via the LDS methodology. There is no claim that
our approach should be the most appealing to everybody's intuition or the most suitable for all
needs. However, it will probably be convenient for the fast-growing community of researchers who
are involved in the development and implementation of algorithmic proof systems for substructural
logics. Moreover, the ideas presented here are not specic to substructural logics. We consider the
results in this section as a rst step in the development of a general theory of Labelled Analytic
Deduction which will be presented in a later chapter.
In our this chpater an algebraic LDS deduction problem is dened by three parameters: a
structured database  (for implicational logics we only need one-dimensional structures), a query
?A and a labelling algebra A. The problem asks whether or not A follows from  given the notion
of information specied by the labelling algebra A (corresponding to the allowed structural rules).
Our system of Labelled Analytic Deduction provides a uniform method for dealing with such
deduction problems, where:
a. the tree-expansion rules are the same for all logical systems in the family;
b. the dierence between logical systems is captured by the conditions under which a branch is
declared closed;
c. such conditions depend only on the labelling algebra associated with each logical system;
d. classical and intuitionistic negations are characterized uniformly, by means of the same tree-
expansion rules, and their dierence is reduced to a dierence in the labelling algebra used
in closing a branch.
In this paper we start our investigation of substructural logics. We deal with the so-called \in-
tensional" (or \multiplicative") operators and lay down the foundations of our system of Labelled
Analytic Deduction. In the second part (forthcoming) we shall:
 Analyse the \extensional" (or \additive") operators.
 Discuss the general decision problem: given a database  , a query ?A and a labelling algebra
A, determine whether there exists a tree for  ?A in which all the branches are closed according
to the labelling algebra A. In its full generality the problem is not algorithmically solvable.
However, there are interesting and still quite general subproblems which are solvable and
whose solution stems naturally from our approach.
14.2.1 Substructural consequence relations
According to the traditional denition a consequence relation is a relation ` between a set of
formulae   and a formula A. The set   represents the data, and A a proposition which follows
from the data. In many applications of logic, however, situations arise in which the data is not best
represented as a set of formulae, but as a richer structure, e.g. a multiset, a sequence, a diagram,
etc. These considerations have led to the study of structured consequence relations as a new area
valued logics in [Hahnle, 1992]. In his [Wallen, 1990] Wallen also uses labels to capture modal logics in the context
of his extension of Bibel's connection method which he relates to analytic tableaux. See also [Maslov, 1969] for a
very early example of the use of labels in a sequent calculus to capture intuitionistic logic. For the use of labels as
a book-keeping mechanism in the context of natural deduction systems for relevance logic, the main reference is to
[Anderson and Belnap Jr, 1975].
4Related work on tableau-like methods for relevance logics is contained in
[Dunn, 1976, McRobbie and Belnap, 1979, Thistlewaite et al., 1988].
14.2. TABLEAUX FOR ALGEBRAIC LDS 383
of logical research motivated by computer science needs. In this paper we focus on the case in
which the data-structures are mono-dimensional.
We take a consequence relation as a relation ` between sequences of formulae and formulae,
satisfying:
Identity A ` A
Surgical Cut
  ` A ; A; ` B
; ; ` B
Since the  ,  and  range over sequences, an application of the cut rule replaces an occurrence
of the formula A with the sequence   exactly in the position of A.
Besides the general axioms of Identity and Surgical Cut given above, the additional axioms
which characterize a specic consequence relation can be divided in two groups:
 axioms describing the general properties of `, called structural conditions or rules;
 axioms describing properties of logical operators, called operational conditions or rules.
Structural rules. Consequence relations may or may not obey any of the following conditions
describing their structural properties:
Exchange
 ; A;B; ` C
 ; B;A; ` C Contraction
 ; A;A; ` C
 ; A; ` C
Expansion
 ; A; ` C
 ; A;A; ` C Weakening
 ; ` C
 ; A; ` C
We can think of a sequent   ` A as stating that the piece of information expressed by A is
\contained" in the data structure expressed by  . Then dierent combinations of the above
structural rules can be seen as dierent ways of dening the properties of the \information ow"
expressed by the turnstile, depending on the structure of the data and on the allowed ways of
manipulating it. For instance, if we disallow the Weakening rule, the consequence relation becomes
sensitive to the relevance of the data to the conclusion: all the data has to be used in the derivation
process. If also Expansion is disallowed, this notion of relevance extends to the single occurrences of
the formulae in the data (as in Anderson and Belnap's system of Relevance Logic, each occurrence
of a formula in the data has to be used). If contraction is disallowed, each item of data can be used
only once and has to be replicated if it is used more than once (as in Girard's Linear Logic and its
satellites). In this way the process of deriving a formula becomes more similar to a physical process
and the consequence relation becomes sensitive to the resources employed. Finally, if Exchange is
disallowed, the \chronology" of this process { i.e. the order in which formulae occur in the data {
becomes signicant (as in the Lambek calculus).
Notice that if Exchange is allowed, the antecedent of a sequent can be regarded as a multiset5.If
Contraction and Expansion are also allowed (of course the Weakening rule implies the Expansion
rule) the antecedent of a sequent can be regarded as a set of formulae, as with the standard Gentzen
systems, i.e. the number of occurrences of formulae does not count, nor does the order in which
they occur.
The operator 
. In the classical and intuitionistic sequent calculus the comma occurring in the
left-hand side6 of a sequent is associated with classical conjunction. This operator represents a
particular way of combining pieces of information. Its inferential role depends on two components:
5For multiset-based consequence relations, the reader is referred to [Avron, 1991].
6For the time being we are considering only single-conclusion sequents. Later on we shall consider also multi-
conclusion sequents in the context of logical systems with classical (involutive) negation.
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the operational rules dening its meaning, and the structural rules dening the meaning of the
turnstile. In a general setting, in which the only condition which are required to hold are Identity
and Surgical cut, the comma is no longer equivalent to classical conjunction. However, these new
consequence relations are still closed under the standard conditions dening classical conjunction.
Such condition characterizes a new type of \substructural" conjunction, denoted by 
 which is no
longer classical (because of the failure of some or all of the structural rules), and yet is dened in
the same way as its classical version and therefore, in a sense, has the same \meaning", namely:
C
  ; A
B; ` C ()  ; A;B; ` C
Clearly, a sequent   ` A becomes equivalent to 
  ` A where 
  denotes the 
-concatenation of
the formulae in  .
Given Identity and Surgical cut, C
 can be easily shown to be equivalent to the pair of sequent
rules:
  ` A  ` B
 ; ` A
B
 ; A;B; ` C
 ; A
B; ` C (14.1)
It is not dicult to see that C
 together with Identity and Surgical Cut, implies:
A ` B C ` D
A
 C ` B 
D (14.2)
Moreover, let us consider the following restricted form of cut:
Transitivity
A ` B B ` C
A ` C
Then, it is easy to see that Transitivity, together with Identity, C
 and (14.2), imply Surgical Cut.
The connective !. Implication is usually characterized by the following condition:
C!   ` A! B ()  ; A ` B
which, under the assumption of Identity and Surgical cut is equivalent to the pair of rules:
 ; A ` B
  ` A! B
  ` A ; B ` C
; A! B;  ` C (14.3)
The operator :. Negation can be dened a la Johansson, in terms of implication and a constant
?. Then the condition C! above immediately yields:
(C:)  ; A ` ? ()   ` :A.
Again, it is easy to see that, given Identity and Surgical cut, the condition C: is equivalent to the
following pair of sequent rules:
 ; A ` ?;
  ` :A
  ` A
:A;  ` ?: (14.4)
Classical negation and the operator [p . Classical negation is characterized by the additional
condition expressed by the \double negation law":
::A ` A (14.5)
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which, given C: | or equivalently the sequent rules in (14.4) |, Identity and Surgical Cut, is




Let us now dene a binary operator [p as follows:
A[p B =def :A! B (14.7)
If (14.5) holds and Exchange is allowed, [p is commutative and associative. Moreover the following
equivalences also hold:
 ; A ` B ()   ` :A[p B  ;:A ` B ()   ` A[p B (14.8)
Thus, in the logics satisfying the Exchange property and the double negation law (14.5) we can
naturally introduce multi-conclusion sequents of the form
  ` 
where  is, like  , a list of formulae, with the intended meaning 
  ` [p  (by 
  and [p  we
denote, respectively, the 
-concatenation of the formulae in   and the [p -concatenation of the for-
mulae in ). The properties of the (classical) negation operator allow us to translate back and forth
from the single-conclusion formulation to the multi-conclusion one. The operator [p corresponds to
the comma in the right-hand side of a multi-conclusion sequent, just as the operator 
 corresponds
to the comma in the left-hand side. Under these circumstances the following equivalence can also
be easily shown:
A
B a` :(A! :B) (14.9)
When all the usual structural rules are allowed, [p is clearly equivalent to classical disjunction.
Notice that, since in the logics satisfying (14.5) and Exchange both 
 and [p are commutative,
the antecedent and the succedent of a sequent can be regarded as multisets rather than just
sequences, and Surgical Cut can be replaced by the more familiar (though not necessarely more
natural):
  ` A; ; A ` 
 ; ` ;
The reader can easily derive multi-conclusion versions of C
, C! and C:, and the corresponding
sequent rules. Clearly [p can be dened directly by the following condition:
C[p   ` ; A;B;()   ` ; A[p B;
which, under the given assumptions, is in turn equivalent to the following pair of rules:
 ; A `  B; ` 
 ; A[p B; ` ;
  ` ; A;B;
  ` ; A[p B; (14.10)
14.2.2 Information frames
As suggested above a theory of labelled analytic deduction could be developed entirely in proof-
theoretical terms. Let us consider, for instance, the analytic rules for implication we obtained from
the labelled natural deduction rules. The labels may be interpreted as lists of formulae, the binary
operation  as list concatenation, and the signed expressions TA : x and FA : x as, respectively,
\A is provable from x" and \A is not provable from x". So the use of signs does not need to involve
any \semantic" consideration. In general the labelling algebra can encode any type of information
which we may want to propagate via the derivation rules. Thus, in the general case, signed formulae
can be considered as simply connecting formulae from a given logical language and labels from a
given labelling algebra. The latter may come from any source, even a specic implementation in
some application area. We do not need to commit a priori to any xed interpretation of the labels.
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On the other hand, if we formulate a set of rules for labelled signed formulae, it is often possible
to read them as semantic rules for some Kripke-style semantics: the labels are now interpreted as
points of a space to which the notion of truth and falsity are relativized. The same labelled signed
formulae TA : x and FA : x can be read as \A is true at x" and \A is false at x" respectively.
The labelling algebra describes the structure of this valuation space. So, the traditional distinction
between \syntax" and \semantics" becomes blurred: what ultimately counts is the algebra of the
labels.
We begin by giving an informal description of the structure of our labelling algebras. We shall
sometimes use a \semantic" terminology to bring out its relation with other familiar structures
which are traditionally studied as part of semantics. However a purely \syntactic" reading is
always possible. We stress that our aim is not to provide \another" semantics7 for substructural
logics, but to develop a system of labelled analytic deduction. \Semantics", here, is a by-product
of algorithmic problems8.
Information tokens. We begin with the notion of resource propositional LDS as dened in
Denition 4.2.1. We assume the labels are information tokens. Information tokens may verify
sentences. Let us write xk A for \x veries A" or \A is true at x". We shall also say that \A
is false at x" if x6k A (our semantics is bivalent and \false" is the same as \non-true"). We write
x v y whenever the information token y veries all the sentences that are veried by x, so that y
contains at least the same information as x (possibly more). Hence:
xk A and x v y =) yk A (14.11)
The relation v is a preorder, i.e. it is reexive and transitive. We assume that two \indiscernible"
information tokens, which verify exactly the same sentences, are identical. Hence v is a partial
order.
Moreover, it is natural to assume that verication is closed under deducibility, that is:
xk A and A ` B =) xk B (14.12)
An information token can be considered equivalent to the set of the sentences that it veries
(each set will then be closed under `). Then the partial ordering v would be set-inclusion, and
xk A would just mean that A 2 x. We shall call this interpretation the canonical interpretation. It
is important to realize that in a context in which the contraction rule may be disallowed, (i.e. our
logic is \resource-sensitive") an information token may verify each formula in a set Individually),
but not all the formulae in the set (collectively). The information token is lost once it has been
\spent" to verify a formula, and we need a \fresh" copy of it to verify another formula. This is
no longer the case when the contraction rule is allowed and, so to speak, our resources can be
multiplied indenitely. Thus in terms of Denition 4.2.1 `' is `v', ' is always true, the labelling
function f(x; y) will turn out to be x  y dened below and x ] y will turn out to be x  y when
used. See also Denition 4.1.2.
Composition of information tokens. Given any two information tokens x and y we can
combine them to form a new information token x  y. The operation  is associative but, in
7Algebraic semantics for intuitionistic substructural logics is given by Do^sen in [Do^sen, 1988]. A related se-
mantics for linear logic is given in [Avron, 1988a]. These semantics are ultimately more or less straightforward
adaptations of the Lindenbaum-Tarski method to the new consequence relations. In [Do^sen, 1989] Do^sen also gives
relational (possibile-world) semantics for subsystems of intuitionistic logic, in the style of the Kripke semantics.
A Kripke-style semantics for linear logic is also given in [Allwein and Dunn, 1993]. These Kripke-style seman-
tics ultimately stem from Urquhart's semantics for relevant implication described in [Urquhart, 1972]. For related
semantic investigations into substructural logics see also [Ono, 1993] and [Sambin, 1993]. Under certain circum-
stances, semantics for arbitrary consequence relations can be generated in a systematic way. On this point see
[Gabbay, 1993b, Gabbay and Ohlbach, 1993a, Gabbay and Ohlbach, 1993b, Gabbay, 1993c].
8We do not exclude, of course, that some readers may nd the \semantic" interpretation of the rules more familiar
or heuristically useful. From this point of view, we stress that our \semantics" covers all substructural logics weaker
than classical logics: classical and intuitionistic negation are characterized in a uniform way, and their dierence is
reduced to the algebra of the labels (or, if you wish, to the structure of the valuation space).
14.2. TABLEAUX FOR ALGEBRAIC LDS 387
general, it is neither commutative nor idempotent. Again, a composition x1      xn of atomic
information tokens veries sentences in a particularly strict, resource-sensitive way: the atomic
information tokens have all to be used to verify the sentence in the order in which they occur.
Thus, in general,
x  y 6v y  x
x 6v x  x
x  x 6v x
x 6v x  y
Information frames. So far we have assumed that information tokens form a partially ordered
set and are closed under a composition operation . We now make two further assumptions which
are both very natural under the canonical interpretation suggested above. First we assume that the
partial ordering induces a complete lattice (under the canonical interpretation information tokens
form a complete lattice of sets). Secondly, we assume that the operation  is continuous in both
arguments. This means that the operation preserves limits:G




fx  ajx 2 Sg =
G
S  a (14.13)
for all directed9 sets S of information tokens. The continuity of  is obvious under the canonical
interpretation, if we dene x  y =def fA
BjA 2 x;B 2 yg.
Notice that the continuity of  implies that the composition operation  is order-preserving:
x1 v y1 and x2 v y2 imply x1  x2 v y1  y2 (14.14)
A distinguished information token is the neutral information token denoted by 1. This acts like
an identity element (thus  is a monoid operation10), so that its combination with an arbitrary
token x is equal to x itself. Notice that this identity element 1 does not coincide, in general, with
the bottom element of the lattice, but it is the top element of a distinguished subset of information
tokens: the tokens which verify the theorems of the given logical system. (Under the canonical
interpretation 1 is the set of all theorems (as opposed to ?).)
The structure described so far will be called an information frame. The following denition
summarizes our previous presentation:
Denition 14.2.1 An information frame is a structure L = (P; ; 1;v) such that:
1. P is a non-empty set of elements called information tokens;
2. P is a complete lattice under v;
3.  is a binary operation on P which is
(a) associative: x  (y  z) = (x  y)  z;
(b) continuous in both arguments: for every directed family fzig,
Ffzi xg = Ffzigx andFfx  zig = x Ffzig;
4. 1 2 P and for every x 2 P , x  1 = 1  x = x;
Recall that the continuity of  implies that this operation is order-preserving: x1 v x2 implies
x1  y v x2  y and y  x1 v y  x2. In the sequel we shall often identify an information frame with
the set of its elements and use L to refer ambiguously to both. The context will ensure that no
confusion arises.
We can dene classes of information frames which satisfy additional conditions on the ordering
v:
9Recall that a set S is directed when every nite subset of S has un upper bound in S.
10Recall that a monoid is a structure (P; ; 1), where P is a non-empty set,  is an associative binary operation
on , and 1 is an identity element, i.e. a constant such that 1  x = x  1 = x for all x.
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1 commutative frames
 ; A;B; ` C
 ; B;A; ` C
2 contractive frames
 ; A;A; ` C
 ; A; ` C
3 expansive frames
 ; A; ` C
 ; A;A; ` C
4 monotonic frames
 ; ` C
 ; A; ` C
Table 14.2: Correspondence between classes of frames and structural rules.
Denition 14.2.2 We say that an information frame is:
commutative if x  y v y  x
contractive if x  x v x
expansive if x v x  x
monotonic if x v x  y
In the sequel dierent substructural logics will be seen to correspond to dierent classes of informa-
tion frames in the expected way, each condition on v being associated with a structural property
of consequence relations. The correspondence is summarized in Table 14.2.
Truth, Falsity and valuations. To complete our analysis we have to make a few remarks on
the notions of \truth" and \falsity". As said before we can think of an information token as a
set of formulae (intuitively, the set of formulae which are veried by it). Under this canonical
interpretation, that a formula A is veried by a token x simply means that A 2 x. Hence, it is
obvious that truth and falsity are preserved under intersections and unions of tokens.
In the context of abstract information frames it is convenient to decompose this property into
the two properties that (a) truth and falsity are preserved under nite joins and meets and (b)
that the functions \y is the truth-value of A at point x" (for each given formula A) are continuous.
It follows that truth and falsity are preserved under arbitrary joins and meets.
In particular, this implies that if some information token veries a sentence A, there exists the
least information token that veries A. Intuitively this represents the \information content" of
A itself, and it is the set fBjA ` Bg under the canonical interpretation. We shall call such an
information token A-characteristic.
These properties of the notions of truth and falsity can be expressed in terms of \valuations".
Let L be an information frame. A valuation over L is a function v : F  P 7! fT; Fg where F
is the set of formulae of the language and and P is the set of information tokens in the frame L,
satisfying the following conditions:
1. For all formulae A, if v(A; x) = T and x v y, then v(A; y) = T .
2. For all formulae A, and all information tokens x; y: if v(A; x) = T and v(A; y) = T , then
v(A; x u y) = T .
3. For all formulae A, and all information tokens x; y: if v(A; x) = F and v(A; y) = F , then
v(A; x t y) = F .
4. For each given A, v is a continuous mapping, i.e.
Ffv(A; x)jx 2 Sg = v(A;FS) andF
fv(A; x)jx 2 Sg = v(A; FS) for all directed sets S of information tokens.
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As usual, by v(A; x) = T we mean \A is true at x" or \xk A", and by v(A; x) = F we mean \A
is false at x" or \x6k A".
As we mentioned, it follows from our denitions that truth and falsity are \continuous", i.e.
they are preserved under arbitrary joins and meets. In the next section we shall present specic
valuation rules which analyse each logical operator. Note that valuations v are really assignments
h in semantical terms. Compare with, for example, Denition 4.1.2.
Remark 14.2.3 The reader is reminded that in this resource-sensitive context, the information
token x t y, which is the lattice join of x and y contains all the information contained in either
x or y, but might not contain all the information contained in both x and y. In other words, it
is sucient to to obtain whatever can be obtained from either x or y, but it is not sucient, in
general, to obtain what can be obtained from their composition x  y.
As said before, we can always think of a valuation simply as a relation between formulae and
labels. Under this more general interpretation, v(A; x) = T means \A can be derived with label
x" and v(A; x) = F means \A cannot be derived with label x" (or, equivalently, it represents goal:
\derive A with label x"). A closed tree for FA : x will then be interpreted as a refutation of the
assumption \A cannot be derived with label x" (or as a successful derivation of the goal).
As usual, a formula will be valid in a given logic when it is true in all valuations over every
information frame belonging to a certain class (associated with the logic). Our labelled system of
analytic deduction will prove theorems by showing that a counterexample, i.e. a falsifying valuation,
is impossible.
In the next section we shall introduce KE-type elimination rules for labelled signed formulae.
These rules will \analyse" the logical operators by specifying the consequences of labelled signed
formulae, i.e. expressions of the form TA : x and FA : x.
14.2.3 Labelled analytic deduction
Information frames, described in the previous section, play a key-role in our generalization of
classical analytic deduction. In their \semantic" interpretation they provide a space to which the
classical notions of truth and falsity are relativized (much as in Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic
logic). In the more general, proof-theoretical, interpretation they provide a space of labels to which
the notion of derivability is relativized. The use of labelled signed formulae in our system of
analytic deduction brings out the correspondence between the two interpretations.
Dierent classes of information frames (as in Denition 14.2.2) will be identied by dierent
labelling algebras. In the context of the present paper, a labelling algebra will be described by a
nite set of expressions of the form  v  where  and  contain variables which are intended as
universally quantied. (Identities will of course be represented by pairs of such expressions.) For
example, the labelling algebra corresponding to the class of commutative and contractive frames
is described by the following expressions:
x  (y  z) v (x  y)  z x  y v y  x
(x  y)  z v x  (y  z) 1  x v x
x  x v x
Our next step consists in generalizing the rules of the classical refutation system KE to the
new setting.
Generalized Bivalence and Non-contradiction The classical notions of truth and falsity are
governed by two basic principles: the Principle of Bivalence (every proposition is either true or
false) and the Principle of Non-Contradiction (no proposition is both true and false). In the KE
system these principles are expressed directly as rules. The Principle of Bivalence is expressed by
the only branching rule of the system11, the rule PB, and the Principle of Non-Contradiction by
the rule for closing a branch (as in the tableau method).
11This fundamental principle of classical semantics is not expressed by the rules of the tableau method if not in
a very indirect way. On this point see [D'Agostino, 1992].
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These principles still apply to our generalized framework except that we refer them to labelled
propositions. Given an arbitrary proposition A and an arbitrary information token x, either it is
true that x veries A or it is false that x veries A (i.e. xk A or x6k A). So the classical rule of
bivalence can be generalized as follows:
TA : x FA : x
(14.15)
for every label x.
According to the proof-theoretical reading of signed formulae, the rule PB is a \lemma intro-
duction" rule: if A can be derived with label x (i.e. if the right-hand subtree is closed), this fact
can be used as a lemma (in the left-hand subtree).
A similar generalization applies to the Principle of Non-Contradiction: it is impossible that the
same formula is veried and not veried by the same information token. Moreover, if a formula
is veried by a token x it is also veried by every token y such that x v y. Hence, the following





provided that x v y.
Proof-theoretically speaking, if A can be derived with label x and the algebra of the labels is
such that whatever can be derived with label x can also be derived with label y, then A can also
be derived with label y and the goal expressed by FA : y is achieved.
In fact, to cover all the logics in the family we are investigating, we need an even more general
closure rule. Let us consider frames which are expansive but not monotonic. Suppose a formula A
is veried by each of the tokens x1; : : : ; xn. By denition of valuation there is the minimum token
at which A is true. Let a be such a minimum token. If the frame is expansive we have
a v
n timesz }| {
a      a
Therefore, since a v xi for i = 1; : : : ; n, A is veried also by the token x1      xn. Hence, a
branch containing all TA : xi and FA : x1    xn should be considered closed. This agrees with
the fact that in any logic which allows expansion, the following rule can be derived:
  ` A  ` A
 ; ` A
This problem can be overcome by introducing a more general closure rule of which the previous








fx1; : : : ; xng v y. So, in the previous example, a branch containing all TA : xi
for i = 1; : : : ; n and FA : x1    xn, is closed by the above rule because, denoting with a the
token Ffx1; : : : ; xng, we have that a v xi for i = 1; : : : ; n. Moreover, a v a      a, and thus
a v x1      xn.
However, as we shall see, this more general closure rule is indeed needed only for the logics
characterized by frames which are expansive, but not monotonic. Since such frames are character-
istic of the version of relevance logic known as \mingle" we shall call them mingle frames. For all
the other logics the simple special case (14.16) will suce.
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Elimination rules for !. It is natural to assume that if an information token x veries a
complex sentence of the form A ! B, and another information token y veries A, then the
composition of the two will verify B, i.e. :
xk A! B =) 8y; y 6k A or x  yk B (14.18)
This justies immediately the following generalizations of the KE elimination rules for TA! B:
TA! B : x
TA : y
TB : x  y
TA! B : x
FB : x  y
FA : y
(14.19)
If we assume that the converse of (14.18) also holds, namely:
xk A! B (= 8y; y 6k A or x  yk B (14.20)
we can justify also the following generalization of the KE elimination rule for FA! B:
FA! B : x
TA : a
FB : x  a
with a a new atomic label (14.21)
The new atomic label a stands for an information token which instantiates the y in the existen-
tially quantied expression which is obtained by contraposing (14.20). In the sequel we shall see
that a \liberalized" version of this rule can be conveniently adopted, to the eect that the atomic
label introduced by the rule does not have to be new.
Again, the rules for implication given above are easily seen to be sound under the proof-
theoretical interpretation. The reader can check that the implication rules (together with our PB
rule) are equivalent to the if-and-only-if valuation clause resulting from the conjunction of (14.18)
and (14.20), namely:
v(A! B; x) = T () 8y; v(A; y) = F or v(B; x  y) = T (14.22)
This condition is formally identical to Urquhart's semantics of relevant implication [Urquhart, 1972].
However, here  is not a semilattice join, but a monoid operation. Thus the above condition is
sucient to characterize the whole family of substructural implication systems and not just the
implication fragment of R.
Labelled KE-trees for implicational logics. The operational rules described above are valid
for all the logical systems in the family, no matter which structural rules they satisfy.
The extra-conditions on the v relation, which characterize a particular class of information
frames, might be expressed as structural rules. Such rules are listed in Table 14.3. However we
shall see that such structural rules are redundant and can be eliminated in favour of the general
closure rule.
Denition 14.2.4
1. A derivation is a tree of labelled signed formulae, or LS-formulae for short, constructed
according to the rules of the system starting from a (posibly empty) sequence of LS-formulae
called initial or assumption LS-formulae.
2. A branch  is closed for the labelling algebra A if  contains a set of LS-formulae fTA :
x1; : : : ; TA : xn; FA : yg such that F
fxig v y holds for A. Otherwise, it is open.
3. A tree is closed for the labelling algebra A when all its branches are closed for A.
4. A formula A is a theorem for the labelling algebra A if and only if there is a tree T such that
(i) T is generated by applications of the rules starting from FA : 1, where 1 is the identity
element (with respect to the operation ) of the labelling algebra A and (ii) T is closed for
A.
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Structural Rules
Permutation Contraction
TA : z  x  y  v
TA : z  y  x  v
TA : z  x  x  y
TA : z  x  y
Expansion Weakening
TA : z  x  y
TA : z  x  x  y
TA : z  x  v
TA : z  x  y  v
Table 14.3: Structural rules (to be shown redundant).
5. A formula A is provable for the labelling algebra A from the sequence of assumptions   if
and only if there is a tree T such that (i) T is generated by applications of the rules starting
from a sequence of initial LS-formulae
TB1 : b1; : : : ; TBn : bn; FA : b1      bn
where B1; : : : ; Bn =  ; (ii) bi 6= bj whenever i 6= j; (iii) T is closed for A.
Redundancy of the structural rules. As mentioned above, the structural rules can be elimi-
nated in favour of the branch closure rule, which allows us to formulate a uniform tree method for
all the logics in the family, and reduce the dierence between them to the conditions under which
a branch is declared closed. In the sequel by \a tree for   ` A" we shall mean a tree starting with
a sequence
TB1 : b1; : : : ; TBn : bn; FA : b1      bn
specied as above.
Proposition 14.2.5 Every closed tree T for   ` A can be transformed into an equivalent closed
tree such that, in each branch, no application of an operational rule follows an application of a
structural rule.
Proof. We dene the rank of a node n as follows: rank(n) = 0 if n is a leaf-node and rank(n) = k+1,
where k is the maximal rank of the successors of n, for every non-leaf node.
Let us say that an LS-formula is misplaced if it is at the same time the conclusion of a structural
rule and a premiss of an operational rule. Given a tree T , let d the number of misplaced formulae
of maximal rank, and r be equal to such maximal rank if d > 0 or to 0 if d = 0. We dene
(r0; d0) < (r; d) if r0 < r or, r0 = r and d0 < d. Let us denote by (T ) the pair (r; d) associated with
the tree T . Clearly if (T ) = (0; 0) no LS-formula in the tree is at the same time the conclusion
of a structural rule and the premiss of an operational rule. Although it may be the case that a
formula which is the premiss of an operational rule occurs in a branch after a formula which is the
conclusion of a structural rule, the former does not depend on the latter. In such a situation, the
tree can always be re-arranged so that no application of an operational rule follows an application
of a structural rule.
Now, let T be a tree such that (T ) > (0; 0). Let TA : x be a misplaced LS-formula of maximal
rank. Suppose TA : w, with w v x, is the premiss of the application of the structural rule from
which TA : x results. For every branch  passing through TA : x, let TC1 : z1[x]; : : : ; TCn : zn[x],
where zi[x] means that the label x occurs in zi, be all the LS-formulae in  which result from the
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Frames
commutative contractive expansive monotonic Implication systems
x  y = y  x x  x v x x v x  x x v x  y
no no no no Lambek's
yes no no no Linear
yes yes no no Relevant
yes yes yes no Mingle
yes yes yes yes Intuitionistic
Table 14.4: Correspondence between implication systems and classes of information frames








Let T 0 obtained from T by: (i) deleting TA : x; (ii) replacing each TCi : zi with the pair of
LS-formulae TCi : zi(x=w); TCi : zi (one after the other), where zi(x=w) denotes the result of
substituting x with w in zi. Then T 0 is a sound tree equivalent to T . Moreover, (T 0) < (T ). 
The above proposition implies that the structural rules can be eliminated in favour of the
general closure rule. To see this, consider that the structural rules always yield a formula signed
with T as conclusion. Moreover, each structural rule re-labels a labelled signed formula TA : x
with a label y such that x v y in the class of frames associated with the structural rule. So, if a
branch is closed by virtue of a set of LS-formulae fTA : x1; : : : ; TA : xn; FA : y with F
fxig v y,
and TA : xi results from the application of a structural rule to TA : z with z v xi, then the branch
would be closed anyway if TA : xi were replaced by TA : z, by virtue of the general closure rule,
without any need for the application of the structural rule. (Notice that FA : y cannot result from
the application of a structural rule because all the structural rules involve only formulae signed
with T .) So every formula which is the conclusion of a structural rule either is not used at all, and
then can be removed, or it is used to close a branch and then can be replaced by an application of
the general closure rule.
Thus, the operational rules and the closure rule are all we need. The dierence between
logical systems is reduced to the dierence in the relation x v y which provides the conditions
for the application of the closure rules. The correspondence between some well-known implication
systems and the classes of information frames associated with dierent conditions on the ordering
v is illustrated in Table 14.4. The system of classical implication is obtained, of course, just by
ignoring the labels.
Examples. We consider now some examples of derivations based on the implication rules given
above. Such derivations solve deduction problems for classes of logics associated with classes of
frames. This means that a single closed tree allows us to determine the weakest logic for which it
represents a proof. Thus, positive solutions of deduction problems can be obtained for classes of
logics simultaneously. In the second part of this paper (forthcoming), where we discuss the decision
problem, we shall dene a notion of completed tree which allows us to deal with nite trees for
some classes of logics. In this way negative solutions of deduction problems for classes of logics can
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also be read o the same completed tree. In the following examples the labelled KE-rules used in
the derivation are indicated on the right column. (For these rules we use the same names used for
the classical rules; see Table 14.1 above.)
We shall adopt the following notational device. We shall write just ` to express the fact that the
consequence relation ` under consideration is not assumed to be closed under any of the structural
rules. We shall write `i1:::in (n  4), to express the fact that the given consequence relation is
closed under the structural rules corresponding to the rows i1; : : : ; in in Table 14.2. In turn, a
substructural consequence relation `i1:::in corresponds to the class of information frames such that
their partial ordering v satises all the conditions specied in rows i1 : : : in. In this way each class
of consequence relation is associated with a class of information frames12.
Example 14.2.6 ` (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B))
Proof.
(1) F (A! B)! ((C ! A)! (C ! B)) : 1
(2) TA! B : a EF !(1)
(3) F (C ! A)! (C ! B) : a EF !(1)
(4) TC ! A : b EF !(3)
(5) FC ! B : a  b EF !(3)
(6) TC : c EF !(5)
(7) FB : a  b  c EF !(5)
(8) TA : b  c ET !(4); (6)
(9) TB : a  b  c ET !(2); (8)


Example 14.2.7 `1 (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C))
Proof.
(1) F (A! (B ! C))! (B ! (A! C)) : 1
(2) TA! (B ! C) : a EF !(1)
(3) F (B ! (A! C)) : a EF !(1)
(4) TB : b EF !(3)
(5) FA! C : a  b EF !(3)
(6) TA : c EF !(5)
(7) FC : a  b  c EF !(5)
(8) TB ! C : a  c ET !(2); (6)
(9) TC : a  c  b ET !(4); (8)


Notice how the previous derivation fails in every logic characterized by non-commutative frames
since a  c  b v a  b  c does not hold true in general.
Example 14.2.8 `12 (A! (A! B))! (A! B)
(1) F ((A! (A! B))! (A! B)) : 1
(2) T (A! (A! B)) : a EF !(1)
(3) F (A! B) : a EF !(1)
(4) TA : b EF !(3)
(5) FB : a  b EF !(3)
(6) T (A! B) : a  b ET !(2); (4)
(7) TB : a  b  b ET !(6); (4)

12We have just considered four structural rules which arise from the Gentzen tradition. It is obvious that the
list of structural rules could be extended ad libitum (for a more comprehensive list see [Do^sen, 1988]). However the
general pattern which associates with each structural rule a condition on the partial ordering v is the same. So we
shall restrict our discussion to the four structural rules listed above, though it should be clear how it extends to
cover any collection of structural rules.
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Notice how the previous derivation fails in every logic characterized by non-contractive frames,
since a  b  b v a  b does not hold true in general.
Example 14.2.9 `123 A! (A! A)
Proof.
(1) F (A! (A! A)) : 1
(2) T (A) : a EF !(1)
(3) F (A! A) : a EF !(1)
(4) TA : b EF !(3)
(5) FA : a  b EF !(3)


Here the branch is closed because of the general closure rule (14.17). For, let c = F
fa; bg. Since
the frame is expansive, c v c  c. Therefore, since c v a and c v b, it follows immediately that
c v a  b and, hence, the branch is closed. Notice how the previous derivation fails in every logic
characterized by non-expansive frames, since c v c  c does not hold true in general. Notice also
that this derivation would not have been possible if we had used just the special case of the closure
rule as given in (14.16). In semantic terms, this means that the existence of the least information
token which veries a given sentence is crucial for the logical systems characterized by frames which
are expansive yet non-monotonic, i.e. what we have called \mingle" frames. This is a point which
is often neglected.
Example 14.2.10 `1234 A! (B ! A)
Proof.
(1) F (A! (B ! A)) : 1
(2) T (A) : a EF !(1)
(3) F (B ! A) : a EF !(1)
(4) T (B) : b EF !(3)
(5) F (A) : a  b EF !(3)


Notice how the previous derivation fails in every logic characterized by non-monotonic frames,
since a v a  b does not hold true in general.
The reader can easily verify that any attempt to derive Peirce's law
((A! B)! A)! A
fails in every information frame, except the \degenerate" one consisting of one point only.
Finally, Modus Ponens can be easily simulated in all implication systems:
Fact 14.2.11 If ` A and ` A! B, then ` B.
Proof. It follows from the hypothesis that there are closed trees T1 and T2 for F (A ! B) : 1
and F (A) : 1 respectively (recall that 1 is identity element for ). Then it is easy to see that the
following is the required closed tree for F (B) : 1.
FB : 1






FA! B : 1
T1

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Notice that the examples given above can be used to show that our labelled deduction system is
complete with respect to the implication logics in Table 14.4, since suitable subsets of the theorems
proved provide axiom systems for such logics and the rule of Modus Ponens can be derived in the
basic system with no additional conditions on v. However this simulation of the axiomatic systems
does not preserve the subformula property, because of the applications of the \cut rule" PB to
simulate the Modus Ponens rule. A more informative completeness proof will be given in the
sequel.
Elimination rules for : Since we dene :A as A ! ?, the elimination rules for : can be




T? : x  y
. (14.23)




F? : x  a
with a a new atomic label (14.24)
However this would not yield a uniform method for dealing with the fragments involving classical
negation, satisfying also the double negation law. It turns out that the LDS approach allows us to
obtain such a uniform method by exploiting the power of the labelling algebra.
Let us say that an information token x is consistent with an information token y if x  y 6k ?
or, in terms of valuations, v(?; x  y) = F . It follows from our denitions that, given an arbitrary
information token x, there exists the greatest information token consistent with it. For, let S be
the set of all information tokens consistent with x, i.e. v(?; x  y) = F for all y 2 S. It follows
from the denition of valuation above (condition 3) that S is a directed set. Consider now
F
S.
By the continuity of , x FS = Ffx  yjy 2 Sg, so v(?; x FS) = v(?;Ffx  yjy 2 Sg). By the
continuity of the notion of falsity, v(?;Ffx  yjy 2 Sg) = F . So FS is the greatest information
token consistent with x. Notice that when the set S is empty,
F
exists and is equal to the bottom
element of the lattice.
Hence we can dene:
x =def maxfyjv(?; x  y) = Fg:




because if A is veried by a y such that ? is falsied by x  y, then A is veried by x, being x
the greatest z such that ? is falsied by x  z.
This rule is equivalent to the original one provided that the following 0-premise rule is also
available:
F? : x  x (14.26)
This rule is clearly sound and the pair of rules (14.25) and (14.26) are equivalent to the rule (14.24).
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provided that F
fyig v x  x for some x. The special case:
T? : y
 (14.28)
provided that y v x  x for some x, is sucient for completeness except for the class of logics
characterized by mingle frames (those which are expansive but non-monotonic).
Such rules are intuitionistically valid. However, classical negation can be characterized simply
by assuming that, in the algebra of the labels, the operation  is an involution, i.e. x = x.
Proposition 14.2.12 For every frame L and every valuation v over L, the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
1. For all information tokens x 2 L and all sentences A:
v(A; x) = T () v(A; x) = T ;
2. For all information tokens x 2 L and all sentences A:
v(::A; x) = T () v(A; x) = T:
The proposition follows immediately from observing that, according to our denitions:
v(:A; x) = T () v(A; x) = F
and therefore
v(::A; x) = T () v(A; x) = T:
Let us consider two information tokens equivalent if they determine exactly the same propositions.
Then, given a frame L, we can clearly restrict our attention to a subframe containing only a
representative for each equivalence class of tokens. So we can assume without loss of generality
that information frames do not contain distinct equivalent tokens. In this case, if any of the two
properties in Proposition 14.2.12 holds, the operation  is an involution, i.e. x = x. We call
a valuation classical if the operation  is an involution. Examples of derivations exploiting this
property of the  operation will be given in later in this section.
As we have just mentioned it is easy to check that our elimination rules (together with PB) are
equivalent to the following valuation clause:
v(:A; x) = T () v(A; x) = F (14.29)
The reader familiar with the literature on relevance logic will be reminded of the -operation used
by Routley and Routley in their semantics of rst-degree entailment [R. and Routley, 1972] (see
also [Routley and Meyer, 1973]). (Similar operations, however, pervade a good deal of work on the
semantics of negation in non-classical logics.) Here the -operation is dened | and explained |
in terms of our basic structures.
Elimination rules for 




fzjy  z v xg
xny =def
G
fzjz  y v xg
It follows, from the continuity of , that x=y (xny) is the greatest z such that y  z v x (z  y v x).
13These operations should not be confused with the left and right implications of the Lambek calculus. We denote
the latter by !. Although we do not deal explicitly with the former, which could be denoted by  , it can be easily
accommodated in our approach.
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Notice that by denition:
y  (x=y) v x and (xny)  y v x
The operations = and n are identical in every commutative frame. There is a strong analogy
between these operations and algebraic division, as emerges from the following properties :
y  (x=y) v x (14.30)
1 v x=x (14.31)
(x=y)  z v (x  z)=y (14.32)
(x=y)=z v x=(y  z): (14.33)
similar properties hold for n.
Let x be an information token that veries A
B. Then we consider as part of the meaning of

 that there are tokens y and z such that: (i) y veries A; (ii) z veries B and (iii) y  z v x. Let
a be such a token that veries A, and b such a token that veries B. Then, of course, a  b veries
A
B. Moreover, we have that a  b v x. So x=a veries B, where x=a is dened as above (i.e. as
the greatest information token z such that a  z v x).





with a a new atomic label (14.34)










The reader can check that our elimination rules (together with PB) are equivalent to the
following valuation clause:
v(A
B; x) = T () 9y; v(A; y) = T and v(B; x=y) = T (14.36)
When a consequence relation is commutative and contains a classical negation, namely it is
closed under the Exchange rule and (14.5), then the following equivalence holds true:
A
B a` :(A! :B) (14.37)
It can be easily shown that, under such circumstances, the operators = and n can be identied and
assumed to satisfy the following identity:
x=y = (x  y) (14.38)
Elimination rules for [p . As mentioned in Section 14.2.1, the operator [p arises naturally in
logical systems with an involutive negation and closed under Exchange. It can be dened in terms
of : and ! as follows:
A[p B =def :A! B:
So, its elimination rules can be derived from the rules for ! and : together with the assumption
that possible models are restricted to the classical ones (i.e. those in which the operation  is an
involution).
It is easy to see that the following rules are valid:
TA[p B : x
FA : y
TB : x  y
TA[p B : x
FB : x  y
TA : y
(14.39)
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TA! B : x
TA : y
TB : x  y
TA! B : x
FB : x  y
FA : y
FA! B : x
TA : a















FA[p B : x
FA : a
FB : x  a
(i)
TA[p B : x
FA : y
TB : x  y
TA[p B : x




T? : x  y
F:A : x
TA : x F? : x  x







(i): for some new atomic label a
(ii): whenever F
fx1; : : : ; xng v y
Table 14.5: The rules of the system LKES for (basic) substructural logics.
and
FA[p B : x
FA : a
FB : x  a
with a a new atomic label (14.40)
The validity of these rules can be seen by deriving them from the rules for ! and :.
Again, it is not dicult to check that our rules (together with PB) are equivalent to the following
valuation clause:
v(A[p B; x) = T () 8y; v(A; y) = T or v(B; x  y) = T (14.41)
The rules introduced in this section (summarized in Table 14.5) provide a labelled generalization
of the KE system. We call this generalization LKES .
Liberalized rules. As we have seen, some of our rules introduce new atomic labels, while elim-
inating connectives. Let us call such rules generative.
One of the crucial properties of our notion of information frame ensures that whenever there
is a token which veries A there is a minimum (with respect to v) such token. Therefore, we
can always assume that the new label a introduced by a generative rule refers to such a minimum
token without loss of soundness. Consider, for example, the rule (14.21). The clause (14.20) says
that if x does not verify A ! B, then there exists a y such that y veries A and x  y falsies
B. If a is the minimum token that veries A, a v y by denition, and therefore x  a falsies B.
Now, suppose that after analysing FA ! B : x in this way we come across, in the same branch,
a signed formula of the form FA ! C : y. If we apply the rule to FA ! C : y, we obtain TA : b
with a new atomic label b, and FC : y  b. Since both a and b are assumed to refer to the least
x which veries A, we can conclude that a = b. Similar arguments apply to the other generative
rules. Therefore:
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Fact 14.2.13 If TA : a1; : : : ; TA : an are labelled signed formulae occuring in the same branch,
and all ai's are atomic labels, then a1 =    = an.
The above fact ensures that the domain of atomic labels introduced in a branch is not extended
unnecessarily. We shall see that this property is crucial for the algorithmic formulation of some
logics.
We can formulate the generative rules in a more convenient way so as to incorporate the content
of Fact 14.2.13.
Denition 14.2.14 We say that an atomic label a is A-characteristic in a branch  if TA : a
occurs in .
Exploiting this terminology, we can formulate \liberalized" versions of the generative rules. Con-
sider again the rule (14.21). We can reformulate it as follows:
FA! B : x
TA : a




In this formulation the atomic label does not have to be new. For instance, this version of the rule
would allow for the following expansion step:
FA! B : x
FB : x  a (14.43)
whenever a is an atomic label such that TA : a occurs above in the branch. Only if no A-
characteristic atomic label occurs in the branch, does the rule force us to introduce a new atomic
label a.
Similar liberalized versions can be formulated for the other generative rules. The justication of
this move is somewhat similar to the justication of the \liberalized"  rule in rst-order analytic
tableaux (on this point see [Haehnle and Schmitt, 1992]).
Analytic restriction. All the elimination rules of the system LKES are analytic, i.e. they
\analyse" complex formulae by specifying the consequences of their truth and falsity in terms
of the truth and falsity of their subformulae. On the other hand the branching rule PB (which
is clearly related to the cut rule) can introduce arbitrary formulae and arbitrary labels. So the
problem of proof-search in our system depends crucially on two components: the choice of the
formulae introduced via PB and the choice of the associated labels.
In the classical KE system | with no labels { the use of the cut rulle PB can be restricted
to analytic applications, i.e. applications preserving the subformula property, without loss of
completeness. Indeed, the choice of the \cut formulae", namely the formulae introduced by an
application of PB, can be even further restricted so that the resulting refutations follow a regular
pattern or canonical form and can be found by means of a simple systematic procedure, along
the lines of the usual tableau-completion procedure. Moreover, such canonical refutations are
often essentially shorter than the corresponding tableau refutations and never signicantly longer
(see [D'Agostino and Mondadori, 1994] for the related technical results in terms of polynomial
simulations).
As we shall see, this property extends also to the labelled version of KE: we can restrict the
applications of PB to subformulae without loss of completeness, and dene a refutation procedure
which is a labelled generalizzation of the classical one. However, the use of labelled formulae
introduces a further degree of freedom in the application of the PB rule: the choice of the label.
The semi-decision procedure described in the rest of this section restricts this freedom to some
extent, but the space of the labels is still innite. Of course, full mechanization can be achieved
only when the complexity of the labels can be bound in one way or the other. This question will
be addressed in the second part of the paper (forthcoming) where we discuss the decision problem.
So the semi-decision procedure described below should be taken only as a convenient rst step
towards the mechanization of proof-search.
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In order to describe the semi-decision procedure we need to introduce the notion of completed
branch. In the classical case, when no labels are present, this notion is straightforward: a branch
 is completed whenever for each signed formula X occurring in it one of the following conditions
is satised:
1. X has the form TP or FP with P atomic.
2. X has the form FA! B and both TA and FB occur in .
3. X has the form TA! B and either FA or TB occurs in .
4. X has the form TA ^B and both TA and TB occur in .
5. X has the form FA ^B and either FA or FB occurs in .
6. X has the form FA _B and both FA and FB occur in .
7. X has the form TA _B and either TA or TB occurs in .
8. X has the form T:A and FA occurs in .
9. X has the form F:A and TA occurs in .
When dealing with labelled signed formulae, this simple notion of a completed branch should be
replaced by a more complex one.
Given a branch , we dene the domain of  as follows:
Denition 14.2.15 The domain of , denoted by D is the smallest set containing all the atomic
labels a occurring in  and closed under the operations , , = and n.
Denition 14.2.16 We say that a labelled signed formula X is completely analysed in a branch
 if one of the following conditions is satised:
1. X has the form TA! B : x and, for all y 2 D, either FA : y or TB : x  y is in .
2. X has the form FA ! B : x and for some atomic a, TA : a occurs in  and FB : x  a
occurs in .
3. X has the form T:A : x and, for all y 2 D, either FA : y or T? : x  y is in .
4. X has the form F:A : x and TA : x occurs in .
5. X has the form TA
B : x and for some atomic a, both TA : a and TB : x=a occur in .
6. X has the form FA 
 B : x and, for all y 2 D, (i) either FA : y or FB : x=y is in  and
(ii) either FB : y or FA : xny is in .
For the logics containing the operator [p , the obvious clause for this operator should be added.
We say that a branch  is completed if every LS-formula occurring in  is completely analysed.
A tree is said to be completed if all its branches are completed.
From our denitions a completed branch must be innite. In the second part of this paper we shall
see when and how we can restrict our attention to a nite portion of a completed branch without
loss of generality.
The following is a procedure which expands a branch linearly:
Procedure: linear completion ;
Repeat until a rule is applicable or  is closed
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1. if  contains two formulae of the form TA ! B : x and TA : y, and does not contain
TB : x  y, then append TB : x  y to ; endif
2. if  contains two formulae of the form TA ! B : x and FB : x  y, and does not contain
FA : y, then append FA : y to ; endif
3. if  contains a formula of the form FA! B : x, then (i) if  does not contain TA : a for any
atomic label a, then append TA : a with a new atomic label a to ; if  contains TA : a for
some atomic label a and does not contain FB : x  a, then append FB : x  a to ; endif
4. if  contains two formulae of the form T:A : x and TA : y, and does not contain T? : x  y,
then append T? : x  y to ; endif
5. if  contains a formula of the form F:A : x, then if  does not contain TA : x, then append
TA : x ; endif
6. if  contains a formula of the form TA
B : x, then (i) if  does not contain TA : a for any
atomic label a, append TA : a for some new atomic label a to ; (ii) if  contains TA : a
with a atomic, and  does not contain TB : x=a, then add TB : x=a to ; endif
7. if  contains two formulae of the form FA
B : x and TA : y, and does not contain FB : x=y,
then append FB : x=y to ; endif
8. if  contains two formulae of the form FA
B : x and TB : y, and does not contain FA : xny,
then append FA : xny to ; endif
Again, the procedure can be extended to cover the operator [p in the obvious way.
Let us say that a branch  is linearly completed if the result of applying the above procedure
to  is  itself. A branch which is linearly completed, may not be completed in that there may
be LS-formulae which are not completely analysed. Notice that such LS-formulae must be of the
form TA ! B : x or T:A : x or FA 
 B : x. In the rst case this means that for some y 2 D
neither FA : y nor TB : x  y are in . Then, we apply the branching rule PB as follows:
TA : y FA : y
:
and expand the two new branches until they are both linearly completed. It is easy to see that each
of these linearly completed branches will contain either FA : y or TB : xy. Similar considerations
apply to the second case and third case. It is routine to dene a systematic procedure which
combines the linear completion procedure with applications of the splitting rule PB to the eect
that either a closed or a completed (innite) tree is always obtained.
Given a frame L and a valuation v over L, let us say that v satises an LS-formula X if X has
the form TA : x and v(A; x) = T , or X has the form FA : x and v(A; x) = F . We say that a set S
of LS-formulae has a model if there are a frame L and a valuation v over L which satises all the
LS-formulae in S. Then, we can show that:
Proposition 14.2.17 Every completed open branch has a model.
Proof.[sketch] Let  be a completed open branch and v a valuation over a frame (including D)
satisfying:
1. v(P; x) = T for all atomic P such that TP : x occurs in ;
2. v(P; x) = F otherwise.
Then v is a valuation which satises | via the valuation clauses (14.22), (14.29), (14.36) and
(14.41) | all the LS-formulae in . This can be easily shown by induction on the degree of the
LS-formulae in . 
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Proposition 14.2.17 above implies that the semi-decision procedure does not cause any loss of
deductive power with respect to the unrestricted system, i.e. the former is complete with respect
to the latter. For, suppose there is a tree T for a set of initial LS-formulae S such that T has a
completed open branch . Then there is a valuation v which satises all the LS-formulae in .
Thus no LKES-tree for the same set of initial LS-formulae (no matter whether the applications of
PB are analytic or not) can be closed, otherwise such a valuation v would be impossible.
The procedure described above shows that every closed tree can be recognized in a nite number
of steps, while the task of showing that a completed tree has an open branch is innite. However,
the search space for the PB-formulae (as opposed to that for the labels) is nite. We described
this as a rst step towards mechanization. In the next section we shall make a second step by
introducing variables in the labels. Our nal nal step will consist in showing when and how the
complexity of the labels can be bound so as to yield a full decision procedure. This problem will
be discussed in the second part of this paper (forthcoming).
14.2.4 Soundness and completeness of LKES
We have shown that in the system LKES we can restrict the PB rule (or cut) to analytic applica-
tions, i.e. applications involving only subformulae of the formulae occurring above in the branch,
without any loss of completeness. We have also described a procedure which generates analytic
deductions. We show now that (the unrestricted) LKES is sound and complete with respect to the
family of substructural logics dened in Section 14.2.1. It follows, by the argument in the previous
section, that the analytic cut procedure is also complete. For the sake of simplicity in this section
we consider the standard rules given in Table 14.5 and not their liberalized version.
To prove the completeness of LKES we make a crucial use of substitutions of atomic labels in
LKES-trees. Let us say that an atomic label a is critical for a tree T if it is the new atomic label
introduced by an application of a generative rule in T . In other words, the only atomic labels
which are non-critical are those associated with initial LS-formulae.
Lemma 14.2.18 (Substitution Lemma) Let T be an LKES-tree, and let T 0 be obtained from
T by replacing each occurrence of a non-critical atomic label a with a label x such that x does not
contain any atomic label which is critical for T . Then T 0 is also an LKES-tree. Moreover, if T
is closed, T 0 is also closed.
As before, we write   `i1;:::;in A to indicate that A is a consequence of   if the the consequence
relation is closed under the structural rules identied by the string i1; : : : ; in (see Table 14.2) as
well as under the general conditions on the logical operators. By   `i1;:::;in
LKES
A we mean that A is
LKES-provable from   for the labelling algebra specied by the conditions on v identied by the
string i1; : : : ; in (in the same table). Then, it is not dicult to show that:
Proposition 14.2.19   `i1;:::;in A =)   `i1;:::;in
LKES
A
Proof. The proof is easily obtained by showing that the relation `i1;:::;in
LKES
is closed under all the
relevant conditions, namely (i) the basic conditions of Identity and Surgical cut, (ii) the general
conditions on the logical operators C
, C!, C: and (iii) the structural rules identied by the
string i1; : : : ; in. We show only how to prove closure under surgical cut, contraction and expansion
and leave the rest to the reader. Suppose   `i1;:::;in
LKES
A and ; A; `i1;:::;in
LKES
B. We want to
show that ; ; `i1;:::;in
LKES
B. Let us write T  :  to denote a sequence of LS-formulae obtained
by the sequence of formulae   by (i) signing them with T and (ii) attaching to each of them a
distinct atomic label. We shall also use  to denote the -concatenation of these atomic labels.
Similarly, we shall use the abbreviations T : , , T :  and . By hypothesis there is a closed
LKES-tree T1 with initial LS-formulae T  : ; FA : , and there is also a closed LKES-tree T2
with initial LS-formulae T : ; TA : a; T : ; FB :   a  . We can assume, without loss of
generality, that the sets of the atomic labels occuring in T1 and T2 are disjoint.
Then the following tree is closed:










Where T2[a=] denotes the result of substituting every occurrence of the atomic label a in T2 with
the label . By the substitution lemma above T2[a=] is closed if T2 is closed. Hence, the above
closed tree is the required LKES-proof of ; ; `i1;:::;inLKES B.
To show closure under contraction, assume  ; A;A; `i1;:::;in
LKES
B. We want to show  ; A; `i1;:::;in
LKES
B provided 2 2 (i1; : : : ; in), i.e. the extra-condition a  a v a on the frame is satised.
By hypothesis there is a closed LKES-tree T1 with initial LS-formulae
T  : ; TA : a; TA : b; T : ; FB :   a  b  
By the substitution lemma stated above we can replace every occurrence of b in this tree with an
occurrence of a and the result will be a closed LKES-tree with initial LS-formulae:
T  : ; TA : a; T : ; FB :   a  a  




FB :   a  




FB :   a  a  
T1[b=a]
To show closure under expansion, assume  ; A; `i1;:::;in
LKES
B. We want to show that  ; A;A; `i1;:::;in
LKES
B, provided that 3 2 (i1; : : : ; in), i.e. the extra condition a v a  a on the frame is satised.
By hypothesis there is a closed LKES-tree T1 with initial LS-formulae T  : ; TA : a; T :
; FB :   a  . Moreover, by the substitution lemma, the tree T1[a=b] obtained from T1 by
replacing every occurrence of a with an atomic label b which does not occur in T1 is also closed.





FB :   a  b  
TB :   a  
TB :   b  

 QQ
FB :   b  
T1[a=b]
 QQ
FB :   a  
T1
The leftmost branch of the tree is closed by virtue of the general closure rule applied to TB :
 a  , TB :   b   and FB :  a  b  . For, F
f a  ;   b  g =   Ffa; bg  .
So, by denoting Ffa; bg with c, we have   c   v   c  c   v   a  b  . 
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Remark 14.2.20 Notice that in the above proof of the closure of `i1;:::;in
LKES
under expansion the
simple special case of the closure rule, as in (14.16), would be sucient if the frame was assumed
to be a monotonic one, i.e. such that a v a  b. In this case the branch would be closed by virtue of
the pair TB :   a  ; FB :   a  b  . Moreover, a simple analysis of the proof of the above
proposition shows that the special case is always sucient for completeness except for the class
of mingle frames, i.e. those which are expansive but non-monotonic. The algorithmic problems
raised by our use of the labels in the closure rule (both for the general and the special case) will be
discussed in the second part of this paper.
It follows from our previous discussion that the semi-decision procedure is also complete and,
therefore, the applications of PB can be restricted as indicated in this procedure.
The soundness (or \faithfulness") of the system LKES with respect to the substructural con-
sequence relations stems from our discussion in the previous sections and from the consideration
of what we have called \the canonical interpretation" of an information frame. According to this
interpretation:
 the information tokens in P are sets of formulae closed under `;
 the composition operation  is dened as follows:
x  y =def fA
BjA 2 x;B 2 yg;
 the identity 1 is dened as the set of theorems fAj ` Ag;
 the partial ordering v is set-inclusion.
Then, P is a complete lattice underv and all the other conditions in the denition of an information
frame (Denition 14.2.1) are satised. The canonical valuation v is then dened as follows:
v(A; x) = T i A 2 x
It is routine to show that all the LKES-rules are sound under the canonical interpretation when
the LS-formulae TA : x and FA : x are interpreted as A 2 x and A 62 x respectively. So, if
A1; : : : ; An `i1;:::;inLKES B, i.e. there is a closed tree for TA1 : a1; : : : ; TAn : an; FB : a1      an, this
means that B 2 a1     an where the ai's are the sets fCjAi ` Cg. Thus, A1 
    
An ` B and,
by C
, A1; : : : ; An ` B. This is sucient to show:
Proposition 14.2.21   `i1;:::;in
LKES
A =)   `i1;:::;in A
14.2.5 Free variables in the labels
Each label occurring in a tree is built up from atomic labels and the relevant operations of the
labelling algebra. New atomic labels are introduced by applications of the rules for analysing
formulae of the form FA ! B : x and TA 
 B : x, and the propagation of the labels is uniquely
determined by the tree rules. By contrast, the rule
TA : x FA : x
is sound for every choice of x and we only know that, for every valid sequent   ` A, there exists
a set of choices for the labels generated by the application of PB which leads to a closed tree. It
is therefore convenient in practice to apply the rule PB with a variable label x and postpone the
evaluation of this variable until enough information is available. For this purpose we need some
new notions.
Denition 14.2.22 We enrich our labelling language with a denumerable set of variables denoted
by 1; 2; 3 etc. A label-scheme  is a label containing variables. A potential closure set is a set of
LS-formulae of the form fTA : 1; : : : ; TA : n; FA : g. A potentially closed branch is a branch
containing a potential closure set. A tree T is potentially closed if all its branches are potentially
closed.
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Notice that a potentially closed branch may contain more than one potential closure set. So,
every potentially closed branch  determines a nite set I of inequalities of the form F
fig v ,
one for each potential closure set occurring in it. (Recall that, with the exception of the logics
characterized by \mingle" frames, i.e. frames which are expansive but not monotonic, a closure
set is always a pair fTA : ; FA : g, so that the inequalities I have the simpler form  v g.)
A potentially closed tree represents the set of all trees obtained by replacing the variables in the
labels with specic values. Some of these substitutions may yield a closed tree. The criterion for
the existence of a closed tree, given a potentially closed one, is simple:
Condition for the existence of closed trees. Let T be a potentially closed tree for   ` A
with potentially closed branches 1; : : : ; n. Each potentially closed branch i is associated with a
nite set of inequalities Ii . Let C be the set of all sets of inequalities fi1; : : : ; ing such that ij 2 Ij
for j = 1; : : : ; n. Then, there is a closed tree for   ` A if at least one set in C has a simultaneous
solution in the labelling algebra under consideration.
In the second part of this paper (forthcoming) we shall discuss the algorithmic problems related
to this use of free variables in the labels. We conclude this rst part by illustrating our method
with some examples.
14.2.6 Further examples
Example 14.2.23 As an example of the use of variables in the labels we show a tree for
` ((A! A)! B)! ((B ! C)! C):
We use x; y; z as label-variables.
F ((A! A)! B)! ((B ! C)! C : 1
T (A! A)! B : a
F (B ! C)! C : a
TB ! C : b
FC : a  b
TA! A : x
TB : a  x




FA! A : x
TA : c
FA : x  c
This is a potentially closed tree which is turned into a closed tree for all commutative logics under
the substitution x = 1.
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Example 14.2.24 Consider the formula (:A ! :B) ! (B ! A). This is a theorem of linear
and relevance logic (as well as, of course, classical logic) but not a theorem of intuitionistic logic.
We show that there are no countermodels for the rst two logics while showing at the same time
that there is one for the third.
F (:A! :B)! (B ! A) : 1
T:A! :B : a
FB ! A : 1  a (= a)
TB : b
FA : a  b
T:A : x
T:B : a  x






In this tree, the lefthand branch is closed for all commutative labelling algebras under the substitu-
tion x = (a  b). Under this substitution the righthand branch is closed only for classical models,
since (a  b) = a  b.
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Example 14.2.25 The formula ::A ! A is a theorem of linear and relevance logic, but not of
intuitionistic logic.
F::A! A : 1
T::A : a
FA : 1  a (= a)
T:A : x






The lefthand branch is closed under the substitution x = a. The righthand branch is closed under
the same substitution only for classical models, where a = a.
Example 14.2.26 The formula (A ! :A) ! :A is a theorem of relevance and intuitionistic
logic but not of linear logic.
F (A! :A)! :A : 1
TA! :A : a
F:A : a
TA : a
T:A : a  a
T? : a  a  a
This one-branch tree is closed for all contractive models, since in all such models aaa v aa.
Example 14.2.27 The formula (A
B ! C)! (A! (B ! C)) is valid in all frames.
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F (A
B ! C)! (A! (B ! C)) : 1
TA
B ! C : a
FA! (B ! C) : a
TA : b
FB ! C : a  b
TB : c
FC : a  b  c
TA
B : x







The left-hand branch of the above tree is closed under the substitution x = b  c. Since c = 1  c v
b=b  c v (b  c)=b (see above, p. 398), the righthand branch is closed under the same substitution.




15.1 Introduction and motivation
Among the many advantages of working within the LDS framework, there is one of great usefulness.
It is the capability of combining any two LDS logics in a very easy and simple way. This allows us
to combine any twologics, provided we have an LDS formulation for them. Since we have general
methods for nding an LDS formulation for almost arbitrary logics, we should, in principle, be
able to develop general methods for combining arbitrary logics.
In many simple cases, such as modal and intuitionistic logics, the methods of bring and
combining them, whcih arise out of LDS considerations can be directly applied without detour
through LDS. Other logics may actually require an LDS presentation.
Let us begin by presenting the master problem of combining logics.
Master Problem: General Weaving of Logics Problem
Let L be a logic with some connectives. Let Li; i 2 I be a family of logics which are conservative
extensions of L. Assume Li \ Lj = L, for i 6= j. Assume each Li has, among others, the set
Ci = f]i1; : : : ; ]ik(i)g of additional connectives to those of L. Then the general weaving of logics
problem is to characterise the set of all logics fLI j  is a name for a way of combining Li; i 2 Ig
which are built on the connectives of L and
Sn
i=1 Ci and which are conservative extensions of each
Li; i 2 I.
In particular we seek to characterise the minimal such logic LminI , as well as some distinguished
other special logics LI , which possibly represent some special ways of combining Li; i 2 I. We use
the notation LI = 
i2ILi.
The above general problem requires the formulation and solution of several secondary problems.
Problem 1:
Characterise the notion of a logical system (i.e. dene the `entities' (logics) involved in the weaving
of logics `problem').
Problem 2:
Present methodologies for combining any two logics, independent of how they are formulated (e.g.
one may be formulated as a Hilbert system, the other through a semantical interpretation, the
third may be an algebraic logic, etc.).
Problem 3:
Investigate transfer properties. If all Li; i 2 I share some property (decidability, interpolation,
etc.) do they transfer to LI?
Problem 4:
Compare the combined logics thus obtained with existing known combinations of logics, which are
abundant in the literature.
Problem 5:
Study possible natural interactions between the logics Li; i 2 I during the combination process, pos-
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sibly leading to non-conservative combinations. Try to identify special ways of non-conservatively
combining logics, which are meaningful (e.g. combinations leading to temporal logics, n-dimensional
cross products, combining a logic with its `metalevel', etc.).
Some attempts at a methodical solution to some of these problems for the case of normal
modal logics can be found in [Kracht and Wolter, 1991, Fine and Schurz, ] and for intuitionistic
modal logics in [Amati and Pirri, 199]. In addition there are many papers presenting particular
combinations of particular logics to suit particular applications. These range from introducing
modality into relevance logic to the fuzzication of an arbitrary logic. It is time to seek a general
methodology for combining logics (which we refer to as `weaving' of logics) and attempt to classify
existing combinations within such a methodology. This is the task of this series of papers.
Upon reection, it seems that the easiest way to combine logics is when they are presnted
semantically. The semantics characterises each connective individually and so any choice of con-
nectives from a variety of systems can in principle be combined. The only problem might arise is
when the semantics are completely dierent in avour. Can we do something in this case? Our
best bet is to use algebraic methods, as we shall see in a later section.
Our main tool in this chapter is the notion of bred semantics and bred labelling. . We
combine logics by bring their semantics or labels.
Example 15.1.1 (Motivating example for bred semantics) This example introduces the idea
of bred semantics. Imagine we want to form a combined logic with the intuitionistic ) and the K
modality . We know the Kripke semantics for ) and the Kripke semantics for . We also know
the syntax of the combined logic, namely all ws built up from the atoms using any of f);g as
connectives. What we do not have is any axioms or semantics for the combined system.
Let us proceed nevertheless and take an arbitrary formula of the combined language, say B =
(p) (q ) r)). We do not have models for the combined language, but we do notice that the main
connective of B is ) and that B = (p) A) with A = (q ) r). We do have intuitionistic models
for ) so let us take such a model of the form m = (S;; a; h). S is the set of possible worlds, 
is a reexive and transitive relation on S, a 2 S is the actual world and h is the assignment to the
atoms, satisfying t 2 h(q) and t  s imply s 2 h(q), where h(q)  S.
We can evaluate, or try to evaluate, B in m, since its main connective is ). For B to hold in
m we must have that it holds in the actual world a. Thus we continue:
a m B i a m (q ) A) i for all t such that a  t and t m p we have t m A.
We know how to evaluate t m p, because p is atomic:
t m p i (def) t 2 h(p).
The problem is to evaluate t m A, which is t m (q ) r).  is not in the intuitionistic
language and so we do not have a semantic recursive evaluation clause for it. Nor is A atomic so
we cannot use the assignment h. So what shall we do?
We notice that in order to complete the evaluation of a m B all we need is to have an answer,
for each t 2 S such that a  t, to the question of whether t m A. Any answer will do! It is at this
stage that we can introduce the basic idea of bring! We notice that A = (q ) r) is a formula
beginning with the modality . So if we take any Kripke model for  (and we do have a sematnics
for ) then we can evaluate A there and get a value, and this value we give to t m A. So let us
associate with each t 2 S, a modal Kripke model nt = (T t; Rt; bt; ht) and agree that t m A be the
value of nt  A. Note that we also have dependence on m, i.e. we should write nm;t etc, but since
m is xed, we omit that.
Let us now expand on nt  A. By denition we need to check
nt  A i bt nt (q ) r) i for all s 2 T t such that btRts we have s nt (q ) r).
We now have a similar problem as before. We want to evaluate in a modal model an intuition-
istic formula. The model cannot give us a value. Again we notice that all we need is to get a value
somehow. Let us use the same idea and associate with each s 2 T t an intutionisitc Kripke model
mt;s = (S
t;s;t;s; at;s; ht;s) and evaluate q ) r in this model. We continue:
s nt (q ) r) is the same by agreement as mt;s  (q ) r) which by denition of intuitionistic
satisfaction, is the same as at;s  (q ) r), which holds i for all w; at;s t;s w and w mt;s q
imply w mt;s r.
The latter can now be evaluated because q and r are atomic.
15.1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 413
To summarize, we needed to have associated (or bred) with each intuitionistic world a modal
model and with each modal world an intuitionistic model. When we were forced to evaluate a
formula D in a world belonging to the other semantics, we continued the evaluation in the associated
model.
The basic bring can be done by a two place function F. If m is a model and t is a possible world
in m then F(m; t) is a Kripke model of the other semantics. We have t m A i F(m; t)  A,
i aF(m;t)  A where A is a formula with main connective not in the logic of the model m and
aF(m;t) is the actual world of the model F(m; t).
The model F(m; t) can be presented in many forms. If the semantics of the two logics involved
are very similar, the model F(m; t) may be a slight modication of the model m itself.
It may even be the case that F(m; t) is m itself with a change in evaluation procedures. For
example bring a classical model to an intuitionistic model can be achieved by a change of the
evaluation procedure.
The intuitive idea of the bred semantics can also be understood in terms of classical model
theory. Suppose we are dealing with classical models of a binary relation R and unary relation Q.
These models have the form (S;R;Q) where S is a set and R  S  S and Q  S. Where do R
and Q come from? For the purpose of the model theory of a binary and unary relations, we do not
care where R and Q come from. All we need is a subset of S  S and a subset of S. However, we
could get R and Q in a more elaborate way. We could, for example, map S onto a group G using
f : S ! G and let xRy hold in S i f(x)  f(y) = f(y)  f(x) in G and let x 2 Q hold if for example
f(x)2 = 1. Our way of looking at this is to say that we are bring group structure onto S.
In computer science terms this can be looked upon as opening a window or what is called
`delegation' in object oriented programming. To compute whether xRy holds, we open a window
and place f(x); f(y) in the window (i.e. go to the associated group) and then compute something
in the widnow (e.g. commutativity) and then come back. The group G itslef may be further bred,
for example, into a eld F . We need a function g : G ! F with some translation of the group
operations into eld operations. For example x  y = z holds in G i g(x)  g(y) = g(z) holds in F .
(This means that G is viewed as a multiplicative group of a eld.)
The above is not exactly bring, it is more like representation. Fibring occurs when we double
back into S. For example we can map G into S using a mapping h : G ! S and require that for
some formula 	(u1; u2; u3) of S the following holds: x  y = z in G i 	(h(x); h(y); h(z)) holds in
S.
Let us now do this operation more systematically. Suppose we are given models of a binary
relation, say (S1; R1); : : : ; (Sn; Rn); : : : and we want to create models of a binary relation and a
unary relation. The simplest way of achieving this is to take the models (Sn; Rn) and to add a
subset Qn  Sn to form (Sn; Rn; Qn). Now let us ask, where does Qn come from? It can be
arbitrary, or we can bre (Sn+1; Rn+1) into (Sn; Rn). Let 	n(R;Q; x) be a formula with R;Q
and one free variable x, let fn : Sn ! Sn+1 embed Sn in Sn+1 and let (Sn; Rn)  x 2 Q i
(Sn+1; Rn+1)  	n(R;Q; fn(x)). Notice that of course 	n depends on x (through fn(x)).
Of course this evaluation may not terminate if each 	n contains Q but it will terminate if 	n
does not contain Q for some n.
We do have bring here because the value of x 2 Q at (Sn; Rn) is determined by going to
(Sn+1; Rn+1).
In programming terms, we have a program 1, relying on a subset Q which can be computed
by a program 2. 2 also relies on Q but sends the computation to 3 etc. The program will
terminate if some n is able to compute Q itself.
Example 15.1.2 (a) Consider any sophisticated word processor. It will allow you, in the middle
of a letter, to open a window and access a spreadsheet. This is in order to enable you to do
a calculation which arises in the text. In fact the more sophisticated the program is, the more
interaction there is between the word processor and the spreadsheet and the more you can import
into your letter.
(b) A prolog program may use the predicate prime(x). It may send the predicate to a Pascal
program to check whether x is prime. The pascal program may use assembly language.
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The next series of denitions will formally present the concept of bring of this chapter. Com-
pare with section ???.
Denition 15.1.3 (Logics and Semantics) 1. A propositional logical language L is com-
prised of an innite set of atoms and a set of connectives f]1; : : : ; ]kg. The connective ]j
has nj places.
2. The ws of L are dened by induction
 An atom q is a w
 If A1; : : : ; Anj are ws then ]j(A1; : : : ; Anj ) is a w with main connective ]j.





AjB and BjC ) AjC:
4. A classical monadic logic language CL for a possible world semantics for a logic L with
connectives f]1; : : : ; ]kg has the non logical predicates '1; : : : ; 'k; R1; : : : ; Rk where Ri is ni+1
place predicate (corresponding to the ni place connective ]i) and 'i is mi(mi  ni +1) place
predicate supporting (or connected to) the connective ]i.
5. An interpretation for the connectives ]i is a classical rst-order formula 	i(t;Q1; : : : ; Qni) of
the langauge CL where t is the only free element variable in 	i and Qj are monadic variables
(subset variables).
6. A possible world structure for the logic L in the langauge CL with interpretation f	ig is any
classical structure m = (Sm; 'mj ; R
m
j ; e
m; hm), where e 2 S; 'j and Rj ; : : : are relations
as in (4) above, and h is an assignment giving a subset h(q)  S, to each atom q of L.
7. Given a structure m, the function h can be extended to an arbitrary w A of L by structural
induction as follows
h(]j(A1; : : : ; Anj )) = ft jm  	j(t; h(A1); : : : ; h(Anj ))g
We also write t h A when t 2 h(A).
We are abusing notation here. `' is classical satisability. 	j(t;Q1; : : : ; Qnj ) is a formula
with free variable t and free subset variables Q1; : : : ; Qnj . By substituting h(Ai) for Qi we
get a w which we can evaluate at m as a classical model.
8. m is said to satisfy A;m  A, if e 2 h(A).
9. We say that a class of model K characterises a consequence relation j (or j is complete for
K) if we have for all A;B:
AjB i for all m 2 K (if m  A then m  B):
Denition 15.1.4 (Fibred semantics) Let Li be logic languages with connectives f]i1; : : : ; ]ikig,
each of nij places and CLi be the corresponding monadic classical logic languages with interpreta-
tions 	ij for the respective connectives. Let L be a langauge containing (and based on) the disjoint
union of the connectives of Li. Let CL be a monadic classical language based on the disjoint union
of the predicates of CLi. We dene a special class of structures for CL, obtained by `bring' the
structures of CLi.
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Let Ki be a class of structures for Li of the form m = (Sm; 'mj ; Rmj ; em; hm). We can
assume that all sets of possible worlds Sm of all structures in [iKi are all pairwise disjoint. We




m. Since all Sm are pairwise disjoint, for each w 2 W there exists a
unique m; i such that w 2 Sm and m 2 Ki. Let (w) be the function giving this unique i. Let
a(w) = em, i.e. a gives the actual world of the model m to which w belongs. Let F(i; w) be an
arbitrary function giving for each i and each w a value w0 = em;m 2 Ki. The function F is
a bring function, associating with each possible world w and each semantic class Ki a structure
m 2 Ki. Let h be an assignment into W dened by
w 2 h(q) i w 2 hm(q); for the unique m such that w 2 Sm:
We call any n = (W; ;a;F; w0; h) a bred structure.
Let K be the class of all bred structures. Let A be a w of L. We dene the notion of
satisfaction as follows:
 w h q i w 2 h(q) , for q atomic.
 w h ]ij(A1; : : : ; Anij ) i
1. (w) = i and for the unique m 2 Ki, such that w 2 Sm we have m  	ij(h(A1) \
Sm; : : : ; h(Ani
j
) \ Sm), or
2. (w) 6= i and w0 = F(i; j) and w0  ]ij(A1; : : : ; Anij ).
 we say n  A i w0  A
 Let K be a class of bred structures. We say K  A i for every n in K;n  A.
Fibring the semantics of a modal logic to itself can be considered as a special case of two
dimensional modal logics.
Denition 15.1.5 (Fibred Kripke Semantics) Let S be a nonempty set of possible worlds.
Consider T = S2, the set of all 2 dimensional vectors (t1; t2) with ti 2 S. Consider an accessibility
relation R  T 2, of the form (t1; t2)R(s1; s2) and an assignment h of the form h(q)  T . Then
(T = S2; R; h) is a Fibred Kripke model.
The above denition seems to be a simple generalisation of the usual Kripke semantics. Instead
of taking structures of the form (S;R; h), where S is a set of possible worlds and R is the accessibility
relation on S, we are generalsiing and taking T = S2 and letting R be an accessibility relation
on 2-vectors from S. This is technically correct, however, the way we are going to manipulate
the semantics is going to rely heavily on the internal structure of S2. The relation R is between
pairs of elements, (w1; t)R(w
0; s). If we understand w as naming a Kripke structure with a set of
possible worlds S(w) and understand t as a possible world t 2 S(w), then we can read the relation
(w; t)R(w0; s) as meaning that the Kripke structure named w0, with the set of possible world S(w0)
containing point s 2 S(w0), is associtated with t 2 S(w).
The point s 2 S(w0) can be interpreted as the actual world of S(w0).
Thus we have:
 w is a model i 9t; y; z(w; x)R(y; z).
 t 2 S(w) i 9y; z(w; t)R(y; z)
 y is a model related to (w; t) i 9z(w; t)R(y; z)
 z 2 S(y) i (w; t)R(y; z).



































Figure 15.1 illustrates this notion.
Let us now examine how the previous example of sequence of models (Sn; Rn) ts into Denition
15.1.4. We can assume without loss of generality that all the Sn are subsets of a single set.
Denote this set by W and think of it as a set of labels. We can also identify the indices 1, 2, 3,
: : : , n, : : : as elements of W . We can thus assume that for each w 2W , Sw W is a set of possible
worlds and Rw  S2w is a binary relation on Sw. Let s(n) = n+1 be the successor function. Since
we identied the indices fng with a subset of W , the successor function becomes some function *
in W 7!W .
The function fw : Sw ! Sw can be realised by a binary function F(w; x) : W W ! W
satisfying for s 2 Sw that F(n; x) 2 Sw.
The binary relation R of Denition 15.1.5 can be realised as (w; x)R(w; fw(x)) or in our new
notation (w; x)R(a(w);F(w; x)). where a(w) = w.
Example 15.1.6 We show by way of example how the Kripke modal semantics can be viewed as
bred in the sense of previous denitions. Let m = (T;R; a; h) be a Kripke model. For each t 2 T
associate the Kripke model mt = (T
t; Rt; t; ht), where
T t = fs 2 T j t = s _ tRsg
Rt = R  T t  T t
ht = h  T t
clearly for any A
t m A i t mt A:
This paper discusses relationships between the consequence relations of Li and the consequence
relation of L, for various conditions on F and h. Let (F; h) be a condition on the combination (i.e.
on F and h). We denote by CL the class of bred structures obtained and by L the resulting
logic (consequence relation). For some 's, L is a conservative extension of each Li. For other
's, we get a specic combined logic. The general problem to study is given a  and Li, can we
characterise L? If we have syntactical axiomatiations of Li, can we put them together to obtain
an axiomatization of L? Can we identify known combined logics from the literature and present
them as the result of some special conditions  on the bring?
Our method is to show how we can bre logics Li into a logic L
F through the most general bring
construction. Once we get semantics and axiomatisation for this general logic LF , any combined
logic existing in the literature can, in principle, be given a semantics which is an extension of the
LF semantics. The situation is similar to that of modal logic K. Any modal logic stronger than
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K can, in principle, be given semantics by restricting that of K. So, by studying the most general
combination LF of logics Li, any existing axiomatic combined logic can, in principle, be given
semantics. Converely, we can try and axiomatise any restriction on the LF semantics.
For example, if we restrict our choice of bred structures and require that for any atomic q and
any w an i
w  q i F(i; w)  q
we get a construction which we call dove-tailing. Does this condition correspond to an axiom on
L? We shall see that in modal logic this requirement is very natural.
Example 15.1.7 (Sample Problem) Devise a logic with the classical connective `^', the in-
tutionistic implication `)', and the S4 modality `'. In other words, we want a logic L with
connectives f^;);g where these connectives behave in L respectively as they behave in their
original logics. (Actually `^' is the same in all three logics.)
To solve the above problem, we adopt an inutitive way of thinking. Given two logics, L1 and L2,
how do we combine them? Never mind the question of whether we get a (minimal) conservative
combination; we just want to put them together in some natural way.
Well, whether we can do anything depends on how the the logics are presented to us and what
we know about them. Here are some possibilities:
1. If L1 and L2 are presented in the same methodology, say proof theoretically as Gentzen
systems, or say as Hilbert systems, then we can let L be the union of the languages and
axioms and rules and allow substitution in L in both sets of axioms and rules. Thus if L1 is
a modal K4 for 1 and L2 is modal K4 for 2 and the common language is classical logic
then L will have both modalities with K4 axioms and rules for each. There is no interaction
between the two modalities. In fact, if we add the interactive axioms
A! 21A
A! 12A
we get the temporal logic Kt (with 1 future and 2 past).
2. It may be that L1 is presented as a Hilbert system and L2 as a Gentzen system, how do we
combine them?
3. Worse still, suppose L1 is presented proof theoretically and L2 semantically, how do we
combine them?
4. If both L1 and L2 are faithfully translatable into a third logic M then we can combine the
two logics in M and translate back. Let 1 and 2 translate (respectively) L1 and L2 into
M. Assume that the translation is done by translating each connective ] of Li of the form
](x1; : : : ; xn) into a formula '](x1; : : : ; xn) = i(])(x1; : : : ; xn) of M.
Thus any formula of L1;2 can be translated into M by applying recursively either 1 or 2
depending on the connective. Let  be this `combined' translation. Thus
 (](A1; : : : ; An)) = i(])((A1); : : : ; (An)); ] 2 Li
 (x) = x, for x atomic.
Dene L1;2 by
L1;2 ` A i (def) M ` (A):
For example both 1 and 2 are translatable into classical logic via transitive possible world
relations R1 and R2. Combining them in M gives a translation into (essentially Kripke
semantics) M using both relations. In semantical terms we get Kripke semantics of the
form (S;R1; R2). In this semantics t  iA i for all s; tRis implies s  A. Do we get the
same system as when we combine their Hilbert Style formulation? In this case the answer is
yes.
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Going back to the example with f^;g of modal logic S4 and f)g of intuitionistic logic. We
note that there are several ways of combining them. Are they identical?
 Combine through the translation into classical logic via their respective Kripke semantics.
 Translate modal logic via the Kripke semantics into classical logicM. Consider the translation
as a syntactical translation into M as a Hilbert system. Weaken M into I (intutionistic
predicate logic). Let L of f^;;)g be dened via the translation into I.
 Combine ^; and ) via the translation of intutionistic logic into modal S4.
 Combine f^;g and f)g as Hilbert systems. Take the union of languages and all instances
of axioms and rules involving the connectives. Alternatively, take a natural deduction or
Gentzen formulation of the two systems and combine the two proof theories.
 Combine the two systems by bring their semantics as proposed in the present paper.
In this chapter we develop several case studies of combining logics:
 Combining two modalities;
 intutitionistic modal logic;
 modal linear logic;
 modal many valued logic;
 intuitionistic many valued logic.
 combining any two LDS's
The rst case study, combining two modalities, is the simplest. This should be straightforward,
as we are combining two logics of the same kind which, in general, have no special requirement on
the assignments to the atoms.
The second case combines two slightly dierent logics; namely modal logic and intuitionistic
logic. the novelty in this case is that intuitionistic logic has a restriction on the assignment to
atoms which has to be satised. This slight complication has to be addressed.
The third case study combines two much more dierent logics, having diernet natural pre-
sentations. Modal logic has good semantics while linear logic is primarily proof theoretical. The
question to ask is does the combination depend on which semantics we choose for the logic?
The fourth and fth case studies address the problem where the two logics are really far apart
in style.  Lukasiewitz many valued logic has an algebraic, truth table presentation, while modal
and intuitionistic logics have a possible world semantics. How do we combine them? Do we have
several options? Do we need a general denition of bring algebraic logics?
We will introduce several methods of combining logics. Each method will have its own name.
So for example we shall dene what it means to `bre' two logics or to `dovetail' two logics or to
`fuzzle' (make fuzzy) a logic by another or to `braid' two logics, etc. Our purpose now is to give
an intuitive idea of what these methodologies are. We explain the concepts by taking a simple
example. Suppose we want to combine two modal logics L1 and L2. Let K1;K2 be the respective
Kripke semantics of the logic. Let m be a model in K1 and let t be a possible world of m.
The semantic construction which combines the logics associates a model n with t. The dierent
methodologies of combination dier on the kind of model n that we use.
1. For bring (type 0 combination) logics, we require that n be any model in K2 .
2. For dovetailing (type 1 combination), we require that n be a model of K2 such that for any
atomic q
t  q i n  q
(i.e. the bred model must agree with the values t gives to atom).
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3. For braiding (type 2 combination), we do not require that n is a model of K2 but that n can
be obtained from a model of K2 in the same way as the model at t is derived from m. So for
example if am is the actual world of m and k is the smallest integer such that am(Rm)kt.
Then we require that for some model n2 2 K2, with actual world an2 , there is an s 2 Sn2
such that an2(Rn2)ks and n is the model obtained from n2 by changing the actual world to
s. n may not be in the semantics K2.
4. For joining (type 3 combination) we form a multi-dimensional system out of the participating
logics.
5. For fuzzling (type 4 combination), we simply assign at t values which are elements of the
algebraic logic L2 instead of just f0; 1g values (e.g. boolean valued models are an example of
`making fuzzy' by weakening the `crisp' f0,1g values into boolean values).
Section 2 Fibres modal Logics. Section 3 Fibres modal and intuitionistic logic. Section 4 asks
the following general question: given two arbitrary logics, for which we may not have a semantic,
how do we combine them? The answer is that since one can always generate algebraic semantics,
it is useful to show how to combine or bre algebraic semantics. By way of application, this section
shows how to combine modal logic with many valued logic, and present a general method of making
logics fuzzy. Section 5 deals with multi-dimensional logics.
15.2 Case study 1: Combining modal logics
This section deals with combinations of modal logics. The problem in its general form is how to
construct a multimodal logic containing several unary modalities, each coming with its own system
of specic axioms. For example, how to combine a necessity A with belief BA and knowledge
KA systems, or how to combine necessity A with temporal connectives GA and HA and the like.
There are many such combined systems in the literature but no methodology for generating
them. Each combined system was presented and motivated by a dierent author for dierent
reasons and dierent applications.
The method presented in this section for modal logics is as follows. Most known modal systems
already have good semantics. Thus each logic Li can be identied via a class of Kripke structures
Ki, which characterises it. Thus we will give methodology for bring (combining) classes of Kripke
structures and study its properties. We shall then investigate what other modes of syntactical com-
binations are available. If each Li is axiomatizable and L is the logic of the semantic combination
of the semantics of Ki of Li, can we axiomatize L by some combination of the individual axiom-
atizations of Li? We continue to study other features such as decidability, nite-model property,
etc.
We begin by combining arbitrary extensions of modal K. It makes no dierence to our method-
ology whether thee extensions are normal or not. We nd out how to axiomatise the combination
in terms of the theorems (axiomatizations) of the combined components. We see that in certain
cases, the combined axiomatization is very simple.
The bring construction is very simple intuitively but unfortunately very awkward to write on
paper.
The rest of the section is structured as follows.
We begin with a short discussion and present a canonical bring construction. Denition 15.2.1
gives the general denition of bred Kripke semantics for modal logics. Its idea is essentially to
replace the notion of a possible world as a `unit' by another Kripke structure. Armed with this
denition, we can bre arbitrary modal logics through their semantics. We need a completeness
theorem for the combined logic, and this is done in Theorem 15.2.3. the proof is involved nota-
tionally, though simple conceptually. It does require an intermediate construction for an inductive
argument to go through. This is called `grafting' and is dened in Denition 15.2.2. Examples
15.2.4 and 15.2.5 show how two modal logics, which are quite typical and arbitrary, can be com-
bined and axiomatised, using the previous completeness theorem. Theorem 15.2.6 gives more
properties of the construction.
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The second part of this section is concerned with a more specic construction, called dovetailing.
Here the combination of the logics is done in a tighter manner, though the combined logic is still a
conservative extension of each of its components. Again, Denitions 15.2.7 and 15.2.8 describe the
notion and Theorem 15.2.9 gives the completeness theorem. Properties of dovetailing and some
examples are given following the completeness theorem. We especially look for conditions on the
logics which make dovetailing the same as the previous notion of bring.
The next series of denitions and theorems have to do with bring fragments of modal logics.
It is important as a preliminary to introducing modality into other systems such as intuitionistic
logic or relevance or linear logics. These other logics do not have all the classical connectives and
so they `take in' only the modality. For this reason we must develop techniques of combining pure
modalities. We may have both modalities  and  in modal intuitionistic logic or modal relevance
logic and because of lack of negation, one is not reducible to the other, and in fact, one may not
have all the dual properties of the other. Thus, for all practical purposes we have here a fragment
with combined pure modalities. Example 15.2.18 introduces the problems involved and Theorem
15.2.20 is the completeness theorem for this case.
We conclude the section with Denition 15.2.23 and Theorem 15.2.24 dealing with the question
of when is the disjunction property preserved in a combination.
Fibring Modalities
Let us now start the business of this section. Imagine we want to combine two modalities 1
and 2. We start with the simple case where both i are K-modalities, i.e. they each satisfy the
axioms below.
1. All truth functional tautologies
2. Modus ponens
` A;` A! B
` B
3. Necessitation ` A
` A
4. Axiom schema
(a) (A! B)! (A! B)
The above is a Hilbert system presentation. Such presentations are standard in modal logics.
One may be tempted to take the combined system with both modalities and theK axioms and rules
for each of them and let this be, together with substitution, the desired bred system K1;2. This
procedure, however, depends on the proof formulation of the components. K may be formulated,
for example, without necessitation, as a system with an innite number of axioms, namely all K-
theorems. If 1 and 2 are bred under this new Hilbert formulation we get a combined system
with less theorems because necessitation is not available. We cannot derive 12(A ! A) for
example unless we put in some additional rules. The lesson we learn from the above example
is that we should not just formally combine proof systems but that we need some semantical
interpretation, an intended meaning, to guide us in doing the bring. This intuition can also help
us with the choice of axioms for the resulting combined system.
Turning now to combining modal logics, we approach the problem semantically. The logic K
is complete for the Kripke semantics with possible world structures of the form (S;R; a; h) where
R  S  S; a 2 S is the actual world and h is the assignment to the atoms (h(q)  S; q atomic).
To distinguish between the semantics for 1 and 2, we write (S1; R1; a1; h1) and (S2; R2; a2; h2)
respectively. We now study in detail how to bre several modalities. We begin with the following:
Canonical Fibring Construction:
Let Ki be the class of all Kripke structures of the modal logics Li with modality i, for i 2 I.
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We want to create a multi modal logic LFI ,which is a conservative extension of each Li. We can
assume that the sets of possible worlds of each model of each semantics class Ki are all disjoint
and that therefore each model can be uniquely identied by its actual world. We note that in case
of normal modal logics such as K, S4 etc., for any model (S;R; a; h) with actual world a, and any
t 2 S, the structure (S;R; t; h) is also a model of the same logic. Even in the non-normal case, this
model will be a model of the basic logic K. We can therefore assume that for each i 2 I and each
(S;R; a; h) 2 Ki and each t 2 S, there exists a j 2 I such that (S;R; t; h) 2 Kj .
Let K = [i2IKi.
Let W be the set of all worlds in any model in K. We can assume that each w 2W identies a
unique Kripke model (Sw; Rw; w; hw) in K (i.e. in one of the semantics of Ki). With Sw its set of
possible worlds, Rw its accessibility relation and hw its assignment. Let (w) 2 I be the function
identifying to which semantics w belongs.
We now need to associate with each w and each t 2 Sw and each j 2 I such that j 6= (w),
a model in the semantics Kj . Let this model be w0 2 W . In case j = (w) let F(j; w; t) = t, i.e.
let w0 = t. We thus have a bring funciton F(j; w; t) = w0. We can also write w0 = Fj(w; t) and
perceive Fj as the bring function for the logic Lj . We require (w
0) = j. We also require that
(w) = (y) for all y 2 Sw. The above construction shall be referred to as the canonical bring
construction.
Denition 15.2.1 (Fibring of propositional modal logics) 1. Let Li; i 2 I be a family of
modal logics with i; i 2 I, respectively. Let Ki be a class of models for which Li is complete.
A bred model for the logic LFI has the form (W;S;R;a; h;F; ; w0) where W is a set of labels.
S is a function giving for each w a set of possible worlds (labels) Sw  W . R is a function
giving for each w, a relation Rw  Sw  Sw. a is a function giving the actual world aw of
the model labelled by w. (In our preparatory discussion above, aw was equal to w).
h is the assignment function hw(q)  Sw, for each atomic q.  is the semantical identifying
function  :W ! I. (w) = i means that the model (Sw; Rw;aw; hw) is a model in Ki. F is
the bring function, for each w and t 2 Sw and i 2 I, such that (w) 6= i, w0 = F(i; w; t) 2W
and (w0) = i. w0 2W is the `actual' model.
In case (w) = i we do not need to bre. However, we can still dene the function F.
We can let F(i; w; t) give us the part of the model w truncated at t. In other words, if
w is the model (S;R;w; h) 2 Ki and t 2 S then F(i; w; t) is essentially (s;R; t; h  St),
where St = fs 2 S j 9n  0tRnsg. Formally we dene F(i; w; t) = w0 and aw0 = t and
Sw
0
= fs 2 Sw j ((9n  0)t(Rw)ns)g and Rw0 = Rw \ (Sw0  Sw0) and hw0 = hw  Sw0 .
The model F(i; w; t), for the case (w) = i may not be in the semantics Ki, for modal logics
which are not normal, violating the requirement on the bring function F. Thus to have a
strictly correct denition, we must assume that Ki is such that all truncated models obtained
from models in Ki are also in Ki.
2. Satisfaction is dened as follows:
 (w; t)  q i t 2 hw(q), for q atomic and t 2 Sw.
 (w; t)  iA i (w) = i and for all s(tRws! s  A) or (w) = j 6= i and (w0; t0)  iA
where w0 = F(i; w; t) and t0 = aw
0
.
 Note that because of our requirement on F(i; w; t) for the case of (w) = i, the second
clause above is identical to the rst clause for this case.
3. We say A is valid if for all models of LFI , with actual world w0 2W we have (w0;aw0)  A.
Denition 15.2.2 (Fibring and Grafting Models) We would like to dene certain construc-
tions with bred structures.
1. Let Li; i 2 I be logics. Let m0 = (S0; R0; a0; h0) be a model of one of the logics, say Li0 .
For each t 2 S0 and each i 6= i0 let mi;t = (W i;t; Si;t; Ri;t, ai;t; hi;t;Fi;t;  i;t; wi;t0 ) be bred
structures with  i;t(wi;t0 ) = i.
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We want to bre mi;t; i 6= i0; t 2 S0 onto m0 as follows:
First assume S0 and W
i;t are all pairwise disjoint sets. Also assume that mi;t is named by
its actual world wi;t0 . We dene the bred model m = (W;S;R;a; h;F; ; a0) as follows




 Let Sw, for w 2W be
Sw = (Si;t)w for w 2W i;t
= So;w for w 2 S0
where So;w = ft 2 S0 j (9n  0)wRn0 tg:
 Let Rw, for w 2W be
Rw = (Ri;t)w for w 2W i;t
Rw = R0  S0;w for w 2 S0
 Let hw, for w 2W be
hw = (hi;t)w; for w 2W i;t
hw = h0  S0;w for w 2 S0
 Let a be dened as follows
aw = (ai;t)w; for w 2W i;t
aw = w for w 2 S0
 Let  be dened as follows
(w) =  i;t(w); for w 2W i;t
(w) = w for w 2 S0
 Let F(j; w; s), for s 2 Sw be:
F(j; w; s) = Fi;t(j; w; s) for w 2W i;t.
F(j; w; s) = wj;s0 for w 2 S0 and j 6= i0
F(io; w; s) = s for w 2 S0
The following holds at the new bred model.
 For any formula A of Li0 and any w 2 S0 we have
w  A in m0 i w  A in m.
 For any formula iB of LFI ; i 6= i0 and any w 2 S0 we have
w  iB in m i mi;w  iB.
2. Let m be a bred model with actual world w0, with (w0) = i0. Let mi for i 6= i0 be bred
models. We want to graft mi onto m at w0 by replacing F
m(i;m; w0) by the model mi.
Let m = (W 0; S0; R0;a0; h0;F0; 0; w0)
mi = (W
i; Si; Ri; ai; hi;Fi;  i; wi)
We can assume all wi;W 0 are pairwise disjoint and that they are named by their actual
worlds, i.e. m = w0 and mi = wi.
Let mi;t, for t 2 So;w0 ; t 6= w0 be F0(i; w0; t). Let mi;w0 =mi = wi.
Then the grafting of mi onto m is dened to be the same as the bring of mi;t onto
(S0;w0 ; R0;w0 ; w0; h
0;w0)
Theorem 15.2.3 (Completeness theorem for the bred logic LFI ) Let Li; i 2 I be modal
logics with semantical classes of structures Ki and set of theorems Ti. (i.e. Ti = fA of Li j
A is valid in all Ki models g). Let TFI be the following set of ws of LFI .
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1. Ti  TFI
2. Modal Fibring Rule:





k=1iBk 2 TFI then for all d, djC 2 TFI .
3. TFI is the smallest set closed under (1), (2), modus ponens and substitution.
Then TFI is the set of all ws of L
F




1. The case of soundness is easy to verify.
2. To show completeness we use induction on the number of nested dierent language modalities
in the formula.
Case n = 1
B is a formula with only one nested dierent modalities. This means B is a w of Li for some
i 2 I. If LFI 6` B, then Li 6` B. Hence there is a model in Ki which validates B. This model
can easily be built up into a bred model (using the canonical bring construction) in which B
holds.
Case n > 1
We can assume B is obtained from formulas of the form
 Bi(x1; x2; : : : xk; y),
 (1)A11(y); : : : ;(1)A1n(1)(y)
...
 (k)Ak1(y); : : : ;(k)Akn(k)(y)
Where (j) is the modality of L(j) and xj is the sequence of variables xj1; : : : ; x
j
n(j) and Bi is a
formula of the logic Li and B is obtained from Bi by the substitution  where (x
r
j) = (r)Arj






In Bi all of x
r
j are within the scope of the modality i.
In this subcase, by the induction hypothesis, each (r)Arj has lower number of nested modal-
ities than B. We assume B is LFI consistent. Hence Bi is Li consistent. We want to show that B
has a bred model. Our strategy is to consider all Li models of Bi and try to augment at least
one of them into a bred model of B.
Letm = (Sm; Rm; am; hm) be any model of Bi. Since B is Bi, we might be able to augment
m into a bred model of B if we can realise the assignment hm by bred models of (xjr). To
be more specic, let t 2 Sm be any possible world in the model m. Consider the assignment
hm(t; xjr), for any atomic proposition x
j
r of Bi, of the sequence x
j . (xjr) is a formula (j)Ajr
of the logic L(j). In the bred semantics, any such (j)Ajr is evaluated at a bred model. The
question is whether we can realise the truth values hm(t; xjr) in a suitable model nj , for all the
atoms of xj . If we can do that for all j, then we can build a bred model for B. Of course we
cannot realise the values hm(t; xjr), i.e. if we bre an arbitary model n
0
t at the point t, we might
change the value of B = B1 at a
m.
We must consider two possibilities
 t is a point such that the values of the atoms xjr at t do not aect the truth value of B1(xjr; y)
at am. In this case we don't mind what model n0t we bre at t, because even though h
m(t; xjr)
is not the same as the value of (xjr) at n
0
t, the values of B = B1 at a
m will not change.
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 t is a point such that the values of xjr at t do aect the value of B1(xjr; y) at am. In this case
the model nt must realise these values.
Our rst observation is that the points t we need worry about are the points at distance less
than d+ 1 from am (i.e. am(Rm)kt holds for k  d+ 1), where d is the maximal depth of nested
modalities in B1. This can be proved by induction. for d = 0 there are no modalities and so a
m is
all that matters. For E evaluated at am, the values that matter are values of E at points s such
that amRms. By the induction hypothesis the value of E at s is not aected by values of atoms
at points at distance more than d from s.
We thus conclude that we need realise all values hm(t; xjr), for all points t at a distance less
than d+ 1 from am.










where "(j; s) = hm(t; xjs). We use the notation: '
" = ' if " = 1 and  ' if " = 0. If the above Cjt
is consistent, then by the induction hypothesis a bred model would exist. If Cjt is inconsistent,
then no bred model exists. Assume now that for every model m 2 Ki, there exists a j and a
t 2 Sm at distance d(t) (with d(t)  d + 1) from the actual world am (i.e. am(Rm)d(t)t) such
that Cjt is inconsistent. Since the number of possible dierent C
j
t is nite, this means that for
some nite number of ws D1; : : : ; Dm built up as conjunctions of atoms and their negations from





d(s)i  Ds)! Bi







d(s)i  Ds)! Bi






which contradicts the assumptions.
We therefore conclude that there exists a model m of Bi for which all C
j
t , for all j and all
t 2 Sm such that d(t)  d+1 are consistent. By the induction hypothesis there exist bred models
Wjt for each C
j
t . In this bred model we have for each x
j
r and t 2 Sm
hm(t; xjr) = value of (j)Ajr in Wjt :
For points t such that d(t) > d+1, letWjt be an arbitrary bred models. These models wil not
necessarily realise the values of hm(t; xjr) but we know that these values do not aect the value of
B1 at a
m. Now that we haveWjt for all t 2 Sm, we can assume thatWjt are all pairwise disjoint.
We can bre m with Wjt and get a new bred model for B = Bi, as we do in Denition 15.2.2.
Subcase b:
We now examine the subcase where the conditions of Subcase a are not necessarily satised. Let
B be an arbitrary formula. Certainly there exists a classical boolean combination 	(x1; : : : ; xn; y),
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where xi = (x
i
1; : : : ; x
i
k(i)) and y = (y1; : : : ; yk) and a substitution  such that B = 	, where
xjr = (j)Ajr and yi = yi. Since we are trying to nd a model for 	, we can assume that 	 is
in a disjunctive normal form 	 =
W
s s.









At least for one such s; s must be LI consistent otherwise we will have `LI 	.






this is a consistent formula which has the form
E(i) = B(i)(z1; : : : ; zm; u)1
with substitution 1 as in Subcase a above. It therefore has a bred model Wi.
The models Wi can now be bred into a model of  and hence of 	, as we have done in
Denition 15.2.2.
This completes the induction and the proof of the theorem. 
Example 15.2.4 Consider two logics K1 and K2 with two K modalities 1 and 2. Consider
the bred cobination KF1;2. By the previous theorem it can be axiomatised by taking all theorems of















where i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j.
Note that necessitation is not available. This example investigates under what conditions ne-
cessitation is admissible.
The logic K has the following special properties:
1. ` >
2. ` (A ^B)$ A ^B
3. The disjunction property
` A! B _C
` (A! B) or ` (A! C)
The above three properties can be used to prove that the modal bring rule is equivalent to neces-
sitation.
First the rule can be reduced to
` iA! iB
` j(iA! iB)
using (2) and (3) above.
Second, since (> ! A)$ A we get from (1) that (> ! A)$ A.
This can be used to derive ` iA
` jiA
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Since necessitation is admissible in each component we get that
` A
` iA
is admissible in the combination K1;2.
The key property which we have used is the disjunction property. This holds for K;K4, and
some other system and for all of these systems the above reduction of the modal bring rule to
necessitation stands.
Example 15.2.5 This example deals with non normal logics. The example we give is typical.
Consider the following axiomatisation of a modal logic L.
0. all substitution instances of truth functional tautologies.
1. A if A is a truth functional tautology.
2. (A ^B)$ (A ^B)




We allow the rule of modus ponens but not necessitation.
This system can derive all theorems of K4 together with A! A and all their modus ponens
consequences. We cannot derive (A ! A) because we do not have necessitation. This logic is
complete for all frames of the form (S;R; a) where R is transitive and aRa holds. We have:
`L A i a  A in all (S;R; a; h):
It is interesting to see what happens if we bre L with itself. We get two L modalities 1 and 2
together with all L theorems for each 1 and 2 and the modal bring rule. Unlike the previous
example this rule cannot be simplied.
Theorem 15.2.6 1. Assume Li; i 2 I has the nite model property then so does LFI .
2. Assume Li; i 2 I are nitely axiomatizable then so is LFI .
3. Assume Li; i 2 I have the disjunction property then so does LFI .
4. Assume Li; i 2 I are decidable, then so is LFI .
Proof. Follows from the completeness proof and (for decidability) the way the theorems are
generated. 
Dove-tailing Modal Logics
Denition 15.2.7 (Dove-tailing of propositional modal logics) 1. Let Li; i 2 I be modal
logics as in the previous denition, with Ki the class of models for Li. Let LDI (the dovetailing
combination of Li; i 2 I) be dened semantically through the class of all (dove-tailed) models
of the form (W;R; a; h), where W is a set of worlds, a 2W , h is an assignment into W and
for each i 2 I;R(i)  W W . We require that for each i (W;R(i); a; h) is a model in Ki.
We further require the following:
Let t 2W be such that there exists n1; : : : ; nk and i1; : : : ; ik such that aRn1(i1) Rn2(i2) : : : 
Rnk(ik)t holds.
Let i 6= ik and let W t = fy 2W j for some n  0; tRn(i)yg
Then the model (W t;R(i) W t W t; t; h W t) is in Ki.
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2. We dene the notion of w  A by induction.
 w  q if w 2 h(q) for q atomic.
 w  iA if for all y 2W , such that wR(i)y we have y  A.
  A i for all models and actual worlds a  A.
Denition 15.2.8 (Dove-tailing Models) Let Li; i 2 I be logics. Let m0 = (S0; R0; a0; h0) be
a model in the logic Li0 . For each i 6= i0 and t 2 S0, let
mi;t = (S
i;t;Ri;t; ai;t; hi;t)
be a dove-tailed model. We want to dove-tail the models mi;t onto m0. We can assume that S0
and Si;t are all pairwise disjoint. We dene a model m = (S;R; a0; h) as follows:





 Let R be dened as follows:
xR(j)y i x 2 Si;t and xRi;t(j)y.
or x 2 S0 and j 6= i0 and aj;xRj;x(j)y
or x 2 S0 and j = i0 and xR0y.





What we have basically grafted is the situation in the following Figure 15.2.
The following holds at the new dovetailed model
 For any formula A of Li0 and any w 2 S0 we have
w  A in m0 i w  A in m.
 For any formula iB of LDI ; i 6= i0 and any w 2 S0 we have








































Theorem 15.2.9 (Completeness theorem for the Dove-tailed logic LDI ) Let Li; i 2 I be
modal logics with semantical classes of structures Ki and set of theorems Ti. Let TDI be teh
following set of ws of LDI .
1. Ti  TDI
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2. Modal Dove-tailing Rule:











then for all d djC 2 TDI . Where qr are atoms or their negations, and q1; : : : ; qk list all the
atoms or their negations appearing in any Ak or Bk; k = 1; 2; : : :.
3. TDI is the smallest set closed under (1), (2) modus ponens and substitution.
Then TDI is the set of all ws of L
D




1. The case of soundness is easy to verify.
2. To prove completeness we proceed along the lines of the proof of the previous theorem, the
completeness theorem for LFI .
The case to examine is subcase a of case n > 1. We have a model m = (Sm; Rm; am; hm) of Li
of the formula Bi and we want to augment it into a dove-tailed model of B.
For this purpose we have to realise the assignment of hm(t; xjr), for points t such that d(t)  d+1
for all xjr by a bred model for the substitution (x
j
r) = (j)Ajr and in addition the model must
realise all the values hm(t; yi), for the atoms yi because the model will be dove-tailed at t. Thus
the formulas Cjt and D
j



















"(j; s) = hm(t; xjs)





Just like the previous proof, if for everym there is a t 2 Sm and a j for which Cjt is inconsistent,











d(s)i  Ds)! B
But from the inconsistency of Cjt for all j; t we get
` Ds:
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We can thus assume that for some modelm of Bi, all the formulas C
j
t are realisable by a model
mjt = (S
j;t;Rj;t; aj;t; hj;t).
We can now dove-tail these models with m into a model of B, as done in Denition 15.2.8.
Note that for each t and atom y; hm(t; y) = hj;t(aj;t; y).
Subcase b of n > 1 is proved also similarly to the bred case. We assume there exists a classical
boolean combination 	(x1; : : : ; xn; y) and a  such that B = 	, where (x
j
r) = (j)Ajr, and
(yi) = yi. Write 	 in a disjuctive normal form and let  be any disjunct. At least one such 
must be LDI consistent. Assume  is such a disjunct.








This formula is consistent and has the form
E(i) = B(i)(z1; : : : ; zm; u)1
with substitution 1 falling under subcase a. It therefore has a dove-tailed model mi.
The models all agree on the value to y and can all be dove-tailed into a single model of  and
hence of B = 	 as in Denition 15.2.8. 
Theorem 15.2.10 Assume Li; i 2 I all admit necessitation, then LDI (the dovetailing of Li) can
be axiomatised by taking the union of the axioms and rules of Li
Proof. The modal dove-tailing rule can be reduced to necessitation in this case. 
Theorem 15.2.11 If Li; i 2 I admit necessitation and satisfy the disjunction property, then LFI =
LDI .
Proof. Follows from the considerations of Example 15.2.4 and the previous theorem. 
Theorem 15.2.12 If Li; i 2 I all have the nite model property (are nitely axiomatizable, have
the disjunction property) so is LDI and L
F
I .
Proof. From the completeness theorem.
1. If all participating models are nite then the bred semantics will contain models which may
not be nite but are made (bred) from nite models. Any particular formula A of the bred
logic when evaluated at a bred model, requires only a nite depth of bring relative to the
actual world and the model can be changed to a nite bred model.
2. The transfer of nite axiomatizability and disjunction property are immediate from the com-
pleteness theorem.
3. The case of decidability is more tricky. If each Li has its own totally dierent decision
procedure, we may not have a decision procedure for LDI or L
F
I . However, if they are
all logics of the same type with the same decision procedure we may be able to transfer
decidability. We can transfer dedidability if the procedure is tableaux like. The argument
goes as follows. Take any formula A of the mixed language. A is of the form Bi(D1; : : : ; Dk)
where Bi(x1; : : : ; xk) is in the logic Li and D1; : : : ; Dk are in some other of the bring logics.
Apply the tableaux method characteristic for the logic Li, regarding D1; : : : ; Dk as atomic.
The tableaux will require assignment of values to the `atoms' D1; : : : ; Dk. When such values
are needed, apply the tableaux methods of the logic Lj of the external connectives of each Dj .




j ; : : : ; C
mj
j ) where D

j (x1; : : : ; xmj )
is in the logic Lj and C
r
j are in some other logic. The process will terminate because the
complexity goes down.
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The above is not a proper proof. We leave decidability and interpolation to a later part of this
series. 
Problem
Find sucient conditions on Li such that the bred logic L
F
I is the same as the dove tailed logic
LDI .
To study this problem we examine two typical examples. First we want to know under what
conditions bring is identical with dovetailing. The condition on the semantics is that it be forward
looking.
Denition 15.2.13 1. A model (S;R; a) is forward looking i for any assignment h, any t and
any h0 such that h  St = h0  St and any w A(B1; : : : ;Bk) we have t h A i t h0 A,
where St = fs j 9n; tRns; n  1g.
2. Ki is said to be forward looking if all of its structures are forward looking.
3. A logic is forward looking if it is complete for a forward looking semantics.
Example 15.2.14 1. If R is reexive then it is not forward looking.
2. modal K and K4 are forward looking.
Theorem 15.2.15 Let Li; i 2 I be logics with semantics Ki. Let A be a w of LFI which has a
bred model. Then A has a dove-tailed like model. The dove-tailed like model may not satisfy the
condition that (S;R((i); a; h) 2 Ki). This condition can be guaranteed when each Ki is forward
looking, in which case we get a proper dove-tailed model.
Proof. We show that any bred model be (W;S;R;a; h;F; ) can be turned into an equivalent
dovetailed model (S;R(i); a; hD). Note that the dove-tailed model relies on the particular hD, and
that (S;R(i); a), for any xed i may not be in the class Ki.
Turning to the denition of (S;Ri; a; h
D), let S be W . We may assume that for any x 2 W
there exists a unique w such that x 2 Sw. Let x; y 2W . We let xR(i)y hold i either
1. for some w, we have that x; y 2 Sw and (w) = i, and xRwy.
2. x 2 Sw and y 2 Sw0 and w0 = F(i; w; x) and aw0Rw0y.
Let hD(q) = [w2Whw(q)















) onto x. When the semantics
of the logic of (w0) is forward looking, this new model can also be assumed to be in the semantics
and hence the dove-tailed model is propert, according to Denition 15.2.7.
Lemma 15.2.16 For any (w; y) and A
(w; y) F A i y D A
where F is satisfaction in the bred model and D is satisfaction in the dovetailed model.
Proof. By induction.
Note that since 8y9!w(y 2 Sw) holds, we can write y F A in place of (w; y) F A.
The lemma holds for atomic q by denition.
y F iA i aw
0 F iA; where w0 = F(i; w; y) i 8x[aw0Rw0x! x F A] i 8x[yR(i)x! x F A]
i y D iA, by the induction hypothesis. 
The lemma just proved that (S;R(i); a; hD) is an equivalent model to (W;S, R;a; h;F; ).
This equivalence holds for any semantics. We have not used in the proof of the lemma the
assumption that the semantics we have bred is forward looking. We need this assumption to
show that under any assignment h (other than hD) the structure (S;R(i); a; h) satises only LFI
theorems. 
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Example 15.2.17 We bre a T-modality 1 with a K-modality 2, to show the dierence between
dovetailing and bring.
Let q be atomic. Consider
21q ^ 2  q:
In the bred semantics the above formula has a model. We can have a pair (w; y), such that
wRwy; (w; y)  q and in the bred model w0 = F(w;w; y) aw0  1q. It is true that in w0 by
reexivity aw
0  q but this leads to no contradiction. In the dovetailed model, however, we will
need to have at some y such that wR2y y  q ^1q, which is impossible.
15.2.1 Fibring and Dove-tailing modal fragments
Example 15.2.18 (Fibring modal fragments) The previous theorems dealt with bring and
dove-tailing full modal logics, with modalities i and all the boolean connectives. We found the-
orems telling us how to bre the semantics Ki of Li and at the same time how to generate the
theorems of Li; i 2 I. The proof also shows that any semantics Ki for Li will do for the purpose of
bring. If Li is complete for Ki and for another semantics K0i, then bring Ki; i 2 I or K0i; i 2 I
yields the same resulting logic and the same set of theorems for LFI or L
D
I respectively. We refer
to this property as sematnical independence of the bring process.
This independence does not hold if we are dealing with modal fragments . Consider for example
two modal fragments L1 and L2, where L1 is the fragment of modal K with f1g only while L2
is the fragment of K with f2;^g. Each fragment is complete for the class K of all K Kripke
models with arbitrary binary relations R. What do we mean by complete? Here we must use the
consequence relation. Let A1; : : : ; An K B mean that in every Kripke model (S;R; ; a; h) 2 K. If
a  Ai, for all i then a  B. Completeness for the fragment with 1 means that for all Ai; B in
the fragment
fAig `K B i fAig K B
where `K is provability in some syntactical formualtion of the full K. If we bre L1 and L2 accord-
ing to (i.e. using) the K Kripke semantics, we get what is expected i.e. we get the f1; f2;^gg
fragment of the full bring of two full versions of K namely ff1;^;g; f2;^;gg. However
because L1 with 1 is a very weak language, all we can express in it is sequents of the form
ni1 qi `L1 n1 q
where qi; q are atomic.
The above will hold in K i for some i; qi = q and ni = n.
Another semantics for L1 is the class of all Kripke models of the form (N ; <1; 0; h) where N
is the set of natural numbers and x <1 y i y = x + 1. This semantics gives 1q the reading `q
holds the next day'.
If we bre L1 and L2 using the natural numbers Kripke sematnics for L1 we get the new theorem
(*) 12q1 ^ 12q2 `L1;2 12(q1 ^ q2)
This theorem does not hold if we bre L1 and L2 using the K semantics for L1. The reason that
we can get (*) is that conjunction becomes available through the bring, and 1 with ^ is sensitive
to the dierent semantics chosen for L1, while L1 on its own is not senstive to the dierences.
It is instructive to see why the inductive argument of the bring completeness theorem works
for the full language, in the case of the natural numbers semantics.
Following our strategy we try to show that 12q1;12q2 6` 12(q1 ^ q2) in the bred se-
mantics.
This form is a substitution instance of the form
1x;1y 6` 1z
using the substitution , with (x) = 2q1;(y) = 2q2 and (z) = 2(q1 ^ q2).
A natural numbers counter model (N ; <1; 0; h) can be obtained with h(1; x) = h(1; y) = 1 and
h(1; z) = 0.
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The realisation of h for the substitution  will give us a bred countermodel for the original
consequence form. We need to bre a model yielding
h(1;2q1) = h(1;2qq) = 1
and h(1;2(q1 ^ q2)) = 0
This is not possible because in L2
(**) 2q1 ^2q2 `L2 2(q1 ^ q2):
We now want to use this fact, (**), to show that (*) must hold.
When the full boolean connectives are available to us in L1 we can write the form:
1(x ^ y ! z);1x;1y ` 1z
the addition of 1 = 1(x ^ y ! z) excludes the above counter model. If we nd such a w Dr
for each unrealisable model, we get
(***) fDrg;1x;1y ` 1; z
and after substitution we get
fDrg;12q1;12q2 ` 12(q1 ^ q2)
Since `L1;2 Dr, we get 12q1;12q2 `L1;2 12(q1 ^ q2). Thus showing (*) is provable.
Without boolean operations in L1 we cannot write Dr. We may try to wrie the Gentzen Rule:
x; y `L1 z
1x;1y `L1 1z
but the meaning of the above as a rule involves validity in all models and is not what we want.
Remark 15.2.19 Given two logics L;M with L complete for several dierent semantics L1;L2; : : :
andM is complete for several semanticsM1;M2; : : :. Then the bring of the semantics Li andMj
might yield dierent bred logical systems. If we want to dene a reasonable notion of semantically
independent bring of L and M we might wish to take the `most general' semantics for each logic
and bre these. The investigations into this topic is postponed to the section on algebraic bring.
Our strategy would be to consider the algebraic logics (Lindebaum algebra?) of L and M and bre
these.
The above discussion shows that bring modal fragments may depend on the semantics chosen
for the fragments. The reason being that we may have a fragment L which is syntatically too weak
to distinguish between two diernt semantics K1 and K2 but when bred with another logicM, the
bred result can make the distinction. Thus we will have no way of predicting the set of theorems
of the bred result. simply by looking at the axiomatic formulation of L and M. The question
still remains of what happens in cases where all the logics involved, i.e. L and M, are so weak
that bring does not help distinguish between the choice of semantics? Can we get a completeness
theorem and thus establishing the semantical independence of the bring process? The answer is
yes under certain conditions.
The weakest (least expressive) modal logic is the pure modality logic with just  and  and
atoms and no other connectives. The ws of such a logic have the formMx, whereM is a string of
modalities and x atomic. Any syntactical bring of logics with pure modalities, Li; i 2 I, will yield
similar mixed wsMx, where x is atomic andM a string of modalities from some Li; i 2 J; J  I; J
nite. Such fragments are of independent interest because when bring modalities into other logics
such as modal intuitionistic logic, one tends to bre only the pure modal fragment. A completeness
theorem for bring pure modalities will therefore be very useful.
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Theorem 15.2.20 (Completeness theorem for bring and dovetailing pure modalities)
Let Li; i 2 I be modal logics in a language with connectives i and/or i together with atomic
propositional variables. We assume for convienence that >;? are available.
Let Ki be semantics (class of Kripke models) for which Li is complete. Let LFI be the bring
(resp. Let LDI be the dovetailing) of Li; i 2 I. Let ji be the consequence relation of Li.
Let j be the consequence relation of LFI (resp. LDI ) dened by the following rules.
1. Any substitution instance of i ji  i, where i j  i is in the language of Li.
2. Pure Modalities bring (resp. dovetailing) rules
A1; : : : ; An j C1; : : : ; Cm
A1; : : : ;An;B j C1; : : : ;Cm
In case of bring, Ai and C not atomic.
A1; : : : ; An j C;B1; : : : ; Bm
A1; : : : ;An; j C;B1; : : : ;Bm
In case of bring, Ai; Bj and C not atomic.
3. j is the smallest consequence relation (monotonic, reexive and transitve) closed under the
above rules.
The following holds.
Let ;  be two nite sets of ws of LFI (resp. L
D
I ). If  6j  , then there exists a bred
model m of LFI (resp L
D
I ) such that
 A 2  implies m  A
 A 2   implies m 6 A
Proof. The proof is by induction on the modal complexity of ws in  [  . Each formula of the




a string of modalities and yi atomic. Let l(i) be the length
of the string. The induction is on the number n = maxil(i).
The inductive assumption on nite sets of ws ;  of max l(i)  n is:
Completeness
 6j   implies for some bred model m;m  all of  and m 6 any B 2  .
Case n = 0
In this case all ws of [  are atomic. We therefore have that  j   i \  6= ? clearly both
inductive assumptions hold.
Case n  1
In this case the elements of [  have the form i = NiM iyi, where Ni is the top front modality,
which may not exist if i is atomic. M
i
is the rest of the string, which may be empty. For a given
 6j  , we need to show a bred (resp. dovetailed) model m as desired. We rst observe that if
q1; : : : ; qk are all the atoms involved in [ , then we can assume that they are distributed among
[ . In fact, if 
 is any set of formulas, we can assume that 
  [  and  6j  . This follows
from the cut rule, because if for all partitions of 
 into 
1 and 
2 we have [
1 j  [
2, then
 j   by cut.
We second observe that we can assume that all modalities Ni for all i belong to the same logic,
say L;. The reason we can do that is that we can decompose  into 1 [2 [ : : : and   into
 1 [ 2 [ : : : such that 1 6j  1;2 6j  2 etc, and j ; j are maximal in containing all the atoms
and all the formulas of the same top modalities Ni of the same logic. If we nd countermodels mj
for j 6j  j , then we can put them together as done in Denition 15.2.2. Since i; i contain all
atoms, the case of dovetailing is also covered, i.e. the models can be dovetailed.
We therefore assume that all Ni are of the same logic, i = 1; 2; : : :.
We therefore need to nd a model m of the logic L such that
 m  A for A 2 
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 m 6 A for A 2  
The third step in our analysis is to ask whether we can nd a countermodel m in which >
holds. If such an m exists then we can assume > 2 . If such a model does not exist then all
bred Kripke models which satisfy  and falsity   have only one possible world, the actual world,
which is not accessible to anything.
In this latter case  j ? and   contains only ws A. We thus found a very special
countermodel for  6j  .
We have now nished our initial analysis of ; .
Let us assume that
 = fD1; : : : ;Dr1 ;E1; : : : ;Er2g [ 
1
and
  = fD01; : : : ;D0r01 ;E
0
1; : : : ;E0r02g [ 
2
and that E1 = >. 
1 [ 
2 cover all basic atoms appearing in ws of  [  .








1 are the tails of the
strings of modalities in  [  .
We need a bred (resp. dovetailed) Kripke modelm = (W;S;R;a; h;F; ; w0) such that (w0) =
L and (Sw0 ; Rw0 ; w0; h
w0) 2 K such that for all s 2 Sw0 ; w0Rw0s ! (s  Dj and s 6 E0j) and for
some tj and sj ; w0R
w0tj and w0R
w0sj and t  Ej and sj 6 D0j .
If for all j we have that both (*1) and (*2) below hold, then by the induction hypothesis we
can nd appropriate countermodels and take their disjunctive amalgamation, and complete the
induction step.
(*1) fD1; : : : ; Dr1 ; Ejg 6j fE01; : : : ; E0r02g




(1  ) D1; : : : ;Dr1 ;Ej j E01; : : : ;D0r02
or
(2  ) D1; : : : ;Dr1 j E01; : : : ;E0r02 ;D
0
j
In either case this contradicts  6j  .
This completes the inductive step and the proof of the theorem. 
15.2.2 The disjunction property
The logics Li may be complete for several possible semantics. We may have that Li is complete
for a class of models Ki which is disjunctive, (dened below). In such a case the bred semantics
will also be disjunctive.
Denition 15.2.21 (Disjunctive Semantics) Let K be modal or intuitionistic semantics. K is
said to be disjunctive i for any nite number of models (Si; Ri; ai; hi) 2 K there exists a model
(S;R; a; h) 2 K such that the following holds:
Si   faig  S   fag
 Ri  (Si   faig)2 = R  (Si   faig)2
 hi  (Si   faig) = h  (S   fag)
 x 2 Si and aiRix imply aRx
 x 2 S and aRx imply for some i; aiRix.
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The model (S;R; a; h) is called a disjunctive amalgamation of (Si; Ri; ai; hi).
Example 15.2.22 There are many logics with disjunctive semantics, e.g. K, K4, T, etc.
Denition 15.2.23 (Disjunctive amalgamation of bred models) Let Li; i 2 I be logics
with semantics Ki. Let LFI be their bred logic through their semantics. Assume that K is disjunc-
tive. let
mi = (W
i; Si; Ri;ai; hi;Fi;  i; wi0)
i = 1; : : : ; k be k bred models such that W i are all pairwise disjoint. Assume we identify the











0) are all in the class of models of K0 (here we identify each bred model by
its actual world). We want to dene a disjunctive amalgamation m of the bred models mi.
Since K0 is disjunctive, there exists a model n0 2 K0 which amalgamates n0i . This means that














0 = h0  Si;w
i
0
The above for i = 1; : : : ; k.
We can now dene m.
m = (W;S;R;a; h;F; ; a0)
The idea being that in the model n0, some of the points are from S
i;wi0 and some are new. For the
old points we bre the models mi. For the new points, we bre arbitrarily, say m1. The denition
is as follows:












The above for X being either S;R;a or h.
(w) =  i(w) for w 2W i
(w) = L0 otherwise
F(j; w; t) = Fi(j; w; t) for w 2W i; t 2 Sw




Theorem 15.2.24 (Completeness theorem for disjunctive semantics) Let Li;Ki be as in
Theorem 15.2.20 and assume further that each Ki is disjunctive. Then the bred (resp. dovetailed)
logic LFI (resp. L
D
I ) is also disjunctive. It can be axiomatised respectively by the following clauses
(1D), (2D), and (3) of 15.2.20. The induction hypothesis also assumes the disjunction property,
namely if  j fM iyig then for some i0; jM i0yi0 .
(1D)
A1; : : : ; An j C
A1; : : : ;An;B j C
(2D)
A1; : : : ; An j C
A1; : : : ;An j C
where in the case of bring, Ai and C are assumed not atomic.
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Proof. The proof follows the same lines as that of 15.2.20.
We reach the stage in the proof where we want to show that (*1) and (*2) hold.
We proceed to use (1D) and (2D).
If (*1) does not hold then by the disjunction property, for some j0
fD1; : : : ; Dr1 ; Ejg jL E0j0
hence fDi;Ejg `L E0j0 hence  j  .
If (*2) does not hold then either






fD1; : : : ; Dr1g jL Ej
and hence (since E1 = >)
fDi;E1g jL E0j
and hence  j  .
This completes the inductive step and the proof of the theorem. 
15.3 Case study 2: Intuitionistic modal logics
This section studies the combination of pure modality  and or  into intuitionistic logic. It begins
with a general discussion of what is involved leading to denition 15.3.1 | bred semantics for
intuitionistic modal logic. This is the most general combination. The completeness theorem is
proved in Theorem 15.3.3. The proof is rather involved, mainly because classical negation is not
available, and we need to deal with negative information in a roundabout way. However, the eort
is worthwhile, as Example 15.3.7 shows.
Let us now begin. Consider a language with atomic propositions and the connectives ^;;).
We want ^ to be intuitionistic conjunction,  to be S4 modality and ) to be intuitionistic
implication. Thus L1 is intuitionistic logic with f^;)g and L2 is S4 modal logic with fg, both
based on the same atoms. We are looking for L1;2. Let us try and nd semantics for this logic.
Consider a w in the language. Say q ) A.
Since the main connective is intutionistic, let us evaluate it at an intuitionistic Kripke model,
say m = (S;; 0; h). S is the set of possible worlds.  is the reexive and transitive accessibility
relation. 0 2 S is the actual world and h is the assignment to the atoms. h satises the assignment
restriction
() t 2 h(q) ^ t  s! s 2 h(q)
for all atoms q.
Let us now evaluate our formula in the model.
m  (q ) A) i by denition 0  (q ) A), where 0 is the actual world.
0  (q ) A) i for all t, if 0  t and t  q then t  A.
We can check whether t  q because this holds i t 2 h(q). However, we do not know how
to evaluate t  A. The connective  is not recognised in m. However to answer whether
m  q ) A all we need is a value for t  A for every t. How we get it is our problem.
Let us then attach to t a modal logic model
nt = F(m; t) = (T
t; Rt; at; ht)























































where nt depends on m and on t 2 S and where T t is the set of possible worlds of nt; Rt is the S4
accessibility relation. at is the actual world and ht is the assignment.
We stipulate:
t m A i (denition) nt  A
The latter is the same as at nt A.
Since nt is a modal model, a value can be found.
We continue the evaluation: at  A i for all x 2 T t; atRtx implies x  A.
If A is in the modal language we can continue to evaluate. If A is atomic we get our value
from ht. What if A contains the intuitionistic )? ie A = (p ) r)? Then we need to evaluate
x nt (p) r).
Since nt is a modal model, we do not know how to evaluate the above. However, all we need
is a value. If we associate with x an intuitionistic model
mx = F(nt; x) = (S
x;x; 0x; hx)
then we can continue our evaluation. mx is functionally dependent on x and nt through the
function F. We can represent the dependence as F(t; x).
We stipulate:
x nt p) r i (denition) mx  (p) r)
which is evaluated at the actual world of mx.
Thus we continue:
mx  p) r i 0x  (p) r) i for all y 2 Sx; 0x  y and y  p implies y  r:
This process can be continued as many times as we need. To carry out the evaluation of
arbitrary mixed formulas of L, we need Kripke models of each logic and functions associating
models of the other logic to each possible world, and innitum, as illustrated in Figure 15.3.
These bred models are not properly dened at the moment but are intuitively dened by the
needs of combining logics. Note that we cannot put arbitrary modal models nt, for points t 2 S,
because they must satisfy the intuitionistic compatibility conditions
() t  s and nt  A imply ns  A
for any A of the modal language.
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We need to secure the above condition (for arbitrary A):
Let nt = (T
t; Rt; at; ht)
ns = (T
s; Rs; as; hs)
We can assume without loss of generality that our Kripke models
n = (T;R; a; h) satisfy the condition:
x 2 T i (9m  0)aRmx
where xR0y i x = y and xRm+1y i 9z(xRz ^ zRmy).
We will argue that we can conservatively ensure that condition (*) holds for arbirary A by
asking that we have:
(**) t  s implies T t  T s and Rt  Rs, and hs  ht  T s.
First note that the modal language L2 contains only atoms and modality . So all ws of L2 have
the form nq; q atomic. Assume at  A. This is equivalent to 8y(atRty ! y  A). Similarly
as  A is equivalent to 8y(asRsy ! y  A). We thus have that condition (*) reduces to
(1) 8y(atRty ! y  A)! 8y(asRsy ! y  A)
Since A is arbitrary, it can be taken to be mq for arbitrary m and atomic q. Thus we get:
(2) 8q8m[8y(at(Rt)my ! y 2 ht(q))! 8y8m(as(Rs)my ! y 2 hs(q))]
In particular we cannot have for some atomic q; t and s and y that t  s and atRty and asRsy
and y 2 ht(q) and y 62 hs(q). Thus the assignments ht are not arbitrary but are increasing in
assigning truth.
To ensure that his happens for every q we have two options:
1. Restrict ht and hs by requiring (*2) to hold, in which case we do not have arbitrary truth
increasing assignment.
2. Allow for arbritary truth increasing assignments. In which case (*2) would imply that
(3) 8y8m[as(Rs)my ! at(Rt)my] and hs(q)  ht(q)  T s
which means that
() t  s implies T s  T t and Rs  Rt; and hs  ht  T s:
Condition (**) is consistent with any Kripke model satisfying (*1). In other words, any Kripke
model satisfying (*1) can be transformed into a Kripke model satisfying (**) which validates the
same formulas. To prove this let














Claim: For any A
at  A i at  A
Proof. Assume at  A, then for all y such that atRty y  A. Hence by (*1) we have for all y
such that for some s; t  s and asRsy we have y  A, hence for all y such that atRty we have
y  A and hence at  A. The other direction is easy. 
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We can thus assume that (**) holds in our semantics.
Consider the bred intuitionistic modal logic with ) and  (instead of ) and ). We need
to secure a condition [*] on the bred semantics, very much like the condition (*) of the previous
example, namely
[* ] t  s and nt  A imply ns  A.
Very much like the previous example one can show that to secure this condition one can assume
condition [**] below.
[** ] t  s implies T t  T s and Rt  Rs and ht = hs  T t.
where nt = (T
t; Rt; at; ht)
ns = (T
s; Rs; as; hs):
In case the bred modal logic contains both  and  we get equality in [**].
Denition 15.3.1 (1) Fibred Semantics for Intuitionistic Modal Logic
Let Li; i 2 I be a family of logics. Each Li is either a fragment of modal logic with either a
modality i or a modality i or both (we may not have negation in the fragment) or a fragment of
some extenstion of intutionistic logic (i.e. an intermediate logic). A bred model for the logic LFI
has the form (W;S;R;a; h;F; ; w0) as in Denition 2.1. We add the following additional bring
conditions.
If (w) = i and Li is an intuitionistic fragment and Lj is a modal or another intuitionistic
fragment and t; s 2 Sw and tRws and t0 = F(j; w; t) and s0 = F(j; w; s) (i.e. t0 and s0 are the bred
models at t and s respectively) then (**) and [**] hold whenever  and/or  are the modalities
respectively present at Lj, or (**) holds if Lj is intuitionistic
(**) St
0  Ss0 ; Rt0  Rs0 ; hs0 = ht0  S0
[** ] St
0  Ss0 ; Rt0  Rs0 ; ht0 = hs0  T 0.
(2)Dove-tailed Semantics for Intutionistic Modal Logic
Let Li be as before. A dove-tailed model for the logic L
D
I has the form (W;R; a; h), where W is
a set of worlds, a 2 W , h is an assignment into W and for each i 2 I;R(i)  W W is the
accessibility relation. For each i 2 I, and t 2 W , (W;R(i); a; h) is a model of the logic Li (modal
or intutionistic).
We also require for any intutionistic Li and any Lj that
1. If Lj is intuitionistic or  only modal that tR(i)s ^ sR(j)t0 imply tR(j)t0
2. If Lj is  modal then tR(i)s ^ tR(j)t0 imply sR(j)t0
3. If Lj is ; modal then both (1), (2) hold.
We also require the following:
Let t 2W be such that there exist n1; : : : ; nk and i1 : : : ; ik such that aRn1(i1)Rn2(i2): : :Rnk(ik)t
holds. Assume i 6= ik and let
W t = fy 2W j tRm(i)y holdsg:
Then the model (W t;R(i) W t; t; h W t) is in Ki.
Lemma 15.3.2 1. Let KI be the bred semantics of the previous denition and assume that
each Ki is disjunctive. Let  and 	 be two nite sets of formulas of the form A)i B, where
)i is the implication of Li. Assume Li does not contain disjunction. Assume further that
there is a bred countermodel m for  `  for every  2 	, then there is a bred counter
model m for  ` 	.
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2. The same holds if ;	 are assumed to contain ws of the form jA;jA all in some Lj.
Proof. A similar construction to that which proves the disjunction property in ordinary modal or
intutionistic logic. 
We are now ready to state a completeness theorem for the bring and dovetailing of modalities
with intuitionistic connectives. We want a general bring of an intutionistic or intermediate logic
connective ) with one or several modalities 1 and/or 2. Thus for example we would like to
bre the ) of Dummett's LC with the K modalities  and . The result of the bring, as well
as the axiomatisation, is very much dependent on the semantics we take for the modalities and
on the additional connectives which happen to be present, such as ^;_ and :. Thus no general
theorem can be easily given. We will therefore choose one type of modality, K modality and only
) and do the bring and dovetailing for that. The methodology will be clear from the proofs and
we shall later indicate what happens if the modalities come from a stronger (possibly non-normal)
extension of K.
The reader will notice throughout that the proofs use properties of intuitonistic logic in an
essential way and one needs to think what one can do in a general case. This we postpone to a
later section.
We now bre several intermediate logics )i with several K modalities j ;j . Since we might
not have :;^ and _, we need to formulate the logics to be bred using the notion of consequence
relation.
Theorem 15.3.3 (Completeness theorem for bred (resp. dovetailed) intuitionistic
modal logics)
1. Let Li be a logic with either an intermediate intutionistic implication )i (and possibly ^;_
and ?) or with one or both of the Li modalities i;i. Let Ki be the semantics for Li. We
make the following assumptions.
(*) For intuitionistic Li, we assume that either disjunction is available or the semantics Ki
is disjunctive.
Let ji be the consequence relation of Li. Then fAjg ji fBkg means that in every Kripke
model of Li (modal or intuitionistic) of the form (S;R; a; h) whenever for all j; a  Aj then
for some k; a  Bk. We regard the consequence relation as a relation between nite sets of
formulas. The completeness theorem characterises the consequence relation of LFI (denoted
by j) in terms of the consequence relations of Li (denoted by ji).
2. Let j be the smallest consequence relation containing ji for i 2 I, closed under substitution
(and of course under reexivity, monotonicity and cut) and closed under the following rules,
where ) is a connective of an arbitrary Li1 and ; of an arbitrary Li2 .
(a)
A1; : : : ; An j C1; : : : ; Cm
A1; : : : ;An;B j C1; : : : ;Cm
for the case of bring Ai and C must begin with ; or ).
A1; : : : ; An j C;B1; : : : ; Bm
A1; : : : ;An j C;B1; : : : ;Bm
for the case of bring Ai; Bj and C must begin with ; or ).
(b) Deduction theorem for each )i.
Then j is the consequence relation of all the bred models of LFI (resp. dovetailed
models of LDI ).
Proof.
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1. Soundness is easy to verify.
2. Completeness can be proved along similar lines to the proof of Theorem 15.2.3.
In the case of modal logics, completeness was proved by induction on the number of nested
modalities of dierent logics. Thus one would expect that we use induction in the modal
intuitionistic case on the number of nested dierent connectives of the dierent logics. Thus
for a formula of the form 2(A )1 23B) )4 B one may expect the inductive nesting
number to be 4. This does not work, however, because the modal logics with  and  only
do not have enough expressive power to carry the inductive case step. It is more convenient
to count only nestings of intuitionistic ), because we can use the expressive power of the )
to carry the induction through. Thus the above formula falls under the inductive case for
n = 2. The nestings are A )1 23B and the full 2(A )1 23B) )4 B. Modalities do
not count and they join the outer ) governing them. The above will be analysed as:
Case n = 1
Substitution into
B1(x; y) = [x)1 23y]
by
1(x) = A;2(y) = B
Case n = 2
Substitution into
B2(x; y) = [2x)4 y]
by
1(x) = A)1 23B
2(y) = B:
Case n is described inductively as composed of ws Bn(x; y), whose outer connective is some
intuitionistic )i of the logic Li and within it some modalities and atoms from Lj ; j 2 J
(abbreviated LJ). A substitution n(xi) gives ws of case n  1.
Let  6`  ;;  sets of ws of LFI (resp. LDI ). We show by induction on the maximal number
n of nested intuitionistic connectives (of dierent logics) in  [   that there exists a bred (resp.
dovetailed) model in which all members of  hold and all members of   do not hold.
Case n = 0
This case means that we have only connectives of the form  and  of various modal logics
Lj ; j 2 J . Let LJ be the logic with modalities of Lj ; j 2 J . We need a lemma:
Lemma 15.3.4 Let A1 : : : An 6j B1; : : : ; Bk in LJ . Then for some bred (resp. dovetailed) model
m of LFJ ;m  Ai and m 6 Bj.
Proof. From the theorem on bring (resp. dovetailing) pure modalities in the previous section,
there exists a bred modal model. The intuitionistic bred part can be added arbitrarily.
Case n = 1
We prove that every ;  s.t.  6j   has a bred (resp. dovetailed) countermodel. Our strategy is
to regard all modally prexed atoms in [  as new atoms in a purely intuitionistic form 0 6j  0.
We can nd an intuitionistic countermodel for that form and realise the assignments to the new
atoms by bring (resp. dovetailing) modal models. This would give us a bred countermodel for
 6j  . We now go through the details.
Let (S;R; a; h) be any intuitionistic countermodel for 0 6j  0 and let fA1; : : : ; Am; Bm+1; : : : ; Bkg
be the new modal atoms. Thus
0 = fi(x; y)g; 0 = jf(x; y)g
and
(x1) = A1; : : : ;(xm) = Am;(xm+1) = Bm+1; : : : ;(xk) = Bk:
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m is an arbitrary division to be chosen later. Let t 2 S and assume h(t; xi) = 1; i  m(t) and
h(t; xi) = 0;m(t) < i  k. If we can realise, for arbitrary t (m depends on t) fAig 6j fBjg then
we get a bred (resp. dovetailed) countermodel for case n = 1. Otherwise fAig j fBjg. By the
property (*) assumed in Theorem 15.3.3, fAig j B where B is either
W
Bj or Bj0 for some j0.
Let t = x1 )i (x2 )i : : : ; (xm(t) )i xj0) : : :). There is only a nite number of possibilities for t.
Hence




Since j t and  = 0;  =  0 we get  j  , a contradiction.
Thus for some intuitionistic countermodel (S;R; a; h) of 0 6j  0, all assignments at t are
realisable by bred models, mt. These models can be grafted onto (S;R; a; h) as in Denition
15.2.2. This grafted model can be turned to satisfy the requirements [*] and [**] of Denition
15.3.1 by following the construction at the beginning of the Section.
This completes the proof for case n = 1.
Case n > 1
We assume ;  are obtained from a i; i of a pure intuitionistic modal component logic LJ as
in case n = 1 via a substitution . In other words
i = fBri j r = 1; : : : ; kg
 i = fBri j r = k + 1 : : :mg
and each Bri has the form
Bri (x
r; yr)
Let 0(xr) = M
r
zr, and let 1(zr) = Ar )j Br. Let  = 01 (0 rst then 1). Thus
(xr) = M
r
(Ar )j Br), where Mr is a string of modalities from LJ and Ar )j Br are from a
logic Lj .
We assume subcase a that each x variable is under the scope of the)i connective. Since i 6`
 i we can assume i0 6jLJ  i0 and hence there are LJ models m = (Sm; Rm; am; hm) in
which i0 holds and  i0 does not hold as shown in case n = 1. Reasoning very much like the
case of Theorem 15.2.3 we want to show that there exists at least one m in which we can realise
the assignment hm(t; xr;js ) for all t by a bred model for (x
r;j
s ), of the logic Lj . Assume this
is not possible. Then by the induction hypothesis for every m, there exists a j and t such that
j;t ` 	j;t, where
j;t = fxr;js j hm(t; xr;js ) = 1; r; s varyingg ` 	j;t
= fxr;js j hm(t; xr;js ) = 0; r; s varyingg:
Our aim is to reach a contradiction by using the fact that for everym there exists a j and t 2 Sm
such that j;t j 	j;t. The contradiction is to show that  j   contrary to assumptions. To
achieve this end we need to extract some formulas 1; 2; : : : so that i0; 10; 20; : : : j  i0
and j 1; j 2; : : : and hence by cut,  = i j   =  i. We need a small lemma to the
eect that we can assume that 	j;t contains (or is equivalent in Lj to) only one element j;t. Using
this fact we can write
j;t = '1 )j ('2 )j : : :) ('k(j;t) )j j;t : : :))
where
j;t = f'1; : : : ; 'k(j;t)g:
Since there is only a nite number of dierent possibilities for j;t, for dierent models m, we
get by case n = 1 that for some 1; 2 : : :, i0; 10; 20; : : : j  i0.
Hence
i; 1; : : : ;`  i
and since j r we get  j   a contradiction.
We now prove the lemma.
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Lemma 15.3.5 We can assume that 	j;t contains only one element.
Proof. Note that all the elements of j;t and 	j;t are of the form (A) B). If Lj contains no
disjunction in the language we get from 4.4 and the induction hypothesis that for some x 2 	j;t
we have j;t ` (x). If Lj does contain disjunction then clearly j;t `
W
	j;t.
In either case we get a w j;t such that j;t ` j;t. We can thus assume that 	j;t contains
only one element. 
We have thus concluded the proof of case n > 1 subcase a.
Subcase b
We now examine the subcase where the conditions of subcase a are not necessarily satised. We
thus have  6`   and ;  are obtained by substitution into i 6`LJ  i and the formulas in i[ i
are of the form Bri (M;x; y) as in subcase a.
We do not have in this case that each variable x is under the scope (in Bri (: : : x : : :)) of intu-
tionistic connecitve )j . This means that i [  i is comprised of several formulas whose outer
connectives are dierent intuitionistic ones )j1 ;)j2 . Since these formulas are evaluated in dier-
ent bred models, we can apply subcase a to them separately. The following lemma explains
Lemma 15.3.6 Let j 6= j0 and assume
A)j B;A0 )j0 B0 ` C )j D;C 0 )j0 D0
then either
A)j B ` C )j D
or
A0 )j0 B0 ` C 0 )j0 D0:

Example 15.3.7 The above theorem allows us to bre or dovetail the following:
1. The intermediate logic KC obtained by adding the schema :A _ ::A to intuitionistic logic
with S4 modality , and .
2. Dummetts LC (obtained by adding the schema (A! B) _ (B ! A) with the K modality .
The axioms of the combined system are obtained from the completeness theorem. For example,
dovetailing the systems in (1) yields:
1. KC axioms with Modus Ponens.
2. A ^(A! B)! B











In the above examples we assumed the bring is done by a function F(w; t) = z. Thus the
value of a new connective (e.g. ) is evaluated at a single model labelled by z. It is more general
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to associate with (w; t), not a single model z but a family of such models in which case F becomes
a set fucntion or a relation R. We thus get in m:
t  ](Ai) i for all n such that (m; t)Rn; we have n  ](Ai)
The advantage of such an approach is that it is more general. Imagine some system where
classical disjunction is a new connective. Then we do not necessarily want to have
A j C;B j C
A _B j C :
15.4 Algebraic bring of logics
Previous sections discussed bring of modal and intutionistic logic through their possible world
semantics. Many logics do not have clear possible world semantics and are best presented through
their algebraic semantics. A typical example is many valued logics, where the algebraic presentation
is the most natural. Thus for example to bre modal logic with many valued logic we need to
know how to construct a bred many valued model. We need to dene the notion of bring of
two algebraic semantics as well as the notion of bring of an algebraic semantics with a possible
world semantics. Furthermore, since many logics have both a possible world and an algebraic
semantics, as for example is the case with modal logics and intuitionistic logic, we need to give
careful denitions which would essentially yield the same bred result no matter how we bre
the logics | algebraically, semantically or mixed. Thus for example the bring of modal and
intuitionistic logic should be indierent to whether we bre them through their Kripke semantics
or through their algebras or in a mixed way. Another bonus to the algebraic formulation of bring
may come in connection with the problem of the semantical independence of the bring process.
We have seen in the case of fragments of modal logics that some fragments were complete for several
dierent semantics and depending on the choice of semantics, the bring of the semantics yielded
dierent bred logics with dierent sets of theorems. It is hoped that by taking the Lindenbaum
algebraic semantics for these fragments and bring them we would get a unique bred system
which we can regard as the bring of the logics.
We begin by describing what we mean by algebraic semantics for a logic. We want a very
general denition that would equally apply to many systems, whether they are monotonic or non-
monotonic. There are many systems which have none of the classical connectives and which satisfy
only some very restricted proof theory. There is no agreed standard denition of what is algebraic
logic or semantics. We shall compare our approach to those of others as we go along. Our primary
concern in this chapter is the bring of logics, so any good denition of algebraic semantics will
do. As it turns out our denitions are of independent interest. The new notion of algebraic logics
for general consequence relations was introduced in Chapter 8, section 5.
This applies algebraic and shows how to bre, dovetail and fuzzle various logics.
Denition 15.4.1 (Fibring and dovetailing algebraic logics) A bred algebra has the form
(W;A; fi; T; h;F), where W is the set of labels. For each w 2W;Aw W is the set of elements
of the algebra labelled by w. fwi is the i-th function of the algebra of w and w; Tw are its order
and truth set. F is a bring function, giving for each w and t 2 Aw and each logic j another
algebra indexed by w0 = F(j; w; t). The following must be satised
t w t0 implies F(j; w; t) is homomorphic onto F(j; w; t0).
We need an assignment function hw(q) giving each atomic q a lter hw(q) in Aw. hw can
be extended to arbitrary ws. We use the bring function when we want to evaluate hw(](q))
for a connective ] which is in another logic Lj. In this case we look at all w
0
t = F(j; w; t) for
all t 2 Aw. We check at which point t the formula ](q) holds at the algebra w0t i.e. we check
ft j hw0t(](q)) 2 Tw0tg. The set of these points is a lter (because t  s implies w0t is homomorphic
onto w0s and hence if ] holds at w
0
t it will hold at w
0
s). We let h
w(](q)) be this lter. The case of
dovetailing of algebras can be distinguished from that of bring by the following extra requirement:
For all w and all t 2 Aw and w0t = F(j; w; t) we have for all atomic q that t 2 hw(q) i
hw
0
t(q) 2 Tw0t .
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Example 15.4.2 Let m be a bred modal logic. Assume the bring is done through its Kripke
semantics. How would the bring be done as an algebra?
A Kripke model (S;R) gives rise to an algebra where the elements are subsets X  S. X  Y
means X  Y . We need to bre an algebra to each subset X  S. We do have Kripke models mx
bred for each points x 2 X. These give rise to algebras ax. Let aX = x2Xax. Clearly X  Y
means X  Y and so aY is a subalgebra of aX .
Thus we associate with each bred modal model a bred algebraic modal model through the
above indicated translation. In the case of dovetailing, there is the commitment that the bred
model agrees on atomic values. This means algebraically that X  q i aX  q for all atoms.
Example 15.4.3 (Many valued modal logic) This is an example of bring semantical models
(modal logic) with algebraic models ( Lukasiewitz many valued logic). We consider the many valued
language with f^;_;!;:g with truth values at the real interval [0 1] . The algebraic models
are linearly ordered abelian groups which are embeddable in [0 1]. So it is sucient to consider
assignments  of values and truth table for values in [0 1]. The following are the algebraic functions:
 The domain is [0 1].
  is numerical .
 T = f0g (0 is truth).
 f^(x; y) = max(x; y).
 f_(x; y) = min(x; y).
 f:(x) = 1  x
 f!(x; y) = max (0; y   x).
Strictly speaking, the assignments  into an algebra a = (A; f^; f_; f!; f:; f0g; ) should be
to lters, i.e. sets of points closed under . These lters can be characterised by a single point
x 2 [0 1] either as (q) = [x 1] or (q) = (x 1] (left open or closed intervals).
We will write (q) = x for [x 1] and x  for (x 1].
We now turn to bring and to dovetailing.
Let m = (S;R; a; h) be a Kripke model for . The bring function F associates with each t 2 S
an algebraic model at = (At;; f^; f_; f!; f:; f0g; t). Since At = [0 1], bring algebras at to t is
nothing more than associating with each t an arbitrary many valued assignment t to the atoms q
of the modal language. In case the semantics is dovetailed, we further require that for atoms q we
have t(q) = 0 i t  q.
We can further bre to each element x 2 At of the algebra a Kripke model nx;t = (Sx;t; Rx;t; ax;t; hx;t).
The requirement is that for x  y;nx;t is homomorphic onto ny;t. This means that the following
holds for x  y:
(*) For all A;nx;t  A implies ny;t  A.
This can be achieved as in the beginning of Section 3 by requiring that:
x  y implies Sx;t  Sy;t and Rx;t  S2y;t  Ry;t and hy;t = hx;t  Sy;t. The reason the assignment
cannot be truth increasing but must remain constant is that we have negation in the language. We
can write both q and   q and neither can change value.
Let us now evaluate (q ! q); q atomic, at the model m.
 a  (q ! q) i for all t 2 S such that aRt; t  q ! q.
 Since the main connective of q ! q is many valued, we have t  q ! q i at  q ! q i
t(q ! q) = 0 i max(0; t(q)  t(q)) = 0 i t(q)  t(q).
 t(q) is directly given since q is atomic. However t(q) is not directly given.  is a modal
operator and we need to go t the bred modal models nx;t; x 2 At (recall that At = [0 1]).
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We let
Qt = fx j nx;t  qg
Qt is a lter because of (*) above. It has the form either [t 1] or (t 1].
Thus t(q) = t (or t ). Thus we need to check whether t(q)  t.
Example 15.4.4 We would like to highlight a point in the previous example, which will be of
importance later. Consider the top level bring. We start with m = (S;R; a; h). Then with each
t 2 S, we bre an algebra at. If all the algebras have the same domain, the bring reduces to
t, the assignment. Let us stop at this stage and consider the entity (S;R; a; h; ) and let us
try to evaluate t  q. Since q contains no mnay valued connectives, we get t  q holds i
8s(tRs implies s  q). Consider the w Iq = def (q ! q) ! q. Really Iq is q but it is formally
a many valued w. So we have to evaluate it at the algebra at. We have at  I(q) i t(q) = 0.
t  I(q) i for all s (tRs implies t(q) = 0).
We now have the opportunity to make t  q fuzzy (i.e. `fuzzle' the satifaction  or `fuzzle' the
modal logic) by extending t to q:
(]) t(q) = SupfsjtRsgs(q).
Using (]) we can fuzzle any w of the modal logic and extend t to all ws. We take the many
valued table for ^;_;: and!. We have thus by understable intuitive denition, through (]), turned
(S;R; a; ) into a sort of modal many valued logic by changing the crisp f0 1g assignment h into
a fuzzy . Note that what we are getting is not bring or dovetailing. It is something new.
Example 15.4.5 Let us continue the previous example and try now to fuzzle many valued logic
with modal logic. Consider the many valued model at = ([0 1]; : : : ; t). To each x 2 [0 1], a modal
model nx;t was bred. For x  y we had Sx;t  Sx;y and Rx;t  S2y;t  Ry;t and hy;t = hx;t  Sy;t.
Clearly n0;t is the largest model. Let q be atomic. The value x  q in the algebra at is obtained by
looking whether t(q)  x. Formally we can write
valt(x; q) = 1 i t(q)  x
valt(x; q) is a `crisp' f0,1g function. We now `fuzzle' it by giving values in the modal algebra. Let
valt be the new fuzzy function.
valt (x; q) = fs 2 Sx;t j s 2 hx;t(q)g:
Since the modal models nx;t satisfy (**) of the beginning of Section 2, we can assume that they
all have the form (St; Rx;t; at; ht) and that x  y implies Rx;t  Ry;t. There is no need to assume
that S gets smaller with increasing  because what is not connected by R in the model is practically
non existent. We can also assume that hx;t(q) = ht(q) \ Sx;t.
for  2 St let t (q) be Infx 2 hx;t(q). Clearly in our particular case t (q) is either 0 or 1.
valt (x; q) = fs 2 Sx;t j st (q)  xg:
We can also turn Rx;t into R

t a many valued relation by dening
Rt (; ) = Infx[Rx;t(; ) holds]
for ;  2 S, and of course
Rx;t(; ) holds i R

t (; )  x:
We can thus assume that we are dealing with structures of the form (St; R

t ; at; ht; 

t ; t) where
Rt (; ) 2 [0 1].
t (q) 2 [0 1]
and we dene
 Rx;t(; t) = 1 i Rt (; )  x
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  2 hx;t(q) i t (q)  x.
 t(q) is the many valued assignment for q, which for the case of dovetailing, equals att (q).
(Note that since att (q) is f0; 1g valued,dovetailing would collapse t to a classical assign-
ment.)
We want to extend t (A) to arbitrary A . We do that by induction. We assume that for A
and B;t (A) = x and 

t (B) = y are dened and we have
valt (x;A) = fs 2 St j st (A)  xg
Similarly for valt (x;B).
The obvious way to extend t is the following
t (A) = Infx8 [Rx;t(; ) = 1 implies  2 valt (x;A)]
Infx8 [Rx;t(; )  x implies t (A)  x]
Clearly also
t (A ^B) = max(t (A); t (B))
t (A _B) = min(t (A); t (B))
t (A! B) = max(0; t (B)  t (A))
t (:A) = 1  t (A)
In other words, we are reading the connectives pointwise as should be.
Example 15.4.6 (A `fuzzled' modal logic) The previous two examples show that modal and
many valued logic can be put together in two dierent ways. If we start with a modal model
(S;R; a; h) then we can fuzzle (make fuzzy) h by changing it into a many valued assignment  and
extend to the entire modal langauge. If we start with a many valued model  then we can fuzzle 
by changing it into a function into elements of a modal algebra. This turned out to be equivalent
to looking at modal models where the possible world relation is fuzzy but the assignment is crisp.
i.e. models of the form (S;R; a; ) where R(; ) 2 [0 1], while  is a f0,1g assignmnt.  can be
extended to all ws, in which case it becomes a [0 1] valued function.
The obvious combination of the two approaches is to make both R and  fuzzy. This leads us
to the following denition.
Denition 15.4.7 An algebraic fuzzled many valued modal model has the form (S;R; a; ),
where R : S2 ! [0 1] is a fuzzy possible world relation and for each s 2 S and atomic q; s(q) 2
[0 1].






where ] 2 f^;_;!;:g and f] is the many valued truth table for ]
s(A) = Infx[ for all ;R(s; )  x implies s(A)  x]
The above denition should be compared with the case of dovetailing.
The above examples indicate how we can dene the notion of one logic L being fuzzled (made
fuzzy) by another logic Z. In the modal-many valued logic examples above, modal logic was made
fuzzy by  Lukasiewicz many valued logic. The possible world relation of the modal semantics was
replaced by a function to truth lters of the many valued algebra and the assignments h of L was
replaced by an algebraic many valued assignment.
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15.5 Label dependent connectives
We have alredy introduced the possiblity that certain constants be label dependent. For example
when we skolemise the data item
 : 9xA(x)
we introduce a constant
c and get
 : A(c)
We can thus create a ;  <  and get:
 : A(c)
The above notation ensures that the data item
9xA(x)
is distinguished from the previous one. We can introduce a ;  <  and get
 : 9xA(x)
then skolemise and end up with
 : A(c)
This section studies label dependent connectives. If the labels are representing time, then we
are dealing with time dependent connectives. It is easier to give examples of the latter.
Example 15.5.1 Consider the temporal connective U(A;B), reading \B until A". Its classical
truth table is:
U(A;B) holds at t i for some s > t;A holds at s, and for all U between t and s we have that
BR holds at U .
We can write the equivalence
t : U(A;B) is equivalent to t : F (A ^HtB)
HB reads \B was always true in the past".
HtB reads \B was always true in the past between now and t".
Ht is a time dependent connective.
Example 15.5.2 The following are examples for making t label dependent.
1. The basic meaning for A is \always A". It is not label dependent. The corresponding LDS
rule is:
s : A; s < r
r : A
2. The basic meaning for tA is "always A up to t".
The corresponding rule is:
s : tA; s < r < t
r : A
3. The basic meaning of tA is \always A except at t"
The corresponding rule is:
s : tA; t < s; s 6= t
s : A
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another example is that of joining two logics to form a two-dimensional product.
Example 15.5.3 (Joining modal logics) Let L be the extension of the modal logic K. This
logic is complete for the class of all Kripke structures (S;R; a; h).
Let L1;L2 be two copies of L with modalities 1 and 2. Let L1;2 be the langauge with both
modalities and consider the following K1;2 semantics for L1;2.
The structures have the form (S = S1  S2; R1; R2; (a1; a2); h) where (Si; Ri; ai) are Li Kripke
structures and h is an assignment into S, i.e. h(q)  S, for each atomic q.
Satisfaction under h is dned as follows:
(t; s) h q if (t; s) 2 h(q).
(t; s) h 1A i for all t0; tR1t0 ) (t0; s) h A
(t; s) h 2A i for all s0; sRws0 ) (t; s0) h A.
We write  A if (a1; a2) h A for all Kripke structures.
To be continued.
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Chapter 16
Abduction in Labelled Deductive
Systems
16.1 Intuitive theory of labelled abduction
This section will introduce our intuitive theory of abduction within the framework of Labelled
Deductive Systems, and give some simple examples.
The new ideas we shall put forward are:
 abduction depends on proof procedures
 abductive principles can be part of the data. In other words, a declarative item of data can
be either a formula or a principle of abduction
The more precise machinery for these concepts will be developed in later sections. This section
will discuss the intuitive ideas.
The basic situation we are dealing with can be presented as
 `?!Q
data ?query or ! input
It is a relationship between a database and a formula. The relationship is either declarative (ie
?Q, Q a query) or imperative (!Q, Q is an input or a demand to perform abduction or a demand
for explanation etc). In the imperative case there is an interaction between  and Q and a new
database 0 emerges.
We have argued in previous chapters that the most general and useful database is the one where
the data is structured and the proof procedures use the structure.
In this set up, the abduction rules are extra moves that help answer the query or help change
the database as a result of the query or input.
Thus to do abduction we need more precise proof procedures or update procedures for struc-
tured databases and then on top of that we can dene the extra abductive rules.
The exact proof procedures can be conviently formalised in the framework of LDS. Meanwhile
let us illustrate our ideas through a series of examples. The reader should compare with section
1.7, where a practical system, which includes abduction, is presented.
Example 16.1.1 The database below is a Horn clause database. It is labelled in the sense that
each clause is named. The query is D. The query does not follow from the database as it is. We
are going to use it to illustrate principles of abduction.
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Data Query
a1 I ^ T ! D ? D
a2 L! I
a3 L ^ S ! T
a4 O ^ P ! T
a5 L
The database literals have no meaning. Let us give them a meaning. In the Stanford University
English Department, there are two main ways of getting a PhD title. One can either put forward
a thesis, stay in the department for 4-5 years acquiring and displaying an immense breadth of
knowledge and pass an interview, or one can write a very good publication and get a job oer from
another university in the top ten in the country. The database then becomes:
Data
a1 Interview ^ Thesis ! Degree
a2 Lecture ! Interview
a3 Lecture ^ Scholarly Survey ! Thesis




Another interpretation for the same database is a component interpretation. To do the laundry
(D) one needs a washing machine (T ) and washing powder (I). For washing powder one can use
dishwashing soap (L). For a washing machine one may use a dishwasher (S) and dishwashing soap
or one may handwash (P ) but then one at least needs a spinner (O).
We thus get in this case
Data
a1 Washing Powder ^ Washing Machine ! Laundry
a2 Dishwashing Soap ! Washing Powder
a3 Diswashing Soap ^ Dishwasher ! Washing Machine




We now list several possible abductive principles for the query ?D. The principles depend on the
computation, so let us suppose that we compute the query prolog like, where the pointer always
starts at the top clause (assume a1 > a2 > a3 > a4 > a5.)
We note that in logic programming [Eshghi and Kowalski, 1989] abduction for Horn clause pro-
grams is done via a system of the form (; I; A), where  is the program, I is a set of integrity
constraints and A is a set of literals which are abducible. Whenever an abducible literal is encoun-
tered in the computation (eg ?D) it is immediately added to the database provided it does not
violate the integrity constraints.
Let us now examine our options:
Example 16.1.2 [Possible principles of Abduction]
1. The rst option is to abduce on anything as soon as needed. This corresponds in our case,
to no integrity constraints and every literal is abducible.
In this case we add D to the database, ie the Abduction principle yields D. In the component
example such abduction makes no sense. I want to know which parts are missing so that we
can get them and wash our clothes.
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2. The second option is to abduce on literals which are not heads of clauses. In this case, we
add S. This is because S is the rst literal encountered in the top down order of execution.
Note that we do not use here a set of abducibles. The structure of the database determines
what we add.
3. If our underlying logic is not classical logic but some other resource logic, we will not succeed
by adding S to the database because that would require the \use" of L twice. Once to make
I succeed in clause a2 and once to make T succeed in clause a3. In the component example
we need more dishwashing soap if we use a dishwasher, and we have only one lot of it (ie a5).
Note that the database is structured and thus we can add
a6 L
and fa1; : : : ; a5g is not the same database as fa1; : : : ; a6g.
Anyway, if the underlying logic is a resource logic, the result of our abduction will be O ^P ,
unless we are prepared to add another copy of L.
4. If we require the weakest logical assumption (in classical logic) which makes the goal succeed
then we must add S _ (O ^P ). This abduction principle is independent of the computation.
5. In co-operative answering, the abduction principle takes the top level clause. In this case
the answer is T . To the query \?D" we answer \yes if T". Think of the thesis example. If
an ordinary student wants to know what is missing to get a PhD, the obvious answer is \a
thesis" and not \a paper and a job oer from Harvard".
6. The power of our labelling mechanism can be easily illustrated by a more rened use of the
labels. If atoms are labelled, for example, by cost (laundry example) the abduction principle
can aim for minimal cost. One can also \cost" the computation itself and aim to abduce on
formulas giving maximal provability with a least number of modus ponens instances.
Example 16.1.3 To show that the abduction depends on the computation let us change the
computation to forward chaining or Gentzen like rules. From
Data `?D
we get
I ^ T ! D; I; S ! T;O ^ P ! T `?D
which reduces to
T ! D;S ! T;O ^ P ! T; `?D
which reduces to the following by chaining:
S ! D;O ^ P ! D; `?D
As we see, not many abduction possibilities are left!
So far we have discussed the possibilities of abduction principles being added to proof rules. We
now come to our second new idea, namely:
 Abduction principles are data!
Example 16.1.4 Consider the following database and query:
a1 A
a2 A! (B ! S)
a3 B
: : : : : : : : :
a4 X, abduce on structrure to nd X.
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a5 B ! D
The goal is ?S 
D.
By writing S 
D for the goal we are saying we want to partition the database, which is a list of
assumptions, into two parts, the rst part must prove S and the second part must prove D. This
is done in resource logics, where one pays attention to the question of which part of the database
proves what.
Such considerations arise in many areas for example in what is known as parsing as logic.
Consider the text:
Mary hit John. He cried.
The way this can be analysed is by assuming that each word is assigned a w of some resource
logic (actually concatenation logic, see [Gabbay and Kempson, 1991]) with a label. This assigne-
ment is done at the lexical level. Thus a noun n is assigned n0 : NP . An intranstive verb v1 is
assigned v01 : NP ! S. A transitive verb v2 is assigned v02 : NP ! (NP ! S). The pronoun `he'
is assigned an abduction principle. Our problem becomes:
Data
1. Mary0: NP
2. hit0: NP ! (NP ! S)
3. John0: NP
4. he: Abduce on structure. Take the rst literal up the list.
5. cried0: NP ! S.
Query
Prove ?S or S 
 S or ?S 
 S 
 S : : : etc, in order to show we have a text of sentences.
We are thus saying that Anaphora resolution makes use of structural abduction.
The reader should note that anaphora resolution is a complex area and we are not making any
linguistic claims here beyond the intuitive example that abduction principles can be treated as
data. We do admit however that logical principles underlying database management do seem to
be operative in natural language understanding and we are working full steam ahead in making
our case.
Coming back to our view of abduction as data, we are really saying:
 A database can either display data items or give us pointers to where to get them.








I would like to give next a combined example of planning and parsing, based on ideas of
[Gabbay and Kempson, 1991].
Example 16.1.5 (Planning) Consider the situation described by the diagram below.
There are three languages involved
1. The database language containing the predicates On(x; y) and Free(x)
2. The imperative (Input) command language with the predicates Move(x; y).
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3. The mixed metalanguage with the connectives \^" for \and" and \)" for \precondition and
action imply postcondition".
a t1: On(a; b)
b c t1: On(b; tab)  Move(a; c)
t1: On(c; tab)
a t2: On(a; c)  Move(a; tab)
b c
b c a t3: On (a; tab).
On(x; y)^ Free(x)^ Free(z)^Move(x; z)) On(x; z)^Free(y)^ Free(x)
The diagram describes the initial layout of the blocks ready to respond to command. t1 labels
all data true at the initial situation and t2 and t3 the additional data after each of the actions. We
have
t1 < t2 < t3:
If we query the system with
? On(a; x)
we get three answers, with dierent labels, indicating where the answer was obtained in the database,
namely:
` t1 : On(a; b)
` t2 : On(a; c)
` t3 : On(a; tab)
The reply to the user is determined by the system as the answer proved with the stronger label,
namely:
On(a; tab)
Call the deductive system governing the planning consideration LDS1
1. This system involves
proving where the blocks are after which action. This system accepts commands in logical form
Move(x; y). It does not accept commands in English. If the command comes in English, which we
can represent as move x onto y, it needs to be parsed into the LDS1 language. This is done in a
parsing logic LDS0. The following diagram explains the scheme, see Figure 16.1:
The following diagram describes the database-query problem of LDS0:
move0: NP ! (NP ! S) ?S + S
a0: NP
c0: NP
move0: NP ! (NP ! S)
it: use abduction. First use structural abduction to
get the rst NP higher in the list, then use
inferential abduction to try and get maximal
inferential eects in LDS1.
tab0: NP
Notice that the abduction principle in LDS0 also uses inferential eect in LDS1. Intuitively we
are trying to abduce on who \it" refers to. If we choose \it" to be a block which is already on the
table, it makes no sense to move it onto the table. Thus the command when applied to the database
will produce no change. The abduction principle gives preference to abduced formulas which give
some eect.
1We remark in passing that this approach oers a conceptual (not computational) solution to the frame problem.
Conceputally, given an initial labelled database and a sequence of actions to be performed, we model the sequence
by another labelled database; the database obtained by adding the results of the actions to the initial database.
We label the additions appropriately. This idea will be pursued elsewhere. There are several such \non-monotonic"
solutions in the literature. This is probably the most general
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English Input:




move (a; c); move (a; tab)
Planning Logic LDS1
Figure 16.1:
From the logical point of view we are using the following principle, (see also Example 16.1.9):
 Abduction principles can serve as items of data in one database 0, being a pointer to
another database 1 where some computation is carried out jointly involving both databases
and the result is the abduced data item in 0.
Example 16.1.6 (Logic Programming Abduction) The abductive system in logic program-
ming can be schematically put into our form by making use of the way the Prolog pointer scans
the database. An abductive system has the form (; I; A), where  = (C1; : : : ; Cn) is a sequence
of clauses and literals, where I are the integrity constraints and where A is the set of abducible
atoms. This system can be translated into the following Horn clause database:
(0) C0 = Abduce on the goal by checking whether the goal is in A and whether when added it





We are now ready for our next conceptual step. If an abductive principle is to be considered
as a declarative item of data, say QAbduce , then what would be the meaning of
 ?! QAbduce
For the imperative interaction !QAbduce , the meaning is obvious, we simply apply the abductive
principle to the database and get a new database. However the query meaning of the abductive
principle is a bit more dicult to explain in general, and we may need to provide an explanation for
each specic case. For example, if the abduction prinicple abduces a formula B, then ?QAbduce
would mean ?B. This seems all right at rst sight, however, the problem here can be that the
abduction process by its nature tries to nd B's which are not available in the database and so
the answer to the query ?QAbduce will always be no. This is clearly unacceptable. We must seek
another meaning for the query.
Let us for the time being, accept only the imperative reading of !QAbduce . We can immediately
allow ourselves to write databases with clauses containing QAbduce in them. Let us see through a
few examples what this means.
Example 16.1.7 Let  = fQAbduce ^ B ! Dg. Think of the above as a database, and assume
the computation procedure to be Prolog like. We consider the following query
?D






Here we assumed that QAbduce yields B. Our database is similar, in this case, to the Prolog
database:
Assert (B) ^B ! D
Indeed, asserting is a form of unconditional abduction.
Example 16.1.8 [Abduction and Negation by Failure] From our point of view, negation by failure
is abduction. This point has also been made in [Eshghi and Kowalski, 1989]. However, we want
to make our position crystal clear to avoid confusion. We believe as stated in Chapter 1, that
abduction is a principle of reasoning of equal standing to deduction and that every logical system
is comprised of both proof rules and various mechanisms including abductive rules. This view
has developed through our interaction with the logics of common sense reasoning and our work in
natural language understanding [Gabbay and Kempson, 1991]. Negation by failure is not central
to our scheme, though it is an interesting example from our point of view.
We begin with a precisely specied proof system. The query ?Q can be algorithmically
checked. If the algorithm succeeds, the answer is yes. The algorithm may loop or it may fail. We
may be able to prove that for the particular ?Q, the algorithm must fail (eg in a case where
none of the rules can even be applied). In this case we can say ?Q nitely fails (relative to the
algorithm). Thus the notion of nite failure can be dened for any proof theoretic system.
Given a system, we can consider the following abduction principles which we call Fail(Q;B):
If ?Q nitely fails then abduce (or assert) B.
To make our example specic, let us choose a language and computation procedures. By an
atomic literal let us understand either an atom fp; q; r; : : :g or an abduction principle Fail(a; b) ,
where a; b are atoms. By clauses let us understand Horn clauses of literals. Goals are conjunctions
of literals. Thus we can write the following clauses:
1. q ^ Fail(a; b) ^ c! p
2. Fail(q; r)
3. a! Fail(b; b).
To explain the computational meaning, we will translate into Prolog. Ordinary Prolog is not ex-
pressive enough for our purpose, so we useN -Prolog [Olivetti and Terracini, 1991, Gabbay and Reyle, 1984,
Gabbay, 1985] with negation by failure, mainly because it allows hypothetical reasoning, ie em-
bedded implications.
We translate:
Fail(a; b) 7! (:a! b):
After translation, the database becomes:
1. q ^ (:a! b) ^ c! p
2. :q ! r
3. a ^ :b! b
which is meaningful computationally in goal directed N -Prolog, see also chapter 4, section 3.
A Horn clause with negation by failure of the form:
a ^ :b! c
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can be translated back into our abductive language as
a! Fail(b; c)
A Prolog goal of the form :a an be translated as Fail(a;?), ? is truth.
N -Prolog is not as expressive as our abductive language. In our abductive language we also
have the imperative meaning of
? Fail(a; b)
which means apply the abduction to .
This would correspond to
Assert (:a! b)
in N -Prolog. N -Prolog does not allow for that. The syntax is dened in such a way that we do
not get goals of the form ?(:a! b). The N -Prolog computation rule would require in this case
to add :a to , which is not meaningful.
The connection between abduction and negation by failure was observed in [Eshghi and Kowalski, 1989].
Since their abductive systems have the restricted form (; I; A) as described in Example 16.1.6,
they need to rewrite the Horn clause program into a more convenient form, translating the Prolog
:a as a and adding the integrity constraint:
a ^ a ! :
Example 16.1.9 (A Conversation between two Intelligent Databases) We have the logi-
cal means to allow for two LDS databases to negotiate and reach an understanding. Imagine
two databases S and H exchanging formulas continuously. At time n, the databases have evolved
through the sequences




H1 ; : : : ;
H
n :
At time n, database S sends a logical input ISn to database H and conversely, database H sends an












To continue and communicate we need action principles for sending the next input. This is
also part of our abduction scheme as hinted at in Example 16.1.5
16.2 Labelled abductive mechanisms
The basic deductive apparatus of LDS is a precise system of rules allowing one to show (or fail
to show) whether  `  , for  a data structure and   a goal structure. Most useful among the
goal structures is the unit structure of the form t : G. Thus for the purpose of explaining what
abduction is going to be in our framework, we assume that the notion of
 ` t : G
is precisely algorithmically dened, thus yielding a particular LDS system L. We now schematically
explain how abduction principles t into this framework. Consider a database , containing  : X
inside it, which we write as [ : X] schematically with t : X. Somewhere in the structure , 
is a label variable and X is a propositional variable standing for a w. For any particular choice
of X, and of  say the choice of  = 0 and X = A, [ : A] is a proper database.
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Suppose we want to prove a goal t : G. Then, for some (maybe none) ws Ai and labels i we
may have
[i : Ai] ` t : G
A principle of abduction
Abduce( : X)
is a computation (algorithm) that can choose one or more of the i and Ai above.
Of course for dierent G we get dierent i; Ai.
The importance of the above point of view is:
1. Databases can take abductive principles as part of their data, slotted at the right places.
2. The abductive principle is relative to the computation procedure and the rest of the database.
Thus when new data is put in, the abductive principle changes. We get a strong learning
component in the database.
An inductive principle is a special case of abductive principle which learns a rule A! B as opposed
to a fact. (atom q). Mathematically there is no dierence.
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